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Tins work, taken in conjunction with a previous one
&quot; On
Mr. Spencer s Formula of Evolution,&quot; must be regarded
as a criticism of the general logical construction of Mr.
Spencer s philosophical system. The writer is not opposed
to the author he criticises as regards the scientific doctrine
of evolution or natural development, so far as it is known
to us
; but he sees great blanks in the deductive treatment,
and great failures of explanation, which cause him to re
gard Mr. Spencer s presumed fulness of exposition as
merely illusory.
In so far as Mr. Spencer s work is viewed as an
attempt to show the a priori reasonableness of evolution
by gradual development already established in various
departments of science by a posteriori methods, it may
be held to have accomplished its object ; but in so far as
it claims to have put together a framework of thought
commensurate with all the sequences of the cosmos, it
must be considered a disjointed structure, from which as
yet several connecting parts are missing. And it will
be found that the deductive system which Mr. Spencer
attempts is so mystical in its fundamental ideas, as well
as so incomplete in its logical connections, that, regardedvi PREFA CE.
as a system of Philosophy, it is as vague as it is ill
constructed.
Thus, although the writer is fundamentally in sympathy
with the goal of Mr. Spencer s attempt, and although he
accepts the same a posteriori truths, he is nevertheless
compelled to criticise adversely the ambitious claims of
the system, with the faultiness of reasoning and general
bad workmanship entailed by the supposed accomplish
ment of the endeavour. Although it is important that
established truths should be frankly accepted, however
inharmonious with previous beliefs, it is equally important
that imperfections of theory should be freely acknow
ledged. The attempt to outrun the gradual growth of
knowledge by filling in every hiatus with theoretical ex
planations is a positive obstruction to the progress of
science.
Although the first principles of a science are the first
in logical order, they are generally the last in order of
discovery. They are arrived at by generalisations of ex
tended experience. They mark the attainment of true
scientific inductions, and manifest their correctness by the
explanations they are able to afford. They enable us to
discern the coherence of large classes of facts, and give
us the power to forecast a line of sequences whereby
we may direct them to the accomplishment of desired
ends, or shape our actions to those coming events which
are beyond our control. As an instrument of discovery,
first principles are of very little value, and, on account of
the many chances of error, and of the fascination which the
idea of a completed system exercises over the imaginationPREFA CE. vii
of great minds, the search after them has been fruitful of
error.
The present undertaking, therefore, is to be regarded
not as an attack upon the evolutionism of Lamarck, nor as
an attack upon the evolutionism of Lyell or Darwin, nor
yet upon the evolutionism of Spencer as regards the de
velopment of intelligence, but as an attack upon the
theory which attempts to combine all these into one con
tinuous process. Moreover, the criticism is not made
upon the ground that such a theory, in the nature of
things, cannot be established, but that as yet it is not
established, and that in the endeavour towards its ac
complishment Mr. Spencer fails. It may even be asserted
that there is not anywhere discernible the probable or
possible grounds of such an universal connection of se
quences.
The writer finds himself in accord with Mr. Spencer in
maintaining that any merely materialistic or mechanical
interpretation of the universe is beyond question insufficient
to account for what we find in it. He is not in accord
with him in supposing that the theory of the &quot;double
aspect
&quot;
is intelligible and capable of completing a logical
explanation. He is not in accord with him in supposing
that mysticism completes explanations partially effected
by intelligible methods. And he is not in accord with
him in his estimate of what can be accomplished by
means of the concrete factors he actually employs, more
particularly in the deductions of biology.
So curiously inconsistent is Mr. Spencer s position, as
at the same time that of the scientific man giving con-viii PREFACE.
crete explanations of concrete sequences, and that of the
mystic basing his explanations on symbolism, that the
whole course of the criticism may be taken as a vindi
cation of Mr. Spencer s final conclusion that :
&quot;
Matter, Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and z with
which we work our equations, and formulate the various
relations among phenomena in such way as to express
their order in terms of x, y, and z though I have shown
that the realities for which x, y, and z stand, cannot be
conceived by us as existing thus or thus without commit
ting ourselves to alternative absurdities.&quot; *
In the predicament thus described we actually find
ourselves whenever we pursue to their logical results
any of Mr. Spencer s formulas of explanation, if we
attach to the terms employed any definite meaning ;
and in this verdict of the author himself is to be found
the most potent vindication of the course of the present
criticism.
The present work may indeed be regarded as undertaken
in the interests of the purity of scientific thought, and for
the promotion of correct methods of scientific investiga
tion, by showing the futility of those methods which
anticipate the results of study, and by exposing the conse
quent abuses of logic and of words, more particularly in the
employrnentof the latter as more than merely representative
of certain concrete facts. This, and any actual clearance
of imperfect theory, constitute the only claim which the
present book may have upon the attention of the student.
To the higher claim of positive accomplishment it does not
* First Principles, p. 580.PREFACE.
aspire. The uses of criticism are negative only. Never
theless this subordinate task has its own place in the
elucidation of truth.
It is not to be expected that Mr. Spencer should reply
to these criticisms. The public will fully appreciate his
objections to the controversies attendant upon replies and
rejoinders, as well from their unsatisfactory results as
from the interruption of work which they entail. The
public will fully understand that silence does not imply
the lack of any answer to our positions, but that Mr.
Spencer is occupied with work having greater claims upon
his attention.CONTENTS.
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MR. SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF
KNOWLEDGE.
CHAPTEE I.
i. TJie Unification of Knowledge as the Main Object of
Mr. Spencer s Works.
MR. HERBERT SPENCER has published a number of volumes with
the evident intention of producing a considerable effect upon
the course of human thought. These volumes are full of sug
gestive thinking, and display in many respects great insight.
The amount of care and research involved in their production is
manifest, and their influence on modern thought, though vague,
is undoubted.
At the same time, it may be questioned whether that portion
of the public which has endeavoured to judge of Mr. Spencer s
undertaking without theological prejudice, and has in part
acknowledged his theories, has ever set itself thoroughly to
understand him, to judge of the consistency and coherency of
his works as a whole, to estimate properly his main endeavour,
and to range in their due places his subordinate tasks. That
such should be the case is not at all surprising, for the bias of
modern thought is all in Mr. Spencer s favour, and men naturally
prefer to have their thinking done for them, being pleased
when they find their own half-formed theories receive apparently
a full and cogent expression. Such, indeed, was the present
A2 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
writer s feeling ; but having set himself to explain Mr. Spencer s
works to a Philosophical Society, he found himself in the diffi
culties already set forth in a previous work and about to be
stated in this.
Now, it must be clearly borne in mind that Mr. Spencer s








Ethics,&quot; &c., are not inde
pendent treatises upon these different sciences, but unite in a
series as links in a continuous chain, forming one whole System
of Philosophy. The question therefore arises, what is the
main idea of Mr. Spencer s series of works ? what is his principal
purpose
? what is the one great object he has in view, to which
all these separate volumes are subservient ?
That the unification of knowledge is the set purpose of Mr.
Spencer s works appears, we think, open to no dispute. What
ever assertion we may make respecting other views of our author
which he may consider misapprehensions, we believe that he
will not shrink from acknowledging this intention as holding
the first and foremost place in his Philosophy. It is the ruling
idea of the whole work. It is the principal purpose he holds in
view throughout the exposition of his doctrines. He not only
sets it out plainly before his readers in commencing his labours,
but he refers to it throughout the whole series of volumes as
being the end, indeed, to which they subserve.
To make this clear, let us study the first chapter of the book
on The Knowable
(&quot; First Principles &quot;), entitled
&quot;
Philosophy
Defined,&quot; in which Mr. Spencer tells us what is Philosophy
and what are its aims. On p. 131 we find it stated that Philo
sophy is &quot;knowledge of the highest degree of generality;&quot; and
again we are asked
&quot; What must be the specific shape here
given to this conception ? The range of intelligence we find
to be limited to the relative. Though persistently conscious
of a Power manifested to us, we have abandoned as futile
the attempt to learn anything respecting the nature of that
Power; and so have shut out Philosophy from much of
the domain supposed to belong to it. The domain left is
that occupied by Science.
( Science concerns itself with the
coexistences and sequences among phenomena ; grouping theseMAIN OBJECT OF MR. SPENCER. 3
at first into generalisations of a simple or low order, and
rising gradually to higher and more extended generalisations.&quot;
Science includes the family of the sciences Mechanics, Physics,
Chemistry, Geology, Biology, Psychology, Sociology, Ethics, &c.
Philosophy is the knowledge constituted by the fusion of all
these contributions into a whole. Science consists of truths
more or less separated, and does not recognise these truths as





presume it must imply unification.
We are next shown the historical growth and organisation
of knowledge, from crude experiences embodied in particular
propositions, to general propositions embracing a large number
of experiences of a similar character. Some of the highest
triumphs of Science have been achieved when classes of pro
positions of diverse characters have been unified in a proposition
which has been able to embrace and express them all within
the meaning of its terms. Thus it is seen that the organisation
of knowledge is a building-up process ; we go from induction to
induction, ever reaching propositions of wider and more com
prehensive sweep, the busy thinkers of humanity bringing the
results of their labours to an edifice which mounts up pyramid-
wise towards the apex which shall crown the entire structure.
As each wider general proposition is formed, it will be seen
that the less-wide included propositions as well as isolated
particular propositions, become, as a mode of thought, corol
laries from that wider proposition./ It is true the wider pro
position itself has been reached inductively, and is justified
by original observations and experience, and by the successive
generalisations which led up to it ; but when it is once formed,
these in their turn become but corollaries of the more general
proposition,
i Such general propositions form the key to know
ledge, and enable us to foretell from given circumstances whole
series of events. We find expressed in them the law of the rela
tions of factors by which we are able to foresee a long course of
sequences. These are the truths and generalisations of Science
which constitute the triumphs of intellectual achievement. \J
What shall we say then ? Shall wo arrive at a time when
these larger truths shall themselves be comprehended in some4 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
still wider generalisation?, and may we eventually look forward
to the unification of all knowledge in a single proposition 1 If
so, the process must apparently be analogous to past methods.
We must build up to it by wider generalisations of the widest
scientific truths, and then we shall have a proposition from
which all others are seen to be corollaries, and from which all
future sequences can be deduced.
\^ Thus we see that the unification of knowledge must have a
double justification, and be capable of a double statement and
exposition. It must be the legitimate outcome of an inductive
or building-up process, and as a mode of thought it must be
embodied in a proposition from which, as corollaries, all the
included truths or propositions are deducible. This, then, is
the goal of Philosophy, and will be found to accord with Mr.
Spencer s teachings. \ After citing several instances in which
a single scientific formula expresses a large number of diverse
individual facts (which passages, for the fuller understanding
of the argument, should be carefully read), he continues (p.
133)=
&quot; And now how is Philosophy constituted 1 It is constituted
by carrying a stage further the process indicated. So long as
these truths are known only apart and regarded as independent,
even the most general of them cannot without laxity of speech
be called philosophical. But when, having been severally
reduced to a simple mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular
physics, and a law of social action, they are contemplated
together as corollaries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to
the kind of knowledge that constitutes Philosophy proper.
&quot; The truths of Philosophy thus bear the same relation to
the highest scientific truths that each of these bears to lower
scientific truths. ... It is the final product of that process
which begins with a mere colligation of crude observations,
goes on establishing propositions that are broader and more
separated from particular cases, and ends in universal proposi
tions. Or to bring the definition to its simplest and clearest
form: Knowledge of the lowest kind is un-unified knowledge;
Science is partially-unified knowledge ; Philosophy is completely
-
unified knoAvledge.&quot;
..MAIN OBJECT OF MR. SPEXCER. 5
Mr. Spencer goes on to a passage which seems to mean, that
if we frame an universal proposition, either rigidly by an induc
tive process not overstepping the bounds of actual knowledge,
or by consciously overstepping these bounds and forming a
hypothesis concerning the universal proposition, then we have
two forms of Philosophy in the one case the universal proposi
tion is the product of the induction, and in the other case it is
the means or instrument of exploration in the latter event it
must be justified by its agreement with experiences and the
amount of interpretation it accomplishes in expressing the rela
tions of sequences. Mr. Spencer would seem to imply that the
strictly inductive method, by never going beyond the bounds of
experience, is insufficient as a means of explanation, and we
must have recourse to hypothesis, so that, setting out with some
hypothetical universal truth, we judge of its merits by the results
the test being that its corollaries shall be found coincident
with the sequences of Nature.
Mr. Spencer, it may be remarked, does not say this explicitly,
but it seems to be what he attempts to say, and it is certainly
what he ought to say to make it conformable to his previous
reasoning. This is what he does say in the second paragraph
of 38 :-
\v
&quot; Two forms of Philosophy, as thus understood, may be dis
tinguished and dealt with separately. On the one hand, the
things contemplated may be the universal truths : all particular
truths referred to being used simply for proof or elucidation of
these universal truths. On the other hand, setting out with the
universal truths as granted, the things contemplated may be the
particular truths as interpreted by them.&quot; (Query, deduced
from them ?) &quot;In both cases we deal with the universal truths
;
but in the one case they are passive and in the other case active
in the one case they form the products of exploration, and in
the other case the instruments of exploration.
1 Y
However, our only object at present is to establish the fact
that Mr. Spencer s main purpose is the unification of know
ledge.
&quot;VVe see that he sets it down as the goal of Philosophy,
and we can only suppose, after this precise initial statement, that
not only the
&quot; First Principles
&quot; but all his other works are6 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
written with this end in view. We therefore propose entering
upon a broad examination of these works, with the purpose of
ascertaining how far they contribute to that end. But first we
will inquire as to the conditions of the proposed unification
itself.
2. The Form of the Unification of Knowledge.
What, then, must be the form of the unification of know
ledge? We hold that all knowledge is expressed in proposi
tions. All knowledge is of the relations of things or the rela
tions of sequences, and all coherent knowledge is expressed in
propositions of one sort or another. Firstly we have singular
propositions, next wider propositions, again propositions of a
still more general character, and finally perhaps universal pro
positions. But nothing is worthy of the name of knowledge
that cannot be set down in a proposition. Still more : nothing is
worthy of the name of a proposition, the terms of which do not
convey a distinct impression to the mind, the separate parts of
which have not distinct meanings and definite intelligibility. This
is indeed our experience in the actual progress of Science. / Scien
tific progress has been made by the formulation of science, that
is, by the framing of specifically knowable propositions, and it
is only when generalisations of thought have taken this definite
form that they have been entitled to a place in the organisation
of knowledge, and formed firm points for fresh departures. If,
then, the formation of Philosophy must be by a method analo
gous to that of Science, the outcome must have equally the
proper form of knowledge, and appear with clear intelligibility
in a proposition framed of definite terms. To say that it
should not so do is to say that we seek for the unification of
knowledge in non-knowledge and in other ways than the ways
of Science.
&quot; The answer to every question which it is possible to frame,&quot;
says Mr. Mill,
&quot;
is contained in a Proposition, or Assertion.
Whatever can be an object of belief, or even of disbelief, must,
when put into words, assume the form of a proposition. All
truth and all error lie in propositions. What, by a convenientFORM OF THE UNIFICATION. 7
misapplication of an abstract term, we call a Truth, is simply a
True Proposition; and errors are false propositions.&quot;
*
A proposition consists of three parts a subject, a predicate,
and a copula. What, then, should be the terms of an. unifica
tory proposition ? It must be all-embracing ; it must comprise
the cosmos. In order to do this our subject must be thus ex
pressed
: All existences, all sequences, or all existences and their
interrelations, or the interrelations of all existences
; the copula




arid the predicate will be the universal
truth which is to unify knowledge.
What then is the right method of procedure for framing this
universal proposition ? Can we reach it as the natural outcome,
by induction, of the present state of the sciences ? or does that
state justify us in framing some hypothetical proposition which
we can afterwards verify by the identification of its corollaries
with the course of nature, and thus cause it in its turn to assist
the inductive process, by enabling us to fill up the blanks in the
connections of the sciences 1 or must we start boldly with some
purely original hypothesis and try it on its own merits ? Evi
dently the former course is that justified by experience. We
must consider how Science leads see if we can frame a propo
sition in harmony with it, and then test it as described. This
is indeed the manner of Mr. Spencer, save that he refrains from
the rigid test of one definite proposition.
Nevertheless we are under the necessity of framing one, and
one only, and the first question that arises is whether we must
include in our subject
&quot; all existences
&quot; or only their interrela
tions 1 But since existences for the most part are compound
and had preceding histories, they must, according to Mr. Spencer
(&quot;First Principles,&quot; p. 541), be included in our proposition.
He says
:
&quot; It was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of
inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes
passed through by every existence in its passage from the
imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from the perceptible
to the imperceptible. If it begins its explanations with exist-
* J. S. Mill s Logic, vol. i. p. 21.8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
ences that already have concrete
&quot;
(Query, perceptible ?) &quot;forms,
or leaves off -while they still retain concrete forms ; then mani
festly, they had preceding histories, or will have succeeding his
tories, or both, of which no account is given. And as such
preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of possible know
ledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them falls short
of the required unification. Whence we saw it to follow that
the formula sought, equally applicable to existences taken singly
and in their totality, must be applicable to the whole history
of each and to the whole history of all.&quot;
This passage must be accepted with some modifications.
Evidently the perceptible and the concrete are treated as iden
tical. Evidently also the history of the passage of the imper
ceptible into the concrete or perceptible is beyond the pale of
knowledge and therefore of Philosophy, although Mr. Spencer
says here that it is the subject of possible knowledge. Also
the element of perceptibility, though a condition of an existence
being within knowledge, is not a condition of the independent
existence and order of nature. Several of these matters will
hereafter have to be discussed. In the meantime it seems evi
dent from the passage quoted that we shall have to include in
our subject
&quot; All existences and their interrelations ;
&quot;
the copula of course will be the word
&quot;
are,&quot; and the predicate
will be the ultimate truth.
And since this ultimate truth, whether it be a rigid induction
or of a hypothetical nature, must be subjected in the end to the
deductive test, the predicate must commence with the words
&quot; corollaries
of,&quot; which for convenience we shall hereafter incor
porate with the copula, leaving the final or ultimate truth to be
expressed in the predicate as the problem for investigation.
3. Mr, Spencer s Unificatory Predicates.
In seeking the requisite proposition, we shall pursue a rather
mixed method
; for while our main object will be the ascertain
ment of Mr. Spencer s opinions, we shall find it more convenient
to consider all the varieties of predicates which could be em-THE UNIFICATORY PREDICATES. 9
ployed to make our proposition complete. As to Mr. Spencer, he
seems to forget that unificatory implies oneness. He has quite
a number of universal truths, and no doubt there are a number
of universal truths; but when, as in 38, he speaks of inter
preting things by means of universal truths in the plural,
where is the unification ? Surely there must be one ultimate
truth from which even the universal truths are derivable. And
from this initial confusion we never get clear. Throughout Mr.
Spencer s works we are continually finding that something or
other is a corollary from some of the ultimate truths
; but this
does not constitute an unification of knowledge it is only a
partial unification, which falls short of the goal of Philosophy.
These universal truths have to be unified.
Further, we find that Mr. Spencer nowhere sets down his
proposed unifications in the distinct form of a proposition.
Whatever ideas he may have, or whatever opinions he may wish
to convey, as to what precisely does constitute the unification
of knowledge, he does not put them down anywhere in the
form of a distinct proposition, but leaves us to gather his
opinions in an indistinct manner from incoherent statements
scattered here and there throughout his works. And if we
set ourselves the task of gathering these opinions for the pur
pose of completing our unificatory proposition by furnishing it
with a predicate, what do we find? We find that quite a
variety of different methods of the unification of knowledge are
taught by Mr. Spencer
! In studying these in detail, we see
that they arrange themselves into six classes, which we may
call the Mystical, the Psychological, the Physical, the Meta
physical, the Supraphysical, and the Symbolical. And if we
make good our criticism, what becomes of Mr. Spencer s unifi
cation of knowledge ?
4. The Mystical Methods of the Unification of Knowledge.
One of the first requisites in the treatment of a complicated
study is the collection of all the material that properly appertains
to it, and the demarcation of all that is extrinsic. It is, there
fore, with great satisfaction that the student observes Mr.io SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Spencer adopt this precautionary method in distinguishing
between the proper objects of study and those speculative and
shadowy subjects upon which so much human energy has been
absolutely wasted. Mr. Spencer very properly holds these in
quiries in contempt, like others before him, and teaches that
modesty of thought which is the characteristic of the true man
of science, retaining his attention within the bounds of the
Knowable, and so restraining his thought that his energy is ex
pended in useful organisation within the actual limits of know
ledge, instead of wasting its force in useless nights into the
regions of the Unknowable. This satisfaction, however, is but
of short duration ; for the student finds, after making this
mental effort to clear the ground of extraneous speculative
growth, and after preparing himself for the masterly task of the
co-ordination of all that is knowable under the guidance of his
new teacher a task he contemplates with great zest and satis
faction that all the work is spoiled by the re-introduction of
that Unknowable which had just been repudiated. For in the
book on the Knowable the Unknowable is always presenting
itself. It meets one at every turn, and each important term
is a back-door into the Unknowable. Elaborate results of
careful structure are vitiated by continual references to the un-
knowability of the factors employed.
This is a fundamental defect in Mr. Spencer s exposition of
his philosophy, and calls for serious attention, since he is ap
parently conscious of the fact himself, and is prepared to justify
it. We ourselves, in our study, fully understood that when we
had reached the end of the book on the Unknowable we had
done with it for ever ; and that is why, in all our subsequent
studies of the book on the Knowable, we so persistently ignored
it, and held that we had to deal with terms and propositions of
a knowable character, and having definite values only.
It is not necessary for our present purpose, although we
are engaged in pointing out this great fundamental defect
of exposition, that we should enter fully into the study of
the Knowable and the Unknowable, but it is necessary that
we should illustrate the nature of the distinction, so as to
lead up to and make clear our point of criticism. TheTHE MYSTICAL METHODS. n
general subject of the limits and conditions of human know
ledge receives attention in some of the following sections
of this chapter, and also in sect, i of chap. ii. For our im
mediate design, let us consider our knowledge of oxygen and
hydrogen. What do we know of these two substances 1 We
turn to a book on chemistry, and find all their several pro
perties or attributes fully set out. We find that oxygen has
certain definite properties, without which it would cease to
be oxygen as we know it ; and when we speak of oxygen,
it is this indissoluble set of attributes that we refer to. We
mean no less than this. Do we mean anything more? Cer
tainly not. All we mean by oxygen is a bundle of attributes
or properties. Curiosity asks,
&quot; What ties this bundle together ?
What is the nexus ?
&quot;
(for these questions always sound more
impressive in Latin).
&quot; What is the substratum upon which
all these properties are built? What is the nature of the
substance or matter in which all these attributes inhere ?
&quot;
Well, we do not know, and we do not see why such a ques
tion should be asked at all. The question derives its point
from the further question,
&quot; In what respect does this nexus
or substratum differ from that of hydrogen, so that the latter
ties together another and different set of attributes?&quot; No
doubt, if we could understand this and the further distinc
tions between all the other elements, it would enormously
extend the boundaries of science ; but this is held to be un
knowable, and certainly is unknown. //Actual knowledge is
limited to the ascertained properties of oxygen, hydrogen, and
the rest, and it does not pertain to the realms of science to say
anything at all about the nexuses and the substrata. Our
knowledge is precise, clear, definite, and without any confu
sion ; we know in chemistry what we are talking about. Chemi
cal science, indeed, is so far advanced that the laws of atomic
combination are set forth. Under Mendejeleef s law, the dis
covery of a new element was predicted ; and, as in the cele
brated case of the planet Neptune, it was looked for and found
taking its place in an orderly series.
Let us suppose now that since we cannot understand the
nexus or substratum of oxygen and hydrogen, they are there-12 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
fore to be regarded as differentiated manifestations of an Un
knowable Power, we would ask, Does this add to our know
ledge of oxygen or hydrogen taken singly 1 We would also
ask, Does it add to our knowledge of them taken together, or
taken in their interrelations 1 It cannot be said that it adds
any information or increases our knowledge of them one iota.
If any one chooses to assert this theory, we may be willing to
admit the truth of it we are scarcely in a position to deny it
but when we come to look at our question in the dry light of
reason, we are bound to confess that the Unknowable Power
which manifests itself thus and thus does actually manifest
itself thus and thus, no more and no less, and is actually
known to us as thus conditioned. This is the material with
which Science deals, and to which Philosophy, taken as the
unification of the sciences, must be rigidly confined. The
\mification must be accomplished within the bounds of know
ledge
: if the unknowable is mixed up in it over and beyond
the known conditions as a factor, but a factor of unknown
value then the whole organisation or co-ordination of the
sciences is vitiated and comes to nought. Hence it appears to
us that the question as to the nature of the nexus or substratum
of matter is quite as much beyond the purview of philosophy as
it is of science, and does not affect the consideration of our
studies in the least. I
Mr. John Stuart Mill may here be cited as giving the weight of
his reasoning to the same effect. He acknowledges the unknown
cause, but disclaims it as holding a place in the truths of science
or philosophy. In his
&quot;
Logic,&quot; chap, ii., 7, there is a very
excellent discussion of the metaphysical questions concerning
the nature of
&quot;body.&quot; It would carry us beyond our present
object to discuss these questions here. It is only requisite to
note that Mr. Mill admits the unknowability of the substratum
of matter, or of the laws of the differentiation of the attributes
of matter, and also the unknowability of the substance of mind.
&quot;
Body having now been defined the external cause, and
(according to the more reasonable opinion) the hidden external
cause, to which we refer our sensations ; it remains to frame a
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this be difficult. For as our conception of a body is that of an
unknown exciting cause of sensations, so our conception of a
mind is that of an unknown recipient, or percipient, of them ;
and not of them alone, but of all our other feelings. As body
is the mysterious something which excites the mind to feel, so




Thus, then, as body is the insentient cause to which we are
naturally prompted to refer a certain portion of our feelings, so
mind may be described as the sentient subject (in the German
sense of the term) of all feelings ; that which has or feels them.
But of the nature of either body or mind, further than the
feelings which the former excites and which the latter expe
riences, we do not, according to the best existing doctrine, know
anything ; and if anything, logic has nothing to do with it, or
with the manner in which the knowledge is acquired&quot; (p. 82).
This seems to correspond with the Unknowable Power of
Mr. Spencer, which manifests itself to us and in us in various
ways. We ask again, What is the value of such a power in a
system of knowledge 1 How does it affect the organisation of
knowledge
? If it is placed out of the sphere of the knowable,
how can it have any place in the endeavour to systematise
knowledge
1 If it has not, then let it for ever be banished
from our minds in the attempt
: if it has, and yet we are unable
to fix it in our minds in its mode of operation, then we have
mere mysticism, and not science at all.
Mr. Mill proceeds to say, when discussing the import of pro
positions, p. 134, that although they deal with phenomena
and their relations, yet indirectly they deal with the sub
strata which are the hidden causes of phenomena. Never
theless all they assert of these is their mere existence, and all
their value, influence, and efficacy are summed up in the knoAv-
ledge of the phenomena in which they manifest themselves.
In actual practice the so-called substances may be completely
ignored
: their only place is that of verbalisms in a logical clas
sification.
&quot; In the first place, sequences and co-existences are not only
asserted respecting Phenomena : we make propositions also14 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
respecting those hidden causes of phenomena which are named
substances and attributes. A substance, however, being to us
nothing but either that which causes, or that which is conscious
of, phenomena ; and the same being true, mutatis mutandis, of
attributes
; no assertion can be made, at least iritli a meaning,
concerning these unknown and unknoicable entities, (beyond their
mere existence,) except in virtue of the Phenomena by which
alone they manifest themselves to our faculties.&quot;
Thus we see that Mr. Mill agrees with Mr. Spencer in his
acknowledgment of the Unknowable, but consistently rejects it
from the list of things respecting which any proposition can be
made.
To make our case more clear, let us take Mr. Spencer s own
illustrations of the office of Philosophy at p. 132 of &quot;First
Principles.&quot;
&quot; If we ascribe the flow of a river to the same force which
causes the fall of a stone, we make a statement, true as far as
it goes, that belongs to a certain division of Science. If, in
further explanation of a movement produced by gravitation in
a direction almost horizontal, we cite the law that fluids subject
to mechanical forces exert re-active forces which are equal in
all directions, we formulate a wider fact, containing the scientific
interpretation of many other phenomena ; as those presented
by the fountain, the hydraulic press, the steam-engine, the air-
pump. And when this proposition, extending only to the
dynamics of fluids, is merged in a proposition of general dyna
mics, comprehending the laws of movement of solids as well as
of fluids, there is reached a yet higher truth
; but still a truth
that comes wholly within the realm of Science.&quot;
This is followed by a second series of illustrations, ending in
the law of the relation between the amount of heat and the
amount of molecular change, and by a third series, drawn from
the phenomena of sociology, and ending in the law that each
man seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallest
efforts.
Now it is quite clear that the several individual instances
xipon which these generalisations are founded, as well as all the
subsidiary generalisations leading up to the wider ones, areTHE MYSTICAL METHODS. 15
matters of clear knowledge. If we add that they are all diffe
rentiated manifestations of an Unknowable Power, we know no
more about them than we did before, and we do not more clearly
understand the nature of their interrelations as a whole.
Mr. Spencer says of them that
&quot; so long as these truths are
known only apart and regarded as independent, even the most
general of them cannot, without laxity of speech, be called
philosophical. But when, having been severally reduced to a
simple mechanical axiom, a principle of molecular physics, and
a law of social action, they are contemplated together as corol
laries of some ultimate truth, then we rise to the kind of know
ledge that constitutes Philosophy proper, f The truths of Philo
sophy thus bear the same relation to the highest scientific truths,
that each of these bears to lower scientific truths, &c.&quot;
^ It is thus seen that even when we reach Philosophy it is still
within the limits of the knowable it is merely Science extended.
Extended it may and indeed must be to its furthest limit
pushed out to its most extreme boundary but it is still Science.
It is a pity, indeed, that it should be called anything else but
Unitative Science, for when we get to speaking of Philosophy
the mind begins to soar., / Philosophy is the intoxication of
Science rather than Science itself ; it sees visions, dreams dreams,
grows poetic, prophetic, religious, and, by exciting the moral and
spiritual emotions of our nature, causes us to lose the calm, clear,
and cold apprehension of knowable things which is the character
istic of Science. In this respect we do not say that Philosophy
is wrong, nor that its broadest views should not so affect us.
The consideration of this subject, indeed, we hope to take up in
a future work ; but in the meantime, having firmly settled our
selves to the task of unifying knowledge under Mr. Spencer s
guidance, we never intend to allow ourselves, while engaged in
tin s special undertaking, to get off our feet or stray away from
the knowable. So that when Mr. Spencer says he looks for the
unification of knowledge in the derivation of the three scientific
truths already specified, as corollaries from some ultimate truth,
we can only understand him to mean that this ultimate truth is
arrived at first inductively, that it is intelligible (that is to say,
knowable), and then that it can be used deductively. If we go1 6 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
on to say that this ultimate truth is a manifestation of the un
knowable, we do not add to our knowledge by saying so. The
ultimate truth must express what we know in the first instance,
and if any one likes to say that it also expresses what we do
not know, in that it, like all other truths, is a manifestation
of the unknowable, he does no harm and he does no good,
regarding the matter in its purely scientific aspect. Its value
depends upon its validity as an ultimate induction, and upon its
capacity for deductive interpretation.
We see, therefore, that the unification of knowledge must
be effected within the limits of the knowable, and we expect
this from Mr. Spencer when he so deliberately sets apart the
unknowable and the knowable for separate treatment.
Nevertheless, the book on the Knowable is pervaded by
references to the Unknowable Power. Now either the Unknow
able Power puts itself wholly into the bondage of conditions or
manifestations, or it does not, and the quantity remaining so
unconditioned is constant or variable. If the Unknowable
Power wholly manifests or conditions itself, then the Unknow
able Power is wholly known in its manifestations, and these
known, it may be ignored. But this will be the case also if that
which remains unconditioned and unmanifested never interferes
with that which is conditioned and manifested. If, on the
other hand, it does so interfere, then it becomes matter of know
ledge, in so far as thus manifested
; but the unification of
knowledge in this case is not possible, for the elements of know
ledge are of a variable character. So that in the one case all
references to the Unknowable Power are confusing and illegiti
mate, and in the other case the task of unification is utterly
hopeless. Still more is this the case if it does interfere in ways
that are unknowable by us.
This is Mr. Spencer s actual treatment of his subject. He
defines matter (chap, iv.), he explains motion (chap, v.), he says
what he means by the term
&quot;
force&quot; (chap, vi.), in their scientific
meanings, and he also treats of all of them in chap. iii. Yet
the two former, viz., Matter and Motion, are but modes of the
latter Force, and by the latter we mean the
&quot;
persistence
of some power which transcends our knowledge and concep-THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 17
tion. The manifestations, as occurring either in ourselves or
outside of us, do not persist ; but that which persists is the
unknown cause of these manifestations. In other words, assert
ing the persistence of force is but another mode of asserting an-
unconditioned reality, without beginning or end.&quot; And as at the
commencement, so at the end of his work, Mr. Spencer holds
the same opinions. On pp. 557, 558, he reiterates the doctrine of
an Unknowable Power which works in us certain effects.
&quot; These effects have certain likenesses of kind, the most
general of which we class together under the names of Matter,
Motion, and Force
; and between these effects there are likenesses
of connection, the most constant of which we class as laws of
the highest certainty.&quot;
But we submit that those laws which come within the scope
of Science are just as valuable to us, and are not in the least
augmented or diminished in value by the acknowledgment of
an Unknowable Power behind them, of which they are but
manifestations. And the writer who introduces an Unknow
able Power in the unification of the Knowable is responsible
for misleading students not sufficiently wary to understand
that this Unknowable Power, whatever may be its value in
moral and emotional aspects, is of no effect whatever in this
particular purpose.
If we say, then, that a stone thrown from an eminence will
fall to the ground, and we can formulate the law by which
its motion is effected, so as to be able to calculate the time it
will take to reach the ground, we are not much wiser if some
philosopher tells us that the fall is effected by some Inscrutable
Power. &quot;We find no reference to an Inscrutable Power in any
treatise on mechanics or chemistry.
&quot;We make no allowance for
it in the actual construction of machinery, guns, ships, buildings,
&c., nor in any of the processes of manufactures. These only
recognise scrutable or knowable powers. And as in the smaller
so in the greater matters of Science ; it is just as evident that
an inscrutable power which manifests itself thus or thus is
known by, and limited by, its known manifestations, and the
unification of knowledge is to be effected within the limits of
actual knowledge only.1 8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
It is true that some of the language of Science, in the imper
fection of our knowledge, consists of words acknowledging
powers ; and the laws of their action being only partially known,
the greater stress of meaning belongs more to the former than to
the latter. But this is an evidence of our ignorance rather than
of our knowledge. As knowledge increases the defect will pass
away. Thus we now speak of the law of gravitation, and care
nothing about the powers or attractions of which it is the law.
We speak of the laws of motion and laws of chemistry simply
as the formulas of the action of unknown powers, but care
nothing about those powers when we are able to formulate their
laws. Thus in the growth of knowledge the remaining terms
expressive of powers will give place to propositions expressive
of laws of action. In the same way some of the scientific or
pseudo-scientific words which Mr. Spencer uses viz., equilibra
tion, polarity, &c. now express meanings in which the acknow
ledgment of unknown powers is expressed ; but when we are
able to formulate their laws, the laws will be everything and
the powers nothing. So to speak, as the knowable advances the
unknowable recedes, or becomes of less account.
In any case, the unknown and the unknowable can never
explain or unify the known. To attempt to do so is mysticism ;
and one of the many phases of Mr. Spencer s work is mysticism
of the character just explained. , The unification of knowledge
effected is an unification within the lines of Science as far as
we can go, and then the final unification is an act of mental
despair in the unification by means of an Unknowable Power.
Before it, all is one
; in it, one is all. Out of it, all proceeds ;
into it, all go. It is the unity of processes ; all things and their
interrelations are but manifestations of it. The question is, Does
anybody understand this 1 and if so, to what object and in what
manner is the valuable information to be applied
1 The test is
in the application. Mr. Spencer has omitted inorganic evolution.
He has subjected himself to criticism in biological evolution, and
it will be seen, when we come to criticise it, that the interpreta
tions, whatever value they may have, are not derived from the
Unknowable Power, but from certain known manifestations of it.
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with a certain number of words and phrases which are capable
of being understood in a variety of different meanings ; and it
will be found in the present criticism that under the various
sections thereof we shall have to treat of the same words. The
reason is that they bear different senses under each head. Thus
the word Force may be used in a mystical sense, in an abstract,
physical, or symbolic sense : and our examination will be rather
one of different systems founded upon these different senses
of the same terms than one dealing with differently expressed
systems of Philosophy.
The sense Ave have now to deal with is that which takes them
all to be but expressions for manifestations of an Unknowable
Power, and invests them with a mysticism derived therefrom,
seeming to confer upon them a greater aptitude for explanation
and for the unification of knowledge than they would possess
if the idea of an Inscrutable Power behind them were not pre
sent to the mind. This is mysticism, and it means that what
we do not know is the explanation of what we do know. We
have found in various instances that the value of terms, pro
positions, and scientific laws is derived from what is knowable
in them, and that their value is not in the least affected by the
addition of an Inscrutable Power. Mysticism is an attempt to
read into these terms, propositions, and laws a value derived
from this attribution to them of an Unknowable Power as their
cause or manifestation. We deny the validity of the attempt in
general, and we shall have to examine some instances in detail.
There are various forms of Mysticism, according to the
education or natural bias of individual minds. They are the
Religious, the Metaphysical, and the pseudo-Scientific forms.
What is common to them all is the recognition of an Inscrutable
Power at work in the cosmos. They diifer in respect to what
is read into this Inscrutable Power, according to the convic
tions, the reasoning, or the sentiment of individuals. The
Inscrutable Power derives its value in human interests from the
manner in which it is regarded, for this is the bond of relation
it has with humanity. What should be the attitude of the
human mind towards it whether it should be regarded as an
Intelligent Divine Being, or as Self-Determining Being, or as2o SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
an Unknowable Force we reserve for discussion when we
come to consider Mr. Spencer s Ethics. All we are concerned
with at the present time is to see how Science and the process
of increasing generalisation of knowledge which ends in unifica
tion is affected by this method of treatment.
The widest of all generalisations, according to Mr. Spencer,
is
&quot; the Persistence of Force ;
&quot; so that the unification of know
ledge is effected when we are able to say
&quot;All existences and
their interrelations are corollaries of the Persistence of Force.&quot;
The Persistence of Force may be taken as a scientific, that
is to say, a knowable phrase, and one that has a limited and
definite meaning, arrived at in the process of inductive science-
building, of which we have before spoken ; and, in this respect,
it does not properly come on for discussion under our present
heading of the Mystical, but will have to be considered under
the head of the Physical Methods of the Unification of Know
ledge. But seeing that Mr. Spencer refuses to be tied down to
any definite meaning which may be attached to the term, and
repudiates as misrepresentations any conclusions deduced from
attaching any definite meaning to it, and since he states, in the
most emphatic manner, that all he means by the term Force
is, that it is a symbol like the algebraical &quot;z,&quot; we are bound
not to consider this method of the unification of knowledge
among the physical methods of the unification of knowledge,
because in these methods we are obliged to give definite mean
ings to the terms we employ. We shall, of course, in order to
make this an exhaustive criticism, so consider the proposition ;
but, in the meantime, what is the value of the proposition if
the term &quot;force&quot; is regarded merely as a term deriving its value
not from processes of induction, but from these plus an Unknow
able Power?
It is to be presumed that the proposition can have no value
if the term &quot;force&quot; has no meaning. Therefore it must when
it is used have some indistinct meaning. It must be half under
stood or it must be changeable and mean something sometimes,
or sometimes have one meaning, sometimes another. This is
the only way to get anything out of it, to mean something when
we pronounce it, or to make it a . principal term in an all-THE MYSTICAL METHODS. 21
comprehensive proposition applicable to all the interrelations of
existences.
From the foregoing two things are evident. Firstly, that in
the scientific progress from, un-unified knowledge to partially
unified knowledge, and to still more unified knowledge, the
process is a truly scientific one from first to last ; that is to say,
the general propositions, though wide, are still definite they
have true meanings are intelligible, and of practical worth in
actual application. (
v
Knowledge never by any process of induc
tion oversteps itself into the Unknowable ; it builds with solid
bricks, and never makes an archway into thin air. It is obvious
that the ultimate truth of Science which is to unify its compo
nent parts if indeed such an end can ever be attained must be
within the scope of knowledge and not beyond it. \ The induc
tive process does not end in mysticism. Mysticism is some
thing added. If Science can proceed a certain distance and no
further, and if it then says, Beyond this I cannot go, it simply
owns its own incompetence. It may recognise mystery beyond,
but this recognition of an Inscrutable Power beyond it is not
an unification of knowledge but a confession of defeat. If in
duction ends in the vague recognition of an Inscrutable Power,
all well and good ; it may have a value, but that value certainly
is not in the unification of knowledge.
l( Secondly, it is clear that there can be no deductive process
from a proposition the terms of which are uncertain or even
positively stated to be inconceivable.) \ What are the corollaries
of blank? what are the corollaries of Force or the Persistence
thereof if Force is an Unknowable Power ?
The deductive problem is from the phrase
&quot; Persistence of
Force,&quot; regarding the latter word as untranslatable into any
definite conception, or regarding it as known forces plus the
attribution of unknowable power, to draw7 a series of corollaries
which correspond to and will be a picture of all the changes of
the universe from the commencement, i.e., from undifferentiated
Force. This is clearly impossible. It may be said that Mr.
Spencer nowhere advances such a proposition. We are unable
to decide exactly, yet his language sometimes looks very like
it. If he does, then our criticism applies. If he does not, then22 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
what he really means will no doubt receive examination in one
of the other sections.
There are other unificatory propositions of Mr. Spencer s
relating to Matter, Motion, &c., which are apparently of definite
meaning, and which we shall so consider later on in our
work, but which also he transforms into mystical proposi
tions when the exigencies of criticism force him to do so. They
are not only Matter and Motion as we know them, but since
they are manifestations of an Unknowable Power they are
supposed to possess a value in thought over and above this
knowable value, and in this case the same remarks apply.
Scientific induction may place them beyond knowledge, but
deduction can get nothing out of them.
What shall we say again to the proposition
&quot; All existences
and their interrelations are corollaries of the Unknowable
&quot;
1
Only this, that the proposed deductive process would be a sheer
impossibility. Not that Mr. Spencer proposes this in clear
words, but it is what any universalistic proposition amounts
to of which the predicate admits in any form an Unknowable
Power as a factor in the process of reasoning.
We come to the conclusion, then, that in Mysticism, that is to
say, those methods of the unification of knowledge the terms of
which are held not merely to connote the included facts of induc
tion, but something added of an unknowable character, although
it may be the final attainment of human research, we do not
reach the final goal of Philosophy the unification of knowledge
but rather an acknowledgment of the futility of the endeavour.
&quot;VYe conclude also that any proposition in which the predicate
contains some term which is merely a sign or symbol standing
for the Unknowable, of which we can form no adequate con
ception, is a proposition of the mystical order transgressing the
limits of true scientific induction, and utterly valueless as the
starting-point of a deductive process.
5. The Psychological Methods of the Unification of
Knowledge.
Mr. Spencer s representation of the means by which the
unification of knowledge may be effected varies with the natureTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS. 23
of his subject. In the &quot;Psychology&quot; \ve get quite a special
account of it indeed, several different accounts.
The continuity of our criticism will be best preserved by
noting here only the general conclusions of our study of the
Psychology
&quot; so far as they relate to the special object of our
present inquiry, namely, the unification of knowledge, leaving the
justification of our representations to a more detailed exposition
in chap. iv. Here we give merely a summary of that chapter,
in order to preserve a proportionate argument.




furnishes us with an interesting study of the endeavour to unify
knowledge by psychological methods, for there are several of
them. Apparently Mr. Spencer defeats his own object by pro
posing so many. Whether he does an injustice to himself or not
by failing to show that these various unifications can themselves
be unified, we do not know
; but holding ourselves that they
cannot be fused into a larger intelligible generalisation, we
believe them to be mutually destructive inasmuch as there can
only be one unification of knowledge. This is a fatal flaw,
independent of the failure of each separate unification, taken
on its own merits, to answer the requirements of the criterion
we hold continually before us, namely, that it must be both a
scientific induction including all other scientific inductions, and
a proposition from which as corollaries all existences and their
interrelations can be deduced.
The first conclusion we come to respecting Mr. Spencer s




is drawn from the reasoning leading up to the following passage,
extracted from 386
:
&quot; And it was further argtied ( 40), that setting out with
these fundamental intuitions provisionally assumed to be true
that is, provisionally assumed to be congruous with all other dicta
of consciousness the process of proving or disproving the con-
gruity becomes the business of Philosophy ; and the complete
establishment of the congruity becomes the same thing as the
complete unification of knowledge in which Philosophy reaches
its
goal.&quot;
We find it, therefore, clearly stated, first, that the goal of24 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Philosophy is the unification of knowledge ; secondly, that this
unification is accomplished when certain fundamental intuitions
are found to he congruous with all the other dicta of conscious
ness
; thirdly, that the business of proving or disproving this con-
gruity becomes the business of Philosophy.
Taking the passage by itself, one would say that as internal
relations are the product of external relations, or the establish
ment of correspondences between the internal in response to the
external; then the establishment of congruities between the
primordial correspondences, with all the other dicta of conscious
ness, must be a very simple process ; for it is only the establish
ment of congruities between the most general experiences and
the details of experiences. The result arrived at would be that
the details of which a whole is made up are parts of that
whole.
But letting this go by, what are the fundamental intuitions
with which all other dicta of consciousness have to be found
congruous, thus producing a harmony in which the unification
of knowledge is effected? Mr. Spencer does not enumerate them,
but the result of his ensuing reasoning is the establishment of
another and entirely different goal and method of Philosophy.
f\
&quot; That which Philosophy takes as its datum must be an
assertion of some likeness and difference to which all other
likenesses and differences are secondary. If knowledge is
classifying, or grouping the like and separating the unlike, and
if the unification of knowledge proceeds by arranging the
smaller classes of experience within the larger, then the pro
position by which knowledge is unified must be one specifying
the antithesis between two ultimate classes of experiences in
which all others merge.
&quot;(
The theory of this second method is: Since knowledge is classi
fication, the more complete the classification the more completely
unified is the knowledge, and the nearer we approach a philo
sophy. When, therefore, we have succeeded in comprehending
knowledge in two large classes, we can proceed no further; know
ledge is unified and philosophy has reached its goal. What,
then, are these two widest of all groups of experiences ? They are
the self and the non-self the faint and the vivid aggregates ofTHE PSYCHOLOGICAL METHODS. 25
experience. &quot;When these are properly demarcated, knowledge
is unified.
But we do not rest here. Another stage of the reasoning
carries us up to the Unknowable. From these considerations
we reach the datum or
&quot;
postulate that the manifestations of
the Unknowable fall into two separate aggregates, constituting
theAvorld of consciousness and the world beyond consciousness.&quot;
Is this, then, the fundamental proposition which has to be
found congruous with every result of experience, direct and
indirect, and which shall thereby fulfil the objects of Philosophy?
All knowledge can be divided into two classes that relating to
the Ego, and that relating to the Non-ego. &quot;When we have
come to this conclusion knowledge is unified, and these two
classes of knowledge are manifestations of an Unknowable
Power. But we have already found that no unification of
knowledge is to be found beyond the bounds of knowledge.
To look to the Unknowable for it is to produce mysticism, and
to transcend knowledge altogether.
These three thoughts are thus summed up by Mr. Spencer,
&quot;First Principles,&quot; p. 157
:
t\
&quot; In brief, our postulates are : an Unknowable Power
; the
existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the
manifestations of that Power
; and a resulting
*
segregation of
the manifestations into those of subject and object.&quot;
I /
This is the organised and consolidated conception, the primor
dial datum with which all the other dicta of consciousness have
to be found congruous, by means of which Philosophy accom
plishes its final unificatory process.
Our criticism upon this portion of Mr. Spencer s endeavour
to unify knowledge can only be that it is vague and meaning
less. That it is of such a wide and general character as to be
applicable to all knowledge is true enough, but general descrip
tions do not give an insight into the relations of sequences, nor
do they enable us to form propositions from which the inter
relations of all existences can be deduced. Shall we say that
the general description of mankind is that it segregates into two
classes, man and woman, and that this is an unification of the
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knowledge of humanity
1
? Or shall we add to our knowledge
by saying that they are different manifestations of the Un
knowable
1
? It is, indeed, the most general description of
the human race, surpassing all descriptions of form, feature,
colour, language, habits, civilisation; yet, although the largest
of possible inductions respecting mankind, how barren of deduc
tions! how little unificatory in its enunciation! how utterly
void of instructiveness as to the interrelations constituting the
history of the human race !
But again reverting to the requirements of the unification of
knowledge, let us inquire how far they are complied with in the
scheme before us. We have seen that to effect this unification
we must build up inductively till we are able to formulate one
widest of all propositions, which shall thereupon become the
starting-point for a series of deductions, which deductions shall
correspond with the actual history of the interrelations of all
existences. How is this requirement satisfied by the scheme
now under consideration 1 Let us first try to frame our proposi
tion, as thus
Subject.
&quot; AH existences and their interrelations
&quot;
Copula.





tlie segregation of the faint and vivid inani
mate truth). festations of the Unknowable.&quot;
With respect to it we can only remark, that we are unable
to see anything in it or to get anything out of it. And we
scarcely know, indeed, how to proceed with our deductive pro
cess. It does not seem that we can go direct from it to concrete
instances, such as the rise of mercury in the barometer or ther
mometer, or the union of oxygen and hydrogen into water, or
the hatching of an egg. We would therefore have to proceed
mediately. But how *? Would we first have to deduce matter
and motion as corollaries from the ultimate proposition? But
these are themselves merely symbolic terms, representing mani
festations of the Unknowable of which we can have no definite
conception, and presumably of the vivid order of manifestations.
Should we next have to deduce the indestructibility of the one
manifestation and the continuity of the other ? Should we have
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to deduce the instability of the homogeneous in order to reach
differentiations of matter and motion, and then could we hope
to deduce from the unificatory proposition, by a separate and
independent process of reasoning, the antagonistic principle of
equilibration, which would put them all back into homogeneity
again? Thus, it is suggested, we would arrive at the unifica
tion of all concrete experiences. We feel compelled, however,
to deny the logical connection of these propositions as deduc
tions from the unificatory proposition now under consideration,
and require a more distinct explanation.
This criticism would seem to render any further examination
of Mr. Spencer s unification of knowledge upon a psychological
basis unnecessary. However, we have pursued the inquiry in
great detail in Chapter IV., in order to do justice to our author
and to prevent the reader from straying from the one fixed
object of Philosophy when studying the
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; so that
in the -midst of multifarious changes he may keep steadfastly
in view the one real point and goal of all his studies. By this
method we shall see that, however rich Mr. Spencer may be in
suggestion, or however satisfactory and profitable may be the
minor studies in themselves, still he fails to satisfy the mind
in respect of the main object which he sets out to accomplish.
We must refer our readers to this chapter for an account of Mr.
Spencer s treatment of the so-called Final Question. All we
need do here is to say that it falls mainly within the lines of
the foregoing criticism. The principal additional thought brought
out in it is that the
&quot;
impression we call resistance .... is
the primordial, the universal, the ever-present constituent of
consciousness ;
&quot; and this consequently
&quot; becomes the mother
tongue of thought, in which all the first cognitions are regis
tered, and into which all symbols afterwards learned are inter-
pretable.
&quot;
It is difficult to know what to make of this in relation to the
foregoing proposition. Evidently Mr. Spencer would have us
believe that all manifestations of the Unknowable, both faint
and vivid, are ultimately resolvable into varieties of the impres
sion we call resistance. These varieties can only be differences
of degree, we presume. To be different in kind would be to
take them out of the classification. Besides, we know what28 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
is meant by differences of degree of resistances, but we could
have no conception of different kinds of resistances. Mr.
Spencer means to say then, that all our knowledge consists of
experiences of aggregates of differences of degrees of resistances,
and that all knowledge aggregates itself into two great masses,
one consisting of intense resistances (the vivid manifestations),
and the other consisting of slighter resistances (the faint mani
festations) ; also that all the manifestations of the Unknow
able take the form of the impression we call resistance, even
although there were no consciousness to be impressed, and that
between these two orders of impressions of resistance there is
no series of invisible gradations but a wide gulf fixed.
Are we then to form a new unificatory proposition according
to our new lights, and say that
&quot;All existences and their interrelations&quot;
&quot; are [corollaries of
]
&quot;
&quot; the segregation of faint and vivid manifestations of the
Unknowable, manifested in different degrees of
the impression we call resistance?
&quot;
Or shall we amend the predicate, and say
&quot; Are the segregation of aggregates of different degrees of
resistances or combinations of resistances ?
&quot;
The former is or would be a subjective unification of know
ledge, since it depends upon
&quot;the impression&quot; which a con
scious being has of resistance ; and therefore it does not seem
to be capable of forming a proposition from which the history
of the existence and interrelations of the objective world and
of times anterior to consciousness could be deduced. Th.3
deduction would have to be from the impression of resistance
and this manifestly could not be applied to objective history.
This is a fatal objection to all subjective methods for the
unification of knowledge. And since knowledge is the estab
lishment of correspondences corresponding to the correspon
dences of the environment, it is difficult to see how any
subjective method is competent to deal with the universe as a
whole in respect of the unification of the knowledge of it.
The second or altered form of the proposition would throw it
into the class of the physical methods of unification of know
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time, we must remark that mere resistance by itself would not
seem to be very fruitful of result. If each unit had merely the
power of self-protection mere resistance without any power of
attraction there would be no occasion for the resistance, for
there would be no encroachment, and we will see in due course
that we shall have to consider a system of mutual attractions
and resistances.
It is right to say that later on in the discussion of his theme
Mr. Spencer enters more minutely into the relations of conscious
ness to resistance. At the same time we do not see that his
subsequent treatment of the question saves him from the
criticism.
Mr. Spencer finishes this process of reasoning by a recourse
to the Unknowable Power, and thus throws the unification of
knowledge by the psychological method upon the mystical
method, subjecting it accordingly to the criticism applicable to
that form of argument.
We conclude this section by taking the three instances of
scientific unification given by Mr. Spencer at the outset to
see if they are capable of receiving the philosophical unification
there proposed by the method of this section, and by means
of the propositions we have found it necessitates. Eeferring to
&quot;First Principles,&quot; p. 132 et seq., we find the various motions of
a river, the fall of a stone, the action of a fountain, the hydraulic
press, the air-pump, and the various laws of movement of solids,
are all capable of expression in common laws of dynamics.
This is followed by a second series of illustrations, ending in
the law of the relation between the amount of heat and the
amount of molecular change, and by a third series, drawn from
the phenomena of sociology, ending in the law that each man
seeks satisfaction for his desires in ways costing the smallest
efforts. The question is, can we unify all these wide scientific
truths by deducing them as corollaries from the proposition that
&quot; All existences and their interrelations
&quot;
&quot; are [corollaries of
]
&quot;
&quot; the segregation of faint and vivid manifestations of the
Unknowable, manifested in the different degrees of
the impression we call resistance
&quot;
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We submit that Mr. Spencer s psychological methods will
not bear this severe logical test, nor any other manner of definite
and formal statement.
6. The Metaphysical Methods for the Unification of
Knowledge.
&quot;We have next in order to consider one of the most inveterate
of the idols of the intellect. There may possibly be a legiti
mate science of metaphysics, but all those sciences which admit
into their system objectivised abstractions are vitiated through
out by the influence of these figments. That student will be
wise who, in commencing any philosophical study, provisionally
at least repudiates all objectivised abstract terms from his
vocabulary. Particular terms representing particular phenomena
we know, and terms of totality representing groups or general
aspects of phenomena we know, but abstractions we do not
know, except as verbalisms for logical convenience.
Abstract terms have two separate origins. They may be,
firstly, general terms changed into the singular, or they may be
terms of relation or attribute generalised and put in the singular.
In every case it is essential to their due impressiveness that
they should have an initial capital letter, and sometimes they
are accorded the dignity of the definite article as The Absolute,
The Homogeneous, &c.*
We have already seen that if we speak of Oxygen or hydrogen
we know what we mean ; and if we speak of the sum of the
chemical elements, it is legitimate and indeed necessary to use
a general term or term of totality Matter; and we prefer
designating this class of terms by the name
&quot; terms of totality
&quot;
rather than by the name &quot;general terms,&quot; because it more
clearly indicates that they derive all their value from the par
ticulars summed up in them, and have no individual value of
themselves. We would have it clearly understood that the
general term in the singular number does not connote some
single existence of which it is the name, but a variety of par
ticulars which are thus represented for convenience. Thus, by
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using the word Matter, we can speak of all the various kinds
of matter included in the term in so far as a common predicate
is applicable. In this use, the term Matter is a well-understood
word, having a definite meaning. But another use is made of
it. We have already seen that we only know oxygen and
hydrogen as differentiated bundles of attributes or properties ;
that the law by which they are differentiated is inscrutable ;
that, if there is any substance in which they inhere, we cannot
possibly know anything about it ; and that, so far as we are
concerned, it might practically be non-existent, while as a part
of knowledge it is non-existent Nevertheless the term Matter
is applied to this figment of the imagination, and figures accord
ingly as a factor in various systems of metaphysics. In the
same way we know certain specific and particular attractions
and repulsions of bodies ; and we are not content with framing
a general term or term of totality for use when we wish to
predicate something which shall be applicable to all of them,
but when it is made, we speak of an individual entity which
seems to have objective existence Polarity. In the same way
the relations of distance give rise to the abstraction Space,
which is thereupon supposed to be an entity Time following
suit
; whereas there is no general space, but only special dis
tances, and no general time, but only particular relative intervals
of succession. Even the Positivist generalises human beings,
and then forms an abstraction called Humanity, which he erects
into an object of worship.
In a very singular passage, Mr. Spencer asks us to study the
instance of a piano.*
&quot; On thinking of a piano, there first rises in imagination its
visual appearance, to which are instantly added (though by
separate mental acts) the ideas of its remote side and of its
solid substance. A complete conception, however, involves the
strings, the hammers, the dampers, the pedals ; and while suc
cessively adding these to the conception, the attributes first
thought of lapse more or less completely out of consciousness.
Nevertheless, the whole group constitutes a representation of
the piano. Now, as in this case we form a definite concept of
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a special existence, by imposing limits and conditions in suc
cessive acts ; so, in the converse case, by taking away the limits
and conditions in successive acts, we form an indefinite notion
of general existence. By fusing a series of states of conscious
ness, in each of which, as it arises, the limitations and conditions
are abolished, there is produced a consciousness of something
unconditioned. To speak more rigorously
: This consciousness
is not the abstract of any one group of thoughts, ideas, or con
ceptions ; but it is the abstract of all thoughts, ideas, or con
ceptions. That which is common to them all, and cannot be
got rid of, is what we predicate by the word existence, &c.&quot;
It seems to us that the process which Mr. Spencer here
proposes is not possible. We cannot put ourselves into that
very unscientific frame of mind which is necessary for the
purpose. We cannot dissociate the ideas of dampers, pedals,
&c., from our conception of a piano. We feel that there is such
a correspondence between things and conceptions, that the only
way to fuse the various ideas connected with a piano into the
required indefiniteness of general existence would be by fusing
the piano itself into general existence by grinding it into dust,
and then we have no idea of a piano at all.
It is by thus quitting the actual limitations of things, and
undertaking impossible mental processes, that philosophers go
so far wrong, and lay themselves open to the sneers of men of
science. They make science get out of its actual conditions
like a ghost out of a body and then from the law of this pseudo-
science of the abstract they work down to the actual. Dis
sociating itself from all the inconvenient trammels of concrete
conditions, metaphysical philosophy completely ignores chemical
and physical science, and sets up in business on its own account.
But it thereby becomes merely a manipulation of words which
are not representative of any actual existence whatsoever.
Mr. Mill, in his chapter
&quot; On the Import of Propositions,&quot;
says
: *
&quot; The distinction between an abstract term and its correspond
ing concrete, is no difference in what they are appointed to
signify ; for the real signification of a concrete general name is,
*
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as we have so often said, its connotation ; and what the con
crete term connotes, forms the entire meaning of the abstract
name. Since there is nothing in the import of an abstract
name which is not in the import of the corresponding concrete,
it is natural to suppose that neither can there be anything in
the import of a proposition of which the terms are abstract, but
what there is in some proposition which can be framed of con
crete terms. ... It is impossible to imagine any proposition
expressed in abstract terms which cannot be transformed into a
precisely equivalent proposition in which the terms are concrete,
namely, either the concrete names which connote the attributes
themselves, or the names of the fandamenta of those attributes*
the facts or phenomena on which they are grounded.&quot;
All terms are originally concrete and refer to definite objective
or subjective existences. In the process of distinguishment and
classification which goes on from the first, plurals are introduced,
and by and by terms which are inclusive of a great number of
individuals come to be used. By and by, also, names are given
to those qualities or properties of objects which they severally
possess in common. Abstract terms are arrived at by both
methods. In the first case, the general term is individualised
and spoken of in the singular (for example, Man), as if the sum
total of a number of individuals could have an existence as a
separate entity, itself capable of being treated as an unity, and
taking its part as such in the interrelations of things. In the
other case, the property or quality dealt with becomes a power
(for example, Humanity or Polarity), taking its place as a
factor amongst other similar powers and amongst the objective
realities of the universe.
From this we see that there will be a great number of words
which have double meanings according as they are used as
general terms referring to a great number of individuals con
cerning which something is predicated, or as they are employed
to designate an imaginary entity which has no actual existence
in the cosmos. Further, if these terms are used in propositions,
ony proposition of which they form part must also have a
double meaning, and must be susceptible of a twofold inter
pretation, resulting in a changeful and uncertain import.
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In this case, the only resource is to consider the proposition in
either sense successively first as having a concrete general
reference, and next as requiring an abstract rendering.
This, then, is what we propose to do in the case of those
propositions of Mr. Spencer s which are framed in such terms
as may either be representative of general concrete facts or else
may be interpretable as pure abstractions. We shall seek clear
ness of thought by a separate consideration of the ambiguous
propositions which Mr. Spencer formulates, and shall inquire
whether they are sufficient under either aspect singly to unify
knowledge. If so, then the other aspect is superfluous ; and if
not, then the intermingling of the two does not effect the desired
unification.
Let us first, then, consider some of the abstract terms employed
by Mr. Spencer in his unification of knowledge Matter, Motion,
Space, Time, Force, Polarity, &c. The survey of Nature which
forms the basis of knowledge informs us of a great variety of
objects, differing in some respects, and in some respects resem
bling each other. Advancing Science, by a process of experiment
and analysis, resolves these objects into seventy or eighty so-
called elements, the properties of each of which it is able to
enumerate. What general name is to be given to the sum
total of these, so that when it is used we may know that it is
applicable to these elements, and that it is these alone which
are spoken of as actually existent? The general term so used
is
&quot;
Matter.&quot; But since they differ amongst themselves, they
can only be designated by this general term in respect of those
properties which they possess in common : then, by a strange
perversity, those properties which they have in common are
abstracted and regarded as an unity or entity ; and although this
abstract Matter, having extension with resistance, and nothing
else, is nowhere to be found, yet it is treated exactly as if it
were a real existence.
One of the most curious instances of the hold which an
abstraction has upon the human mind as an imagined existence
is the term Space. We have referred to it before. If there
is one thing of which people are certain, it is the existence of
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an abstract term derived from the experience of
&quot; distance
between.&quot; In just the same way the abstract term Time does
not represent any reality, but is derived from intervals of suc
cessions of changes in the relations of bodies. Some change
of relations of objects being taken as a standard say the rela
tions of movement of the earth and the sun then other
changes of relations are compared therewith, and the term
Time becomes a convenient word, but does not represent an
objective existence.
Motion is a general term relating to all motions, and ex
pressive of the change of positions of objects or the parts
thereof. It is not, and cannot be made to be, representative of
any individual objective existence. It is a convenient term to
use when treating of all motions, when we predicate something
which is applicable to all motions. It is not an objective entity,
nor a factor having actual existence.
We may have some difficulty in realising the terms Attraction,
Resistance, Polarity, Force, Equilibration, &c., in our minds as
general concrete terms, yet it must be still more difficult to assign
them any value as abstract terms. As concrete realities, we
may be able to understand the relations of various attractions,
repulsions, &c., and to make calculations respecting them which
shall come out correct, these attractions and repulsions being
in operation amongst and being part of the properties of the
seventy or eighty so-called elements. When we speak of them
in general terms, we are unable to divest our thoughts of these
concrete references. The terms ought to be merely sums-total of
concrete experiences. As to their being abstract entities, we
can have no conception of attractions and repulsions apart from
the concrete objects.
Therefore if Mr. Spencer should say (as indeed it would not
be unfair for the purposes of study to assume him to say) that
&quot;All existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Persistence of Force,&quot;
and the term Force is held not to be a general concrete term
but an abstraction, then it could be maintained that as an
abstraction it has no existence, neither has it properly any36 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
meaning dissociated in this way from all the concrete facts from
which it has been extracted.
Again, if we say that
&quot; All existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Formula of Evolution and Dissolution,&quot;
apart from the incongruities of thought involved in the state
ment, there is also this point relevant to the present issue
namely, the principal terms used therein (i.e., Matter and
Motion, considered as abstract terms) represent no existence.
There is no abstract Matter and no abstract Motion. There
are, it is true, the seventy or eighty so-called elements, which




undergo changes of relative position which are called &quot;motions;&quot;
the concrete hypotheses concerning both of which will be duly
considered in their proper place
: but if we choose to undertake
a purely mental process having no correspondence with reality,
and to manufacture an ideal matter and an entity called Motion,
we cannot argue from them as to the actualities of things, nor
unify our knowledge of them by means of these invented terms.
It is useless, therefore, to traverse the whole of Mr. Spencer s
series of propositions, and examine them in respect of their
adequacy as abstract terms to unify knowledge made up of
individual concrete experiences. If these terms are to be of
any use in such an endeavour, it must be as general terms or
terms of totality representing universal concrete facts never
quitting their reliance upon these facts, and never losing their
relation thereto. If deductions are to be made from this
generalised and abstractly stated knowledge, it must only be as
a convenient and mediate mode of deducing conclusions from
the vast number of original concrete facts.
Wo need have no scruple, therefore, in summarily quitting
this class of methods for the unification of knowledge, and of
proceeding forthwith to the direct method just indicated.THE PHYSICAL METHODS. 37
7. The Physical Methods for the Unification of Knowledge.
The subject we have now to consider is the endeavour to find
the goal of Philosophy within the limits of Science or the
actually known. As such a method is very narrow in its scope
and very rigid in its limits, we are not likely to be successful.
Kor do we apprehend that any philosopher could so limit him
self, nor that Mr. Spencer anywhere proposes to confine his
speculations within such narrow bounds. Everywhere we have
to frame hypotheses which go beyond the known, and this
mental reaching out into the unknown but not unknowable
region of theoretical science brings before us the considerations
treated of in our next section, entitled, the
&quot;
Supraphysical
Methods for the Unification of Knowledge.&quot; In actual fact, Mr.
Spencer s attempt, when it is not by the methods already dis
cussed, is a mixture of these rigid scientific and theoretical-
scientific methods
; and it must be admitted that the actual and
the theoretic are so closely interwoven that it is difficult to
distinguish them
; so that in result the actually known gives the
Aveight of its authority to the theoretic, and the latter throws
its all-including mantle over the universe in the guise of
authentic science. Therefore, without imputing to Mr. Spencer
any attempt to unify knowledge within the region of the actually
known, it will be useful to see how far the known by itself will
carry us on our way ; and the inquiry will also prove an advan
tageous preliminary to the study of the wider hypotheses treated
in the next section, which, indeed, derive all their authority,
whatever that may be, from the facts and generalisations of
actual science.
There are two general remarks to be made as to this class
of methods. The first is, that we expect to find strict intelli
gibility of terms. The physical sciences being built up from
observation and experience, the terms employed should always
carry with them exactness of expression, so as to be commen
surate with the experiences which are to be registered by their
means. Physical terms have definite and limited meanings, so
that when they are used, they are known to possess an exact38 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
value no more and no less. Their title to become true factors
in processes of reasoning is in so far as they represent actual
factors in the objective processes.
For example, there is no mistaking a treatise of mechanics,
nor the formulas therein contained. So also in the science of
chemistry, certain words or signs are symbols representing certain
facts or groups of facts actually existent in nature, and the
interrelations of groups of properties of a definite and known
kind.
Indefiniteness and error creep in when the mental process of
generalisation begins, which has no corresponding process in
the facts of nature themselves. This process may be a legiti
mate one to a certain extent and for certain purposes to the
end, that is to say, of ascertaining how far the same predicate
can be applied to large classes of facts but it requires constant
verification, and is good only so far as it is commensurate
with facts. It is, however, a dangerous process for general
terms when once established in the mind by repetition, and by
constant use in arguments and reasonings, are apt to assume a
false reality, as representing, not a collection of concretes, but
an unit which is an entity itself, and a factor not only in
thought but in nature. Thus we get the word
&quot;
matter,&quot; which,
from being originally nothing more than a collective term, sum
ming up the seventy or eighty so-called elements (the elements
themselves being nothing more than groups of properties), came
first to represent them in respect of those properties which
they all had in common, namely, extension and resistance, and
afterwards to represent a mysterious something which held
together these groups of properties an unknowable entity,
active and powerful, but beyond the ken of human sense or
insight.
There is, therefore, a twofold way in which Mr. Spencer s
physical class of methods for the unification of knowledge may
be regarded.
&quot;We may either take his general physical terms
as terms having a definite meaning and a value commensurate
with the contained physical or concrete experiences, and reason
therefrom, or we may regard them as general symbols. In the
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are calculable
; in the other case wo have imaginary entities,
things having an unity and powers founded upon these known
factors, but including something more than the totality of its
contents.
Now it is obvious that according to the way in which we
use these terms must be the result of our endeavours towards
the unification of knowledge. We venture to submit, with
due deference yet with boldness, that if we adopt the latter
course and seek our unification of knowledge in the formation
of a proposition which expresses the supposed relations of
general entities, which are themselves inconceivable and entirely
unrepresentable in thought, then we take our unification of
knowledge out of the bounds of the intelligible and throw it
into the class of the metaphysical methods which we dealt with
in the last section.
On the other hand, if we accept the physical terms as having
definite, limited, and intelligible meanings, then we have a course
of reasoning open before us which we can pursue clearly, and
which is open to criticism and intelligent treatment, whether we
can succeed in effecting an unification by means of it or not.
If we are asked which course Mr. Spencer actually pursues
in his work, we should answer, Both, although perhaps un
consciously. He does not clearly let his readers see firstly
what the one can effect and then what the other can effect,
but he proceeds in a conjoint fashion, so that when intel
ligible concrete matters are being dealt with, the one rendering
of the terms is given, and, when the exigencies of the case
surpass intelligibility or the powers of the human reason, then
the other aspect of the terms comes in, and is employed with
a certain air of collusiveness, so as to satisfy the eager desires
of the hasty reader, if not the critical judgment of the student.
It will be our task, having distinguished the different methods,
and having pointed out when terms lose their significance, so
as to become mystical or metaphysical, and thus to throw the
unification into the illegitimate class of methods, to set out in
detail the various physical methods proposed by Mr. Spencer,
and, after attaching to them every possible intelligible mean
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accomplish the object which he has set before our view. This
is the task we now propose.
The second general remark we have to make respecting the
physical class of unificatory propositions is, that they must
express a process.
There is nothing upon which Mr. Spencer insists more
strongly than that all sequences are parts of one process, and
that in the discernment of this process i.e., in the setting up
in the mind of a series of corollaries which shall be the counter
part of the series of sequences which nature presents is to be
found the unification of our knowledge of nature. We would
therefore direct attention to the question, what is meant by a
process, and what is meant by the recognition of a process 1
An artificial process is the treatment of substances by sub
jecting them to various chemical and mechanical forces, so as
to change some of their arrangements of properties, either by
adding to or taking from, and thus changing the shape or alter
ing the distribution in such a way as to produce the intended
result. A natural process is the change or redistribution of parts
effected by the natural relations of bundles of properties under
given circumstances, without any intention towards a given
end. A natural process works from the past, not to the future :
it is simply the flowing on of one sequence after another
as different forces come into relation. From this view of a
natural process it follows that if we could trace up the present
state of the cosmos to its immediately preceding state, and so
backwards, we would discern the history of all sequences. And
if, further, we could analyse nature, and be able to ascertain her
constitution at any given period, and by preference a period of
simplicity of composition and structure, then we would be able
to deduce therefrom all her subsequent history as a process con
sequent upon that constitution at that time. &quot;We would no
doubt be able to say, There is so much oxygen, so much hydro
gen, so much iron, and so forth, and the properties of oxygen
are thus, the properties of hydrogen are thus, the properties of
iron are thus, and so on. If we could do this, then we Avould
have so many factors to our process, and our knowledge of the
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able to reduce the number of the original factors. At present
the number of the factors is the number of the so-called ele
ments, say seventy or eighty, plus ether and the known physical
laws. For a complete knowledge it would be requisite to know
the quantity and the exact position of each atom at any given
time which might be selected as a starting-point. But failing
that exact knowledge, even the conception of such a calculation
might be supposed to give us a fair notion of its adequacy to
explain all the incidents of the process, presuming the requi
site knowledge of quantity and position. But even then we
should still be very far from an unification of knowledge, in
that the munber of the factors is so great. It is true that the
reduction of all knowledge to the recognition of a process
calculable from the relations, positions, quantities, and proper
ties of seventy or eighty factors would be a great simplifica
tion
; yet it is only a first stage in the process. To show that
these factors themselves are but the results of a still smaller
number of factors would be a still further simplification ; but
the real unification of the processes of nature would not be
reached until the whole series was interpreted as the relation of
two factors.
It would seem from this statement that knowledge never will
be unified
; and, indeed, that is our belief. At the same time
it will be our duty to give our attention to such proposals as
are made, and not set up our despair or our scepticism as a test
of other men s achievements. And if all the histories of Nature
can be understood by means of the recognition of a process
dependent upon the interrelations of factors, be these factors
numerous or few, then knowledge is so far unified our expla
nations are effective, our knowledge is organised, Science has
become a practically complete Philosophy.
8. An Enumeration of Mr. Spencer s Physical MethodsJor the
Unification of Knowledge.
(a.) Hypothesis of the Sevmty Factors.
The first proposition we have to consider is that the history
of the solar system, ending in the state of things as we kno\r42 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
it now, including the existing facts of animal and vegetable
life, is the result of a process due to the constituent factors of
a nebula existent in the cosmos some millions of years ago.
This nebula consisted of the seventy or eighty so-called ele
ments or bundles of properties, as known to us and as described
in books on chemistry. Their interrelations were to some
extent influenced and determined by forces not inherent in
the mass, such as separative Motion, which, when disengaged
from the nebula, allowed these constituent factors to come into
relation, with the results indicated. The question thereupon
arises, Is such a hypothesis sufficient to explain the results, so
that we can understand the whole course of physical and bio
logical history as the inevitable and calculable process due to
those primordial factors ?
Mr. Spencer has not written a book upon Inorganic Evolu
tion, but he has indicated the method of treatment he would
have pursued had he done so in the Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; criticised by us in our former volume.*
This Appendix also explains the origin and nature of Organic
Matter. Thereupon the student may take up the study of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; showing how all the forms of life are the resultants
of some combinations of the so-called elements in relation to
the circumstances of their physical environment. This history
affords matter for a more elaborate and detailed examination in
Chapter V. of this work. The result of the two criticisms is to
show that from the nebula constituted as described the results
are not deducible as claimed. The process of development
from the nebula to the finished organism, acknowledging it
to be a process, is not intelligible as the result of the factors
given. In this examination, as already stated, we have not
wandered beyond the boundaries of a book on Chemistry, a
book on Physics, and a book on Mechanics. As thus limited
to actual knowledge, we have found the factors inadequate to
produce the known results. Whether they are capable or not of
a wider reading remains to be seen in our next section.
In the meantime, it is worth while to inquire if any of the
other propositions of Mr. Spencer are capable of a strictly
* See
&quot; On Mr. Spencer s Formula of Evolution,&quot; p. 33 ct scq.PHYSICAL METHODS ONE FACTOR. 43
scientific statement, and, as preliminary to the next section, it
will be well to ascertain their value in this respect. Founded
on actual science as these supraphysical methods must be, it will
be useful to examine first what truths of science afford them
countenance and authority.
(b.) Hypothesis of the One Factor.
The first scientific generalisation in order of pre-eminence and
of most extensive use throughout the work is the Persistence
of Force, and the method based upon it ascribes the unification
of knowledge to the proposition that
&quot; All existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Persistence of Force.&quot;
This proposition has already been considered in its abstract
interpretation ; we have now to consider it in its value as
derived from, and being a general expression of, concrete expe
rience. We have to regard the Persistence of Force as an
ultimate generalisation built up by ever-increasing generalisa
tions of knowledge as specified in the beginning of this
chapter, and from which all changes of the universe can as
corollaries be deduced.
Let us take our science first-hand from the exposition of
Professor Balfour Stewart, to whose work
&quot; On the Conservation
of Energy
&quot; we now refer. This work strikes us as tentative
rather than as conclusive, as an attempt in the right direction
rather than as the final expression of scientific investigation.
The matters treated of by Professor Stewart do not seem in
his hands to acquire complete philosophic form, as will be seen.
In the first place, Professor Stewart gives us a catalogue of
the Forces of iS ature, and, secondly, a list of the Energies of
Nature. What is the difference between Force and Energy is
not stated, and has to be gathered from a comparison of the
two lists. And even then, when we discover that the former
means principally the forces of attraction, the denotative terms
might easily be exchanged. Energy is that which &quot;does
work
&quot;
against these attractive forces.44 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
The Forces of Nature are
1. The Attraction of Gravitation (p. 48).
2. The Attraction of Cohesion (p. 51).
3. The Attraction of Chemical Affinity (p. 53).
4. Electrical Attraction (p. 64) regarded as &quot;peculiarly allied
to that force which we call Chemical Affinity.&quot;
We have purposely left out &quot;Elastic Forces&quot; (p. 50), as in
all probability the cases so termed are compound cases of
resistive and attractive forces.
Professor Stewart does not propound any theory of the
Conservation of Force similar to that of the Conservation of
Energy, which will shortly come under our notice. Neverthe
less it would seem to be just as well founded in science as the
doctrine of the Conservation of Energy. Neither does he
teach us the transmutation of Force according to which the
various kinds of Force enumerated above could be changed the
one into the other.
Let us now consider
The List of Energies.
A. Energy of Visible Motion.
13. Visible Energy of Position.
C. Heat Motion.
D. Molecular Separation.
E. Atomic or Chemical Separation.
F. Electrical Separation.
G. Electricity in Motion.
H. Radiant Energy.
&quot;We observe that Professor Stewart says nothing about Nerve
Force, Muscular Energy, Polarity, &c., which are terms used
by Mr. Spencer ; nor does he mention Feeling, but proceeds
to the
&quot; Law of Conservation&quot;
&quot;115. Having thus endeavoured, provisionally at least, to
catalogue our various energies, we are in a position to state
more definitely what is meant by the conservation of energy.
For this purpose, let us take the universe as a whole, or, if this
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be isolated from the rest, as far as force or energy is concerned,
forming a sort of microcosm, to which we may conveniently
direct attention.
&quot; This portion, then, neither parts with any of its energy to
the universe beyond, nor receives any from it. Such an isola
tion is, of course, unnatural and impgssible, but it is conceiv
able, and will, at least, tend to concentrate our thoughts. Now,
whether we regard the great universe or this small microcosm,
the principle of the conservation of energy asserts that the sum
of all the various energies is a constant quantity, that is to say,
adopting the language of Algebra
(A) + (B) + (C) + (D) + (E) + (F) + (G) + (H) =
{^^
&quot;
1 1 6. This does not mean, of course, that (A) is constant in
itself, or any other of the left-hand members of this equation,
for, in truth, they are always changing about into each other
now, some visible energy being changed into heat or electricity;
and, anon, some heat or electricity being changed back again
into visible energy but it only means that the sum of all the
energies taken together is constant. &quot;VVe have, in fact, in the
left hand, eight variable quantities, and we only assert that
their sum is constant, not by any means that they are constant
themselves.&quot;
&quot;VVe note here that we shall have to quote this exposition
of the conservation of energy against Mr. Spencer when we
come to controvert his doctrine of the Continuity of Motion ;
for Motion, according to Professor Stewart, is not a constant
quantity, but is interchangeable with energy of position, which
is a state of rest.
An element of obscurity remains in respect of the affinities
or polarities of the so-called elements. The question arises,
Are these constant quantities inherent in these elements? If
not, what would they be without them ? and if they are, how
do they rank with the forces or energies on the list, since they
are not then convertible ?
And again, if all the modes of energy specified are convertible,
is it legitimate to suppose that they could all be converted
into one kind
1
? In this case, what would become of the chemical46 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
attractions or polarities in question ? Generally speaking, what
is the relation of the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy to
the permanency of the properties of the so-called elements ?
With these preliminary provisoes, we are able to under
stand the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy as held
by men of science, namely, that there is a variety of different
kinds or modes of manifestations of energy in nature, that
these modes are capable of interchange ; and that although
each mode may vary in quantity, it only does so by be
coming another mode, the total quantity of energy remaining
constant.
This is the doctrine upon which is founded Mr. Spencer s
&quot;Persistence of Force.&quot; It would appear in some places of Mr.
Spencer s work, though not in others, that he would include in
this term the Indestructibility of Matter also
; yet as the latter is
not a mode of force interchangeable with any other, it Avould seem
illegitimate to do so, and therefore we take it that Mr. Spencer s
scientific doctrine is the same as Professor Stewart s. At any
rate, it is convenient for the present section so to consider it,
reserving for the next section any extension of meaning. It
is the scientific statement as arrived at by scientific men
that we have under consideration at present, and having fully
acquainted ourselves therewith, we have to consider what are the
corollaries of the constant quantity of energy. Can we deduce
all the interrelations of existences from the knowledge we
have that the sum total of all kinds of energy, however they may
interchange, remains a constant quantity ? To our mind it is a
barren proposition. The only corollary from it seems to be that
if one kind diminishes another must increase. We may find
all the facts of nature in conformity, that is, uncontradictory of
this principle and of the Indestructibility of Matter and the
attractive Forces, but we shall never be able to deduce the
particular and special changes from these principles. We shall
never be able to understand the differentiation of the un
known energy into the various modes of its manifestation as
set forth by Professor Stewart ; and failing in the first
corollaries, we fail in all the others. Since we cannot know
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corollaries from it. If we are asked to draw corollaries from
the Persistence of Force, and we know not Force, the stress
of getting the corollaries is thrown upon the Persistence, and
the only corollaries derivable therefrom are merely that if
one kind of force augments, another will diminish, and vice
versa. The only other corollary we could get from the teaching
would be that the facts of experience upon which the doctrine
is founded will never contradict themselves, but will always
be found conformable to the general principle of which they
are the warrant. In fact, nearly all Mr. Spencer s corollaries
from the Persistence of Force are found to be merely statements
that such and such a fact, general or particular, is in harmony
with the doctrine of the Persistence of Force. But it will at
once be seen that to find facts or circumstances uncontra-
dictory of a proposition is a very different thing from deriving
them from it as corollaries. The former is a merely negative
result, the latter is what we truly look for as conferring that
insight into the connection of sequences which is the unifica
tion of knowledge. Bearing in mind that Mr. Spencer pro
poses to found his most general proposition on actual science,
let us take several of the corollaries which he draws from the
Persistence of Force and examine them as corollaries from the
doctrine of the Conservation of Energy as expounded by Pro
fessor Stewart.
Still keeping within the bounds of actual science, let us ask
whether the Instability of the Homogeneous is really a corollary
from the Conservation of the Attractive Forces or the Conserva
tion of Energy ? The proposition is
&quot;The homogeneous, or any substance or existence that is
homogeneous, is unstable.&quot;
Viewed as a corollary from the theory of the constant quan
tity of energy, this proposition does not seem to have any
relation to that general principle. If it has, the corollary would
seem to be that the homogeneous remains stable if it is in a state
of balance, which is, indeed, implied in the term homogeneous.
Supposing, however, Mr. Spencer means that if different parts of
a homogeneous mass are differently affected by various incident
forces, the mass no longer remains homogeneous then wa48 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
acknowledge the corollary but quit the proposition under study,
and find another one altogether, namely, that incident forces
impinging upon another aggregate of forces produce changes.
This will be allowed as a corollary, but will be seen, to be a very
barren one. The kind of change wrought, the nature of the
sequences, depends upon the particular incident forces, and upon
the particular receptive forces.
We have seen already that the Indestructibility of Matter is
not a corollary from the doctrine of the Conservation of Energy.
Professor Stewart, though in an imperfect way, disclaims it,
nor can it be included in the list, because all that are included in
the list are not individually permanent but changeable. And
it is not a corollary from exclusion, because by exclusion it
cannot stand in the relation of a corollary at all. It is an
independent, not a dependent, doctrine. The scientific state
ment of the Conservation of Energy is thus seen not to warrant
as its corollary the doctrine of the Indestructibility of Matter.
Is it, then, a corollary from the Conservation of Force as given
by Professor Stewart 1 If the proof of it is the indestructibility
of weight, then by Matter is meant the Attraction of Gravita
tion, and the theory is a corollary from itself.
Again, the Continuity of Motion is not a corollary from the
Conservation of Energy, because motions, being included as
some of the energies which are mutually convertible with other
energies in a state of balance or rest, are seen not to be con
tinuous.
Xeither is any power of the nature of mind, feeling, will
power, mental energy, &c., a corollary from the Conservation of
Energy, for being excluded from the list, they are not conver
tible into any of those which compose the constancy of the
quantity. On the other hand, it is a corollary from this doc
trine that there are no such energies in operation as factors,
for they can only act in increasing or decreasing the quantity
of energy made up of the kinds mentioned in the list. Whereas
energy is a constant quantity, never augmenting nor decreasing.
Are we to say that Equilibration is a corollary from the Per
sistence of Force, as thus made up of the two forms described by
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to a state of rest. All motion is the act of balancing ; when
balance is reached, rest ensues. But the constancy of the quan
tity of energy only means that whether in the form of motion or
in the form of energy of position the total quantity is the same
the form is indifferent and the constancy of the quantity
does not necessitate either motion or rest. As regards Mr.
Spencer s special phases of Equilibration promulgated in the
&quot;
Principles of Biology,&quot; there is no relation apparent.*
We might, again, ask, Is the Formula of Evolution a corollary
from the Persistence of Force, as thus considered, or Integration
or Dissolution 1 We would find in each case either contradic
tion or non-relation. The only corollary from the Persistence
of Force is that if there is change from one kind of energy, it
must be into another kind ; but the doctrine is absolutely fruit
less of special corollaries. It does not even necessitate change
of any kind, only that if there is a change it must be into an
other kind. The key to special changes must not be looked for
in this barren and general proposition, but in the actual kinds
and relations of the special forces enumerated, and in the
resistive or other forces which are left out of it alto&amp;lt;rether. o
When these are brought together and understood in all their
relations of quantity and position at any given time, then we
can read the sequences, not otherwise.
We find, then, that the scientific doctrine of the Conservation
of Energy is useless in itself for the philosophic purpose.
Viewed as a corollary from the scientific doctrine of the Con
servation of Energy, the only logical conclusion arrived at would
be that some change would take place equivalent to the amount
of energy changed.
And if we add to this the doctrine of the Conservation of
the Attractive Forces, and again the Indestructibility of Matter,
whatever that is, we are unable by them to read off the history
of the physical cosmos, and much less can we attain to an
explanation of biological processes.
We therefore conclude that within the limits of actual science
philosophy is not attainable. A more detailed criticism to this
end is given in our former work, and in the examination of
* See Chapter V. of this work.
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the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; included in the present volume. &quot;We now pass
oil to the Supraphysical Hypotheses.
9. The Supraphysiccd Methods for the Unification of
Knowledge.
Since it is seen that the purely physical methods of study carry
us out a short distance in our endeavours towards the explana
tion of the cosmos, while the study of them yet points in various
ways towards theories of a more general character, our thoughts
naturally take a wider range, and we set ourselves to the task
of framing hypotheses which, whether founded on actual know
ledge or purely imaginary, aim at one and the same result,
namely, the explanation of all the modes of physical combina
tions and histories and all their associated developments. These
theories, for convenience sake, we call the Supraphysical, on two
grounds
: in the first place, because they aim at getting behind
and explaining the relations of the present ultimately known
factors (i.e., the chemical elements) ; and in the second place,
because since they are thus but an extension of the methods
and factors of science, we do not transgress beyond the reach
of the human intellect, but every idea and every proposition
founded upon them is at least conceivable. Thus we are
capable of estimating what each hypothesis is able to explain
and what it fails to include. Such demarcations of failure
are just as useful as the demarcations of success, because they
enable the intellect properly to direct its future exertions
; and
this is far better than the endeavour to slur over deficiencies
of explanation under the cover of indefinite thought and con
fusing verbiage.
We shall have to treat of two classes of hypotheses of the
Supraphysical order, the legitimate and the illegitimate, the
former dealing with definite conceptions and being more nearly
related to the actual truths of science, and perhaps con
sequently of a more limited scope the latter free from such
tiresome restrictions as to meaning and scope, and, from their
indefiniteness, apt to delude the mind with the appearance of
greater magnificence, and even of greater efficacy for cosmicalTHE SUPRAPHYSICAL METHODS. 51
explanation. Both methods have this in common, that they
are founded on generalisations of actual knowledge ; but they
treat these generalisations in very different ways, the charac
teristic of the former being that it deals with imagined concretes,
that of the latter being that it deals with objectivised abstrac
tions that is to say, terms of totality conceived as general terms
connoting a something which is an unity itself a special factor
having definite relations with other objectivised abstractions
established in the same way.
Let us first treat of those legitimate hypotheses which are
most nearly related to actual knowledge. And it is not to be
supposed that in this chapter, which is only a mere outline
of the study, we intend to traverse the whole field of supra-
physical speculation. It is our intention here merely to indicate
the chief features, so as to enable the student, in following Mr.
Spencer or any other author, properly to locate the particular
hypothesis or method he may have under examination, and thus
prevent aimless and indefinite wandering.
(a.) Suprapliysical Hypotheses Strictly Considered.
Physical science has done something already, if we endeavour
to approach the subject from the safe side of actual accom
plishment, towards supraphysical theories. Men of science
are working towards such theories year by year. The methods,
experimental or logical, by which Science has reduced chemical
processes to the interrelations of the seventy or eighty so-called
elements, and physics to certain laws of motion, are continually
encroaching upon the mysteries of the unknown, arid are endea
vouring to penetrate still further. Year by year adds to our
knowledge of the motions of matter, and of the behaviour of
the elementary substances under various physical conditions.
In chemistry we find the hypothesis that the seventy or
eighty so-called elements are really not simple, but have com
plex constitutions, formed of one or two simple original elements
differentially aggregated. The properties of these original ele
ments are variously estimated. Some theories would invest them
merely with the attributes of attraction and resistance, perhaps
also with differentiated shapes and modes and rates of motion.52 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
The theory that the relations of the so-called elements are
those of modes and rates of motion, coupled with some theory
of shapes produced by the varied aggregation of units having
polarities of attraction and repulsion, is supported by implica
tions from various branches of science. The doctrine of chemi
cal combinations supports it
; more particularly does it derive
support from the very abstruse law formulated by Mendele-
jeef and Lothar Meyer, termed the &quot;Periodic System.&quot; The
science of Molecular Physics, to which the late Professor Clerk
Maxwell so largely contributed, and which the late Professor
Clifford popularised, also tends in the same direction. The
science of Spectroscopy likewise indicates the complicated
structure of some of the so-called elements in the number and
variety of the lines produced in the spectrum, and in the theory
that these are caused by the varied motions of different units
in a state of incandescence. The behaviour, also, of different
substances in a state of tenuity in the radiometer under the
application of electricity again tends in the same direction.
The physical explanation of heat as molecular motion, of light
as ethereal motion, of colour as differentiated rates of ethereal
motion, all point towards a theory founded on the relations of
differently constituted aggregations of units of attraction and
repulsion plus an ether having no property but simple resis
tance and attraction.
Kow it is possible to suppose a physical world thus constituted
it is a reasonable hypothesis one that we are able to conceive
one coming within what Professor Tyndall would call legiti
mate scientific imagination. It may be regarded as a possible
explanation of the laws of the various sciences of Chemistry,
Physics (molar and molecular), Electricity, Light, Heat, Spec
troscopy, &c.
; and if the special laws were eventually arrived
at, it would constitute an actual unification of all these sciences.
We are still, it is true, far from such an unification, but science
is tending in that direction.
How far Mr. Spencer places his reliance on this intelligible
hypothesis is not very clear. Undoubtedly he works with it to
a certain extent, and he even, as we shall presently see in the
critical study of his work on
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in his reply to our previous criticism lie so decidedly and
positively refuses to be tied down to any such definite and
precise theories, that it is difficult to know how far and to what
extent he relies upon them, and how far he discards them in
favour of symbols that stand for things and processes of which
we can have no conception.
As just stated, the critical study is that of Biology.
&quot;We can
see very well that the theory just indicated might be supposed
to be sufficient for the explanation of the physical constitution
of the cosmos, but it would not seem to account for the origin
and history of organised living beings. Here, again, notwith
standing very close study of Mr. Spencer s &quot;Biology,&quot; we are
unable to assign the author s exact position. He very clearly
repudiates &quot;feeling&quot; as a factor in biological histories,* and
apparently relies wholly upon the properties of some of the
so-called elements, including their mutual polarities, and upon
their external relations, called equilibrations, with the physical
forces and energies included in Professor Stewart s list. In this
case Biology itself would have to be included in the ultimate
unification of knowledge we have just described ; and under
these conditions, supposing such to be Mr. Spencer s views,
we have examined his theory of Biology very thoroughly in
Chapter V. of this book. The result of that examination is
that the explanation fails ; and if we add to this failure to
explain Biology upon merely physical premises, the additional
failure to account for and define the mutual relations of physical
structure and processes with feeling and mentality, we have
the most important and interesting of all studies shut out from
the proposed unification of knowledge.
(b.) Hypotheses including Feeling.
It is of comparatively little moment to us that all physical
processes, exclusive of the biological, can be shown to be the
result of certain differentiated combinations of original simple
units. Such a proof is an intellectual achievement which gives
intellectual gratification and no more. What is of vital interest
is to know what we ourselves are, whence we came and how,
* See Principles of Biology, vol. i. chap. 8.54 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
whither we tend, and what tlie law of our conduct what we
are to one another in the long course of our history 1 Are
we anything more than accidents appearing in the cooling of a
nebula, and vanishing in the ruins of a dead world 1
On these questions the theory just considered throws no light.
A rational explanation of feeling and its relations, simple and
complex, with physical aggregations and organisations, seems to
demand a theory of origin which includes feeling amongst the
initial factors a theory which shall specify a factor of feeling
in the most simple of all physical interrelations; which shall
assign feeling as an universal concomitant of physical combi
nations and disintegrations. Several such theories have been
propounded, in which physical changes bear assigned relations
to feeling, and feeling bears assigned relation to and influence
upon physical changes. This introduces us to a very difficult
problem ; for if feeling is not merely the concomitant of a
physical process, but is also a factor in physical processes, how
is the theory of the constant quantity of the physical forces to be
maintained ? Of course it can be replied that the theory need not
be maintained ; it may be argued that feeling,
&quot;
psychic force,&quot;
or whatever it may be termed, may increase or decrease or vary
the physical forces of Professor Ealfour Stewart s list, and that
there may be no fixed relations between physical combinations
and feeling. But everything in the history and constitution of
living beings points to the existence of such definite relationship
of interdependences. Were it otherwise, the unification of
knowledge, and indeed science of any sort, would seem to be
impossible. But in fact, as justified by experience, we are
warranted in our endeavour to assign an explanation a historic
explanation by which we shall see that all biological structure
and function is the result of the interrelations of original fac
tors, including feeling. As a matter of fact, all we can say
is, that no adequate explanation on these lines has yet been
effected, and we have no inkling of any. At the present time,
notwithstanding all our achievements of Science, the relations
of physical combinations and changes to feeling, and the influ
ence of feeling upon physical changes, is an impenetrable
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tery to the full. Nevertheless, he professes to have accom
plished the task of explaining the origin and development of all
living creatures, or at least to have formulated the main lines of
such a history of morphological and physiological development ;
and this theory is founded purely upon physical processes, the
factor of feeling heing formally excluded.
We think it may fairly he urged that some such theory as
the one just indicated may, if not at present, yet at some future
time, come within the scope of legitimate hypotheses. AVe are
ahle to conceive of all the factors requisite for such a hypothesis/
although we are not able as yet to frame any notion of their mode
of connection or relation. This, however, remains for the future.
Mere possibilities we are unable to measure. But if such
a conception, however legitimate the hypothesis may be, is not
possible at the present time, and yet is necessary for the com
plete unification of knowledge, then all the more certain is it
that at the present time such a unification cannot be effected.
Let us now proceed to put into a proposition the views we
have just been discussing, so as to keep our theories within the
methods of procedure we deemed to be correct at the commence
ment of our present study.
Let us first say
&quot;All existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
conceptions of the relations of original units of attraction
and repulsion.&quot;
Our conclusion is, that although this might be a sufficient ex
planation of all physical processes, it would not afford us an
explanation of the origin and development of living beings, even
if we consider such development to be unaffected by the factor
of feeling; and that if we consider it to be so affected, then,
since the factor of feeling is not included, either expressly or
implicitly, in the proposition, that proposition fails to recognise
one of the essential factors, and is to that extent incomplete.
This thesis will be more fully considered in Chapter V., where
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(c.) Other Supraphysical Hypotheses.
There are other forms into which the supraphysical hypo
theses can be thrown, and which are implied ill several parts of
Mr. Spencer s works. The importance he attaches to Equilibra
tion and Polarity warrants us in giving them special treatment.
For clearness of study, let us throw them into the form of a pro
position, thus :




&quot; All existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
Polarity.&quot;





largely employs them in effecting his constructive arrangements.
Polarity is a legitimate scientific term
; it is representative of
a number of concrete facts, taking its origin in the action of the
loadstone and magnetic needle, enlarged by the knowledge of
the behaviour of electrified substances, but deriving its spe
cial significance in biological construction from the science of
crystallography. The special relationships thus characterised
are those mutual affections of atoms by which they range them
selves into special forms of aggregation. These mutual affections
may or may not have to do with what are called chemical
affinities, but in any case they have to do with the method
of aggregation of similarly constituted molecules.
The form of crystallisation is now universally specified as
appertaining to the properties of those bodies which do crystal
lise, although there are certain bodies called colloids which do
not assume that form of aggregation. The manner in which Mr.
Spencer employs the powers included in the term Polarity is
treated of at great length in Chapter V. of the present work.
He assumes that the differences of perceptible crystalloid form are
due to differences of size and shape of the atom or molecule and
very reasonably so, for assuming polarity of an atom or molecule
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effectuated must be due to the shapes and sizes of the con
stituent particles. Colloids, he seems also to say, have similar
attractions and repulsions, but they either have no constant
shape or the shapes are not rectilinear but curvilinear. Mr.
Spencer s very clever and ingenious but delusive argument is
founded on the attempt to confer on the colloids which con
stitute organic matter all the formative powers of the crystalloids,
so that on the one hand they are so pliant as to receive any
and every change of form, and yet, when so required for con
structive purposes, they have the methods of aggregation of
crystals, with definite shapes and fixed modes of aggregation.
The theory is strained still further when, in lieu of the definite
homogeneous structure of a mass of crystal, we have it stated that
we owe to a similar process the heterogeneous structure of an
animal composed of an osseous part, a nervous part, a cuticle, a
liver, muscle, &c., made up, it may be, of similar modified units,
but not forming a structure resultant from the forms and
polarities of special physiological units, in the same manner as a
mass of crystal is determined by the forms and polarities of
its constituent particles. It will be found, we think, from a
study of the criticism just referred to, that the proposition ex
plaining the interrelations of all existences by Polarity will
not be found of the desired efficiency.
The proposition attributing all existences and the history of
their interrelations to Equilibration is a wider and more inde
finite explanation, inclusive in all probability of the polarities
we have just been considering. It is a supraphysical hypo
thesis, because it is founded upon experiences with which we
are fully acquainted and conveys a more or less definite concep
tion. The hypothesis is in some respects confusing, in that it is
not clear what forces can be equilibrated with one another, and
what forces stand apart and have no place in a process of mutual
balancing. Of course, it can be clearly understood that the
forces and energies enumerated in Professor Balfour Stewart s
list mutually affect each other, and whether interchangeable or
not can be so related to each other as to mutually balance each
other in a state of rest or equilibrium. But it is not quite
clear what (if any) of the properties we ascribe to the seventy58 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
or eighty so-called elements are essential to them and cannot
Le detached from them, and are therefore not includahle in
a general equilibration for instance, Polarity. The whole
subject requires a greater thoroughness of treatment than Mr.
Spencer has given it, and it is imperative that some one should
write that preliminary book on Inorganic Evolution which Mr.
Spencer was obliged to omit. Is Polarity a fixed property, for
instance, of Oxygen
1 If so, and if not, how does it take part
in a process of Equilibration
1
? Again, if Matter is a special
manifestation of Force of an indestructible character and not
interchangeable with other modes of Force, in what respect does
it so differ from those other modes as to be uninterchangeable,
and how does it enter into the general process of Equilibra
tion 1 Is Matter as a form of force specialised as Attrac
tion or as Resistance ? If the latter, is it conditioned as to
shape or size, or how otherwise 1 Is it always associated witli
Motion or Attraction ? Mr. Spencer would perhaps say that
all these alternative scientific notions are inconceivable. If
so, then all these supraphysical theories must be abandoned as
not affording the sought-for universalistic explanation. All we
desire to make out now is, that if we are to consider such hypo
theses, they must be commensurate with the whole of the facts,
and they must be framed in clear language founded on definite
notions of actual conditions. If, as we suppose, Equilibration
is one of those ill-conceived thoughts of which we have a clear
conception with regard to some special instances, and vaguely
formed analogies with regard to other processes, together with
still more indefinite ideas of application to the whole system
of things, it is quite beyond all intelligibility as an universa
listic explanation and as a means for the unification of know
ledge.
This hypothesis is treated at length in Chapter V. of the
present work, forming part of our study of
&quot;
Biology,&quot; and is
given in this connection because that study is the most important
of Mr. Spencer s series of works, as well as on account of the
curious twists and turns which are therein given to the hypo
thesis of Equilibration. We content ourselves here with showing
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clearly set out, as veil as the forces which are beyond its scope
(if any) and the modes in which they affect each other, the
mere term Equilibration as prime mover or as an instrument
in development, and more particularly in biological development,
especially, again, if feeling is a factor therein, is useless and
meaningless ; and until all this is done -we cannot understand
the proposition -which assigns Equilibration as the long-sought-for
predicate
(d.) The Hypothesis of the Three Factors.
We have now to consider certain illegitimate supraphysical
methods. We characterised these at the outset of the section
as being founded on objectivised abstractions. We have already
found a condemnation of all such methods of reasoning in a
former section of this chapter. But \ve find it necessary to
speak of them here because they have a supposititious authority
in physical experiences, and because it is desirable to show in
what manner they are actually applied in trying to make use
of them as explanations of physical change. Eor this purpose
we shall have to direct attention to the process of reasoning in
the earlier chapters of the book on the Knowable in Mr. Spencer s
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
The course of thought pursued in these earlier chapters of
&quot; Eirst Principles
&quot; has all the formality of a clear and con
sistent argument carefully stated. The reader is made to feel
that he advances firmly step by step, until he has it clearly
impressed upon his mind that all his future work is founded
upon the understood relations of three original factors, the
formulation of which will constitute the desired unification
of knowledge. Now, a factor is that which has special properties
in relation to other factors, and when we have a given number of
related factors, and clearly understand these relations, we can
foresee the general character if not the details of their sub
sequent histories. The factors which Mr. Spencer gives are
the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and
the Persistence of Force. It will be seen that neither Matter,
Motion, nor Force are defined. In the special chapters treating
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specified, but it is elsewhere stated that they are but symbols
standing for modes of the Unknowable. If we confine them
to the modes or manifestations as known to us, the consideration
of our subject is thrown into the physical section of our study,
or into the preceding part of this section. If we take them in
the sense implied in each particular sentence in which they
occur, we have variable terms, but generally meaning the approach
together or separation of bodies having resistance and exten
sion, and implying powers of attraction and combination, and
powers of separation. But the real stress of meaning is often
put upon the adjective turned into an objectivised abstraction,
and we find our minds dwelling more upon the Indestructibility,
the Continuity, and the Persistence than upon the intelligent
understanding of the objects which are indestructible, con
tinuous, and persistent. How we can speak of these factory,
and yet not be able to specify those properties in respect of
which they are related factors in a process of physical develop
ment, is incomprehensible. A treatise on chemistry we can
understand, or a treatise on mechanics, although we have no
knowledge at all as to what oxygen is in itself, nor what motion
is in itself
; howbeit we do know what we mean in every
instance when these terms are used in scientific treatises. Mr.
Spencer works with the three factors mentioned above, and in
the formulation of their relationship he seeks to unify knowledge.




Recapitulation, Criticism, and Recommencement.&quot;
&quot;
90. But now, what parts do these truths play in forming
such a conception 1 Does any one of them singly convey an
idea of the cosmos : meaning by this word the totality of the
manifestations of the Unknowable? Do all of them taken
together yield us an adequate idea of this kind ? Do they, even
when thought of in combination, compose anything like such an
idea 1 To each of these questions the answer must be ~No.
&quot; Neither these truths nor any other such truths, separately
or jointly, constitute that integrated knowledge in which only
Philosophy finds its goal. It has been supposed by one thinker
that when Science has succeeded in reducing all more complex
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will have reached its limit. Another authority has tacitly
asserted that all minor facts are so merged in the major fact
that the force everywhere in action is nowhere lost, that to
express this is to express the constitution of the universe.
But either conclusion implies a misapprehension of the problem.
&quot; For these are all analytical truths, and no analytical truth-
no number of analytical truths, will make up that synthesis of
thought which alone can be an interpretation of the synthesis
of things. The decomposition of phenomena into their elements,
is but a preparation for understanding phenomena in their state
of composition, as actually manifested. To have ascertained
the laws of the factors is not at all to have ascertained the laws
of their co-operation. The question is, not how any factor,
flatter or Motion or Force, behaves by itself, or under some
imagined simple conditions ; nor is it even how one factor
behaves under the complicated conditions of actual existence.
The thing to be expressed is the joint product of the factors under
all its various aspects. Only when we can formulate the total
process, have we gained that knowledge of it which Philosophy
aspires to. A clear comprehension of this matter is important
enough to justify some further exposition.&quot; ....
&quot;
92. To resume, then, we have now to seek a law of
composition of phenomena, co-extensive with those laws of their
components set forth in the foregoing chapters. Having seen
that matter is indestructible, motion continuous, and force per
sistent having seen that forces are everywhere undergoing
transformation, and that motion, always following the line of
least resistance, is invariably rhythmic, it remains to discover
the similarly-invariable formula expressing the combined con
sequences of the actions thus separately formulated.&quot;
The problem here proposed is the formulation of the com
position of phenomena by the light thrown upon it in the
preceding chapters.
&quot;The thing to be expressed is the joint
product of the factors,&quot; and the factors are Matter, Motion, and
Force, and the continuity of each. Xow it is evident that
unless we know precisely what is connoted by these terms, we
are unable to understand the formula when expressed. This is
the old question which is always reappearing, and it is impossible62 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
to tell whether Mr. Spencer thinks it necessary that \ve should
attach any meaning to them or not ; but if not, how are we to
distinguish between them, so as to know that we are talking
about different things ? It is not possible to speak about them
without attaching some ideas to them. And we can only suppose
Matter to refer to the sum-total of the seventy or eighty so-called
elements, Motion to their change of relative positions, and Force
we do not know to what. Nor does Mr. Spencer appear to
be in any more satisfactory position respecting it, for he omits it
altogether in the final unificatory formula in which he originally
proposed to include it. The difficulty is this : he has already
said that Matter is a manifestation of Force, and that Motion
is a manifestation of Force
; how then can they be three
separate factors ? Force sometimes seems to be one original
factor precedent to the other two, and manifesting itself
in them annihilating its separate existence, if it ever had
any, in the two modes of manifestation, so that it loses indi
viduality in the two factors
; and yet is put down as one
of three co-operating factors. How can it be a third
factor in a set of which its own manifestations are the other
two 1 *
Accordingly, when Mr. Spencer asks the question,t
&quot; What
must be the general character of srch a formula?&quot; he replies,
&quot; It must be one that specifies the course of the changes under
gone by both the Matter and the Motion,&quot; leaving the third
factor out of accoxuit altogether.
&quot; The law we seek, there
fore,&quot; he says,
&quot; must be the law of the continuous redistribution
of Matter and Motion. . . . Philosophy, rightly so called, can
come into existence only by solving the problem.&quot;
One is surely entitled to ask why all the importance attributed
to Force in so many preceding chapters, if all knowledge is to
be summed up in terms of Matter and Motion ; and why in
all the succeeding chapters there is any reference beyond the
terms of the formula as so limited to the laws of the redis-
* This difficulty is treated at length in our former criticism
&quot; On Mr.
Spencer s Formula of Evolution,&quot; p. 208.
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tribution of Matter and Motion
; and what validity can be
attached to the cosmical unificatory explanations in detail when
all the work is done in other terms than those of the formula
itself? For throughout Mr. Spencer s works there is a constant
reference to the harmony of his various explanations with, the
formulated unification of knowledge because coincident with
the laws of Force, which inferred or expressed laws of Force
are other than the one particular law expressed in the formula.
Thus Force is of great import up to the formulation of the
factors
; -it is then tacitly omitted from the formula without any
explanation of the reasons why ; and again, when we come to
actual work, it is once more quietly resumed as if it were actually
included in the formula.
Our problem, therefore, resolves itself into two questions,
namely Is the unification of knowledge to be effected by
means of the knowledge of one factor, Force, or by means of
the formulation of the relations of two factors, Matter and
Motion
1
? And in the ensuing discussion we find ourselves
labouring under the great difficulty of having to use language
and employ terms of which we disapprove. To use terms
appertaining to a particular doctrine in the discussion and
criticism of that doctrine is almost an acceptance of it so
much is conceded at the outset, so much is involved in the
accuracy or inaccuracy of nomenclature. And first let us
consider
(e.) The Hypothesis of One Factor.
The one factor is of course Force. Now Factor is a term of
relationship, and implies other factors. Therefore we cannot
call one individual existence (if these words have any meaning)
a factor at all. The thought we try to form in our minds is
that of an activity, simple, homogeneous, unconditioned, and
having no relations to any other existence. Any change is one
of self-determination. &quot;When a man has succeeded in formin^
this conception, he is capable of writing whole volumes of Philo
sophy, sprinkled throughout with entities dignified with names
having initial capitals; and the ignorant will look up to him with
awe. ISTothing whatever can be said against him, only that he64 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
lives outside the world of actual and practical thought, for none
of his thinking is ever applicable to scientific explanations, nor
to the conduct of life either in ethics or politics.
From one factor, whether it is called Force, the Absolute,
or the Unconditioned, no thinking is ever possible. Yet to
one point all thought of the a priori kind is forced, and cannot
rest till it reaches Unconditioned Being. Mr. Spencer s penul
timate is the Homogeneous. He is forced to this by the
nature of his argument. If Philosophy is bound to explain all
changes, it must go back to a time before changes commenced.
If it has to account for all differentiations, it must commence
with the Homogeneous. If it has to tell us all about the
Conditioned, it must have a background of the Unconditioned.
Thus we arrive, as indeed is explained by Mr. Spencer himself,
at the Absolute or Unconditioned Being.
We find, indeed, that all philosophies whatever, starting from
any point, whether of a subjective nature or of a purely and
strictly physical nature, are bound to meet at this focus of
thought. All study, whether subjective or objective, is the
study of changes and series of changes. The senses are conscious
of changes, the volition deals with changes, the intellect per
ceives changes all around it
; the mind wonders at changes,
Science tries to understand their connections. We anticipate
the future ; we endeavour to explain the present by the past.
We seek the ultimate cause of all change. In going backwards,
as Mr. Spencer correctly points out, we go from the definite,
coherent, heterogeneous, to the indefinite, incoherent, homoge
neous. We go from the complex to the simple, from greater
diversity to greater sameness. In the course of our thought we
arrive at a time of least differentiation, and finally to a state of
absolute uniformity, where there are no conditions to the ulti
mate being. From the physical sciences we trace the progres
sive simplicity and uniformity up to a sphere of units of attrac
tion and repulsion having no differentiation and apparently no
cause of any differentiation. Science out of its own materials
can assign no beginning of change. Under the philosopher s
keenest analysis the specialities of material bodies disappear and
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unmanifested in Matter or Motion, and which does not know
even Attraction and Resistance. And here he finds himself
strangely enough in the company of Hegel and others, the most
advanced of the subjective philosophers, who have arrived by
another road at the same identical point.
This is the difficulty that presents itself, and is met by various
schools in various ways. The Comtists refuse to set out on the
speculative journey at all. Mr. Spencer goes nearly to the end,
but not quite, and boldly says he has been almost all the way
all the rest is Unknowable ; and yet all knowledge is unified
by the fact that all its lines converge towards that unknow
able centre into which he is unable to penetrate
: a statement
which is manifestly no explanation. Hegel, again, plunges into
the depths of this Homogeneous, this Absolute Being, and from
the fact of it producing change out of an apparently unchange
able homogeneity, deduces the principle of Self-Determination.
Having established this principle at the beginning, he holds that
it has an ever-living right as a factor in the universe, and thus
builds up a system which most commends itself to the religious
philosophers of the day.
However, the fact remains, that, whether from the religious,
the subjective, or the scientific standpoints, all views end in the
realisation by the mind of Absolute Being, supreme, uncondi
tioned, and unknowable whatever afterwards may be made of
it by each party.
Mr. Spencer seemingly attacks this problem in his specious
argument entitled
&quot; The Instability of the Homogeneous.&quot; But
&quot; the Homogeneous,&quot; when pursued to a final analysis, carries us
onward by the obliteration of differentiations to a state where
all differentiations have disappeared to a state not merely of
uniformity or equal balance of Matter and Motion or of the
forces of attraction and resistance, but to a state before even
these forces have become differentiated. This impossibility of
attaining to a conception of the primordial state and of the
grand First Cause of all changes would seem to exclude the
possibility of the unification of knowledge. Mr. Spencer s
theory of the Instability of the Homogeneous is equivalent to
Hegel s Self-Determination. If the history of the cosmos is a
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single process and the initial cause is due to this or any similar
principle, then in the absence of a knowledge of the Uncon
ditioned the nature of the process must for ever remain beyond
the grasp of human reason.
Let us, however, say that
&quot; All Existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Instability of the Homogeneous,&quot;
and examine it as a supraphysical method.
Now &quot;the Homogeneous&quot; is merely an adjective turned
into a noun. We have to suppose something of which homo-
geneousness is predicated. We are obliged, in fact, to represent
in our minds units of some sort either units of resistance and
attraction or units of some other sort. The figure of equilibrium
according to Mr. Spencer is the sphere. If forces are the main
element in the ultimate constitution of the universe, then homo
geneous units of force must be co-existent in a state of equili
brium that is to say, in a sphere. Now the proposition is
that the homogeneous is unstable, and it is therefore equiva
lent to the proposition that a state of equilibrium is unstable.
It means that the homogeneous of itself changes to something
else, and that of two sides of a balance, by and by, one will
outweigh the other. This of course is contradictory to the
theory of the Persistence of Force, but agrees with the theory
of Self-Determination held by some philosophers. But it is
evident that although it may be a principle in nature that every
thing changes into something else, still this principle does not
show us the interdependence of sequences, and knowledge could
not be unified thereby.
The next proposition we have to consider under this heading
is that
&quot;All Existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Persistence of Force.&quot;
It does not seem that if we are unable to get corollaries from
Force itself or from Absolute Being, that we shall be able to
get such corollaries from its attribute of Persistence as shall
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modes, there will be corollaries as to some of the general condi
tions of the relations of these modes.
Thus if Matter, taken as Eesistance and Extension, is a mode
of Force, and Force is Persistent, and Motion is also a mode of
Force, it is not a corollary that each is indestructible and un-
transformable into the other, for such might be, and the sum
or persistence of Force would be unchanged.
But, indeed, there is no warrant in science for the supposi
tion of Force at all, only for Forces.
Professor Stewart does not say that (A) + (P) + (C) + (D)
+ (E) + (F) + (G) + (H) = Force, or Energy ; he does not let
them escape from the left-hand side of the equation at all. All
he states is that (A), &c., + to (H) = a constant quantity. As
a name for this constant quantity, as a term expressive of the
sum-total of the individuals of a class, the word Energy may
be good ; but as representative of an entity it is merely an
objectivised abstraction of the. illegitimate order.
Apparently (A) never decreases without some one or more of
the others in the series increasing ; and if all but one were made
to disappear, then the constant quantity would be in that one
kind of energy ; it would not disappear into the other side of
the equation. We would have (A) = a constant quantity, say
Attraction. This, coupled with the ultimate result of the theory
of the indestructibility of matter, viz., Resistance or Repulsion,
would give us two ultimate factors.
It may be admitted at once that such a hypothesis, if we had
more knowledge, might explain all the physical relations of
things. We may grant that from these factors through
Polarity, Shape, and Size all the constituents and mutual
relations of the seventy or eighty so-called elements might be
explained, and a theory of the universe and of its distri
bution might be made. But, as shown in our previous criti
cism, it would be open to some grave objections, and would be
deficient in explanations of the greatest interest and import
ance to us. The grave objections would be that we could never
picture to our minds any state from which to make a historical
start. If we supposed a heterogeneous beginning, our philosophy
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could find no starting-point at all; and if we pictured to ourselves
a state of great simplicity under the rule of equilibration, we
could not imagine anything but a very speedy reversion to a
state of homogeneity or complete equilibration. We can only
reasonably deduce the complex organised universe from a com
plex unorganised one. We can understand organisation out of
a chaos of complex material, but not the formation of complex
material out of the Homogeneous.
The great deficiencies of such an explanation would be,
that while possibly it might explain the physical interrela
tions, it has not within it the possibility of any explanations
of feeling or consciousness, and, we make bold to say, of any of
the interrelations of matter constituting organised living beings,
or of their reproduction and continuance as races of creatures.
The question next arises how far Mr. Spencer s Persistence
of Force is equivalent to Professor Balfour Stewart s Conserva
tion of Energy. No doubt Mr. Spencer means more by it than
is contained in Professor Stewart s list of Energies, and more
than the list of his Eorces added, and he may think that we
are treating him unjustly in regarding his theory as identical
with Professor Stewart s. Let us consider this. We are bound,
we think, in the first place, to take Professor Stewart s doctrine
of the Conservation of Energy as complete in itself. All the
items of the equation are transformable one into the other,
and the increment of one implies the decrease of some other.
It is not asserted that any other mode of energy beyond the
limits of the list can be transformed into any one of them,
or vice versa ; but, on the contrary, the inference is that such a
transference is an impossibility, for it would vary the total
quantity of energy. The essential point of the theory is that this
quantity is invariable that the circle of interchange of modes
is complete in itself, and is unassailable from any quarter.
If, therefore, Mr. Spencer means by the Persistence of Force
something more than Professor Stewart means by the Conserva
tion of Energy, plus the Conservation of the Attractive Forces,
and plus the Indestructibility of Matter, which are also complete
in themselves and unassailable, he must mean that there is a
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changeable with them, which also is of a constant character.
Now we do not know the above modes of Force or Power
in themselves, but we have a scientific knowledge of them, which
is more to the purpose. What do we know of this implied extra
Force ? We grant at onoe we do not know it in itself : do we
know it scientifically, as we know the other modes of Force ?
do we know its manifestations, and the laws thereof? If we
do, let Mr. Spencer express them, and show their relations
amongst themselves and their relations to the other modes of
Force or Power. If it can be done, we are so much nearer the
unification of knowledge. If it has not been done, we so far
fail of it. If it is impossible, that unification is impossible too.
The uniformity or parallelism of the characteristics of all
changes in the physical world and in the regions of feeling and
social action are indeed very suggestive of an identical Power
behind them all. This parallelism affords the poet and the
orator abundant stores of illustration in their poems and dis-
coxirses, and has also its philosophic significance. Mr. Spencer s
volumes are rich in instances of these apparently overruling
Laws of Force, and he very often appeals to them as forming
that bond of universal relationship which is to unify know
ledge. We acknowledge the full force of the suggestion, but
cannot go beyond its bare recognition, and are unable to give it
that precise statement or formulation which alone can impress
upon it any scientific value. Grateful acknowledgment is due
to Mr. Spencer for bringing out so strongly these marked identi
ties of process between the physical world and the facts of biology,
including the action of the emotions, of the intellect, and of
bodies of men in societies ; but granting all this, there is still
wanting a definite formulation, and there is still wanting the
knowledge of this extra factor and its laws of interrelation
with those other factors which we can formulate with scientific
precision.
It can, however, be maintained from Mr. Spencer s writings
that his Persistence of Force is not more than Professor Stewart s
Conservation of Energy plus the Conservation of the Attractive
Forces and the Indestructibility of Matter. Inorganic Evolu
tion is clearly contained within the assigned limits, and it70 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
will be seen from a study of Organic Evolution as explained
by Mr. Spencer so far as regards its first stages in the
Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; examined in our previous
criticism, and so far as regards its more advanced stages in the
passages treated of in Chapter V. of the present work that
the supposed explanation never trespasses beyond these limits.
Morphological and physiological developments are all shown
to be the results of the physical properties of certain elementary
substances in equilibration with a physical environment, all
governed by purely physical laws. In addition to this we must
also bear in mind that Mr. Spencer expressly excludes Feeling
from amongst the factors of Biology.*
The conclusion is, that
&quot; One Factor
&quot;
is a contradiction of
terms, since the term
&quot; Factor
&quot;
implies other factors in inter
relation
; that from the adjective Persistence no corollaries are
deducible ; that the constancy of quantity amongst modes does
not afford any knowledge of their special relations ; that to
keep any meaning in our studies we have to confine ourselves
to concrete experiences or legitimate generalisations therefrom ;
that any supraphysical theory is only of value so far as it is
commensurate with the concrete ; and that outside of concrete
manifestations the terms Force and Energy have no meaning
whatsoever.
(/.) Tlie Hypothesis of the Two Factors.
The two factors are the two manifestations of Force, namely,
Matter and Motion. These are the two factors that ultimately
find a place in the formula of evolution and dissolution. The
conclusion indicated in Chapter XL of
&quot; First Principles
receives an elaborate treatment in the following six chapters,
until the goal of Philosophy is arrived at in the formula
referred to. The value of this formula received a varied
examination in our former criticism ; nevertheless, it will be
useful to summarise our views of it here.
In the first place, we desire to know what meaning is to be
attached to the terms. We have already seen that if the term
Matter is to be taken as indicative of the nexus or substratum
binding together the various bundles of properties constituting
*
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the chemical element, it is a term without any logical value
whatever in any formula or process of reasoning.
&quot;VYe have
also seen that, as an objectivised abstraction, it has no actual
existence, and that the only legitimate use of the term is its
employment in a proposition which makes a predication com
mon to all the chemical elements. These propositions are
very limited in number, and comprise assertions respecting the
properties of resistance, extension, attraction, and their spatial
derivatives, or their derivatives of motion and time. In our
former work we entered into a detailed examination of the
possible meanings of this hypothesis, but Mr. Spencer repu
diates all of them as not being the expression of his views.
We found, of course, that these factors did not afford explana
tions of the facts of feeling and mind, nor, indeed, of the
morphological and physiological histories of animal and vege
table life, even if considered apart from the factor of feeling.
A further criticism of the methods by which Mr. Spencer
works out these processes will be given in Chapter V. of this
work, and will exhibit still more clearly, we think, the failure
of Mr. Spencer s reasoning. In this critical portion of his
system of Philosophy the formula of evolution and dissolution
plays no part whatever in the logical synthesis. The factors
from which, as results or consequents, the morphological and
physiological histories have to be deduced are not objectivised
abstractions called Matter and Motion, but a certain small
number of chemical elements, together with certain laws of
polarity and equilibration, and certain laws of Force or Motion.
These facts are so imperfectly realised in the mind, and their
relations are so loosely referred to, that they never receive
proper scientific statement. This, of course, renders all the
more easy the apparent accomplishment of the process ; but
immediately strict formulation and definiteness of meaning arc
insisted upon, its deficiencies become apparent. However, what
we wish to point out here is that the formula of evolution and
dissolution does not represent the working power of the universe,
even according to Mr. Spencer s treatment, but that the actual
tools by which he endeavour to accomplish his great construc
tive work are the known elements and their physical laws.72 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
The formula referred to is nothing more than a partial descrip
tion of the most general characteristics of physical changes,
and even in this very limited and comparatively uninteresting
portion of the cosmos it does not claim to rank as an explana
tion showing the sequences from original factors.
This formula is so well known that we need not repeat it.
The proposition founded on it would be
&quot; All Existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Formula of Evolution.&quot;
&quot;We now have to free the term matter from the rigid limits we
assigned to it in the study of the Physical Methods as merely
a name for the sum-total of the whole of the substances
known to us as the so-called elements. As a supraphysical
term, we have to consider it as relating to units having resist
ance and therefore extension. We are free to vary our hypo
thesis by supposing other attributes, such as attraction ; and
indeed it is difficult to see how we can proceed without some
such addition. We may even suppose mutual repulsion. We
must not, however, introduce special polarities, for that would
increase the number of oiir factors and spoil our proposition.
We are at liberty, however, to suppose varieties of size and
shape.
Our proposition includes the term Motion. It is founded
upon the joint doctrines of the Indestructibility of Matter
and the Continuity of Motion. The latter proposition we shall
have occasion to controvert, but for the present purpose pro
visionally accept. The supposition is that motion never ceases,
but is ever continuous ; ceasing in one connection, it is only
transferred to some visible or invisible motion of other aggregates
of matter. What we have to do now is to consider the pro
position that Matter and Motion being both indestructible,
their interchanges are concomitant, and all the changes of the
universe are correctly described, if not explained, by the assertion
of a concomitance between the concentration of matter and the
transference of motion
; as well as betAveen the reception of
motion and the separation of matter.
As before pointed out, the causes of these concentrationsJ. of Matter with the /
dlsslPatlon I Of Motion.&quot;
( integration )
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and separations of matter, which include all the chemical as well
as the mechanical combinations and decompositions in nature,
are not touched by the hypothesis. Taking the causes for
granted, then, the most general characteristic of the phenomena
so says our hypothesis is the concomitance of the separation
of matter with the increase of motion and of the concentration
of matter with the decrease of motion. Surely this is not say
ing very much, and falls conspicuously short of an explanation.
We have, therefore, to throw our proposition into the amended
form
&quot;All Existences and their interrelations
are [corollaries of]
the Concomitance of the
integration
dissipation j
Let us see how it is applicable to the construction of the uni
verse out of the raw material postulated.
The furthest point to which Mr. Spencer carries us back is
the existence of a nebula or of nebulae in a medium of ether.
These nebulae have or acquire a rotary movement ; also, pre
sumably, they are composed of the seventy or eighty so-called
elements in a gaseous condition
; but whether or not, whatever
the constituents of the nebulae may be, the cause of differentia
tion is unassigned. This, as already alleged, constitutes Mr.
Spencer s first failure in explanation, and he is under the diffi
culty either of accepting the elements as we know them and
conceive them (which leaves them unexplained), or of carry
ing us backwards towards universal homogeneity and absolute
being, from which they are unexplainable. Now, even if we
accept the condition of things thus described, and apply to it
the Formula of Evolution, it is impossible to work out from these
data the actually existent universe. Evolution is an integra
tion or concentration of matter and a concomitant dissipation of
motion. It is necessary that the attention should be fixed
upon this concomitance. We cannot have the concentration of
matter without the dissipation of motion, and conversely we
cannot have the reception of motion without the dissipation of
matter. The two things go together. There is always a double74 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
process. It is impossible in the nature of things that it can be
otherwise. Whenever there is evolution there is dissolution
;
whenever there is a process of dissolution there is a concomitant
process of evolution. There is a measurably equal concentration
of matter for all dissolution or separation of matter, and this
means exactly the same thing as the concomitant increase and
decrease of motion.
We must also remember that the quantity of Matter is always
the same and the quantity of Motion is always the same. Yet,
notwithstanding the fact that in the cosmical system matter can
part with motion to other matter, it cannot part with it wholly
so as to remain matter by itself. Mr. Spencer nowhere tells us
why this process should not be carried to such an extremity.
We must also bear in mind that motion cannot exist by
itself, but is always the motion of matter. These con
siderations all tend to strengthen the theory of concomitance,
namely, that matter and motion being constant quantities
and always combined, whenever there is a concentration of
one there must be a dissipation of the other. We must also
bear in mind that the state of concentration means one of greater
density of matter and less motion, and that the state of dissipation
means one of greater tenuity of matter and increase of motion.
Resuming our study, then, of the original state of scattered
nebulae, we have certain aggregates of relatively concentrated
matter with comparatively little motion, surrounded by ether,
which is presumably matter in a state of great tenuity, and
according to the hypothesis now under consideration, in a state
of relatively greater motion. What happens ? According to Mr.
Spencer, the nebulas part with their motion and undergo the
process of evolution or concentration, while the surrounding
ether absorbs their motion and undergoes a process of dissipa
tion. But, according to our view of the matter from the postu
lates given, the ether, having an excess of motion over the nebulas,
would impart some of its motion to them, and gradually dissolve
them till the whole of the nebulse were amalgamated with ether
into one homogeneous mass. On what principle can Mr. Spencer
justify the supposition that the nebulse could part with their
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Motion does not pass away into space and exist by. itself apart
from matter it is only transferred to other matter. According
to this theory, it is a constant quantity, and cannot go out of
existence. In the case given, what becomes of it ? Do we not
here find an additional failure of Mr. Spencer s physical explana
tion ?
A difficulty here presents itself with which Mr. Spencer
does not deal. Either we must conceive of the physical universe
as limited or as unlimited. If we conceive of it as unlimited,
then universalistic science is impossible.
&quot;We are, therefore,
bound to think of it as limited ; and if we are bound to think of
it as limited, we are bound to think of motion as quantitatively
constant and as contained within definite confines. The effect of
motion is to separate units of matter, and the law of its transfer
ence can only be that of the equalisation of motion, and conse
quently equal distribution of matter, tending ever to a state
of equilibrium or homogeneity ; that is to say, an equal dis
tribution of matter and motion a state, in fact, of perfect
equilibrium. From this it would appear that equilibration is
the ruling principle under the conduct of which the Formula of
Evolution works.
How, then, if all things arose out of a state of homogeneity,
could there ever have been any evolution or concentration of
the matter of some part of it, with a concomitant dissipation
of another part of it ? It would be inconsistent with the ruling
principle of evolution, namely, equilibration. And even if
slightly disturbed by some external power, would it not im
mediately revert in the most direct manner to its equilibrium ?
If the ruling tendency is equilibration considered as the equal
distribution of matter and motion, and if all changes have to be
accounted for a,s changes from homogeneity, then since homo
geneity is an equal distribution of matter and motion, out of it
no changes could ever arise.
It would really appear that Mr. Spencer is so intent upon evolu
tion that he forgets the concomitance of the other half of his
formula, and having a nebula in his hands, he unceremoniously
throws the superfluous motion overboard into the realms of space,
without ever looking to see what becomes of it.76 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Equilibration is a tendency to the homogeneous, and since
equilibration rules evolution and dissolution, it tends to defeat
evolution, and it is not clear how any evolution can take
place. Therefore, simple mechanical equilibration is not the
ruling principle of the universe, nor the ultimate cause of
its changes, but there is something else which governs the
mutual processes of evolution and dissolution. &quot;What that
something else is nobody can tell, but evidently the something
which rules evolution and dissolution must be the law by which
all knowledge is unified, for all knowledge is knowledge of evo
lutions and dissolutions, and until it is discovered there can be
no such unification.
The most simple instances of evolution and dissolution are
those which occur under the withdrawal or application of that
kind of motion called heat. The application of heat to ice
causes a change into liquid water ; the further application of
heat produces the state of water called steam. The withdrawal
of heat causes a series of reverse changes. And in Mr.
Spencer s imperfect demonstration this seems to be the prin
cipal if not the only view taken of the changes recognised by
the Formula of Evolution. Molecular motion is withdrawn by
some unknown cause from the nebula, and it concentrates. As
before stated, it is not clear whether this nebula is homogeneous
matter or not. If it is, it is not shown why concentration does
not take place uniformly instead of into diversified forms. The
withdrawal of heat, for instance, affects different substances
differently. At the same temperature we have different substances
in all the different states of solid, liquid, and aeriform. The
air, the solids, and the liquids in a room are all about the same
temperature. These different states are not examples of different
amounts of heat, but of the properties of bodies which defy the
uniformity of the concomitance of the concentration of matter
with the dissipation of motion showing again that there must be
some law overriding that of the concomitance of the two which
is Mr. Spencer s Formula or law of Evolution. According to
the formula, the more dense an object the less motion, and the
greater tenuity the greater motion. According to the degree
cf density the degree of molecular motion.THE HYPOTHESIS OF TWO FACTORS. 77




forgetfulness of the conditions of the formula of Evolution and
Dissolution and the course of the previous argument ; for he
says, 183
:
&quot;Apparently the universally co-existent forces of attraction
and repulsion, which, as we have seen, necessitate rhythm in
all minor changes throughout the Universe, also necessitate
rhythm in the totality of its changes produce now an immea-
snrahle period during which the attractive forces predominating,
cause universal concentration, and then an immeasurable period
during which the repulsive forces predominating, cause universal
diffusion alternate eras of Evolution and Dissolution.&quot;
Here we have the forces of attraction and repulsion set down
as causing alternation instead of concomitance. In the place
of a concomitance of evolution and dissolution, which is the
essence of the formula of Evolution and Dissolution, we have
alternate eras of each. Surely this is a plain contradiction of
theory.
Another curious inconsistency in the working out of the
theory is the doctrine of &quot;locked-up&quot; motion. ^Nitrogenous
compounds specially possess this property of being able to
&quot; lock
up&quot; motion gunpowder, gun-cotton, nitre-glycerine,some
of the compounds of organic matter, all possess it. It is one oi
the properties of organic matter which is essential to the higher
evolutionary stages; without it, biological development could
not take place. Yet it is contradictory to the Formula of Evolu
tion, which is to the effect that the more motion the less inte
gration, and to the theory of the Continuity of Motion, which
proclaims that motion is always going on and never stops. So
that the Formula and its sustaining doctrine fail us just in the
most interesting and important of our studies.
In the argument of this sub-section we have been obliged to
attach definite notions to the terms with which we have to deal,
namely, Matter and Motion
; and we have had to take them, if
not as realised abstractions, still as near to that form as possible.
This means that we have de-specialised our notions as far as
was in our power ; nevertheless, all the value or meaning in
the whole of the argument lies in whatever remains of con-;8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
crete connotation. Since Mr. Spencer would repudiate these
concrete meanings as far as he could, we cannot suppose that it
is in this aspect that he would estimate their value. Yet if we
take away their concrete contents there is nothing left to give
them any meaning, and therefore, in every respect, Ave recognise
the inutility of this method.
10. Tlie Supraphysical Methods of the Unification ofKnow
ledge, and Mr. Spencer s Use of them.
Nevertheless it is to this class of method that Mr. Spencer
really looks for the unification of knowledge.
For instance, he regards matter as something more than a
mystical and incomprehensible entity, as more than a mere
abstract term, as more than a subjective phenomenon, as
different from the simple sum-total of the so-called elements.
And the same remarks may be made of other terms which he
uses, such as Force, Forces, Motion, Attraction, Resistance,
Special Polarity, Equilibration, Integration, Dissipation, &c.
The whole aim of the book on




is to establish a science of the sciences a science
which is not a mere mysticism or subjective speculation, and
which yet goes beyond the limits of the narrow concrete sciences,
even though, being founded on them by a process of still higher
generalisation, its terms and propositions are not beyond the
intelligent comprehension of the human mind. It is true,
indeed, that Mr. Spencer denies all this, as will come under our
notice in the next section
; but we do maintain that such is
the intent and general purport of this part of his works, and
the impression produced by them upon the mind of the student.
&quot;\Vo justify our statement by the argument that by such a
science of the sciences alone and by such methods alone can
physical science be unified, and we are taught to look forward
to it from the outset of Mr. Spencer s works. This view of Mr.
Spencer s attempt is borne out by a perusal of his chapters on
the Indestructibility of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and
the Persistence of Force, in the book on &quot;The Knowable.&quot;
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something higher and wider than, the so-called elements and
their relations, and are so used in the enunciation of supra-
physical truths, such as
&quot; The Persistence of Relations among
Forces,&quot;
&quot; The Transformation and Equivalence of Forces,&quot;
&quot;The Direction of Motion,&quot; &quot;The Ehythm of Motion,&quot;
&quot; The Formula of Evolution,&quot; &quot;Segregation,&quot; &quot;Equilibration,&quot;
&c.
It is the duty of the student to see whether the attempt so
made by Mr. Spencer is carried out carefully or not, to the
exclusion of metaphysical abstractions, which have no meaning
and represent no actualities of the processes of the cosmos
;
whether the result is or is not vitiated by the introduction of
the mystical ; whether the subjective is properly eliminated ;
whether the general theory is justified either as a rigid induc
tion from facts or as a deduction corresponding with facts ;
whether the unification only to be accomplished by one or other
of these methods is merely simulated by the applicability of
identical descriptions to various classes of processes ; whether,
in fact, the science of the sciences so attempted is kept free
from mixture with all other methods of thought and from
obscurities of reasoning, and moreover is made not only clear
and intelligible, as all scientific statements should be, but also
is shown to be sufficient to account for all the interrelations of
existences.
11. The Method of Cumulative Factors.
We do not say that Mr. Spencer anywhere teaches the
theory of an unification of science by means of cumulative
factors, but in several places he speaks of
&quot; additional factors
&quot;
coming in which assist the progress of evolution, and we feel
justified in considering the subject specially, in case of any
student being misled by the suggestion of such a method.
It is obvious that if we undertake to explain any complicated
state of existence as the resultant of the relations of certain
original factors, the explanation, if effected, will be held to be
complete in itself. If it be a chemical explanation, the results
will all be shown as due to the relations of certain of tho8o SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
chemical elements. If it be an arithmetical calculation, the
result is involved in the statement of the problem under the
laws of the relations of arithmetical combinations. Again, all the
intermediate stages, from the commencement to the result, are
equally due to the relations of the original factors. We should
not say of them, whatever phase they might present, that they
constituted &quot;additional factors.&quot; Yet this is what Mr. Spencer
does in the exposition of his scheme. Each stage of complexity
becomes an additional factor in the progress of Evolution. Now
it can easily be understood that advancement in complexity,
when once established, helps forward the general progress of
the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, by establishing addi
tional causes of heterogeneity in varied modes of relationship
with the new conditions of the environment. But it is mislead
ing to say that any new combination being the direct result
of original factors constitutes a new factor. It is an incident
in the general process, but nothing new is added so far as
the enumeration of the factors of the general process is con
cerned.
Therefore we cannot suppose that Mr. Spencer seriously
advances the general theory of the evolution of the cosmos by
means of cumulative factors. At the same time, the exposition
of his theory here and there by means of this mode of expression
is apt to mislead the student, and should be duly noted in
advance. For if the reader of Mr. Spencer s works became
impressed with the notion that new or additional factors came
into the cosmical process now and again, it is clear that he would
not properly understand Mr. Spencer s design of reading its
history as one process from first to last, the understanding of
which is the unification of knowledge.
It is easy to trace the steps by which he would be misled.
For instance, he would suppose that highly complex molecules
formed by the natural relationships of elementary atoms should
be regarded as additional factors in the relations of things. And
again, when these complex molecules by ordinary physical laws
or by chance contiguity formed themselves into small masses, he
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fiable, sensitive, formed fresh factors in the cosmical series.
And he might then make the mistake of regarding &quot;sensitiveness&quot;
as the new factor, and not only so, but he might even suppose
that sensitiveness, being a noun, was the name of some entity
actually existent in the universe, and a factor in its processes,
instead of regarding it as a name for the mechanical instability
of certain highly complex compounds of the chemical elements.
And if he did so, it is obvious he could make no greater mis
take in the pursuit of a strictly logical and deductive procedure.
But if he did make such an error, the step would be easy to the
supposition of feeling or consciousness, and by very easy grada
tions he could arrive at organised consciousness. The new
factor expressed by the term
&quot;
sensitiveness,&quot; although ex
pressive of delicate mechanical relations, easily lends itself to
subjective applications, and through the verbal tie of association,
a new factor of Feeling might make its appearance in the cos
mical sequences. And although Mr. Spencer may be careful to
explain that Feeling is not a factor in biological actions and
development, yet the student finds great difficulty in bearing
this in mind.
In one sense, each new combination is a new individual
factor in its environment, as each man or woman taking his or
her place in the world is a new factor in society ; and in any
account of a partial history, the advent of such a new individual
may be regarded as the addition of a new factor. But in a
cosmical explanation there can be no new factors
; all has to be
accounted for as from resultant original factors as the product
of the original constituents ; and it is misleading to speak of
additional factors unless it is well understood that it is a mere
mode of convenience of expression. At the same time, it con
veys a dangerous suggestion in a system of which the essential
thought is the logical explanation of all things as a single
process due to the relations of a small number of original
factors.
Again, the danger is enhanced if the student, believing in
the possibility of new or additional factors appearing in the
progress of evolution, believes also in similar accretions to the
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physical laws. For instance, after mastering the meaning of
the term &quot;equilibration&quot; in dynamic, he might admit a new
factor in that class of physical changes called biological in Mr.
Spencer s special law of biological equilibration, by which
animals and plants endeavour to preserve their existence by the
adaptation of inner forces to meet destructive forces in the
present or prospective environment. His mind having been
weakened and his logical faculty rendered less acute by pre
vious familiarity with the admission of additional factors, he
might be ready to admit new and additional laws of dynamics,
and in this complexity of confusion he might lose the logical
connection with his original conception of a single and continu
ous process of the cosmos resulting from certain understood
primordial agencies.
This section is inserted not on the supposition that Mr.
Spencer anywhere teaches the theory of cumulative factors
except as incidents in the consequents of original general
factors, but by way of guarding the student from mistakes
he might make in the interpretation of the author s language.
1 2. The Symbolic Method for the Unification of
Knowledge,
&quot;VVe think that if charged with any of the foregoing methods
of the unification of knowledge, Mr. Spencer would deny the
imputation, and say that his critic misunderstood him. It
would appear to be the peculiarity of Mr. Spencer s system that
his unification of knowledge is effected by means of the discern
ment of the relation of unknowable entities, which entities cannot
be represented in thought, and have to be symbolised by certain
signs. It seems that unknowable powers, although manifested
as such and such, cannot be regarded as known, even although
their relationship to one another can be known. It appears
that this knowledge of relationship between them is in one
sense sufficient for the unification of knowledge, yet in anotherTHE SYMBOLIC METHOD. 83
sense it is insufficient, in that the entities of which we know
the relationship are unknowable. It appears that we are not
allowed to unify knowledge within the bounds of these know-
able relationships, but must introduce symbols standing for the
Unknowable Powers. &quot;We are not allowed to use symbols
standing for known factors, but are obliged to use symbols
standing for unknowable entities. These entities can only be
represented by symbols, and when we say that Matter, Motion,
and Force are the entities in question, and are unknowable
in themselves, but yet are fully known in their interrelation
ships, insomuch that knowledge can be unified by means of a
proposition or formula expressive of their relationship, the
knowledge of what they are
&quot; in themselves
&quot; would seem not
to be necessary at all, and any reference to them by means of
symbols to be quite out of place. We are fully satisfied if we
can unify knowledge by means of the proposition specifying
the mutual relationship. But according to Mr. Spencer, Matter,
Motion, and Force are terms that are not allowed to stand for
known factors, but must stand for the unknowable, yet dif
ferentiated factors, and mean no more than x, y, and z. In
another place this subject is fully considered. Symbols as a
rule stand for something that is known, and are supposed to
have no value unless they stand for something. But according
to Mr. Spencer s peculiar and unique position, they stand for
something or somethings that we do not know, but which are
yet of such a nature that when the relationship between them
is expressed, the proposition in which they occur has a mean
ing. Thus, for instance, if we say that the integration of
x is concomitant with the dissipation of y, the proposition
has a meaning, although we do not know what x and y
stand for. Evidently the meaning is to be gathered from the
relationship of x and y as expressed in the terms integration
and dissipation. Now the only meaning we can attach to
integration is &quot;mutual approach,&quot; and the only meaning we
can attach to dissipation is the transference of the dispartive
power. These seem to imply units which have extension, for
how otherwise can we attach any meaning to &quot;approach to
gether
&quot;
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also get our meaning only by supposing units having extension
being further separated from each other. Therefore we are
forced by the necessities of the case to make x stand for the
units of extension and y stand for the separative power which
is transferred. We cannot, in a general description of changes,
use the terms integration and dissipation without supposing
an extended something which integrates or dissipates. To
say, then, that x and y have no definite meaning is not
correct. If they symbolise more than the mere extension and
dissipation, whatever more they symbolise is of no value or
account whatsoever. What they do symbolise of the knowable
is all that we have to do with, and is all that is expressed
in a proposition in which they occur.
&quot; The inmost nature or essence of a Thing is apt to be re
garded as something unknown, which, if we knew it, would
explain and account for all the phenomena which the thing
exhibits to us. But this unknown something is a supposition
without evidence. We have no ground for supposing that
there is anything which, if known to us, would afford to our
intellect this satisfaction ; would sum up, as it were, the know-
able attributes of the object in a single sentence. Moreover,
if there were such a central property, it would not answer to the
idea of an inmost nature
; for if knowable by any intelli
gence, it must, like other properties, be relative to the intelli
gence which knows it, that is, it must consist in impressing
that intelligence in some specific way ; for this is the only idea
we have of knowing ; the only sense in which the verb to
know means anything.
&quot;It would, no doubt, be absurd to assume that our words
exhaust the possibilities of Being. There may be innumerable
modes of it which are inaccessible to our faculties, and which
consequently we are unable to name. But we ought not to
speak of these modes of Being by any of the names we possess.
These are all inexplicable, because they all stand for known
modes of Being. We might invent new names for the un
known modes
; but the new names would have no more meaning
than the x, y, z of Algebra.&quot;*
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According to this, Mr. Spencer is unwise in using the terms
Matter, Motion, and Force to represent the unknowable yet
differentiated Powers, because they stand for known modes of
Being, and if he wishes words to stand for the unknown modes
he ought to use the symbols x, y, and z, and then they have no
more meaning than when used in Algebra as blank forms of O O
equations, of no value until a meaning is put into them. But
Mr. Spencer could not afford to translate the term Matter
wherever he uses it into the sign x, Motion into y, and Force
into z. Let the student try it, and he will find in every case
that he either means nothing at all, or that he has concrete
implications, as in the case considered above. Mr. Mill con
siders the resort to x, y, and z a resort to blankness, the ne phis
ultra of speculative absurdity. Mr. Spencer considers it the
highest attainment of philosophical research.
Mr. Spencer s repudiation of special and limited meanings for
his principal terms when hard pressed by criticism is a mere
evasion. It is a means by which, when any definite meaning
attached to his terms is found to embarrass the unification of
knowledge in any given proposition, the proposition may be held
to be good on the understanding that the principal terms mean
something, but we do not know what. In this way they may take,
one after the other, all the definite meanings that can be assigned
to them, plus something elsewhich shall make up for their deficien
cies
; and the unification of knowledge is then effected by terms
which include every meaning that can be placed upon them.
The final unification of knowledge is effected through an
amalgamation of all the methods by means of symbols which
will receive any and all meanings. We beg to submit that this
is not the method of unification which Science has a right to
demand. Science requires that the ultimate truth of induction
should be clearly and intelligibly expressed. Logic requires
that the ultimate truth from which all others are deducible
should be an intelligible proposition having definite terms. What
Mr. Spencer has given us is changeful, incoherent, unintelligible
as a whole, and in any of its intelligible forms is insufficiently
founded on induction, and incapable deductively of reproducing
the universe and its history.86 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
13. Simulations of Unification.
This review of Mr. Spencer s methods for the unification of
knowledge would not be complete without a notice of several
simulations of unification which present themselves throughout
his works, sometimes inmost important conjunctures, and which
give the appearance of unity of process without the reality and
without the logical continuity required. These methods and
the effect upon the mind do not depend upon the formulation of
an all-embracing proposition at all, but upon the common appli
cability of descriptive terms. A certain parallelism between
different processes is discerned, and without attempting to
identify these processes in their relations of historical depend
ence, or to explain them as outcomes of some common original
factors, it is deemed sufficient to generalise their common char
acteristics, so that by composing a description which is appli
cable to them in common, a false and delusive unification of
knowledge is thereby effected. If we have to describe the
history of a complex physical world, we have to describe a
history of change in which the raw material, by a process (let
us say) of cooling, was enabled gradually to enter into relations
of mutual combination. Again, if we have to describe the
history of organisms, we have to recount a history of gradual
differentiation and insensible development.
&quot;We find that the
general characteristics of these two histories is an advance by
insensible gradations from a state of incoherent, indefinite,
simple homogeneity to a state of coherent, definite, complex
heterogeneity. A study of mental history exhibits the same
characteristics, and this identity of the characteristics of these
histories gives an outside semblance of unity that is made to
pass for the unity itself. But so long as the wttole of the three
processes are not shown to be the results of the same compre-
hendable original factors, this unity is in reality not effected.
The persistent manner in which this similarity of character
istic is presented to us throughout Mr. Spencer s works, and his
continual assertion of the harmony or conformability of various
processes to these characteristics of
&quot; evolution in
general,&quot; pro
duces in the mind the desired effect. Moreover, it producesSIMULATIONS OF UNIFICATION. 7
the effect of throwing the attention on the Formula of Evolu
tion in which these general characteristics are formally expressed,
thus raising the conviction of the effectiveness of that formula
in the unification of knowledge. Yet, when examined, this
constant reference to the Formula of Evolution will be found
to be of a very superficial character. For it is not the appli
cation of the formula in its entirety to any case under con
sideration
; it is only the taking out of a part of the formula
and seeing that it applies. The formula was expressly stated
in advance to be the formulation of the relations of three origi
nal factors, but one of them has been omitted altogether. The
two factors left were Matter and Motion, and the essence of
the formula was the concomitance of the integration of the one
with the dissipation of the other. But in the instances referred
to, this concomitant process is utterly ignored, as are also the
two factors themselves ; and the applicability of the formula is
held to be good, and the unification of knowledge is held to be
valid, if it be found merely that the histories of all combina
tions present an advance from a state of incoherent indefinite
homogeneity to a state of coherent definite heterogeneity. If
the unification of knowledge is effected by means of the Formula
of Evolution, it is because that Formula is taken to pieces, and
part of it applied here and part there. It is not universally
applied in its integrity.
The second simulation of unification is effected by the frequent
use of an important word which occurs in the Formula of
Evolution, a word which in like manner is dissociated from
the factors the law of the interrelation of which the formula is
supposed to express. This word is then set up in business
for itself and is very effective. It is
&quot;
Integration.&quot; If the
history of all processes includes a progress from a state of inco
herent, indefinite homogeneity to a state of coherent, definite
heterogeneity, it is a history of the mutual combinations of
various original factors, whether these factors be ultimate units
of attraction and resistance, or atoms of the so-called elements, or
of physiological units, or feelings, or sounds, or men, or what not.
It is a history of combinations of units, of combinations of
compounds, of combinations of aggregates, of combinations of88 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
complex aggregates. It is evident that whether these are
interdependent or not, whether they are all results of two
or of many original factors, or whether there be new factors
and accessions of forces in the course of their histories, the
history of the whole of them is still one of combinations
and continuous combinations
; or let us call the process one of
continuous
&quot;
integration.&quot; Then integration is expressive of
the principal characteristic of this history, and any theory of
combination or series of combinations to which the term
&quot; inte
gration&quot; can be applied is found to conform to &quot;evolution in
general ;
&quot;
for is it not one of the principal terms in the Formula
of Evolution? Yet when we come to examine its place in the
formula, we find that its application is confined to the integra
tion of matter, and is made strictly concomitant, as the very
essence of the formula, with the dissipation of motion.
But how does Mr. Spencer apply it in the course of his
works ? Language is integrated, feelings are integrated, expe
riences are integrated, the whole intellectual and moral history
of man in society is a series of integrations. The question is,
are they integrations of Matter accompanied by dissipations of
Motion ? There is no pretence that they are. The Formula
of Evolution, then, is straightway abandoned, and the unifica
tion of knowledge is simulated by the word
&quot;
integration,&quot;
which expresses a general characteristic of all evolutions, with
out disclosing its factors, nor the nature of their interrelations
by Avhich the steps and interdependence of the actual events in
their history could be understood.
In our previous criticism we referred to several instances, and
we now refer the student to the
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; Part iii. chap, x.,
for further illustrations of this deceptive method of treatment.
Here Mr. Spencer speaks of the integrations of correspondences
of the inner organism with complex circumstances of the environ
ment, and through this progressive integration suggests the
unity of intellectual evolution with evolution in general. Yet
there is no explanation of integration of correspondences, nor
how it is comprised within the Formula of Evolution, which
treats of the integration of Matter and the concomitant dis
sipation of Motion. This is a simulation of unity, but notGENERAL SUMMARY. 89
the unity that is only to be effected by means of a general truth
from which all the changes of the universe are deducible.
Again, in considering
&quot; the substance of mind,&quot; Mr. Spencer
says
*
&quot; It is possible, then may we not even say probable
1 that
something of the same order as that which we call a nervous
shock is the ultimate unit of consciousness; and that all the
unlikenesses among our feelings result from unlike modes of
integration of this ultimate unit.&quot;
Thus the word
&quot;
integration,&quot; being capable of expressing
combinations and associations in all the sciences, is able to give
the appearance of unificatory efficiency to any formula in
which it is used when the particular limitations of it and the
specified conditions attached to it are ignored.
And againt
&quot; Possible answers are at once supplied if we assume that
diverse feelings are produced by diverse modes, and degrees, and
complexities, of integration of the alleged ultimate unit of con
sciousness.&quot;
It cannot be pretended that the integration here referred to
is identical with the integration of the Formula of Evolution.
14. General Summary.
As before observed, the course of this criticism has not been
the examination of one distinct theory for the unification of
knowledge clearly stated by Mr. Spencer, nor even of several
conflicting methods set out in definite language. It has been
the examination of several sets of propositions, each of which
might be justifiably represented as the one which Mr. Spencer
advances, in all the various meanings of which they are capable.
Each separate proposition or examination, under the heads of
Mystical, Metaphysical, Physical, Supraphysical, or Symbolical,
has proved inadequate either on the ground of indefiniteness of
meaning or on the ground of inadequacy of effect, in affording
us the requisite means of unifying knowledge. And our argu-
*
Principles of Psychology, vol. i. p. 151. t Ibid., p 154.90 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
merit is, that since each in itself is insufficient for our purpose,
so are all taken together. The ordinary reader is apt to suppose,
in the vast and diverse fields of knowledge through which, he
passes, that if words and phrases suitable to the processes of
a special science have other meanings applicable to the processes
of other sciences, then in this verbal and accidental similarity
there exists essential identity ; but careful examination will
show that no such identity of the processes under study really
exists, and that the supposed unification of knowledge is a trick
of words only.
It has been our duty to define in what the unification of
knowledge would really consist, and to insist upon a rigid and
inflexible method of procedure and statement. We have shown
that the goal must be worked up to by processes of induction
from the knowledge embodied in actual science, and that if
hypotheses are framed, they must be intelligible, and must be
capable of verification deductively by a process of drawing
corollaries, which corollaries shall represent the actual processes
of nature. We have also expressed our doubt as to the possi
bility of such an attainment, and have reserved for treatment
in another volume the attitude of the mind with regard to the
Unknowable Power as a factor in Ethics and Sociology generally.
The reader may perhaps think that in the foregoing examina
tion we have insisted too rigidly upon the logical consistency
and conclusiveness of the philosophic attempt, and that after
all, although Mr. Spencer s theory may be wanting in logical
consistency, yet that he really has constructed a philosophical
system which only wants a clearer and more consistent state
ment. He may think that the work has been done in the
rough, and only wants going over again. We would willingly
think so, but cannot see our way to this conclusion. We think
that the attempt is so ambitious, so immensely beyond the
reach of knowledge, that it is an impossible attainment now, if
not for ever. We will consider in another place the true merits
of Mr. Spencer s work, which we have no wish to disparage ;
but as a system of philosophy pitched in the high aim which
Mr. Spencer expressly claims for it, his or any other system
must be a failure. We think this will be the more apparentGENERAL SUMMARY. gi
when wo have completed this work by the criticism of the
&quot;
Principles of Biology.&quot;
It may, again, be thought that the identity of methods of
development and the apparent universality of the Laws of
Force throughout all the activities of Physics, Biology, and
Sociology afford the requisite unification of knowledge. These
are, as before remarked, very suggestive of community of origin
and of identity of process ; but in the absence of a complete
knowledge of the original factors in their relations, and more




&quot; in respect to the physical factors, it is quite
impossible to understand the history of the cosmos, including
organisms, as a series of sequences from these original factors,
yet this is requisite in order to put meaning into a theory of
identity of methods of development and universality of Laws of
Force.
Again, it may be said that the unification of knowledge and
the goal of Philosophy may not be attained perhaps by Mr.
Spencer in the deduction of corollaries from one ultimate
truth, and that he is too severe upon himself when he imposes
it upon his system, but that it may be attained, and has been
effected by him, in the statement of a body of truths, related
and consistent, and together affording a full explanation of the
history of the cosmos, including Biology. We admit that the
unification of knowledge and the construction of a cosmical
theory might theoretically be effected in this way, and the
requirements of the logical faculty be fully satisfied
; but again
we venture to submit that Mr. Spencer has not stated any such
connected and complete theory. He has formulated a number
of truths, some of them valuable, and others of them very crude,
as in the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; but they do not cohere in that organic and
scientific interdependence which is requisite ; nor are they
stated in that scientific and intelligible language which is
essential to true philosophy.
The remainder of this book will be occupied by the con
sideration in Chapter II. of Mr. Spencer s re-statement of his
position contained in the recently published Appendix to &quot;First
Principles \
&quot;
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subjects ; by a detailed study in Chapter IV. of the
&quot;
Principles
of Psychology,&quot; so far as regards the unification of knowledge ;
and by a criticism in Chapter V. of Mr. Spencer s very interest
ing and ambitious attempt to deduce the histories of biological
development from certain original factors. &quot;We shall find, we
believe, in all these studies that Mr. Spencer does not keep the
one clear aim before him with which he sets out that he does
not keep to a single intelligible method but that his ends and
methods are of that uncertain and changeful character with
which we have charged him in this introductory chapter. We
believe that these detailed studies will be found to justify the
criticisms now made, and to show that Mr. Spencer has failed
to produce a consistent and complete work. At the same time
we testify our admiration for the attempt, and still more for
some grand generalisations in special departments, and we do
not regard his failure as due to any other cause than the
impossibility of the attainment of the end proposed. Fortu
nately for the sake of continued intellectual activity, there still
remains a vast Unknown and an impenetrable Unknowable.CHAPTER II.
REPLY TO MR. SPENCER S CRITICISM!.
i. Justification of our Previous Criticism.
OUR former examination of Mr. Spencer s
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
was undertaken on the supposition that the object sought after
was the unification of knowledge, and the methods by which
this unification is to be effected have now been more fully
considered. At the same time we then clearly recognised that
such unification was only to be accomplished when all processes
could be recognised as corollaries of some primordial truth or
set of factors. These factors we took to be the Indestructibility
of Matter, the Continuity of Motion, and the Persistence of
Force. Our first course of criticism was to the effect that, if we
attached any definite meanings to the terms employed, we would
find our ultimate factors insufficient to explain many processes,
more especially the processes of Biology and the processes of
Feeling and Intelligence. Seeing that Mr. Spencer advanced
the Formula of Evolution as the formula of the interrelation of
the three factors, WQ took that as the main subject of investiga
tion, and found that, whatever definite meaning we attached
to the terms therein employed, we were unable to work out our
deductive process in the respects just specified.
In this conclusion it would appear we are quite justified, for
Mr. Spencer says in his reply that any definite conception of
them involves alternative impossibilities of thought. These
definite conceptions of a materialistic and mechanical char
acterwere the subjects of our previous criticism. Taken on
its own merits, such an investigation is useful, and by bring
ing it out into a clear statement, helps to disillusionise the94 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
mind of any one who -would be inclined to suppose that these
materialistic explanations were sufficient to account for biological
and psychical histories. Taken as a piece of criticism of Mr.
Spencer, it may or may not be judged applicable. We distin
guished in our own minds between the chapters in the book on
the Unlmoicable dealing with ultimate scientific ideas, as treating
of these ideas &quot;in their ultimate nature&quot; or what they are &quot;in
themselves, and the chapters explaining Matter, Motion, and
Eorce in the book on the Knowable, as defining them for future
use in the attempt at the unification of knowledge. It did not
occur to us that we could unify knowledge by means of terms
that had no definite meanings. This theory we shall therefore
discuss separately. In the meantime we justify our criticism of
Mr. Spencer from the point of view of having definite meanings
by references to chapters treating of them in the book on the
Kuowable.
And first as to
&quot;
Matter.&quot; At page 167 we find :
&quot; We may therefore deliver ourselves over without hesitation
to those terms of thought which experience has organised
in us. We need not, in our physical, chemical, or other
researches, refrain from dealing with Matter as made up of
extended and resistant atoms
; for this conception, necessarily
resulting from our experiences of Matter, is not less legitimate
than the conception of aggregate masses as extended and resistant.
The atomic hypothesis, as well as the kindred hypothesis of an
all-pervading ether consisting of molecules, is simply a necessary
development of those universal forms which the actions of the
Unknowable have wrought in us. The conclusions logically
worked out by the aid of these hypotheses are sure to be in
harmony with all others which these same forms involve, and
will have a relative truth that is equally complete.&quot;
A further justification may be found in the fact that Mr.
Spencer, adopting the nebular hypothesis, which regards all
changes as incidents in the cooling of a primordial nebula,
must consider that all changes are resultants of the properties
and relative quantities and positions of its constituent elements,
which are described in treatises of chemistry.
Yet another justification can be drawn from the actual treat-JUSTIFICATION OF PREVIOUS CRITICISM. 95
ment of the processes of biology by Mr. Spencer himself, in
which, starting -with the factors from which they are all merely
resultants, he enumerates these as oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen,
carbon, &c.
, for internal factors ; and heat, light, motion, &c.
,
for external factors. It is true that Mr. Spencer does not
explain the cause of the differentiations of the so-called elements
oxygen, hydrogen, &c., and so much the worse for the unification
of knowledge. But heat, light, motion, &c., he professes to be





are merely regulative attractions and
repulsions dependent in some manner upon sizes and shapes.
In fact, it is due to our having definite notions of these that
his science of biological interpretation is at all justifiable in its
very first inception. As a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer through
out his works uses the terms Matter, Motion, &c., in their




supposes we do not know what he means by them, and never
tells us that all he refers to is x, y, and z : we do not think he
even once uses these symbols.
We are further justified by a study of Dissolution ; for if
we are to reason from aggregates to constituents, following Mr.
Spencer, we have to argue the properties of the atoms of the
so-called elements from what we know of the aggregates ; and
the unification of knowledge is not complete, according to the




is less precise ;
*
indeed, it is so
obscure that it does not seem capable of scientific or logical use.
The conception of Motion involves conceptions of Space, Time,
and Matter. A something (i.e., Matter) that moves, a series
of positions (i.e., positions relative to other things) occupied in
succession, and a group of constant positions (i.e., of other
things) united in thought with the successive (i.e., relative)
ones these are the constituents of the idea. Mr. Spencer pro
ceeds to trace up the conception of Motion to experiences of
Force, but what we require to know is the precise sense in which
Motion is to be used in the formulas, scientific generalisations,
and logical uses of the book on the Knowable.
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The definition of
&quot;
Force&quot; as it is to be used in the book on
the Knowable, as distinguished from its use in the book on the
Unknowable, is still more indefinite and confusing. Surely, as
one of those factors in the formulation of the relations of which
is to be found the unification of knowledge, and which is to be
a constituent in the proposition by which is to be explained all
the processes of the physical and biological sciences, we are en
titled to look for a precise definition. How otherwise are we
to understand our propositions, or how can they be real and not
pretentious generalisations of knowledge ?
What do we find ? We find ourselves at once plunged into
confusion. Instead of Force being a co-equal factor with two
other factors, making a total of three, the interrelations of which
have to be formulated it is at once stated to be that from which
Matter and Motion are built up.
&quot; Matter and Motion, as we
know them, are differently conditioned manifestations of Force.&quot;
We are permitted to know Matter and Motion, the first as
&quot; extended and resistant atoms,&quot; having the chemical and
physical properties ascribed to them in scientific treatises ; and
we are permitted to know Motion, but scarcely as a factor, only
as a phenomenal result a relative series of positions ; and then
we find that the third factor, Force, is nothing but as mani
fested in the other two namely, Matter and Motion Force
itself being inscrutable. These are the scientific definitions
upon which we are to base our formulas and propositions of the
Knowable, and by which its sequences and relations are to be
explained. This attempt is made to the best of our ability in
our previous work keeping within the bounds of intelligibility
and we found it to fail. We attempted to work it out by
means of every intelligible meaning that could be attached to
the terms, and Mr. Spencer s reply to it is that these were not
the meanings he attached to them, and thinks we were unjust
in attributing such meanings to him. Let him then give us his
own intelligible and precise definitions, and we shall be glad to
do our work over again.
However, to resume the statement of our previous criticism,
we have to remind the reader that, on the failure of the mate
rialistic explanations, we called his attention to the fact that
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essential factors in his formula, all of which were necessary in
the explanation of things, yet he had omitted the one from
which we had been led to expect the most namely, the terrn
&quot;Force.&quot; Here we found (like Mr. Spencer, no doubt) that we
could not include it, and also we found, like him, that it had
no definite meaning. This seemed to show that the unification
of knowledge could not be effected by the aid of this term. At
the same time, we now know from Mr. Spencer that this unifi
cation can be accomplished by terms of which we do not know
the meaning ; and we shall resume the consideration of the
value of this term in this aspect, and of the method of unifi
cation by means of symbolism, in a special section of this
chapter.
Part IV. of the previous criticism consisted of a study of Mr.
Spencer s exposition with the view of framing a formula which
should be a general expression of it. Here we found that the most
general characteristic of all processes was to be found not in the
&quot;nouns&quot; but in the &quot;verbs&quot; not in matter and motion, force





would most likely be found to agree with Mr. Spencer s theory
that knowledge can be unified by a formula expressive of the
most general relations of factors, the factors themselves being
unknowable. This theory is the same as the one just referred
to as unification by means of symbolism, hereafter to be spe
cially considered. In our previous criticism we framed a formula
in the sense indicated, endeavouring to make the factors inde
finite and their relations precise. It was as follows :
&quot; Evolution is integration, during which every existence
passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity, to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity, and during which the activities undergo
a parallel transformation.&quot;
The fault of this formula is that it is not a proposition from
which corollaries can be made, so as to deduce the whole process
of the universe, but a merely outside description of the process.
A second defect lies in the fact that the concomitance of the
dissipation of something else as a correlative of integration would
have to be abandoned. Of course it could be said
&quot;Dissolution is disintegration, during which&quot; the converse
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happens ; and it could be added
&quot; Evolution and dissolution
are necessarily concomitant.&quot;
But even then the formula would fail, taken simply as an
universal description ; for there are some integrations which do
not seem to have any concomitant dissipations such as the
integrations of languages, of music, of biological correspon
dences in general, of psychological correspondences in general,
or again the integrations of machinery, of trades, of professions,
and of sociology generally.
And then, in any case, it is only a mode of definition of
words ; it explains the meaning of the words evolution and
dissolution by means of other words, integration and disintegra
tion
; these in their turn are only varied expressions for combi
nations and decombinations, which are the very things we wish
to have explained ; and to translate them into the mysterious
words evolution and dissolution is not doing anything at all,
unless they disclose the interdependence of sequences, and the
hnal dependence upon some original calculable factors. The
only gain is that the word evolution has the meaning of deve
lopment by gradual natural processes, and we are made to slip
into a theory unawares, notwithstanding the strictly limited
definition of concentration which Mr. Spencer gives to it when
propounding his formula.





&quot;symbolical,&quot; and represents some process of which we have
no conception ; and, if we attempt to attach to it any definite
meaning, we shall be landed in alternative impossibilities of
thought ; but in every view we take of it, it seems to fail as an
unification of knowledge.
The result of this criticism was to show that any materialistic
and mechanical explanation of the universe was inadequate, and
in these terms is comprised all the properties of the so-called
elements as described in books on chemistry, and all the laws
of the physical relations of bodies, including Polarities, Equili
brations, Motions, &c. This was the clear and definite result
of our study. We do not say that Mr. Spencer is antagonistic
to it. He probably agrees with it. At the same time we assert
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materialistic and mechanical character. In the surpassingly
interesting study of Biology his constructive process is purely
materialistic, as exhibited in our criticism of his exposition of
the origin of organic matter in our former volume, and in our
examination of the Biology in Chapter V. of the present work.
Therefore we hold, despite Mr. Spencer s general admissions of its
insufficiency, nevertheless the most important part of his work is
attempted on the lines of materialistic and mechanical explana
tions, and are open to the criticisms we have advanced. Does
he, or does he not, formally abandon these materialistic explana
tions? If he abandons them, his two volumes on &quot;Biology&quot;
go for nothing. If he does not, then let the objections made
be fairly met and replied to in detail.
There are only two modes of escape from this position of
dilemma. One is by adopting a theory of
&quot;
symbolism,&quot; which
we have already partially considered, and which is the position
taken up by Mr. Spencer in his reply to our criticism, and which





theory, which we shall take
next in order.
2. Considerations leading up to a study of Mr. Spencer s




(a.) On Theories of Knoidedije.
The endeavour to accomplish an unification of knowledge
appears to necessitate a theory of knowledge, and this again
implies a theory of the origin of Psychology. We do not wish
to undertake a treatise upon this science ; yet it is necessary
to give it some consideration in order to understand what Mr.
Spencer means by the summary of his system of Philosophy,
stated in reply to our former criticism at page 579 of his
&quot; First
Principles.&quot;
For our part, we do not see that such a perfect science of
the origin of Psychology is yet possible. Until the fundamental
relationship of the chemical elements towards consciousness isioo SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
capable of being formulated, we do not think that any theory
either of the historic origin of Psychology, as part of one universal
process, or of the Unification of Knowledge, is possible.
Mr. Spencer s system of Psychology, as regards its genesis
and organic development, is one of chemical and mechanical
origin. It forms part of the processes of his Biology, from
which Feeling as a factor is expressly excluded. In biological
development, as will be shown in Chapter V. of this work, Mr.
Spencer relies entirely upon the properties of certain chemical
elements and of the environment, for the most part expressed
in terms of the laws of motion, equilibration, and polarity.
From these result structure and function of organisms and their





second or subjective side to events and effects determined by
these mechanical agencies, without allowing that the processes
are in any way the results of any feeling or consciousness, so
that in a history of origin and development they may bo
altogether excluded.
Founded upon this system of Biology, which may be more
fully studied in the chapters referred to, is Mr. Spencer s system
of Psychology. In his eyes Psychology, regarded historically,
is merely the physiological function of the nervous system.
This system, produced by way of equilibration in response to
forces of the environment, becomes ever more complex and inte
grated ; and since it is accompanied by a subjective aspect,
emotions, feelings, intelligence, and knowledge become more
organised and integrated at the same time. We must confess
we do not see under this system (whatever rough justification
we may find for it in what is called &quot;automatic response&quot; to
environment) how abstract and general ideas and memories can
be localised in structure. But this and many other points of
criticism have to be passed over.








&quot; between the inner organism and the com
plex environment. In pursuance of this process, the nervous
system is differentiated so as to cognise different modes of the
environment : the eye is developed in correspondence with the
ethereal undulations having the subjective aspect of sight andOA
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the colour sense, &c.
; the ear is formed in response to undula
tions of the air having the subjective aspect of the sense of
sound
; and the organs of taste and smell are also similarly
specialised from the rest of the nervous tissue. Why these
different motions or chemical actions should be correlated with
these various subjective affections we do not know, and is
beyond the scope of the mechanical and chemical system under
our consideration.
What we particularly wish to point out in this system is the
fact that according to it there is nothing in the organism save
what has been produced in it directly or indirectly by the
environment, acting in some unknown way upon the chemical
elements of which it consists, such organism being itself, so
to speak, but a part of the external environment in the first
instance. The conclusion we would draw from this is, that
we are able to place full reliance upon the actual experiences
supplied us by our senses. The very organs of sense themselves,
being produced by the environment, have nothing else to justify
their existence : their presence implies the action of the environ
ment upon the organism. On this hypothesis knowledge is
found to be fundamentally trustworthy and to be specifically dif
ferentiated according to the particular modes of action of the
external world upon us. This is direct knowledge, and it con
sists of a countless number of individual experiences, extending
over every moment of our lives.
But in addition to this direct knowledge, there exists
whether capable of a physical interpretation or not, and without
considering the question as to whether Feeling is a factor in
organic development a cognition of these cognitions, a memory
of them, and a discriminating power by which likenesses and
differences are determined, and the order and relations of events
are discerned. What, therefore, results from the exercise of
this faculty within the organism of the race is an interior





Again, we have to leave out of account the question as to
how these secondary products are registered in the actual
organism of the brain and nervous system, so as to render102 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
memory and reasoning functions of some organ. But granted
this, we see how these, not being in direct response to the action
of the environment, may not always be in true correspondence
with it, errors and false notions being the result. The history
of knowledge will then be the history of the endeavours to form
a system of correspondences within this portion of the nervous
system with the vastness and complexity of the external world.
In the attempt to grasp this vastness and complexity within
the purview of a limited intellect, various devices have been
resorted to, of which the principal ones have been generalisation
and abstraction. General terms have been formed to sum up
groups of objects of which similar predicates can be asserted ;
but in the common and ordinary use of them they have, often
been transformed from mere terms of totality into imitative
general existences expressed in the singular, though they have
evidently come at last to be regarded as actual individual entities ;
and tlnis a mere idea becomes objectivised, and treated of as if
it actually existed in the environment. The same thing has hap
pened with abstractions. The attributes of bodies, being shared
more or less by other bodies, could be spoken of in the same
terms ; and the effect produced upon the consciousness by simi
larities of action came for convenience to be spoken of by the same
Avord. These abstractions being named in the singular number,
assumed the character of individual existences, and being thus
objectivised, played a part in thought as if they had an indi
vidual objective existence in the surrounding universe. These
objectivised generals and abstractions becoming thus objects
of thought, have played an important part in philosophy and
speculation, giving rise to much error and confusion. Witness
how difficult it is to learn that there is no objectivity answering
to the terms Time and Space that Matter and Motion have no
existence as generals modified into particular modes. This i.s
a hard lesson.
But, on the other hand, the intellect has the power to learn
this lesson, and to correct error and confusion by a recourse to
actual contact with the environment, and a reconstitution of
the internal mental organism. It is able in the development of
a race to move more and more towards establishing a system ofOX THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 103
internal correspondences in accord with the system of external
correspondences. It is able, in the first place, to discern
between the nature of the external action and the nature of the
resulting subjective feeling. It can state the differences of
colour in terms of reflected ethereal undulations, and thus
separate the objective action from the sensational result. The
same process takes place with respect to the differences of
sound. We distinguish between the subjective sensations and
the objective undulations of the air. The probability is that
we shall also be able eventually to discern the varied chemical
action of substances upon the organs of the mouth and nose, and
thus objectively to describe the differences of taste and smell.
Hereupon arises the question how we know things. Do we
know them as they are in themselves, or only as they appear
to us and affect us 1 Is knowledge actual or phenomenal ?
It must be granted at once that fundamental knowledge
is only of the modes by which outward bodies affect us. It will
be true, then, to say that all knowledge is phenomenal ; and it
therefore follows that we can have no absolute knowledge ; and
again, that we cannot know things in themselves or out of
relation to us.
In such statements there is a great mixture of truth and
error. It appears to us that in a great many philosophical
studies at the present time we should commence our thinking
de novo. It has been usual to enter upon philosophical study
in continuance of previous theories. Thus the old questions
remain and the old controversies continue to be beaten out.
But during the last twenty-five years science has made such
immense progress, more particularly in the abstruse studies of
light, heat, molecular physics, and the relations of the energies
of nature, that the whole groundwork of thought is changed.
Moreover, the doctrine of development, and more particularly of
biological evolution, has completely changed the nature of the
problems to be solved and the modes of solving them. These,
taken together, constitute no less than a revolution in philo
sophic thought ; and it seems to us that to pursue the new
studies weighted with the old ideas is a very cumbrous method
of procedure. It is best to bid good-bye for a while to Berkeley,104 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Hume, Kant, and the others, though coming back to them
respectfully afterwards, it may be, to correct and compare.
Even Mill one of the most clear and satisfactory of writers
since he wrote anterior to this revolution of thought, is now
in some respects out of date.
Mr. Mill s favourite object of study is an orange. Let us
take it and ask ourselves what we know of it In the first
place, we know that it is yellow and has a recognisable odour
and flavour. It affects the senses of sight, smell, and taste. In
the next place, it has shape, size, and relative position. In the
third place, it has weight or attraction towards the centre of
the earth.
Various questions have arisen as to what we know of this
orange. Do we only know it as it affects our senses, or do we
know it as it is in itself ? Is the orange yellow, scented, and
sweet or acid in itself, or has it only the properties of affecting
sentient beings in such a manner as to produce in them these
feelings 1 It has been decided that colour, taste, and smell are
not properties of the object, but affections of the senses produced
by the object. The orange is not yellow, odorous, nor sapid
to the table upon which it lies. Science has penetrated the
secret of colour, and is able to assign a physical explanation to
the various colours. The length of a wave of red light is
Red, . . .
Yellow,
. . . .
So, speaking of yellow, we mean objectively waves of ^ 4 ^ 00 of
an inch and the rate of impingement on the retina of the eye ;
or subjectively the feeling produced by these motions upon a
sentient being fitted to cognise them. So again sound has been
explained as undulations of air. Science has not yet been
able in a similar manner to formulate tastes and odours, but
there is every reason to suppose that this will be accomplished
some day. &quot;When it has been done, then, in a similar manner,
each taste and smell will have a physical explanation and a
subjective accompaniment, the correlation of the subjective andO.V THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 105
the objective aspect, however, remaining as yet beyond prospect
of explanation.
The conclusion drawn from this dependence upon the senses
for knowledge has been that all knowledge is phenomenal, and
cannot be freed from the subjective aspect attached to every
cognisance of objectivities. The further conclusion has followed,
that we cannot know things in themselves.
Another mode of stating this conclusion is, that all knowledge
is relative, and that we cannot know things absolutely or as
they exist independently of the cogniser. The discussion of
these theories has been very subtle, and when it has been
complicated by the recognition of objectivised abstractions as
amongst the things-in-themselves which have been considered,
has led to labyrinthine verbiage.
We desire to study the question whether, granting all know
ledge to be relative or phenomenal, we are nevertheless able to
understand and know the objective world in the relations of
things to one another independent of consciousness 1 Whether
there is not within consciousness a fundamental fact which
corresponds with the fundamental fact of the environment by
which the history of the objective universe anterior to the
emergence of consciousness can be understood, and by which
the present objective universe can be understood as it acts
within itself independent of the observant consciousness, and
which constitutes it an independent active external world, and
not mere phantasmagoria of the mind 1
Let us return to our orange and ask what it is in itself?
Well, it is not a thing-in-itself at all
; it is an aggregate, it is
composed of a certain number of atoms of certain of the
chemical elements. We have already considered the question
what these are in themselves, and the orange is but a certain
combination of them.
Moreover, the orange does not exist by itself ; it has relations
to the objects around it, not merely of relative position, but of
actual force. It presses upon the table on which it rests,
it will weigh down one side of a balance, it will break an
insufficient support. [Nothing exists by itself, and therefore
nothing can be studied in itself.io5 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
&quot;We are accordingly forced, with whatever object we start, to
a consideration of the chemical elements; and these we have
already found to be merely bundles of properties in relation to
each other.
The question whether these properties are the actual re
lationships of things amongst themselves, and whether our
knowledge of them is affected by our subjective consciousness,
as is the case with the effects of external actions of objects
upon our senses of colour, taste, and smell, is a very inter
esting one. The fact that there is no colour, no light or
dark, no sound, no taste, no smell, in the objective universe
is difficult for any sentient being to realise ; and when it is
realised, it acts with such impressive force, and affects such a vast
extent of knowledge, that an. universal scepticism sets in, and
everything seems to be unreal. The question suggests itself,
Is the cognition of the universe as reconstituted of differential
relative attractions, resistances, modes and rates of motion,
shapes, sizes, &c., &c., only known to us relatively to our senses, or
do these factors indeed form a cosmos interacting thus indepen
dently of our senses, yet truly cognisable by us ? Is there a com
mon ground upon which, the objective and the subjective meet ?
Science so far seems to say Yes ; and although we cannot say
that we know a thing (i.e., a chemical element) in itself, we can
know things amongst themselves, expressible in terms of attrac
tion, resistance, repulsion, shape, size, modes and rates of motion.
Philosophy in the hands of Mr. Spencer corroborates this
view, as we see in Part VII. of the
&quot;
Psychology.&quot; This part
is valuable in its mode as well as in its results. It is a vindi
cation of reason as overriding the reliability or non-reliability
of the senses, and indeed is a vindication and rectification of
the senses themselves.
We hold that those properties of objects which are known to
us by attractions or resistances in relation to our muscular sense
are known to us as they are amongst themselves, or rather as
they are to that material portion of ourselves which forms Olir
physical frame
; and that all the senses of colour, sound, &c.,
are interpretable in terms of relations of resistance
; that our
bodies and the external world possess a community of attri-O.Y THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE. 107
Lutes which gives us a knowledge of the relations of things
amongst one another a knowledge not of nature, but only of
relation not of original properties, so as to afford knowledge
of actions and sequences, but of the general nature of objective
relationships, independent of subjective impressions.
We can understand by processes of reasoning that the re
lations of external objects to ourselves through the organs of
sight and hearing are relations of muscular resistance ; and
although the nature of the action of odorous and sapid bodies
upon the organs of the nose and mouth is not yet under
stood, yet in the end, no doubt, it will receive a similar
explanation. Mr. Spencer himself argues that this impression
of resistance is the mother-tongue of thought, into which all
language has to be translated. If he had said attraction and
resistance, it would have been a more perfect statement.
Thus we find a physical history long anterior to ourselves, of
which we can take cognisance. Natural operations of physics,
chemistry, &c., which we can cognise, although not witnesses
of their occurrence ; chemical processes which from their
minuteness or gaseous invisibility we cannot perceive ; operations
of physical forces which escape our senses ; all these we can
ideally grasp, although beyond sentiency, by means of the intel
lectual imagination, which, abjuring all feelings but those of
attraction and resistance and their derivatives, is able to inter
pret all the present in these terms, and picture all the past.
So also we have sciences called abstract or exact, which are
universal in their application and precise in their statement,
because they are general truths of these all-constituent factors
of the cosmos. We refer to mechanics, geometry, and mathe
matics. These are sciences of the universal relations of things
amongst themselves, cognisable in the first instance by those
primordial feelings of attraction and resistance of which we
have spoken. They consist of the knowledge of relations of
shape, size, attraction, resistance, and aggregation
: into these,
in all probability, all physical knowledge will ultimately be





independent of the superficial senses.
Hence it will be found that while we hold all knowledgeloS SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
to be relative, yet since we are part of the objective, we can
understand the interrelations of things amongst themselves
independent of sentiency ; that in this sense we can have
absolute knowledge ; but that this absolute knowledge is also in
a sense relative knowledge ; that knowledge is only partly pheno
menal in respect of the superficial senses ; that there is a common
ground on which the phenomenal and the absolute meet, namely,
in the fundamental sense of muscular resistance. This is the
same as Mr. Spencer s teaching that all terms have to be tran
slated in the end into terms of the feeling we call resistance.
This language may seem paradoxical ; but that only shows the
necessity for repudiating a good deal of the old language which
has been used in Philosophy, and indicates why there is so much
discussion about terms, and so much misunderstanding. If
&quot;absolute&quot; means non-relative, there is no absolute knowledge.
If &quot;absolute&quot; means knowledge of things amongst themselves
independently of sentiency, there can be no knowledge without
a sentient being capable of knowing; but yet sentient beings
having fundamental experiences of the bodies with which they
are correlated can have such a knowledge of things amongst
themselves. If &quot;absolute&quot; means knowledge of things in
themselves, since objects only exist in relation, we cannot
know each object individually in itself. All knowledge is
Relative in the double sense of being the relation of things to
the knower
; and of being concerned with objects interrelated
to each other. In a sense all knowledge is phenomenal
: but
in respect of the expression of knowledge in terms of attraction,
resistance, shape, size, &c., it is a real knowledge of the actual
relations of things amongst themselves.
Our general conclusion is, then, that in so far as our knoAV-
ledge consists of colours, light and shade, sounds, smells, odours,
it is phenomenal, and does not represent objectivities, except in
so far as they are the special effects wrought by the attractions,
repulsions, and motions of objectivities upon the senses, but
that these objective actions are not represented by the subjective
terms, which terms are only applicable to the feelings of the
receptive sentient organism.
Again, we hold that we do not know tilings in themselves,OA
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Lut that we only know the chemical elements as bundles of
properties in relation to each other, aggregated into simple and
complex objects called things, which things are related to each
other as results of their constituents and their interrelations ;
that we are therefore capable of forming a science of things
amongst themselves independent of sense, anterior to and sub
sequent to the existence of sentient organisms, which science
can be expressed in terms of attraction, repulsion, resistance,
shape, size, modes and rates of motion.
So far we have treated only of objective science. As regards
subjective knowledge, the knowledge of emotions, thoughts,
ideas, and feelings generally, we are not prepared to treat. Nor
are we in a position to speak of the interrelation and mutual
dependence of subjective and objective. It is still an open
question in our mind how far each is a factor in any action of
an organism, and the question remains over for future study.
As regards the study of
&quot;
things among themselves,&quot; it may





c. Relations of Space
:
Size, Shape, Distance, Position, Aggregation.
A. Relations of Time :
Co-existence, Succession.
These may all be regarded as fundamental knowledge, in
terms &quot;of which all objective knowledge may be expressed; and
if Feeling is not a factor in biological development, then the
history of biological development, as of all other developments,
may be described in these terms, and its causes and conditions
can all be contained within these terms. And inasmuch as the
subjective aspect of these terms corresponds with the actual
interrelationships of external, present, and anterior existences,
the knowledge so expressed is not only phenomenal and relative,
but is also obliterating the word &quot;absolute&quot; from all future
philosophic use a true picture of the history of things amongst
themselves independent of subjective cognisability.no SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
(6.) Digression: being an Examination of the Second Chapter
of Mill s
&quot; Examination of Sir W. Hamilton s Philosophy,&quot;
entitled
&quot; The Relativity of Human Knowledge,&quot;
The doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge is variously
accepted by different philosophers. We might understand
it, as





&quot; We can only know what we have the power of knowing.&quot;
But these, Mr. Mill says, are trivialities, insignificant truisms,
which 110 one ever did or could call in question, and which
apparently are of no value when expressed.
Again, there is an acceptation of the doctrine in which it
means that we only know anything by knowing it as dis
tinguished from something else
; that all consciousness is of
diiference. But this view, although valuable, may be put aside
as not appropriate to our present purpose.
&quot;All language,&quot; says Mr. Mill,* &quot;recognises a distinction
between myself, the Ego, and a world either material or spiritual,
or both, external to me, but of which I can, in some mode or
measure, take cognisance. The most fundamental questions in
Philosophy are those which seek to determine what we are able
to know of these external objects, and by what evidence we
know it.&quot;
Mr. Mill then proceeds to take an object an orange and
study what we know of it. We have already given our study
of it. The conclusion which he comes to is this t
&quot; When thus analysed, it is affirmed that all the attributes
which we ascribe to objects consist in their having the power
of exciting one or another variety of sensation in our minds
;
that to us the properties of an object have this and no other
meaning ; that an object is to us nothing else than that which
affects our senses in a certain manner ; that we are incapable of
attaching to the word object any other meaning.
. . . This is
tho doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge in the simplest,
* Mill on Hamilton, p. 6, second paragraph,
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purest, and, as I think, the most proper acceptation of the
words.&quot;
Mr. Mill then goes on to consider two forms of this doctrine.
Before proceeding with them, let us remark upon the ex
ceedingly narrow view of the subject as taken by Mr. Mill, as,
indeed, by most metaphysicians. The circumstance that always
strikes the reader is the absence of reference to the general
results of science and of large scientific generalisations. Mr.
Mill says.
&quot; Let us take an object.&quot; This object is not considered
as an aggregate of chemical elements, but as
&quot; an object,&quot; an
individual existence.
Again, most metaphysicians, as in this case, content them
selves with a statical view of an object. They do not take
objects in visible action or sensible relation to each other, but
take a single object, as Mr. Spencer does the piano. They
isolate one aggregate, and then study it as far as possible stati
cally
: whereas dynamics is the great natural study. Mr. Mill
says nothing about light and the undulatory motions which
impinge upon the eye, nor about the chemical action of the
material particles which affect the nose and the mouth. Xor
does he speak of the attraction of the orange to the centre of
the earth, nor of the resistance of the table upon which it rests.
By some philosophers it is held, he says,
&quot; that the attributes
which we ascribe to objects consist in their having the power
of exciting one or another variety of sensation in our minds ;
that to us the properties of an object have this and no other
meaning ; that an object is to us nothing else than that which
affects our senses in a certain manner.&quot;
In considering this, we are not disposed to deny that objects
are to us as stated when they are in actual relation with our
senses, and when we take them in both their subjective and
objective aspects.
- In such a case an orange is yellow, odorous,
and sapid. Suppose, again, a heavy object falls upon it and
crushes it, and the juice stains the white cloth of the table.
The objects are still to us as they affect us, and our knowledge
of them is as our senses inform us. The study is correct as far
as it goes, but it does not go far enough ; it does not recognise
the relations between the aggregate called an orange^ and the112 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
falling object, the table, and the tablecloth. These objects have
relations amongst themselves. To one another they are not
coloured, sapid, or odorous, nor do they hear the noise of the
catastrophe ; but they have relations of attraction and resistance,
of shape, size, relative position, and consequent change, as well
as (in the case of the stained tablecloth) of chemical or molecular
combination. All these changes take place quite independently
of the sentient onlooker, and are capable of being expressed in
terms non-connotative of sentiency. Yet Mr. Mill says that the
only properties of an object are its powers of exciting in us certain
sensations. Certainly he limits the assertion in respect as they
are cognisable
&quot; to us&quot; but then these are not all the proper
ties of objects, but only their properties in regard to us. They
have properties in regard to one another ; they interact inde
pendently of our volition
; their laws are not laws of thought.
The different sciences are studies of external processes, not laws
of mental associations. We interfere volitionally, but only in the
application of external powers, and our mental associations are
produced by actual external associations of independent objects.
We follow, we do not lead.
Mr. Mill then goes on to describe the most extreme form of
the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge as held by the
Idealists and Sceptics, including Berkeley and Hume and all
their followers, which schools we are inclined to think should
now, for reasons previously stated, be reckoned out of date.
This, however, is far from being the shape in which the
doctrine is usually held. To most of those who hold it, the
difference between the Ego and the Non-ego is not one of
language only, nor a formal distinction between two aspects of
the same reality, but denotes two realities, each self-existent,
and neither dependent on the other. They believe that there is
a real universe of
&quot;
things-in-themselves,&quot; and that whenever




&quot; which is behind the phenomenon and is the cause of it.
But as to what the thing is
&quot; in itself,&quot; we, having no organ
except our senses for communicating with it, can only know
what our senses tell us
; and as they tell us nothing except
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know what it is in itself at all. It is supposed that it must
be something in itself. External things exist and have an
inmost nature, but their inmost nature is inaccessible to our
faculties. We know it not, and can assert nothing of it with
a meaning. But the representations generated in our minds
by the action of the things themselves, these we may know,
and these are all that we can know respecting them. Let
us take for consideration, for example, the chemical element
oxygen and the chemical element iron. We know all about
the properties of these substances. The properties are ,two-
fold: firstly, their objective relation to the other elements,
to the earth, and the rest of the physical universe ; and,
secondly, their relations to our subjectivity. The whole of
their properties are relations with other things. Out of this
relationship we do not know them at all. All that we know
of them is that they are bundles of properties, and these proper
ties are relationships. We also know that such of these proper
ties as are cognised by the superficial senses are explainable by
the fundamental senses, and can be set down in mathematical and
chemical formulae. It may be argued there must be something
which differentiates the substratum or nexus which holds these
various distinguishing properties of oxygen and iron together,
and which constitutes oxygen and iron in themselves. If so,
let those who argue for it make what practical use they can of
it. It does not concern us until these elements can be decom
posed and we add to our actual knowledge. It seems strange
to us that when philosophers have once decided that this kind
of knowledge is inaccessible to us, there should be so much
discussion about it. Why not let it drop altogether? It is
unwise to discuss things in themselves too much, for men may
talk about them till they believe in them.
It is in the form just considered that the doctrine of the
Relativity of Knowledge is held by the greater number of those
who profess to hold it, attaching any definite idea to the term.
A great deal of importance has been attached to the doctrine,
but we are inclined to think its importance has been over
estimated. It seems to have merely a negative value in shutting
out useless discussion as to the ultimate causes of physical and
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subjective processes, and to be useful principally in causing us
to limit our attention to the actual sequences in nature, and
to confine our explanations, so far as they will go, within the
bounds of the knowable ; and if they will not go far enough, to
let them remain incomplete. As a doctrine of positive value,
we think that logically it is deceptive ; for if an orange is known
to us only relatively, it is yellow ; whereas we know that it is
not in itself yellow. The impression yellow is a subjective
fact an incident in the relativity of knowledge, and not a pro
perty of the orange in respect of non-sentient physical bodies.
This falsifying influence of the relativity of knowledge is
shown in that form of the doctrine next explained by Mr. Mill.
This is the form in which it is held by Kant and his followers.
Beyond the immediate sensations and their unknown outward
cause it is held that the mind adds something of its own.
These additional elements do not belong to the objects them
selves, but to our perceptions and conceptions of them. The
attributes of filling Space and occupying a portion of Time
result from the nature of mind itself, which is .so constituted
that it cannot take any impressions from objects except in
those particular modes. Time and Space are only modes of
our perceptions, not modes of existence. These and others
are not properties of the things, but of our mode of conceiving
them.
Merely referring by the way to our belief that Space and
Time are relations of
&quot; distance between
&quot; and contemporaneous
or successive action, which are experiences of objective relations,
we observe that, firstly, they have no existences as objective
entities
; and, secondly, as Mr. Spencer has pointed out, if they
are forms of thought, it is because they are correspondences
with universal objectivities. The universality of the experience
has evolved the fundamental thought. The fundamental facts
of physical interrelations named attraction and resistance, and
their derivative relationships, correspond with that universal
language of the feeling of resistance to which Mr. Spencer refers;
and if we are obliged by the laws of our mentality to conceive
of objects as thus and thus, it is owing to the laws of biological
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facts is registered organically in the physical constitution of
the race as the primordial &quot;correspondence&quot; between organism
and environment.
A modification of the doctrine is that by which it is held
that Place, Extension, Substance, Cause, and the rest, are con
ceptions put together out of ideas of sensation by the known
laws of association. It is not stated whether this &quot;putting
together&quot; is done by the individual or the race, but probably it was
supposed to be done by the individual, as the doctrine is ante-
Darwinian. The fact of placing the origin of these notions in
the laws of mental association without going farther, and assign
ing an exterior cause in the direct relations of things amongst
themselves, should be sufficient to condemn it under the new
philosophy. The doctrine of the association of ideas depends
upon the association of the things which they represent, and has
been produced by them.
Mr. Mill proceeds to say that the Eelativity of Knowledge
means the inaccessibility to our faculties of any other knowledge
of things than that of the impressions they produce on our
mental consciousness. We have already shown that even the
impressions produced upon our mental consciousness are not
knowledge, such as the yellowness of the orange, the rising and
setting of the sun, &c. These impressions have to be rectified
by reason. On the other hand, we maintain that some of the
impressions produced upon our mental consciousness are true
notions of the properties of things amongst themselves, and in
this respect differ from the impressions produced through the
superficial senses. If the doctrine of relativity has any value
at all, it is in the validification of the existence of a true rela
tion between the knower and the known, and in giving us
confidence in the reasoned results of this relation, as against
the sceptical results of a mere phenomenalism.
Again, Mr. Mill remarks :
&quot; It is obvious that what has been
said respecting the unknowableness of Things in Themselves
forms no obstacle to our ascribing attributes or properties to
them, provided these are always conceived as relative to us.&quot;
On this we remark that, clearly, if all knowledge be a rela
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knower, all knowledge must be conceived as described; but inas
much as no action takes place except between two or more things,
there must be a relation between these things of which we be
come cognisant. The generalisation of these relationships is the
triumphs of modern science. Mr. Mill proceeds
:
&quot; If a thing
produces effects of which our sight, hearing, or touch can take
cognisance, it follows, and indeed is but the same statement in
other words, that the thing has power to produce these effects.
The various powers are its properties, and of such, an indefinite
multitude is open to our knowledge. But this knowledge is
merely phenomenal. The object is known to us only in one
special relation, namely, as that which produces, or is capable
of producing, certain impressions on our senses ; and all that we
really know is these impressions.&quot; On this we would remark,
that a thing never produces effects by itself, but only in relation
to other things, and that the only things to which the word
&quot;thing&quot; can be philosophically applied are the atoms of the
chemical elements; all other objects are merely aggregates of
them in relation. The question is, are their powers or proper
ties in relation to one another, or only to us ? We do not see
how it can be supposed to be otherwise than the former.
Then the question arises, can we know what these relations
are ; as, for instance, when we speak of chemical affinities ?
&quot;We certainly do, as they are set forth in books on chemistry,
although we do not know the nature of these affinities. O
Now, if this is all that is meant by saying that all knowledge
is phenomenal, and that we do not know the inmost motive
and essence of the things oxygen, hydrogen, &c. then all
knowledge is phenomenal, but it is none the less actual
knowledge. Reason is still at liberty to penetrate as far as
it can into the constitution of these elementary substances,
and we need not even despair of acquiring that knowledge
which would explain and account for all the phenomena which
the thing exhibits to us in relation to other things, notwith
standing that, when so discovered, the new truth would also be
relative to us, the knowers, and more might remain behind.
They would then become known modes of Being. Mr. Mill
adds :
&quot; We might invent new names for the unknown modes ;ON CONCEPTIONS. 117
but the new names would have no more meaning than the x, y,
and z, of algebra.&quot; He might have added,
&quot; or apply old ones.&quot;





Is chemistry a body of knowledge, or mechanics, or the other
sciences 1 Apparently so, for in practical life there are immense
and widespread organisations for teaching them. The question
whether such knowledge is to be called phenomenal or absolute
is of little importance.
(c.) On Conceptions.
Conceptions are mental representations of experiences relating
to the subjective purely, or mediately to the objective. We
have only to consider the latter for our present purposes. Con
ceptions differ greatly in their character. They may be very
simple, as that of an individual simple object, such as my tea
cup ; or they may be rather more complex, as that of my watch.
In fact, it may be doubted if I have a clear conception of my
watch, as I have of my tea-cup. I have never thoroughly exa
mined my watch, so as to understand its construction. I have
a very indefinite knowledge of the relations of its springs, wheels,
and check actions. So that complexity is very often accom
panied by indefiniteness of conception. Here we find another
characteristic of conceptions in that they vary in definiteness.
A very important distinction between conceptions is whether
they are of individual objects or of a class of similar objects.
I have a distinct conception of my dog, but when I speak of
dogs, the conception I have is very indistinct on account of
the great variety of breeds. So that in this respect also we
have definite and indefinite conceptions.
Again, with regard to objects of great*magnitude, the intellect
fails to grasp them, more particularly if they are at the same
time complex in their contents. The mind is able to form but
a very uncertain and changeful concept.
Once more, if we go beyond those aggregates of things called
objects and consider their mutual actions, we again are able to
form but very imperfect conceptions. If I say,
&quot; I bought a
dog,&quot; the conception produced in the mind of the hearer is of a
very indefinite character. He has his conception of me, he hasii8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
a conception of a dog, but not of the particular dog which was
purchased ; and he has a conception of
&quot;
buying,&quot; but not of
this particular transaction. Yet he has in result received some
specific information, and notwithstanding the want of all this
definiteness of conception, he knows that an event has taken
place, and is able to estimate the import and essential character
intended to be conveyed by the words employed.
The consideration of conceptions always leads to a considera
tion of the words which are employed to denote them, and by
which we are able to make our thoughts and wishes known to
one another. Words differ from conceptions in being, instead
of mental representations of objects, only the marks or symbols,
verbal or written, by which those mental representations are
denoted. They are a system of symbolisation.
We have already called attention to the fact that the inter
course of the mind with the objective universe is simply between
the individual concretes and the individual mind
; and that
whatever thereafter ensues is a mental process merely. In this
manner we justified the original experiences, and claimed the
right to rectify the working of the subsequent inner growth.
We required that the error of using mere terms of totality
as generals having an unitative objective existence should be
rectified, as has often previously been urged.
We have now to consider another class of so-called conceptions,
namely, those known as abstract. These are altogether bad,
and, like ill weeds, grow apace. They arise from a comparison of
similars. We experience similar effects, such as that of the sen
sation red, and form a conception of redness ; and then the mind
having formed a noun, straightwayimagines an objective existence
answering to it. These are called objectivised abstractions, and
represent no concrete existences whatever. On this subject,
also, we have already had occasion to remark.
The difficulty arises in this way. In order to cope with the
vast numbers, bulk, variety, and complexity of individual ex
periences, and with the vast results of scientific investigation,
the mind is obliged, in the first place, to form indefinite concep
tions, to generalise, and to abstract, and then to express itself
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and variable meaning on account of the rough and imperfect,
changeable and individual imports of the terms employed.
This evil is so great that except by the greatest care men do
not clearly understand one another when they go beyond very
simple and concrete language.
The object of this sub-section is to lead up to a considera
tion of Mr. Spencer s theory of symbolism, and the question is,
Are conceptions symbols? A symbol, according to Webster s
Dictionary, is a sign by which one knows or infers a thing.
Now we cannot make out that a conception is a sign at all.
Symbols are accepted signs between two or more people for the
purpose of indicating what conceptions are desired to be under
stood conceptions themselves being the mental representation
of external objects or events, definite or indefinite, simple or
complex, perfect or incomplete, coincident or non-coincident, or
however they may exist in the minds of each. Of these the
words are symbols. Mr. Spencer maintains that conceptions
or some classes of them are symbols. Now the merit of a
symbol is in proportion to its definiteness, but conceptions,
according to Mr. Spencer, are symbolic proportionately to their
indefiniteness. In proportion as our conceptions of a thing are
obscure, indefinite, and incomplete, do they become symbolic ;
so that in the end the most obscure, indefinite, and incom
plete conception is the most symbolic. He goes on further to
hold, that only when the most symbolical, and therefore the
most indefinite, obscure, and incomplete conceptions are reached,
are we able to propound philosophical formulas which shall
unify knowledge, and make clear the order of the universe.
Mr. Spencer does not call all conceptions symbolic, only those
which are obscure, indefinite, and incomplete those which the
mind fails fully and completely to picture to itself, as, for
instance,
&quot; The World.&quot; Now the symbol here is the word,
written or spoken,
&quot;
World.&quot; This word is the sign or symbol
by which we make known to one another the subject of our dis
course. It calls up to our minds, when we are asked to think
about it without a limiting context, a number of indefinite,
varying, complex, and incomplete conceptions, which in any
two minds are not likely wholly to coincide. But again, if we120 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
are asked to limit our conception to that of the earth as a
member of the solar system, or by itself as a sphere variously
exhibiting oceans and continents, or again merely as an oblate
spheroid of certain dimensions it is held that since we are
unable to form a representation of it in our minds commen
surate with the object, our conception, in proportion to our
inability so to realise it, is symbolic. Well, philosophers are
entitled to use words as they please, but we fail to see the
utility of thus transferring the signification of a written or
verbal sign to a conception. Suppose we call the conception
of the earth as a planet a symbolic conception, it does not
in the least alter the value of the word or of the conception
it does not add to our notion of the earth, nor vary the value
of any proposition in which it occurs. In the same way the
notion of a watch is symbolic, as are the conceptions of all
animals and vegetables as are, indeed, the conceptions of all
the chemical elements. There are no conceptions, or very few,
that are not symbolic. The only use of the suggestion is, so to
speak, a misuse of it, as leading us to suppose that those abstract
and general conceptions which are most symbolic in respect of
their indefiniteness have a value for logical purposes which
they really do not possess.
These are the conceptions symbolised by the terms Matter,
Motion, Force, Space, Time, &c., with perhaps Integration,
Polarity, and Equilibration. As these are very obscure, indefi
nite, incomplete, if not indeed unpicturable conceptions, it is
held that they are symbolical.
&quot;VVe have already shown these
terms to be the expression of some general laws of relationship
of the chemical elements, which are themselves only bundles of
properties in relation to each other. They are not entities at
all, nor factors ; as such they have no existence ; they are mere
abstractions fictions of the imagination. The mind has no
conceptions of abstractions and generals ; the terms, as thus
used, only connote concrete experiences of the relationships of
the chemical elements, and are only of value in proportion as
they are representations of those relationships, and are only
useful in logic in their power of expressing large classes of
individual facts or events.MR. SPENCER S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 121
&quot;VVe do not need to enforce our position by a consideration of
the import of each of the terms referred to at the commence
ment of the last paragraph.
&quot;We are not engaged in writing
a treatise on logic, and do not wish to say more than is suffi
cient for the purposes of this particular criticism. We charac
terise the term Matter as a term of totality including all the
chemical elements in the universe, and therefore as a general
concrete term of particular meaning in any proposition as
specifically defined or as indicated by the context. As a con
ception, we hold that we have no conception of it otherwise
than in response to some one of the meanings just indicated,
namely, either as a conception of the sum-total of the chemical
elements in the universe, or in the solar system, or in the world
;
or as a conception of each unit, or all units, in relation to each
other in terms of attraction and resistance
; or as a conception
of resistance only ; or as resistance in relation to our muscular
energy, &c. And if it be urged that these are imperfect con
ceptions, and that the facts transcend the conceptive powers of
the mind, so be it. But again, if it is held that nevertheless
we can grasp the scientific value of them, and by regarding our
conceptions as symbols, can reason about them with intelligence
and scientific security, again well and good ; but it must be on
the understanding that we can comprehend with definiteness
what we are talking about. Granted the chemical elements, we
have merely to classify their properties of attraction, resistance,
position, aggregation, cohesion, affinity, polarity, equilibration,
&c., and with these concrete applications we can go far in
scientific generalisation ; but we can make no progress whatever
when we quit the concrete reference.
(d.) Mr. Spencer s Scheme as Re-stated in his Appendix
to &quot;First Principles.&quot;
&quot;We are now in a position to judge of Mr. Spencer s scheme
for the unification of knowledge as re-stated by him in reply to
our criticism. It is to be effected indeed by the terms Matter,
Motion, and Force, but Mr. Spencer repudiates as insufficient
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of these words notwithstanding that in various places, and
more especially in the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; the attempts actually made to
work out the processes of the universe are from the concrete
factors of the chemical elements in response to a concrete en




standing for symbolic concepts, and they are symbolic concepts,
not because, like the term
&quot; The World,&quot; they can take their
places in a proposition in some definite and limited meaning
as representative of a concrete reality understood but not
fully and perfectly conceived by the mind ; but because they
neither represent any such concrete reality, nor are capable
of having any definite meaning, so as to be of any intelligible
value in a proposition or in processes of reasoning. They
are of the class of symbolic concepts which are symbolic
not on account of vastness of number or bulk, but because
they are obscure. Whereas the term
&quot; The World
&quot; has a
concrete value in any of its meanings, notwithstanding our
inability to form an adequate conception of it ; the terms
Matter, Motion, and Force are abstractions, and the fact that
the mind fails to make any conception of them, does not put
them upon the same footing as those other symbolic concepts
which can have a value in a process of reasoning. As abstrac
tions, they can have no place as factors in the actual universe,
and can have no value as symbolic concepts. They can only
be of value as symbolic concepts when they represent sum-
totals of concrete experiences, expressing the general facts of
the actual individual relationships of the objective world.
Now it is evident that the unification of knowledge,
taken as the understanding of the sequences of the cosmos
from the interrelations of original factors, requires that we
should know these original interrelations, and is not to be
effected by means of our want of knowledge of them, no
matter what artifice of symbolism we may resort to. It will
be observed that we speak of a knowledge of the interrelations
and not of the nature of these original factors ; for, as already
observed in sub-section (a), the knowledge of the interrelations
or properties of things is a knowledge of things amongst them
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&quot;We therefore come to the conclusion that if Mr. Spencer has
framed his system on a scheme of terms which are symbols
of symbolic conceptions, and symbolic because of our mental
incapacity to grasp their meaning, he empties out of his
scheme every vestige of intelligibility, and gives us only pale
ghosts of thoughts in a shadowy world.
But in actual practice we find that this method is only used
to fill up the blanks in a scheme mainly worked out by means
of concrete factors. Whenever and wherever the processes are
actually or presumably capable of definite explanation, that
course has been pursued (as mainly in the
&quot;
Biology &quot;), but where
this plan has been found inefficient, we have been put off
with the other shadowy and intangible method.
This is the more easy because the two methods are pursued
under the same guise. We have already seen that the set of
terms employed by Mr. Spencer is used by him in the two
senses. Matter, and Motion, and Force, while correctly meaning
the sum totals of certain contained definite meanings, are also
employed to represent impossible abstractions and still more im
possible symbolic conceptions. By this inclusion of the definite
and the incomprehensible in a single set of terms, we are pre
pared to attack a universe which is partly known and partly
unknowable, and somehow or another surely we have unified
knowledge
!
It is true that whenever we venture upon a definite statement
of doctrine, such as the universal concomitancy of the concentra
tion of Matter with the dissipation or transference of Motion,
it is difficult to keep to it as soon as we come to changes where
the Motion is retained or locked up, and to changes which are
not concentration of Matter nor dissipation of Motion, such as
the integrations of language and the psychical correspondences
generally ; but then, when we begin to reflect that Matter, and
Motion, and Force are only symbolic conceptions, and that by
attaching definite meanings to them we land ourselves in
alternative impossibilities of thought, it is clear that we ought
not to attach definite meanings to them where those definite
meanings do not work.
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Spencer in a single page of his reply (&quot; First Principles,&quot;
Appendix, p. 578).
Firstly, lines 29 to 31
&quot; Over and over again it lias been
shown in various ways that the deepest truths we can reach are
simply statements of the widest uniformities in our experience of
the relations of Matter, Motion, and Force.&quot;
Here the foundation of knowledge is very properly put idthin
OUT experience. Now, our experience is very varied, and is
generalised in the various sciences, more particularly in the
sciences of Mechanics, Physics, and Chemistry. Here are
presented some very wide uniformities of nature, which we
naturally formulate ; and the formulations arrived at are the
deepest truths we can reach.
At this point we part company with Mr. Spencer in two direc
tions. Firstly, because he uses the terms Matter, Motion, and
Force, not as terms of totality commensurate with the whole of
our concrete knowledge not as general terms summing up
what we actually know but as abstract terms representing
entities that have no existence. Secondly, because he describes
the uniformities of nature, in that whatever the factors, the
history of the interrelations of those factors is a history of the
progress from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite,
coherent heterogeneity. This universal characteristic is very
much relied upon throughout his works as constituting the
unification of knowledge, and although the truth is admitted,
its efficacy in this respect is denied by us, and is not consistent
with that requirement of Mr. Spencer s which looks for the
unification of knowledge in the ability to deduce all processes
as corollariesfrom some ultimate truth.
The next step which Mr. Spencer takes in this re-statement
of his position is in his treatment of these terms, Matter,
Motion, and Force. And on this same page, one of his
principal confusions of thought is very neatly presented. In
the first place, he speaks of Matter and Motion as being de
pendent upon Force; and then again he puts all three upon
a level as equally dependent upon an Unknowable Power.
Thus we find (line 7),
&quot; There is one ultimate component of
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resolvable;&quot; and again (line 17),
&quot;The truths that Matter is
indestructible and Motion continuous can be known to us only
as corollaries from the truth that Force is persistent that
Force is that out of which our conceptions of Matter and
Motion are built. I have gone on to say that by the
Persistence of Force we really mean the persistence of some
power which transcends our knowledge and conception.
Throughout all which arguments the implication is that I hold
Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations of this
unknown power.&quot;
Here we have a series of dependent terms :
(i.) The Persistence of Force, which means some power which
transcends our knowledge, and which is a constant quantity
:
(2.) Corollaries therefrom : namely
The Indestructibility of Matter.
The Continuity of Motion.*
Now either the two latter are the authority in experience
for the former, of which it is the sum-total ; or the former is
known independently to be a constant quantity, having only two
modes of manifestation, in which case the latter are corollaries
of the former. But we do not know that Force or the Unknow
able Power has only two modes of manifestation, for it is not
knowable. We may only know two, but really there may be
many more. The question is, &quot;What is our authority for the
assumption that Force is a constant quantity, and that it only
has two modes of manifestation ? If our authority is the In
destructibility of Matter and the Continuity of Motion, these
are independent truths, and the Persistence of Force is the
corollary.
But Mr. Spencer next proceeds to put Matter, Motion, and
Force all upon the same level.
Line 33
&quot;A Power of which the nature remains for ever
inconceivable, and to which no limits in Time or Space can be
imagined, works in us certain effects. These effects have certain
likenesses of kind, the most general of which we class together
under the names of Matter, Motion, and Force.&quot;
* The logic is much confused if the Continuity of Motion proves not to
be a, truth at all. See I of Chapter III.126 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Here we find that we have three classes of experience ; not
one viz.
, Force : nor two, which we often make dependent upon
that one viz., Matter and Motion but three which are distin
guished and classified in separate and distinct categories ; and
all three are made dependent upon a fourth viz., the Unknow
able Power. Here Force and its persistence are not identified, as
above, with this Unknowable Power, but, along with the other
two classes of experience, are made dependent upon it. All this
results from the first fault of manufacturing abstractions which
have no corresponding entities from the error of changing
general terms from mere expressions of sums-total into terms
representative of actual existences ; for when we come to use
these objectivised generals or objectivised abstractions in
reasoning, since they are so very shadowy, we can use them
almost any way we like, and in return they can use us any way
they like, if such an expression can be pardoned. Witness,
for instance, the fault so often referred to of Mr. Spencer s
attempt, after elaborate preparation, to formulate the inter
relation of three factors in the Formula of Evolution, when one
is dropped out in the process, and only two find a place
there these two themselves becoming mere shadows, and the
interrelation of concomitance being so attenuated that it is
completely forgotten by the time we arrive at psychological corre
spondences. This confirms the view that Mr. Spencer has no






It is an inconsistency to state that Matter, Motion, and Force
are conditioned manifestations of the Unknowable Power, and
again, that Matter and Motion are the conditioned manifes




Throughout all which arguments the implication
is that I hold Matter and Motion to be conditioned manifestations
of this unknown Power.&quot;MR. SPENCER S POSITION AS RE-STATED. 127
Line 33
&quot;A Power of which the nature for ever remains
inconceivable . . . works in us certain effects . . . Matter,
Motion, and Force.&quot;
Matter is further on spoken of as &quot;a certain conditioned
effect wrought in us by the Unknown Power;&quot; and on p. 579
we are told,
&quot; Matter and Motion are both regarded by me as
modes of manifestation of Force.&quot;
Now suppose for the sake of the theory we admit that Matter
and Motion are conditioned manifestations of Force, or that
Matter, Motion, and Force are conditioned manifestations of the
Unknowable Power
; and suppose, too, we regard those conditions
as permanent. It is evident that the conditions have the superior
power over the Unknowable : the Unknowable is in bonds, and
is not at liberty to uncondition itself, or change about from one
condition to another
; and it is as thus conditioned, and only
by means of its conditions, that it is known to us. The con
ditions appear in our experience, and not d priori, to be constant ;
and it is this constancy of the conditions of the seventy or eighty
so-called elements that is our warrant for the constant quantities
of their properties in detail, and in their sums-total as expressed
in the terms Matter, Motion, and Force.
We have to consider, what right have we to go beyond the
manifestations as conditioned, and therefore as known to us?
The Unknowable Power works in us certain definite effects, and
we cannot go beyond these effects. Mr. Spencer wants to convert
the totalities of certain classes of effects into actual existences
making them into entities which are acting factors in the uni
verse. But this is a very different process from the legitimate
although perhaps impossible intellectual endeavour so to analyse
the actual working factors of the universe into their simplest
constituents that we may understand all processes as the result
ants of certain simple original factors.
The fourth position is the introduction of subjectivity.
&quot; Matter and Motion are both regarded by me as modes of
manifestation of Force, and that Force, as we are conscious of it
when by our own efforts we produce changes, is the correlative
of that Universal Power which transcends consciousness.&quot;
Now this is a hard thing to understand. Matter and Motion128 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
are manifestations of Force. Does this mean a manifestation to
us, or that Matter and Motion are conditions of Force indepen
dently of us 1 The question arises Can we know anything as
independent of us ? I and We are evidently forces, for we
produce changes ; yet consciousness is not a mode of Force, for
it is not included in Balfour Stewart s list of Forces and
Energies, and is not interchangeable with members of the
series. Presumably Mr. Spencer does not mean that consciousness
produces changes, but only that the forces of the organism (in
response to the environment), of which we are merely conscious,
produce the changes in question ; and that this force (or forces)
is the correlative of that Universal Power. Yet this cannot be,
because the forces of the organism are manifestations of, and
therefore cannot be the correlative of, that Unknowable Power.
But what is the meaning of correlative ? Must a correlative of
an Unknowable Power be itself a force or power? If so, that
force or power is not all-inclusive. &quot;What, then, is consciousness,
and what is effort, and what is the Ego which exercises them
and produces changes
1
Then, again, can we speak of the physical universe as inde
pendent of us, as antecedent to us, and so treat of it that we
are corollaries of its original factors ? Either we can do so, and
we are able to elaborate organisms from purely physical factors,
as attempted in Mr. Spencer s
&quot;
Biology,&quot; consciousness coming
in mysteriously and unaccountably as the subjective aspect of
a physical event over which it has no controlling influence, and
in which the biological function of feeling is not a factor
or else we cannot do so, but must recognise consciousness as
a factor, requiring a position to be assigned to it in the scheme
of things. Is it a factor or is it not ? If so, when and where
did it come in ? At the beginning, or at some subsequent stage
of physical development ?
But what we have more particularly to point out is that in
Mr. Spencer s scheme, as thus announced by him, we have the
whole treatment of knowledge made dependent upon subjective
experiences, without recognising an objectivity independent of
us, of which we have but a kind of picture. Yet in his expo
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a universe of whose interrelations we are but incidents. In the
latter case we must recognise physical factors independent of
us ; and if, as Mr. Spencer says, we are unable to do this, but
only know force in our own consciousness, and can have no
notion of external force, even knowledge itself, and much more
its unification, is impossible.
But if Mr. Spencer means only that our consciousness is cor
relative with the externality in the sense of corresponding with
it, and enabling us to recognise it and its changes, he only means
that consciousness is consciousness of forces independent of itself,
and amongst which it has no place, and its connection with
which cannot be understood. All which considerations throw no
light upon the unification of knowledge, but rather the reverse,
and do not make Mr. Spencer s scheme any more intelligible.
We now come to the last position, which is the theory that
all knowledge can be unified by a statement of the relations of
factors, the factors themselves being unknown. Our previous
exposition as to the nature of abstractions (Chap.
i. 6 and
Chap. ii. 2) shows conclusively, we think, that everything
is its relations and nothing more everything is nothing
&quot; in itself
&quot;
every entity consists of its properties, and its




is an impossible proceeding. Each factor is
a factor in relation to other factors, and its properties are
properties in relation to other factors. Each factor is a bundle
of relations. It is all very well to say that it must be some
thing in itself, and that this self must be differentiated in order to
produce the differentiated relations ; but it amounts to nothing ;
for it is only in the actual intercourse or relations of things
that any changes take place, and this is all that we know and all
that takes place in the actual physical universe. If Science is
ever able to recognise things in themselves, all \\*ell and good ;
it will not add anything to knowledge ; for even if all things
were reduced to two factors, knowledge will refer to the inter
relations of these two factors, for there can be no interrela
tions of one factor. When we come to that position, Science
ceases, and only speculation proceeds to dream about self-deter
mination or the instability of the homogeneous.
I130 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
But when Mr. Spencer speaks of unifying knowledge by
means of formulas expressing the relations of factors, the factors
themselves being unknown or even unknowable, we reply, If
the relations of the factors are known, the factors themselves
are known. The interrelations constitute the factors. We seek
for Mr. Spencer to state where he formulates these relations
and thereby accomplishes the unification of knowledge. Does
he do so in the Formula of Evolution or does he not? If
so, does he mean to say that we can have a conception of
concentration and dissipation without having a notion of units
of resistance and therefore of extension ? Or can we have a
conception of motion without the same ? To throw the stress
upon integration and dissipation, and ignore the limitations of
Matter and Motion, is simply to say that all changes of every
combination are either changes of combination or changes of
decombination, which is only a change of words, and to say
that the change is from homogeneity to heterogeneity is
merely descriptive. The addition that the contained motion
undergoes parallel transformation is either descriptive also,
or involves a specific definition of motion, which Mr. Spencer
repudiates.
The question really is whether Mr. Spencer shall be kept to
definite meanings when he speaks of the interrelations of factors,
or shall he be allowed sometimes to use them in their definite
meanings (which are all that come into our calculations), and
sometimes run away from them behind the scenes, letting them
come out again in definite shapes when they have to do con
crete work. This brings us to the end of the first stage of Mr.
Spencer s reply and to his algebraical illustration of the theory
we have just been considering.
(e.) On the Algebraical Illustration of the Theory that Knowledge
can be unified by means of the Formulation of the Relations
of Factors, the Factors themselves being Unknown.
Mr. Spencer says (p. 578, line 32) &quot;Matter, Motion, and
Force are but symbols of the Unknown Keality.&quot;
Line 40
&quot; The interpretation of all phenomena in terms of
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of our complex symbols of thought to the simplest symbols ; and
when the equation has been brought to its lowest terms, the
symbols remain symbols
still.&quot;
The question hence arises, what does Mr. Spencer mean by a
symbol ? Does he mean a sign which stands for something
known, or a sign which stands for something unknown ? Evi
dently the latter, if we may judge from the expression that
&quot;
symbols remain symbols still,&quot; more particularly as he has just
said that
&quot; our idea of a unit of matter or atom is regarded
by me simply as a symbol which the form of our thought obliges
us to use, but which we cannot suppose answers to the reality
without committing ourselves to alternative impossibilities of
thought.&quot; What, then, is the use of a symbol if symbols remain
symbols still and are not convertible into definite knowledge
1 and
how can actual knowledge be unified by means of symbols which
do not answer to anything definite ? How can knowledge be
unified by means of propositions framed of symbols that are
merely symbols, and which, if we attach definite meanings to
them, land us in alternative impossibilities of thought ? How
can an ultimate truth be expressed in mere untranslatable sym
bols, from which all other truths are deducible as corollaries ?
As long as symbols remain symbols, the formula in which they
are employed is utterly useless for the unification of knowledge.
Mr. Spencer says that his method consists in the reduction of
our complex symbols of thought to the simplest, but this
process of reduction to simplicity is in reality the illegitimate
process of abstraction, followed by the objectivising of these
abstractions.
Mr. Spencer proceeds to illustrate his position algebraically.
He says
&quot; I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of Matter,
Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and 2 with which we work
our equations, and formulate the various relations among pheno
mena in such way as to express their order in terms of x, y,
and 2.&quot;
We fail to see that Mr. Spencer is justified in the use of
this illustration, and we have examined his works in order to
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proper algebraical form. Of course, when a science such as
that of mechanics or chemistry can he couched in rigid mathe
matical language, it has attained the highest point of certitude
and unification. But we think it must he the opinion of
every candid reader that Mr. Spencer has not worked out his
scheme by means of equations at all, and we do not know what
Mr. Spencer could have been thinking of when he says he has
done so. &quot;Would he specify where the equations are ?
We also ask, is it really the fact that Mr. Spencer has treated
Matter, Motion, and Force as x, y, and zl The &quot;Principles
of Biology
&quot;
is the most important of his works, and in it his
factors are the well-known properties of oxygen, hydrogen,
nitrogen, carbon, and other elements, as internal factors ; to
gether with incident molecular motion, ethereal motion, &c.,
as external factors. He advances all these as if his readers
would be able to assign to them all definite values, and as
if they would understand him when he spoke about them.
He did not tell us that they were only symbols standing for
something we did not know, and that at the end we knew
as little about them as at the beginning that the symbols
were but symbols still. Of course, if Mr. Spencer means
that we do not know what oxygen is
&quot; in
itself,&quot; and that
we can only speak of its relations with the relations of other
unknowable things
&quot;in themselves,&quot; we quite understand that,
and are quite aware that we have to deal with the relations or pro
perties of the factors alone. We perfectly apprehended the nature
of the calculation, but found ourselves unable to arrive at Mr.
Spencer s results. It seems quite beside the question and out
side this calculation altogether to speak of x, y, and 2 as having
anything to do with it, either as representing the specific differ
entiations of oxygen, nitrogen, &c., &quot;in themselves,&quot; or as repre
senting the differentiations of some shadowy abstractions of
absolute Matter, Motion, or Force. We really do not see that
they had anything to do with it. Most certainly if they had,
the calculation was vitiated for us. It is absolutely impossible
for us to draw out the resultants of a mixed quantity of known
and of unknowable factors. If we have known factors plus an
unknowable reality, we cannot do our work. Then as to equa-THE ALGEBRAICAL ILLUSTRATION. 133
tions in anything like algebraical form, there are none of them
in the
&quot;Biology.&quot; Mr. Spencer is under a delusion when he
thinks he has been working equations.
As to Inorganic Evolution, surely we ought to be able to
express the process of equilibration by which the union of
oxygen and hydrogen (forming water) is effected iir terms of
x, y, and z ; and similarly with some of the other processes of the
biological factors ; so that we might mount up gradually to the
equation of a moving equilibrium, and afterwards of a depen
dent moving equilibrium. Such a task would be difficult, no
doubt, but possibly some future philosopher might be able to
furnish us with equations of the manner in which the adjust
ments of direct and indirect equilibration of dependent moving
equilibria are effected, and explain by means of an algebraical
formula the law of the redistribution and redirection of the in
terior forces of an organism in antagonism to incident forces
which would otherwise destroy it. And might we not, indeed,
look for an algebraical explanation of genesis and reproduc
tion, and of the need for the continuance of species? In
the meantime, we venture to submit that although Mr. Spencer
may think he has given us equations, he really has not done
so.
Mr. Spencer seems to say that the unification of knowledge
is effected if we can
&quot; formulate the various relations of pheno
mena in such way as to express their order in terms of x, y,
and
2,&quot; although the realities for which x, y, and z stand cannot
be conceived by us.
We know the properties (i.e., the mutual relations) of the
chemical elements, and we know the laws of physics. The
problem is first to classify them, to ascertain their most general
relations, and then to express their order. When we express
their order, we must do so in those general terms which are
commensurate with the facts to be expressed. If we symbolise
them by means of names, these names are symbols of those
most general relations, and have definite values. Each term
implies an appreciable differentiation of meaning. We do not
say that much can be effected in this way probably not; for
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ledge. But evidently, if it is to be done at all, it is to be done
in this way.
Mr. Spencer says, make the terms indefinite make them
symbols which do not mean anything so definite as to em
barrass you when you are required to bring them into actual
application with the phenomena yoii wish to unify. Do not
allow them to be retranslatable, but let them remain symbols
still. But is anything accomplished? An obvious criticism
would be that unless x, ?/, and z have definite meanings attached
to them, there is no differentiation which justifies them what
then is the cause of their being distinguished at all? Why
should there not be two only? or why, on the other hand,
should there not be ten or twenty
? Evidently they have been
arrived at by a process of analysis, generalising, and distinguish-
ment of difference ; and in order to justify us in distinguishing
x from y, and both from z, they must have had previous
histories and some differentiation of meaning. Nay, what is
more, this meaning and this value must be strictly dependent
upon such previous history. We cannot use experience to
mount as by a ladder to abstractions, and then, despising the
foundations, allow abstractions from their high position to lord
it over obedient concretes. Therefore we utterly dispute the
truth of Mr. Spencer s dictum that x, y, and z can be used with
out definite meanings, and that the order of phenomena can
then be expressed by their means.
Such a method is a parody xipon algebra. It would seem
that although reasoning by means of symbols, as in algebra, is
very abstract, still it is reliable and useful when its empty forms
are filled in with concrete things. It starts from the concrete,
it symbolises concretes, it reasons about them, it comes to
conclusions about them, it retranslates itself into the concrete,
and the result can be tested by practical application. Reason
ing like this is only a leap into the air of abstraction. It
starts from actual facts and it ends in concrete knowledge.
Symbols are signs that stand for something symbols that
do not symbolise lose their functions. To say that we can
reason about the relations of symbols, while the symbols them
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Relation implies knowledge ; we cannot say anything about
the relations of symbols without knowing something about
the things symbolised, namely, their relations or properties
by which they are distinguished from one another and by
which they are related to one another ; in fact, that is all
we know about them. If we can generalise these relations in
such a way as to be able to express them all in a general
formula, that is well : the problem is how to do it. Even
then our result will only be a general description, and will not
be the unification of knowledge, which requires all phenomena
to be deduced as corollaries from an ultimate truth correspond
ing to processes resultant from the properties of primordial
factors.
And after all, the argument comes to the same thing, whether
we use the terms x, y, and z, as Mr. Spencer proposes, or
the terms Matter, Motion, and Force. If the latter mean no
more than/the former, they are mere symbols, although they
are more to look at, and their employment seems to give more
satisfaction to the mind of the reader than would the actual
replacement of them in the text by the symbols x, y, and z.
If the unification of knowledge is effectible by means of the
relations of x, y, and z, we naturally ask what these relations
are. &quot;We should have a list of them. Is it, for instance, a rela
tion of x that it manifests resistance ? If so, what is it in rela
tion with when it manifests resistance ? Some other xl X then
is in relation to x in manifesting resistance. Is x in relation
to x in mutual attraction also 1 Has it also the relation of
extension? Is x related to x in respect of polarity? Are
there varieties of these relationships consequent upon diversities
and correspondences of Resistance, Attraction, Extension, and
Polarity ? We suppose we are not going beyond the terms of
the hypothesis in taking these to be the relationships of x.
Then as to the relationships of y. Has y any relationships
in respect of other y &1 Has it any relationship to xl or,
again, is it only a manifestation of xl Or still again, is it
a result of the relationship of x s consequent on the Attrac
tions, Resistances, Extensions, and Polarities of x s 1 And
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differentiation of x s 1 Yet how can we deal with it in the
singular ?
According to the Formula of Evolution, the approach to
gether of some x s implies the retrocession of some other x s,
so that the measurements apart of all # s in their totality is
constant. This means that y is constant so much y one way,
so much y another way. But note how difficult it is to speak
of y without having one eye on Motion, so as to speak of it in
an intelligible manner. It does not seem possible to speak of
the integration of x and the dissipation of y without bring
ing in the notions of Resistances, Attractions, Extension,
Polarity, and consequent Motion. Does Mr. Spencer allow
these terms to come into account in his hypothesis that all
knowledge is to be unified in terms of the relations of x, y,
and z ? If not, then he should show us how it is to be alge
braically worked out. But if so, then we submit that we did
not trespass beyond these in our former criticism^ which his
reply does not in the least respect touch.
The matter is still more complicated if we go beyond this
and speak of the relations of z to x + y. Can Mr. Spencer
express the relations of z to x + y in terms of any of them 1 Is
z = x + y 1 Is it ever z by itself ? Is z = x + y + something else ?
Is it z singular or z s plural ? What are the special relations
of z to x, or of z to y 1 Can Mr. Spencer tell us what are the
relations of z to the special relations of x called Attraction,
Resistance, Extension, and Polarity ?
Then, again, is there any other factor beyond the end of
the alphabet altogether, say &amp;lt; ? and how is that related to
x, y, and z 1
To us it seems illogical to speak of the relations of terms
having no meaning. We think it is due that some pains
should be taken to explain the unification of knowledge when
some or all of the so-called factors are merely symbols, having
no definite meaning.
It appears, then, that if we change the terms Matter, Motion,
and Force into x, y, and z, it does not make the least difference
either in Mr. Spencer s reasoning or in our criticism. The
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speak of Matter, Motion, and Force, or of x, y, and z, the
argument remains the same. In either .case we are actually
dealing with Attractions, Eesistances, Extensions, Polarities,
and Motions, of specific chemical elements, and their inter
relations. It is impossible, if we are to make anything of our
doctrine at all, to treat it otherwise than as having definite
factors. We cannot deal with concrete changes except from
the properties of concrete factors.
At the same time there still remains the question whether
by either of these sets of terms Mr. Spencer could treat each
mode of manifestation as pre-existing or co-existing. But these
notions seem to be so very abstract as not only to transcend
actual experience, but also the power of &quot;scientific imagination.&quot;
One might perhaps imagine ultimate units having equal pro
perties, Attraction, Resistance, Extension, Polarity, and Motion,
but it is difficult to see of what use such a supposition would
be
; and it would be impossible to suppose Matter and Motion
as independent and unrelated factors.
On the other hand, are we to consider these Attractions,
Eesistances, Extensions, Polarities, and Motions as combined
into bundles indecomposable, as we know them in the seventy
or eighty so-called elements, so that what we have to deal
with would be not x, y, and z in the abstract and impossible
manner of Mr. Spencer, but so many diverse bundles of x, y,
and zl
3. The Double-Aspect Theory.
The only other method of escape from the effect of our
criticism is by means of what is known as the Double-Aspect
Theory. Mr. Spencer maintains that his theory is neither mate
rialistic nor spiritualistic. The school of thought to which he
belongs holds that all knowledge has two aspects. All events
are both objective and subjective, and are stateable in two
different ways, in two different sets of terms, according as the
fact or event is regarded. In a great many cases the sub
jective language is used when the main interest is in regard
to its subjective importance. In other cases objective terms
are employed because the main import is in regard to physical138 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
interrelations. But as a matter of fact, any event may be
described in language drawn from either department. It will
be our duty later on to discuss this theory in detail. At pre
sent it is sufficient for our purpose to ascertain how it affects
the unification of knowledge upon the lines we have been
pursuing.
The criterion of accomplishment which we have kept steadily
in view throughout all our studies is that passage from Mr.
Spencer s Summary of
&quot; First Principles,&quot; which will be found
quoted in extenso at page 9 of this work. Therein the task
propounded was the formulation of the whole series of changes
passed through by every existence, both anterior and subsequent
to their having concrete forms, and in their passage from the
imperceptible state to the perceptible state. Presumably this
task is identical with that by which we look for the philosophic
unification in the formulation of one primordial truth or fact
from which cosmical histories can be deduced by a series of
corollaries. It is no doubt identical also with the statement
that the unification of knowledge is effected in the recognition
of these histories as one process, being resultants of the rela
tions of primordial factors.
How then does the theory of the Double Aspect assist in the
solution of the cosmical problem, and how are Mr. Spencer s
detailed explanations of developmental histories facilitated by
its aid 1
We recall the account given in Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;Biology&quot; of the development of organic molecules from inor
ganic, and we recall the history of biological evolution which
takes up the study of the process from that point. In this latter
we recollect that all morphological and functional developments
were accounted for as due firstly to the nature and peculiarities
of the chemical compounds in relation with a certain physical
environment, and afterwards to the polarities and equilibrations
of physiological units and masses.
These explanations are all effected in purely objective terms.
Feeling, or the subjective, is excluded as not having anything to
do with the organised result. If the explanation were good and
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Spencer deems sufficient would be accomplished in the objective
aspect purely. Let us see how (feeling being excluded as a factor)
the explanation is assisted by an attempt to give the objective
terms used in the explanation a subjective aspect also. Take,
to begin with, the building-up process by which crystallisation is
effected. This natural process is ascribed to the mutual attrac
tions and repulsions of atoms or molecules, which, having
special sizes and shapes, produce when thus ranged together
definite structural forms of aggregation. What is the subjec
tive aspect of the process
1
? The subjective aspect of this inde
pendent natural event is simply the mode in which it affects us,
and which we have to take into account in our description of
the observed combinations, but it is not at all an element in
the actual changes which have taken place. The subjective is
of course present in all statements of knowledge. Knowledge
implies both the subjective and the objective, and therefore all
knowledge may be supposed to have a double aspect, namely,
the aspect of how the objective affects the subjective, as, for
instance, the manner in which ethereal undulations y^^ of an
inch affect the consciousness; and an objective aspect, for in
stance, the independent relations of the chemical elements and
their changes amongst themselves. But when we come to in
troducing the subjective aspect into such objective explanations,
we can only mean one of two things firstly, either that the
subjective is a factor in the combinations, a theory which could
not be maintained ; or, secondly, that in order to understand
explanations in objective processes we must have some common
element in the objective and the subjective, some simple stan
dard of knowledge common to both. This would be found, as
Mr. Spencer partly suggests, in the objective fact and the sub
jective impression of resistance, and in the objective fact and
the subjective impression of attraction (weight). Here, truly, we
have a double aspect of fundamental terms, but even thus the
series of events is determined by the objective, and the sub
jective aspect merely follows. The cosmical explanation as
given by Mr. Spencer in physical terms is full and complete in
itself
; it is double-aspected because the knowledge of it by the
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knowledge has a double aspect. But the series of sequences
which make up the cosmical history, as given by Mr. Spencer,
is independent of the subjective.
From this it may be asserted, that since all knowledge im
plies the subjective, there can be no unification of knowledge
without the subjective. Be it so. Is there any unification of
knowledge with it ? Suppose that the fundamental knowledge
of attraction and resistance is true knowledge, and that the
subjective is implied in all the objective processes described by
Mr. Spencer in. objective language as resultants from these
fundamental conceptions which have the double aspect. Sup
pose, even, that we add to them the conception of Force, which
is a term capable of a double aspect, and try to effect our ex
planations by means of Attractive Force and Eesistive Force.
Still, in working out the cosmical history, including biological
evolution, we should have to follow Mr. Spencer, and never stray
beyond the bounds of the objective aspect. The whole series of
determining causes would be found to be in the objective aspect
of the problem. The explanations would be effected in the lan
guage of Attraction and Kepulsion and their derivatives, size,
shape, distance, approach, retrocession, aggregation, disintegra
tion, polarity, equilibration, &c. Although essential to the
knowledge of these processes, still by no means could we intro
duce the subjective as a factor, even if it is included in our
appreciation of the original factors. Nor can we even introduce
it as an accompaniment until most unaccountably it introduces
itself gradually into the objective processes, some will think
as a factor, although Mr. Spencer repudiates it. This growth of
self-consciousness amongst factors which we only recognised as
unconscious is most unaccountable, and is a difficulty not to
be got over by mere nomenclature. Surely there was no double
aspect anterior to organised living beings ? AYhence then came
the double aspect ? Knowledge is not to be unified until this
explanation can be given.
As the unification of knowledge is only to be accomplished
in the formulation of a syllogism which is to explain every
differentiation, every structure, every organism, and which shall
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the origin and development of organised consciousness, as
resultants from the relations of some simple factors, then that
original simple state of things from which all these compli
cated results ensued must be expressible in terms which specify
the relations of the two aspects ; and if the original relations
and the subsequent developments are expressed and worked
out in terms of one only of these aspects, then such an expo
sition is imperfect as a representation of the actual course
of things and fails of being a complete and true picture of the
history of the cosmos.
This is what Mr. Spencer has done ; he has worked out his
scheme by means of one aspect only, by means of the objective
set of terms only. And when he has done that,, it is not fair
to say,
&quot; After all, things have a double aspect, and this ex
planation is not complete if you take the terms in the limited
meanings of materialistic and mechanical interpretations,&quot;
when all the while he has so employed them apparently to his
own full satisfaction, without at the same time making a
completion of his work by specifying the relationship between
the two aspects which would accomplish it. If he cannot
do this he must abandon as impossible the claim of unifying
knowledge.
If all knowledge has a double aspect, then knowledge cannot
be unified until the relation of the two aspects is understood
;
until we know the value of the terms we use in both aspects ;
and until the whole series of cosmical events is capable of
being formulated in two corresponding sets of terms parallel
and without break of continuity nor interchangeableness. To
employ one set of terms to commence with, and another set of
terms to end with in a history of cosmical evolution, is not
a conformity with the requisite conditions. To begin with
oxygen, hydrogen, and a cooling nebula, and to end with
emotions and thoughts, is not a concomitant
&quot; double aspect,
but a revolution. We do not get at the sequences of events as
&quot; resultants
&quot;
of the original state, but find ourselves turned
round and occupying a different position altogether from the
deductive intentions with which we started.
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sequences from two ends. &quot;We mentally stand at the begin
ning of things, looking down the long vista of physical change,
and again we stand in this modern age an ego looking back
through the ages. We recognise from each point of view long
lines of sequences merging into each other in the misty mid
distance, but there they intermingle, and the nature of their
connection we cannot discern.
The Double-Aspect Theory is of no use for the comprehension
of cosmical history. It is at best but another method of
stating the doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge. There is
no knowledge without a knower, and no knowledge of the
objective but as the knower is capable of knowing it. But if
fundamental knowledge is the impression of resistance and
attraction, and fundamental objective facts are resistances and
attractions, the objective can be known as it is. Here the
Double-Aspect Theory is a key to knowledge by the subjective
of the objective, but it is merely a key to the sequences of the
objective ; it does not aid us in accounting for consciousness
making its appearance in the series of physical events, nor does
it assist us in the failure of the physical explanations of biology.
The most plausible ground on which this theory is main
tained is in the fact of the concomitance of feeling with some
of the processes and actions of the physical organisms of living
creatures. It is a favourite method of representing it to say
Here we have a certain nervous change in the optic nerve, and
a concomitant feeling of yellow. This is not two events, but
one event, and we speak of it in either mode according to the
point of view from which we regard it. It is one fact with a
double aspect. On this we would observe, that, in regard to the
unification of knowledge, it is all quite beside the mark. We
are engaged in investigating a series of consequences ; at one
time there was no double aspect now there is. Whence came
the double aspect 1 It may be quite true now that physiologi
cal phenomena have double aspects, but this does not afford an
answer to the question of origin, and the advancement of it
does not assist in the solution of the problem of the unification
of knowledge as propounded by Mr. Spencer in the passage
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doned in this view of it, and is sought to be effected by those
other separate and independent sets of methods treated of in
our criticism of Mr. Spencer s psychological methods. But these
we have seen to be of no value or interest, as not being of a
kind to give us insight into the sequences of the universe.
4. Criticism to which Mr. Spencer has not Replied.
It is desirable to call attention to some of the detailed criti
cism of our former work to which Mr. Spencer has not replied,
but which he holds has been answered by implication in his
general reply. This general reply is to the effect that if we had
correctly understood his terms Matter, Motion, and Force as
merely symbols, and borne in mind his position, that by attach
ing definite notions to them any argument founded thereupon
landed us in contradictions of thought, then we could not have
written the book at all. Our work, however, would seem to
enforce Mr. Spencer s dictum and to exhibit the truth of his
remarks. And indeed his own great works do but bear out
the truth of the same proposition, for whenever Mr. Spencer
attaches any definite meanings to his terms, although we may
proceed safely for some distance, yet in the end we are landed
in alternative impossibilities of thought. In our criticism we
did but illustrate the truth of Mr. Spencer s views against him
self, and his own work is but a vindication of the mysticism or
scepticism which is it? to which he gives expression in his
reply to criticism.
Let us ask in detail what efficacy there is in this vague
reply to our definite charges of want of logical continuity of
exposition in the omission from the Formula of Evolution of
one of the three factors proposed at the outset as essential to its
formulation ? &quot;What answer is it to the charge of inapplica
bility of the formula to the differentiations of feelings, to the
integrations of society, language, aesthetics, and superorganic
evolution generally, in respect of the universality of the con
comitance of integration of matter and dissipation of motion ?
What reply does it afford to the criticism as to the Instability
of the Homogeneous ? How does it help to explain the passage
of the inorganic to the organic which we found impossible ?144 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
5. Summary.
Our previous criticism of Mr. Spencer s worlj* was to the
effect that he could not escape choosing between two alter
natives, namely
Definiteness with Insufficiency, or
Indefiniteness with Incomprehensibility ;
in either of which cases the unification of knowledge is not
effected; for this unification requires that the whole operation
should be within the sphere of the known and knowable, other
wise it is beyond the bounds of science, and is not knowledge
at all. The partial unifications of knowledge which constitute
the sciences are definite and comprehensible, so much so as to
give us the power of prevision. Philosophy at the outset of
our studies was set forth as merely the extension of this kind
of knowledge, and therefore should be, although more general,
yet just as definite, comprehensible, and precise, conferring the
same power of prevision, which is the same thing as the calcula
tion of sequences from known factors. This is the same thing
also as the deduction of corollaries from ultimate truths.
Mr. Spencer s reply amounts to this, that he does not accept
the alternative of Definiteness with Insufficiency, but that he
accepts the alternative of Indefiniteness with Incomprehensi
bility. We therefore deny that he has effected the unification
of knowledge. It is for the student to judge for himself.
It is true Mr. Spencer may maintain that he holds a clear
and definite theory. But we believe that he has failed to make
himself generally understood in regard to his main point as to
the unification of knowledge ; and if so, then it is his duty to
set himself right with the thinking world, as otherwise he has
failed in the main object he has in view in writing at all,




i. The Continuity of Motion.
WE have seen in our endeavour to understand Force that we
have been obliged to recognise it as manifesting itself in two
ways, and two ways only, namely, the way in which it presses
and the way in which it resists, otherwise stated as attraction
and repulsion.
This view meets with a singular confirmation in
&quot; First Prin
ciples,&quot; p. 514, where Mr. Spencer says
&quot; We have seen
( 74) that phenomena are interpretable only
as the results of universally coexistent forces of attraction and
repulsion. These universally coexistent forces of attraction
and repulsion are, indeed, the complementary aspects of that
absolutely persistent force which is the ultimate datum of
consciousness. . . . And from this necessary correlation results
our inability, before pointed out, of interpreting any phenomena,
save in terms of those correlations.&quot;
We now wish to compare several statements of Mr. Spencer s




This theory is explained in chap. v. of
&quot; First Principles,&quot;
p. 180 :
&quot; The Continuity of Motion, like the Indestructibility ol
Matter, is clearly a proposition on the truth of which depends the
possibility of exact science, and therefore of a Philosophy which
unifies the results of exact Science. Motions of masses and of
molecules, exhibited by bodies both organic and inorganic, form
the larger half of the phenomena to be interpreted ; and if
such motions might either proceed from nothing or lapse into
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nothing, there would be an end to scientific interpretation of
them. Each constituent change might as well as not be sup
posed to begin and end of itself.&quot;
Page 182
&quot; Whether that absolute reality which produces in
us the consciousness we call Motion, be or be not an eternal
mode of the Unknowable, it is impossible for us to say ; but
that the relative reality which we call Motion never can come
into existence, or cease to exist, is a truth involved in the very
nature of our consciousness. To think of Motion as either being
created or annihilated to think of nothing becoming something,
or something becoming nothing is to establish in consciousness
a relation between two terms, of which one is absent from
consciousness, which is impossible. The very nature of in
telligence, negatives the supposition that Motion can be conceived
(much less known) to either commence or cease.&quot;
We will compare these statements with
&quot; Lessons in Elemen
tary Mechanics,&quot; by Magnus, afterwards with Mr. Spencer s
chapter on
&quot;
Equilibration,&quot; and finally with Professor Balfour
Stewart s &quot;Conservation of Energy.&quot;
Magnus divides his treatise into three parts ist, Kinematics
or Motion ; 2d, Dynamics or Force
; 3d, Statics or Eest.
We find (p. 6)
&quot; We thus see that bodies themselves and their molecules are
constantly in motion or tending to move ; that absolute rest no
where exists
; and that what we call rest, which is really rest
relatively to us, can be analysed into counteracted tendencies
to motion.&quot;
It will be convenient for us to commence with the second
part, and consider the nature of Dynamics, or the science which
deals with the cause of motion that is to say, Force.
Page 6 1 &quot;The principal properties of matter, with which
we are concerned, are, that it moves and offers resistance to the
motion of other bodies. Now, force is the name given to the
unknown causes of all the various phenomena which matter
exhibits : and as all these phenomena are accompanied by
motion or the tendency to motion, we shall understand by force
whatever produces or tends to produce motion or change of motion.
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as the cause of motion, and wherever we find motion or change
of motion we shall assume the existence of force.&quot;
It would appear from this that Force is the tendency to move
(i.e., Attraction). Motion is the result of that tendency when
not opposed. It would also appear that the tendency or Force
does not result in Motion when counteracted by other tendencies
or Forces, and that the relation of equilibrium between the
tendency or Force and the opposing Force is a state of rest or
equilibrium. A study of Mechanics would also show that there
are cases of the pure acceleration and retardation of Motion, thus
proving the variability of the quantity of Motion.
Mr. Spencer says it is impossible for us to say that
&quot; motion
can ever come into existence or cease to exist.&quot;
&quot; To think
of Motion as either being created or annihilated to think of
nothing becoming something, or something becoming nothing
. . .
is impossible.&quot; But surely this is an erroneous way of putting
the case, for Motion is not a thing at all. It is not an existence
that is to say, it is not a mode of Force. It is neither a force
of attraction, nor a force of repulsion, the only two modes of
Force known to us but simply one of the results of the inter
action of these modes of Force, the modes of Force themselves
remaining quantitatively the same whether resulting in actual
motion or not. Thus when a motion begins it does not come
into existence or get created, and when it ceases it does not go
out of existence or become annihilated. The fact is simply
this : that quantums of attractive or repulsive forces become
related to each other in a different manner i.e., the manner
of rest or equilibrium instead of the manner of motion.
Magnus clearly recognises this fact of the commencement and
the ending of motion. (See pp. 2 and 3.) The picture on the
Avail tends to fall, and
&quot; Let a window or fireplace be opened, let the air be freed in
some direction from restraint, and it will at once obey its ten
dency and begin to move. . . . All that observation teaches us
is that bodies tend to move.&quot;
It is singular that Mr. Spencer takes all his instances in proof
of the continuity of Motion from cases of the retardation of
Motion. Bodies in motion come to rest not so much in con-148 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
sequence of the attraction of the earth or counteracting forces, as
in consequence of the resistance of the atmosphere, of friction,
and of actual contact with other bodies, which all cause so many
subtractions from the motion of the moving body until none is
left, so that finally all the motion in the moving body is trans
ferred to other bodies. Even amongst cases of the retardation
.of motion, the most simple case of a body projected upward is
not taken notice of, but only the more complicated and obscure
instances are adduced, in which the influence of gravitation is
small and obscure, and the influences of resistance and friction
are conspicuous.
Cases of acceleration of motion are not even alluded to. The
case of the acceleration in motion of a falling body is not men
tioned, nor is it easy to see how the doctrine of constant quantums
of motion could be maintained if these accumulated accelerations
were taken into account, without any means of predicating a cor
responding decrement of motions elsewhere, which indeed in the
case of a rock falling from a state of rest on a precipice cannot
be discerned.
If we consider the case of a body projected upwards say a
cannon-ball we find that it imparts some of its motion to the
air, and finally it comes to a state of rest, having expended all
its motion : and yet in its immediate descent it imparts just as
much motion as before to the atmosphere, and finally on its
impact with the ground originates a certain amount of heat
therein as well as in itself. The motion imparted to the air in
its ascent, according to Mr. Spencer s theory, is continuous for
ever, and is not received back again by the cannon-ball in
the course of its descent, but instead thereof it imparts another
modicum of motion to the air, which motion also continues for
ever. And it must be borne in mind that we are now discussing
not the constancy of the quantity of force, but of actual motion.
It will be worth our while again to consider the case of an ex
plosion of gunpowder or dynamite. Here there is no evidence of
avast amount of motion actuallygoing on unseen in the solid parti
cles of the substance. The substances are as quiescent as sugar or
salt. Their ignition causes a vast amount of motion. Yet the
inference that a corresponding amount of motion was actuallyTHE CONTINUITY OF MOTION DISPUTED. 149
in existence in the molecules of gunpowder or dynamite is not
justifiable. Here is a commencement of motion, an enormous
increment of motion consequent upon the small amount of motion,






is always and necessarily caused or produced by an equivalent
antecedent motion transferred from one body to another, and not
by a Force.
It will be noted that in this argument we do not take account
of the quantum of force or energy, which remains the same, but
question merely the quantum of actual motion. And the difficulty
is not disposed of by Mr. Spencer s device of &quot;locked-up motion.&quot;
Motion is not intermittent. It must be continuous. It is this
continuity that is the point of the discussion. If Motion is
locked up, it means that it is intermitted ; it is not going on
it is not Motion. The locking up of Motion is a denial of the
continuity of Motion. Motion stops and begins again. Motion,
therefore, is not continuous. In various parts of Mr. Spencer s
works occur references to
&quot;
locked-up motion,&quot; as in coal and
nitrogenous compounds. Is motion
&quot; locked up
&quot; in a stone
upon the edge of a precipice ?
Having now considered the case of the beginnings and end
ings of motions, and the consequent increments and decre
ments of the sum-total of motion, let us next view the matter
from the point of view of Statics, Rest, and Equilibrium, as
set out by Magnus and by Mr. Spencer himself. We begin by
quoting Magnus (p. 167)
:
&quot; Problem of Statics. The problem of Statics is to deter
mine the conditions under which several forces acting on a body
produce equilibrium.&quot;
Page 1 6 8.
&quot; Forces in Statics are supposed to be prevented
by some kind of resistance from producing motion.&quot;
&quot; If two forces act upon a body, it is clear that, in order that
they should produce no effect, they must act (i) at the same
point ; (2) in opposite directions ; and (3) they must be equal in
magnitude.&quot;
Page 169.
&quot; When the forces produce equilibrium, their joint
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&quot; If any number of forces acting at a point be in equilibrium,
and one of them be removed, the resultant of all the rest is
equal in magnitude, but opposite in direction to the removed
force
; for, since the forces were originally in equilibrium, the
removal of one force must destroy the equilibrium, since all the
other forces served to counteract the effect of this one.&quot;
This view of equilibrium is recognised by Mr. Spencer in his
chapter (First Principles, chap, xxii.) on Equilibration.
Page 484.
&quot;In all cases there is a progress towards equilibra
tion. That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which,
as we before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and
which, as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of
every force into divergent forces ... at the same time necessi
tates the ultimate establishment of a balance. Every motion
being motion under resistance is continually suffering deduc
tions, and these unceasing deductions finally result in the cessa
tion of the motion.&quot;
As usual, this conclusion, according to Mr. Spencer, is de-
ducible from the Persistence of Force.
Page 515. &quot;But the forces of attraction and repulsion being
universally co-existent, it follows, as before shown, that all
motion is motion under resistance. . . . This being the condi
tion under which all motion occurs, two corollaries result. The
first is, that the deductions perpetually made by the commu
nication of motion to the resisting medium, cannot but bring
the motion of the body to cm end in a longer or shorter time.
The second is, that the motion of the body cannot cease until
these deductions destroy it. In other words, movement must
continue till equilibration takes place ; and equilibration must
eventually take place. Both these are manifest deductions from
the persistence of force. . . . Hence this primordial truth is our
immediate warrant for the conclusions, that the changes which
Evolution presents cannot end until equilibrium is reached
; and
that equilibrium must at last be reached.&quot;
This passage is open to two or three interpretations. Firstly,
it may mean that all forces eventually counteract each other,
and all motions cease, which seems a reasonable proposition.
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to an abrupt end. Secondly, it may mean that
&quot; the changes
which evolution*
presents,&quot; must finally result in an equilibrium.
In this case it would be equivalent to saying that all matter
will have been integrated and all motion dissipated, and that
there can be no more changes. This is the ultimate equilibri
um. But this statement is utterly incomprehensible. Such an
utter separation of matter and motion is impossible to conceive.
Thirdly, it may mean that we arrive ultimately at an equilibrium
mobile an universal alternation of motion a dissolution of the
cosmos into its ultimate units, having equal alternate motions :
either that or no motion at all
; for if there be an universal
counteraction of forces there will be an universal quiescence.
But even if there is not the assertion of such an universal
quiescence, there is in Mr. Spencer s statement an acknowledg
ment of the fact of the combination of forces resulting in
absence of motion. He recognises the state of rest described
by Magnus, and this recognition of a state of rest is an admission
of the possibility that forces tending to motion may not effect
that result on account of the counteracting tendency of other
forces. The theory of a statical equilibrium is inconsistent
with the theory of the Continuity of Motion.
We argue, therefore, that whether we consider the matter
from the point of view of the beginnings and endings of motion,
causing occasional increments and decrements of motion, or
whether we consider it in relation to the theory of equilibrium,
we find the theory of the Continuity of Motion to be unten
able. &quot;We also find that it is not a deduction from the Per
sistence of Force, since different manifestations of force can
counteract each other. And we do not find it justified nega
tively from the suggested difficulty as to the creation or anni
hilation of motion.
This view of the case is corroborated by a reference to Professor
Balfour Stewart s
&quot; Conservation of Energy.&quot; Throughout this
book a broad distinction is recognised between energy in
actual motion and energy in a state of rest, or potentiality,
or equilibrium. There is energy of actual motion and energy
of position. These are capable of change, the one into the
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other. The sum-total of energy remains constant. The sum-total
of energy of position is not constant, nor is the sum-total of the
energy of actual motion. For this see 34 at p. 23 on the Energy
of Position. In 64 we find the case succinctly stated.
&quot; Here it is well to bear in mind that all energy consists
of two kinds, that of position and that of actual motion, and
also that this distinction holds for invisible molecular energy
just as truly as for that which is visible.&quot;
Professor Stewart gives us two lists one of the Forces
of Nature, and one of the Energies of Nature, including
both classes of energies, commencing with the Energy of Visible
Motion, and proceeding to the Visible Energy of Position, such
as in a stone on the top of a cliff, in a head of water, in a
rain-cloud, in a crossbow bent, in a clock or watch wound
up, and in various other instances.
This list seems to us a little defective, in that it does not
fully describe each case in the two states of motion and posi
tion of advantage.
The enumeration of energies is followed up by a statement of
the law of conservation, according to which (A) + (B) + (C) +
(D) + (E) + (F) + (G) + (H) = a constant quantity, and then
comes a list of the transmutations of these different kinds of
energies, the one into the other, in the course of which it is
shown that energy of actual motion and energy of position are
interchangeable, the conclusion being against the theory that
there is a constant quantity of either kind, and therefore against
Mr. Spencer s theory of the Continuity of Motion.
The question then arises, how does this overthrow of the
Continuity of Motion affect the working out of Mr. Spencer s
arguments? He advances it in the &quot;First Principles&quot; as one of
the three factors the formulation of whose interrelations is to
unify knowledge. Clearly it ought to find no place in the
Formula
; and the relation specified in the Formula of Evolution
and Dissolution of concomitance with the integration of Matter
does not hold good indeed, as a matter of fact, we found in
our previous criticism, when we came to apply it, that it did not
prove satisfactory. Practically also we found that this theory
landed us in all sorts of confusions, notably in the foundationsTHE ULTIMATE PROBLEM. 153




Motion in nitrogenous compounds. So also it is the cause of
Mr. Spencer s indefiniteness of expression in all those cases of
latent and retained Motion which abound so plentifully in his
&quot; First Principles.&quot; With respect to the Formula of Evolution,
its essential point namely, the concomitance of the integra
tion of Matter and the dissipation of Motion disappears. The
processes are not pari passu ; Evolution and Dissolution need
not be concomitant.
With respect to the formula which was to unify knowledge,
we now come to this rather absurd position, that of the three
factors which Mr. Spencer proposed to formulate, one (Force)
is quietly ignored, another (The Continuity of Motion) is proved
to be erroneous, and the third contains a term, &quot;matter,&quot; to
which Mr. Spencer refuses to attach any definite meaning.
And we shall see that in practice, as applied to biological
and psychical phenomena, this formula is wholly inapplicable,
except as a description of the advance from an indefinite inco
herent homogeneity to a definite coherent heterogeneity. All
it amounts to is merely an assertion of the natural gradual
development of changes, and we get no insight whatever into
those relations of original factors and their necessary sequences
which constitute an intelligent history of the cosmos.
It seems to us that the whole subject of the Persistence of
Force, the Conservation of Energy, and the continuance or non-
continuance of Motion, should be re-stated by scientists.
2. The Ultimate Problem.
Already in Chap. I. i we have stated the nature of the pro
blem to be solved in attempting the unification of knowledge.
We have to frame a proposition which, specifying certain
factors, shall enable us by a series of deductions to form a
continuous picture representing the sequences of the objective
universe as they have actually occurred. The ideally perfect
unification would consist in the specification of every incident
in the entire series of sequences ; but the unification might be re
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could be deduced from the sum-total of certain generalised (not
abstracted) factors. This would be reached (if at all) in the
natural course of discovery by means of an alternative series of
analyses and deductions, of hypotheses and verifications ; but
each hypothesis requires clear statement, and each
-
testing a
rigid exactness. Now Mr. Spencer does not clearly tell us the
state from which he starts. If he starts from the state of a
nebula consisting of the seventy or eighty so-called elements in
a gaseous condition in known quantities, and irregularly distri
buted, we have a starting-point with definite factors. If also
there is an environment of ether with which this nebula is in
relation, we can so define the interrelation that it shall not be a
cause of uncertainty to us. Then within the limitation of
space and factors so defined we can set out on our deductive
process, which is also a process of construction.
But clearly this is not the unification of knowledge ; for we
have here seventy or eighty factors, whose differentiations have
to be accounted for. These seventy or eighty factors have what
we call properties properties of special attractions, relative
size, shape, weight, &c., and until these differentiations are ex
plained, no generalised factors can be used in the explanations
of their subsequent interrelations of combination, disintegra
tion, &c. We are tied down strictly to the specific properties
of our seventy or eighty factors. We cannot talk of Matter as
a general factor, nor of Force, nor of Polarity, nor of Equili
bration, for we do not know anything about them. All we
know are specific resistances, extensions, attractions, repulsions,
feelings (?), &c. We are only entitled to speak of a general Matter,
Force, Polarity, &c., when we know their fundamental relations,
and when we know them in such a way that we are able to reason
from them to the so-called elements, and through them to the
following sequences.
It is perhaps to expect too much of Philosophy to require
that it should reduce its ultimate factors to two. But all
philosophers of a very speculative character endeavour to start
with a state of the simplest possible constitution a state con
taining as few factors as possible, and these in the simplest
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Mr. Spencer, in his chapter on Dissolution, would seem to
resolve the universe ultimately into forces of attraction and
repulsion, and would seek to impose upon it the state of homo
geneity, or equal and symmetrical distribution. Both at p. 542
of &quot;First Principles&quot; and in the Formula of Evolution we find
a possible homogeneity stated, and the general tenor of Mr.
Spencer s process is from a state of homogeneity. To this
meeting-point the studies of all philosophers seem to tend.
The religious philosopher finds an original Divine Mind, the
subjective philosopher finds Absolute Unconditioned Being, the
physical philosopher finds a homogeneity of attractive and repul
sive forces or Absolute Force. All unite in saying that this
primordial factor is Unknowable. How, then, to make a begin
ning ? Mr. Spencer seemingly attacks the problem in his theory
of the Instability of the Homogeneous, but when we examine it,
we find he only means that the Homogeneous is unstable when
attacked by external forces, but when not so attacked it is
stable. Hegel propounds the theory of Self-Determination.
It would seem that this, being contrary (as it is) to experience
and incomprehensible in its statement, has no warrant save in
the necessity we feel for assigning a cause in our own minds to
the commencement of changes, in order to justify our onward
course of thought.
The problem is made more complex from the necessity we
are tinder of including in our original factors not only such as
will account for the seventy or eighty so-called elements in their
purely physical combinations, but also such as will account for
feelings and their combinations, which constitute also psychical
life, and which affect biological changes.
3. Mr. Spencer s Admissions of his Failure to Account for
Consciousness.
There is one principal difficulty in Mr. Spencer s scheme. As
we have so often observed, Mr. Spencer defines the scope of Philo
sophy as the accounting for every existence. Among existences
are those of organisms ; and if by existence we mean every fact
relating to material existences, then we have the facts of con-156 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
sciousness and mind, and these have to be explained. Surely
the facts of feeling have had some influence upon the morpho
logical and physiological development of organisms. Yet Mr.
Spencer distinctly states that the facts of feeling, and therefore
of mind, though exhibiting a parallelism with those of Matter and
Motion, cannot, nevertheless, be comprehended in the Formula
of Evolution. How, then, is knowledge unified 1 how is the end
of Philosophy fulfilled ? Mr. Spencer says (&quot; Psychology,&quot; 62,
p. 157)
:
&quot; So far from helping us to think of them as of one
kind, analysis serves but to render more manifest the impossi
bility of finding for them a common concept a thought under
which they can be united. Let it be granted that all existence
distinguished as objective, may be resolved into the existence of
units of one kind. Let it be granted that every species of
objective activity may be understood as due to the rhythmical
motions of such ultimate units ; and that among the objective
activities so understood, are the waves of molecular motion
propagated through nerves and nerve-centres. And let it
further be granted that all existence distinguished as sub
jective, is resolvable into units of consciousness similar in
nature to those which we know as nervous shocks ; each of
which is the correlative of a rhythmical motion of a material
unit, or group of such units. Can we then think of the sub
jective and objective activities as the same 1 Can the oscilla
tion of a molecule be represented in consciousness side by side
with a nervous shock, and the two be recognised as one ? No
effort enables us to assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has
nothing in common with a unit of motion, becomes more than
ever manifest when we bring the two into juxtaposition. And
the immediate verdict of consciousness thus given, might be
analytically justified were this a fit place for the needful
analysis.&quot;
And again on p. 508 he says
:
&quot;
Specifically stated, the pro
blem is to interpret (Q. explain?) mental (Q. subjective?) evolution
in terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion. (Q. do
Matter and Motion here mean the relations of attractive and
repulsive forces, or do they meanX and Y?) Though under its
subjective aspect Mind is known only as an aggregate of statesNO EXPLANATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 157
of consciousness, which cannot be conceived as forms of Matter
and Motion, (Q. repeated) and do not therefore necessarily
conform to the same laws of re-distribution
; (Q. is not this a
denial of the all-comprehensiveness of the Formula of Evolution ?)
yet under its objective aspect, Mind is known as an aggregate
of activities (Q. Motions?} manifested by an organism is the
correlative ( Q. antecedent cause or co-existing fact ?), therefore,
of certain material transformations (Q. of attractive and re
pulsive forces or of X and Y?} which must come within the
general process (Q. formula?) of material (Q. X and Y?)
evolution (Q. concentration of X and dissipation of Y ?), if that
process is truly universal. THOUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF MIND
ITSELF (Q. subjective?) CANNOT BE EXPLAINED BY A SERIES OF
DEDUCTIONS FROM THE PERSISTENCE OF FORCE, yet it remains
possible that its obverse (Q. antecedent cause?), the development
(Q. combination?) of physical changes in a physical (Q,. the
combination of attractive and repulsive forces, or of X and Y,
and the recombination of combinations of these attractive and
repulsiveforces, or ofX and Y ?) organ (Q. aggregate ?), may be
so explained ; and until it is so explained, the conception of
MENTAL EVOLUTION (Q. and even when it is so explained ?),
as a part of Evolution in general, remains incomplete.&quot;
Mr. Spencer speaks in a language that we do not understand.
We formed our notions of the meaning of the terms he employs
from the analysis of his doctrines, but when we come to read
his more advanced doctrines, we find they have undergone an
evolution ; hence all the difficulties we experience, as indicated
above, in understanding his meaning in many important
passages. As we understand the above, Mr. Spencer maintains
that by a series of deductions from the Persistence of Force
and by means of the Formula of Evolution the causes of the
production of an organism such as a man can be explained,
although his feelings and his mind cannot thereby be explained.
There are several inferences from this. Firstly, there is more in
the results of the Persistence of Force and the Formula of Evo
lution than the results of attractive and repulsive forces
; and
that since we are unable to understand this plus, or its rela
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understand, therefore, although we may be able to recognise a
regular |process of development due to the permanence and
regular order of these relations, yet we cannot unify our know
ledge. Secondly, we infer that Mr. Spencer maintains the
proposition that feeling and mind have not been factors in any
morphological and physiological development ; for he says that
an organism is explainable on physical grounds only, which
means that we can deduce and build up an organism from the
relations of the chemical elements and the laws of physics
alone. . An organism is thus physically explainable up to the
most complex development. The result is feeling and mind :
but the organisation would be the same were there no such
result as feeling and mind. It may be that feeling and mind
are necessary results of these relations of the original factors,
although we cannot conceive it
; but, nevertheless, they are
nothing more than such results, and it is deducible from
these premises that there might be complex organisms with
out feeling and without mind. Thirdly, *f we allow that
feeling and mind have had any influence as factors in morpho
logical and physiological development, then we admit as factors
in that development more than the factors recognised in a
physical explanation i.e., attractive and repulsive forces. If
feeling cannot be explained from physical antecedents, and yet
feeling is a factor in the structural and functional development
of physical organisms, then a physical explanation of organisms
is not possible, and organisms escape altogether from the
Formula of Evolution and the unification of knowledge. It
is true there is one last resource, namely, to abandon to the
chemical elements the definite terms of attractive and repul
sive forces having definite results, and to deal only with x, y,
and z. That, indeed, releases us from our dilemma, for we can
make x mean sometimes one thing and sometimes another
; and
surely a protean world requires protean words to represent it.
4. Does Mr. Spencer Profess to Explain the Universe ?
In reply to our previous volume, some critics have said that
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therefore, our criticism in this respect is not applicable. Let
us consider this point. We advance this as Mr. Spencer s
object for the following reasons, viz. :
Firstly, Because he recognises it at the outset of his work, in
the chapter on the &quot;Scope of Philosophy,&quot; from which we have
already quoted. Here he looks for the unification of know
ledge in the gradual advance of Science, which in various de
partments unifies great diversities of individual facts by means
of some wide proposition, and we seek the goal of Philosophy in
some widest of all propositions, which shall include everything
in its organic explanations.
Secondly, We justify this view of Mr. Spencer s object from
his summing up at the end of
&quot; First Principles,&quot; when he has
finished all his work, and says to himself,
&quot; It is
good.&quot; This
passage is very precise ; it is almost legal in its phraseology.
It runs as follows (p. 541):
&quot;In commencing our search,
. . .
it was shown that a Philosophy stands self-convicted of inade
quacy, if it does not formulate the whole series of changes passed
through by every existence in its passage from the imperceptible to
the perceptible, and again from the perceptible to the imperceptible.
If it begins its explanations with existences that already have
concrete forms; or leaves off while they still retain concrete
forms
; then, manifestly, they had preceding histories, or will
have succeeding histories, or both, of which no account is given.
And as such preceding and succeeding histories are subjects of-
possible knowledge, a Philosophy which says nothing about them,
falls short of the required unification. &quot;Whence we saw it to
follow that the formula sought, equally applicable to existences
taken singly and in their totality, must be applicable to the
whole history of each and to the whole history of all.&quot;
From this it would seem that the unification of knowledge is
to be found in the formulation of
&quot; the whole series of changes
passed through by every existence.&quot; Here, of course, there is
the obscurity of the term formulate ; but we take it that that
word must refer to the dependence of change upon anterior con
ditions, these anterior conditions being fewer and more simple
the farther we go back, until we discern in one or two simple
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Thirdly, We hold this to be Mr. Spencer s theory because
his work is mainly a process of construction. Starting from
the comparatively simple and undifferentiated, he proceeds by
gradual steps to the more complex. In his actual work, and
in its effect upon our minds, Mr. Spencer undertakes a pro
cess of building up. We see before our eyes the formation of a
solar system out of a nebula. The world cools, the geological
strata are formed, oceans and continents appear. Plants and
animals creep into life, till in their gigantic strength they rise
superior to the elements and defy their brute creators. Man is
developed as the resultant of oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, &c. in
relation with external factors of heat, light, &c. Strange
sciences of Ethics, Politics, and Esthetics supervene. Intelli
gence and emotion have come out of physical arrangement of
the chemical elements. We see it all before our eyes. Is it
not unfolded by Mr. Spencer in his series of works ?
Fourthly, Mr. Spencer states distinctly in several places that
he regards this evolution as a single process from first to last.
What does a single process mean but the dependence of
changes upon anterior conditions, and what can the under
standing of the process be but the understanding of the initial
conditions 1
The &quot;Biology&quot; is essentially a constructive undertaking, which
is the same thing as a deductive process of reasoning. From
certain factors in the primal cosmos, whenever we may fix the
time, we have to deduce, or, which is the same thing, construct
the cosmos as we now know it. Mr. Spencer s is not merely an
inductive gathering up of all knowledge into one scientific pro
position, but a deductive process from primordial principles.
It is not sufficient, according to him, that we should know all
that is, but that we should know it as what it must have been,
and could not have been otherwise. Therefore the
&quot;Biology&quot;
comes to be a constructive process. We first see the construction
of organic molecules out of inorganic, and then the building up
of organic molecules into plants and animals represented as strict
deductions from the properties of the original factors.
This is what Mr. Spencer says (&quot; Psychology,&quot; p. 136)
:
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throughout all forms of existence, there can be no break, no
change from one group of concrete phenomena to another with
out a bridge of intermediate phenomena.&quot; He then goes on to
show how Geology is only a branch of a particular science
which is in its totality Astronomy. Biology is only a specialised
part of Geology, and Psychology is only a specialised part of
Biology.
&quot;
Theoretically all the concrete sciences are adjoining
tracts of one science, which has for its object-matter the con
tinuous transformation which the universe undergoes.&quot;
We therefore come to the conclusion that Mr. Spencer does
undertake an explanation of the universe. He is not content,
nor indeed is it sufficient merely to specify the general character
istics of cosmical history in all its branches. He rigidly lays
down the necessity for the deductive process, and attempts the
correlative constructive problem.( 163 )
CHAPTEE IV.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE &quot;PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY&quot; WITH
REGARD TO ITS POSITION IN THE SYSTEM FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF KNOWLEDGE.
THIS chapter is undertaken for the purpose of ranging Psycho
logy in its proper place in the deductive order of the sciences
upon the scheme for the unification of knowledge propounded
by Mr. Spencer. We wish to ascertain its place relatively to
the other sciences in a properly ordered system of knowledge,
and we also wish to ascertain in what respects it assists in the
proper understanding of Mr. Spencer s system.
In this undertaking we do not propose to criticise the
&quot;
Psy
chology&quot; on its merits as an independent work, and we therefore
pass over some of its most important features without note or
comment. To do otherwies would be beside our purpose.
Accordingly we omit many valuable and interesting inquiries,
and confine ourselves strictly to the object we have in view.
In summarising the remarks that have occurred to us in our
studies of the work, we find them to fall under three headings,
and we divide our chapter accordingly. We shall first treat of
a method for the unification of knowledge propounded in the
body of the work, which is one altogether separate and different
from the main and scientific unification upon the lines of which
the great constructive portions of Mr. Spencer s works are car




&quot; in regard to the constructive methods, to see how they
fall in with the general plan. Thirdly, we shall consider how
any of the difficulties we may have met in the course of
our study are to be got over by means of the Double-Aspect
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i. The Psychological Method for the Unification of
Knowledge.
(a.) Study of Part VII. of the
&quot;
Principles of Psychology.&quot;
We shall first direct the attention of the student to Part VII.
of the
&quot;
Principles of Psychology,&quot; in which will be found the
peculiar method for the unification of knowledge already referred
to. It is entitled
&quot; General Analysis,&quot; and its object is defined
to be
&quot; An Inquiry Concerning the Nature of Human Know
ledge.&quot; We shall find it necessary to pursue a somewhat detailed
inquiry, a procedure which, although more tedious to the general
reader, is more satisfactory to the student and more just to the
author than criticisms given in general terms. We find in
385 (vol. ii. p. 307):
&quot;
Knowledge implies something known and something which
knows ; whence it follows that a theory of knowledge is a
theory of the relation between the two.* Observe how dis
tinct are the three things.
&quot;
Here, on the one hand, is an aggregate of propositions re
specting objects ; and each group of these propositions, as, for
instance, those constituting the science of Astronomy, we regard
as expressing certain connections, which continue to hold
whether we continue conscious or not. Here, on the other
hand, is an aggregate of propositions concerning states of con
sciousness
; and we regard these propositions as expressing
certain connections which continue to hold irrespective of the
continuance of any other connections. And now here are cer
tain propositions which do not assert connections among Things,
and which do not assert connections among Thoughts, but
which assert connections between Things and Thoughts. Or,
to speak strictly, though they tacitly assert certain connections
among Things, and certain connections among Thoughts, which
are indispensable elements of them, yet the connections with
which they are immediately concerned are those between Things
and Thoughts.&quot;
*
Compare this with Mr. Spencer s definition of knowledge in
&quot; First
Principles,&quot; 42.1 64 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
The rest of tlie section is taken up with a further explana
tion of the object sought for in a Theory of Knowledge. And
this brings the author back to the main object of his Philosophy,
and causes him to revert to the statement of that object made
in the
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
This reference is made in 386, and as we are now dealing
with Mr. Spencer s main argument, and as careless or obscure
references to long anterior passages of his work are likely to be
misleading unless properly examined, it will be our duty to
carefully study the connection between the train of thought
therein set forth, and the final outcome in the chapters now
before us. Thus at the outset we are obliged to make a long
digression from our immediate study in order to estimate pro
perly that original thought to which the new reasonings have to
be joined. And first let us see if the representation now made




The salient point of the reference is found to be (p. 310, line
1 6), &quot;the complete unification of knowledge, in which Philo
sophy reaches its
goal.&quot; This unification is declared to be found
(line 15) in the complete establishment of the congruity of
certain fundamental intuitions with all other dicta of conscious
ness. This process of proving or disproving the congruity is
therefore seen to be (line 14)
&quot;the business of Philosophy,&quot; in
the accomplishment of which is to be found the required unifi
cation of knowledge.
The following is a quotation of the passage in full, part of
which we italicise :
&quot;
386. To do this will be to redeem the promise made by
implication in First Principles, when dealing with the Data
of Philosophy. It was there argued ( 39) that developed
intelligence is framed upon certain organised and consolidated
conceptions of which it cannot divest itself ; and which it can
no more stir without using than the body can stir without help
of its limbs. In what way, then, is it possible for intelligence,
striving after Philosophy, to give any account of these concep
tions, and to show either their validity or their invalidity?
There is but one way. Those of them which are vital, or cannot
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assumed as true provisionally. The fundamental intuitions that
are essential to the process of thinking, must be temporarily
accepted as unquestionable
: leaving the assumption of their
unquestionableness to be justified by the results. And it was
further argued ( 40) that setting out with these fundamental
intuitions provisionally assumed to be true that is, provision
ally assumed to be congruous with all other dicta of conscious
ness the process of proving or disproving the congruity becomes
the business of Philosophy ; and the complete establishment of the
congruity becomes the same thing as the complete unification
of knowledge, in which Philosophy reaches its goal.&quot;
We find it, therefore, clearly stated, first, that the goal of
Philosophy is the unification of knowledge ; secondly, that this
unification is accomplished when certain fundamental intuitions
are found to be congruous with all the other dicta of conscious
ness ; and, thirdly, that the proving or disproving this congruity
is the business of Philosophy.
&quot;We will now refer back to the
&quot; Data of Philosophy
&quot;
to see
whether this is a correct representation of the passage. And we
may as well say at once that we find there no such clear and
concise statement, but a very long, diffuse, and indefinite discus
sion containing a variety of imperfectly conceived propositions.
Firstly, we think we come upon the primordial datum in 41,
which is thus presented to us : *
&quot; What is this datum, or rather what are these data, which
Philosophy cannot do without ? Clearly one primordial datum
is involved in the foregoing statement. Already by implication
we have assumed, and must for ever continue to assume, that
congruities and incongruities exist, and are cognisable by
us.&quot;
The italicised proposition, therefore, is the first fundamental
datum of philosophy, further explained towards the end of
p. 141
:
&quot; And here we get to the bottom of the matter. The per
manence of a consciousness of likeness or difference, is our
ultimate warrant for asserting the existence of likeness or differ
ence
; and, in fact, we mean by the existence of likeness or dif
ference, nothing more than the permanent consciousness of it.&quot;
* First Principles, p. 140.1 66 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
This, however, is not enough.
42.
&quot; But Philosophy requires for its datum some substan
tive proposition. To recognise as unquestionable a certain
fundamental process of thought, is not enough
: we must recog
nise as unquestionable some fundamental product of thought,
reached by this process. If Philosophy is completely-unified
knowledge if the unification of knowledge is to be effected
only by showing that some ultimate proposition includes and
consolidates all the results of experience; then, clearly, this
ultimate proposition which has to be proved congruous with all
others, must express a piece of knowledge, and not the validity
of an act of knowing. Having assumed the trustworthiness of
consciousness, we have also to assume as trustworthy some
deliverance of consciousness.
&quot;
&quot;What must this be ? Must it not be one affirming the
widest and most profound distinction which things present ?
Must it not be a statement of congruities and incongruities
more general than any other ? An ultimate principle that is to
unify all experience, must be co-extensive with all experience.
. . . That which Philosophy takes as its datum, must be an
assertion of some likeness and difference to which all other like
nesses and differences are secondary. If knowledge is classifying,
or grouping the like and separating the unlike
; and if the
unification of knowledge proceeds by arranging the smaller
classes of like experiences within the larger, and these within
the still larger ; then, the proposition by which knowledge is
unified, must be one specifying the antithesis between two ulti
mate classes of experiences, in which all others merge.&quot;
From this passage it would appear that the unification of
knowledge, which is the goal of Philosophy, is to be reached by
a different method altogether from those which we discussed
in our former criticism. The theory of this latest method is :
Since knowledge is classification, the more complete the classi
fication the more completely unified is the knowledge, and the
nearer we approach to a philosophy. When, therefore, we have
all knowledge comprehended in two large classes, we can pro
ceed no farther : knowledge is unified and Philosophy has
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However, to proceed. We have to bear in mind that the
&quot; sub
stantive proposition
&quot; which Philosophy requires for its datum
has not been found in 42. We pass on to 43.
This section is a disquisition on the faint and vivid manifes
tations which compose knowledge, and which possess seven sepa
rate characters by which they are distinguished.
Section 44 groups these two classes of manifestations into
self and non-self. The
&quot; vivid manifestations indissolubly bound
together in relatively immense masses and having independent
conditions of existence we call the Non-ego.&quot;





proposed to be sought in 42. Taking into consideration that
this proposition is described as
&quot; one specifying the antithesis
between two ultimate classes of experiences, in which all others
merge,&quot; as
&quot; one affirming the widest and most profound dis
tinction which things present,&quot; we are tempted to put down as
the second datum this proposition, namely, that all knowledge
i.e., Philosophy is comprised in the proposition that
&quot; the
widest and most profound distinction which things present is
the distinction between the Ego and the Xon-ego.&quot;
But there crops up here and there another datum, for which
see 44, p. 154.
&quot;
Or, rather, more truly, each order of manifestation carries
with it the irresistible implication of some power that mani
fests itself ... in the faint forms . . . and in the vivid
forms.&quot;
Page 156. &quot;And so we are made vaguely conscious of an
indefinitely-extended region of power or being, not merely
separate from the current of faint manifestations constituting
the Ego, but lying beyond the current of vivid manifestations
constituting the immediately-present portion of the Non-ego&quot;
These lead up to the datum or
&quot;
postulate that the manifes
tations of the Unknowable
&quot;
(Power ?)
&quot; fall into the two
separate aggregates constituting the world of consciousness and
the world beyond consciousness.&quot;
This seems to be the fundamental proposition which has to
be found congruous with every result of experience, direct and1 68 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
indirect, and. which shall thereby become the unification of
knowledge aimed at by Philosophy.
On p. 156 it is described as the &quot;fundamental cognition.&quot;
&quot; The establishment of this distinction precedes all reason
ing; and while, running through our mental structure as it
does, we are debarred from reasoning about it without taking
for granted its existence ; analysis, nevertheless, enables us to
justify the assertion of its existence, by showing that it is also
the outcome of a classification based on accumulated likenesses
and accumulated differences. In other words Reasoning, which
is itself but a formation of cohesions among manifestations,
here strengthens, by the cohesions it forms, the cohesions which
it finds already existing.
&quot;
In 45 we seem to realise the substantive proposition pro
posed to be sought in 42.
&quot;I have thus . . . indicated the
essential nature and justification of that primordial proposi
tion which Philosophy requires as a datum.&quot; This seems to
refer to the previous passage at the end of 44.
&quot; And so we are made vaguely conscious of an indefinitely-
extended region of power or being, not merely separate from the
current of faint manifestations constituting the Ego, but lying
beyond the current of vivid manifestations constituting the
immediately-present portion of the Non-ego&quot;
The whole argument is summed up on the following page.
AVe are never, however, given one fundamental proposition, but
several
; and their coherence, so as to form an unification of all
knowledge, cannot, on the face of it, be recognised.
Page 157.
&quot;In brief, our postulates are: an Unknowable
Power; the existence of knowable likenesses and differences
among the manifestations of that Power ; and a resulting segre
gation of the manifestations into those of subject and object.&quot;
What is segregation ? It is a term derived from, and, pro
perly speaking, exclusively applicable to, material bodies, and
it refers to the process by which the like separates itself from
the unlike, and each kind of substance under proper conditions,
such as heat or liquidity, gathers itself together in separate
places.
&quot;We know of no possible method by which different
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themselves together, so as to form on the one hand faint mani
festations which we call feelings, and on the other vivid mani
festations which we call the world beyond consciousness. Who
has perceived or will venture to describe the process ? Can we,
indeed, assert that we mean anything when we say that the faint
manifestations of the Unknowable segregate and the vivid mani
festations of the Unknowable segregate ]
These, then, are the &quot;organised and consolidated conceptions
&quot;
referred to in the
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; which have to be found con
gruous with all the other dicta of consciousness, and in which
the unitative object of Philosophy is attained.
We have remarked throughout this chapter a great amount
of vagueness, not merely of language, but also of thought. We
seem to be carrying on two arguments, if not more, at the same
time. We are apparently occupied mainly with an inquiry as
to the data or groundwork of knowledge, the result of which
inquiry is summed up on p. 157 as just quoted; and we are also
on the outlook for the definite and substantive proposition pro
posed at the commencement of 42 as requisite for the datum
of Philosophy, and which the summary hardly supplies.
To revert now to the
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; we find that the funda
mental intuitions with which all other dicta of consciousness
have to be found congruous, in order to accomplish a perfected
philosophy and unification of knowledge, are these :
1. The existence of an Unknowable Power.
2. The existence of knowable likenesses and differences
among the manifestations of that Power.
3. A resulting segregation of the manifestations into those
of subject and object.
The business of Philosophy, therefore, is the proving or dis
proving of the congruity between all other dicta of consciousness
and these fundamental intuitions.
According to this statement, the proper course would be to
ask three questions
:
Firstly, Are all the dicta of consciousness congruous with the
belief in the existence of an Unknowable Power ]
Secondly, Are they congruous with the consciousness of
knowable likenesses and differences ?170 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Thirdly, Are they congruous with the segregation into sub
ject and object ?
And if we give affirmative replies to all these questions, know
ledge is unified and Philosophy attained.
At the same time, we fail to see that we are any wiser or
better off for the fact. If this is the highest point to which
Philosophy can attain, it seems to us a very vapid result. It
gives us no insight into the relations of things; throws no light
upon the sequences of the universe; affords no explanations ;
gives us no power over the course of events, because it gives us
no knowledge of their relations
; imparts no information as to
our place in the historic cosmos, and is altogether a vain and
empty conclusion.
In addition to this, it is to be observed that the unification
thus effected does not conform to the requirements of the
objects of Philosophy, as explained elsewhere in Mr. Spencer s
works and quoted by us in the first chapter of this work. The
object of Philosophy is to trace back the order of sequences^of
the Cosmos, so that given the relations of certain original factors
in property and distribution, all the range of sequences can be
understood as resultants therefrom.
To place the unification of knowledge in the finding of con-
gruities between the multitudinous experiences of consciousness
and those fundamental experiences out of which all conscious
ness has been evolved, is no more than finding congruities
between a mass and the parts which make up that mass. In
this respect, indeed, it might be said that if we find the present
constitution of the cosmos and its past history congruous with
some anterior simple state, although we do not understand the
order of the sequences, then knowledge might be considered
unified. But as a matter of fact, we do not find the requisite
congruity between the known history of the cosmos and the
supposed constitution of the primordial nebula, for the former
includes subjective feelings which are not congruous with the
contents of the latter.
But truly this is not Mr. Spencer s idea : his teaching seems to
refer to the primordial experiences of individuals, or to indivi
dual conceptions of general primordial experiences of living crea-DIGRESSION. 171
tares. Here again we would observe that the simple finding of
congruities between the sum-total of experience and individual
experience is nothing very important. What shall we say if
this final result is no more than the bare statement that all
experiences are manifestations of an Unknowable Power, which
manifestations segregate into two orders, namely, the faint and
the vivid?
(b.) Digression.
In our previously published criticism of Mr. Spencer we gave
a different account of his unification of knowledge, gathered
from his
&quot; Summary and Conclusion
&quot; in
&quot; First Principles.&quot;




&quot; in regard to this question. We found that the unifi
cation of knowledge, which it was the object of Philosophy
to accomplish, was the formulation of the whole series of changes




&quot;It was shown that a Philosophy stands self-
convicted of inadequacy, if it does not formulate the whole
series of changes passed through by every existence in its pas
sage from the imperceptible to the perceptible, and again from
the perceptible to the imperceptible. If it begins its explanations
with existences that already have concrete forms, or leaves off
while they still retain concrete forms; then, manifestly, they had
preceding histories, or will have succeeding histories, or both, of
which no account is given. And as such preceding or succeeding
histories are subjects of possible knowledge, a Philosophy which
says nothing about them, falls short of the required unification.
Whence we saw it to follow that the formula sought, equally
applicable to existences taken singly and in their totality, must
be applicable to the whole history of each and to the whole
history of all.&quot;
The succeeding paragraph (p. 542) refers to the Formula of
Evolution, which is said to be the requisite formulation.
The question arises, which of Mr. Spencer s two methods is
the one he really advocates, or, if he propounds both of them,
are they identical
1
? In the one case, Mr. Spencer states thati;2 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Philosophy accomplishes its object, namely, the unification of
knowledge, by formulating some
&quot; ultimate proposition
&quot; which
shall be found congruous with all other experience. JSTow a pro
position is composed of three parts a subject, a predicate, and
a copula. The following sentence, which seems to be the sum
ming up of the chapter on the &quot;Data of Philosophy,&quot; to which




now under consideration, is not a proposition at all :
&quot; In brief, our postulates are : an Unknowable Power
;
the existence of knowable likenesses and differences among the
manifestations of that Power ; and a resulting segregation of the
manifestations into those of subject and object.&quot;
Yet we can find no other proposition which is clearly stated as
the one which is to unify all knowledge. The question then
arises, have these postulates the effect intended 1 Assuming
them to be correctly stated, do they unify knowledge 1 At first
sight they seem to be comprehensive enough, but not to throw
much light on the relation of sequence or process. They do
not, for instance, explain the combination of oxygen and hydro
gen into water, nor the varied states of ice, water, and steam.
Again, they do not explain the nature of heredity. Nor do
they throw much light on the sensitiveness of the eye to those
undulations called light. Clearly the postulates do not explain
the order of cosmical sequences.
Let us now consider the question as to the identity of the
two methods of unification proposed by Mr. Spencer, viz. :
&quot;
Evolution, is,&quot; &c.
&quot; In brief, our postulates are,&quot; &c.
To us there do not appear to be any common elements of com
parison. Let us, however, again refer to the
&quot; Summary and
Conclusion,&quot; to enable us to determine what is the proposition
which affords the desired unification of knowledge. The fol
lowing is a short summary
:
Page 538. A proposal to review the completed organisation
of knowledge.
Page 539, ist Par. Philosophy is the unification of know
ledge.DIGRESSION. 173
2nd Par. The data with which Philosophy must set out, as
already stated in detail.
3rd Par. The primary truth. The Persistence of Force
(Query, is this the Philosophy required?) includes the &quot;Inde
structibility of Matter&quot; and the
&quot;
Continuity of Motion.&quot;
Page 540. Further corollaries.
1 86. All these truths co-ordinated will form a philosophy.
&quot; That which alone can unify knowledge must be the law of
co-operation of all the factors a law expressing simultaneously
the complex antecedents and the complex consequents which any
phenomenon as a whole presents.&quot;
2nd Par. The law sought must be the continuous redis
tribution of Matter and Motion . . . Hence we may be cer
tain, d, priori, that there must be a law of the concomitant
redistribution of Matter and Motion, which holds of every
change ; and which, by thus unifying all changes, must be the
basis of a Philosophy. (Query, does this mean, must be the
Philosophy required ?)
3rd Par. Then comes the categorical statement of what is
required of a Philosophy which affords our researches a standard
of efficiency, and by which we find all Mr. Spencer s endeavours
to fail.
Page 542, ist Par. The formula in view is the Formula of
Evolution, but this is not the same kind of unification as that
which was proposed to be effected in the formulation of a
primary conception or fundamental proposition congruous with
all other dicta of consciousness.
Page 543. The Formula applied in detail.
Page 545. Evolution one in principle and one in fact.
Page 547. Still Philosophy is not complete as long as
Evolution is only an induction. What is required is the state
ment of one fact or principle from which all the facts of Evolu
tion and Dissolution can be deduced.
&quot; Our next step, therefore, was to show why, Force being
persistent, the transformation which Evolution shows us neces
sarily results.&quot;
&quot;We appear now to be coming in view of the grand ultimate
formula or proposition which shall completely unify knowledge174 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
and constitute a Philosophy; for it turns out, after all, that the
Formula of Evolution is not sufficient. The one comprehensive
truth, therefore, would seem to be
&quot; The Persistence of Force,&quot;
which it is necessary to examine separately on its own merits
as to meaning and efficacy, and which is so dealt with in our
previous criticism.
Page 547 shows how the principle of the Persistence of Force
involves as a consequence the instability of the homogeneous,
and this being accomplished, everything else follows. The full
consideration of this curious reasoning is given in our previously
published criticism, and the weakness of it is manifest in the
section now under consideration ; for Mr. Spencer, we find, does
not really treat of the homogeneous, but of a heterogeneous
complex cosmos containing some &quot;finite homogeneous aggre
gates
&quot; and
&quot; diverse forces,&quot; thus begging the question of the
heterogeneity for which, according to the statement on p. 541,
he had to account.
Page 549 ought to disclose the unificatory proposition of
Philosophy; and it is stated that &quot;each of these laws of the
redistribution of Matter and Motion, was found to be a deriva
tive law a law deducible from the fundamental law. The
Persistence of Force being granted, there follow as inevitable
inferences, &c. . . . And thus discovering that the processes
of change formulated under these titles are so many different
aspects of one transformation, determined by an ultimate
necessity, we arrive at a complete unification of them a
synthesis in which Evolution in general and in detail becomes
known as an implication of the law that transcends proof.
. . . AVhich further unification brings us to a conception
of the entire plexus of changes presented by each concrete
phenomenon, and by the aggregate of concrete phenomena, as
a manifestation of one fundamental fact a fact shown alike
in the total change and in all the separate changes composing
it,&quot; and thus answers to the requirements given on p. 541.
In 191, p. 551, we come upon a rounding off of the argu
ment by a reversion to the other statement of the method of a
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of consciousness is congruous with all other dicta of conscious
ness. We could not in its proper place find out with exactness
what that datum was, but it is given here
&quot; The recognition
of a persistent Force, ever changing its manifestations,&quot; but un
changed in quantity throughout all past time and all future
time, is that which we find alone makes possible each concrete
interpretation, and at last unifies all concrete interpretations.
. . . Our synthesis has proceeded by taking for granted at every
step this ultimate truth ; and the ultimate truth cannot, there
fore, be regarded as in any sense an outcome of the synthesis.&quot;
We do not think that the original datum as thus expressed was
given very clearly in the chapter on the &quot;Data of Philosophy.&quot;
If it was, then we find the proposition,
&quot; There is a Persistent
Force or Power,&quot; alike the fundamental fact from which the
Formula of Evolution is derived and the fundamental con
ception with which all other dicta of consciousness are con
gruous. This is, of course, Mr. Spencer s own statement. The
difficulty we ourselves find is in understanding the meaning
of the word Force, and then in deriving the corollaries. We
have elsewhere stated that unless we can attach clear ideas to
the terms Force, Matter, Motion, &c., none of the propositions
in which they are used can be intelligible, and therefore such
propositions are incapable of expressing an item of knowledge,
a fact of cognition, a truth of Philosophy. They are out of
court altogether, and Mr. Spencer himself states that they
cannot be understood.
&quot; There is a Persistent Force or Power ever changing its
manifestations.&quot; The more we think over this proposition, the
more incapable we find it of affording any satisfactory outcome.
It is said to have corollaries, but we struggle about inside the
hard bounds of our prison-house, and we cannot get out of it.
Force shows no inclination to solidify into Matter or to mani
fest itself in Feeling, and we do not know that Motion even
is a necessary mode of Force.
Section 192 is a general vindication of unity and a challenge.
&quot; If it can be shown that the Persistence of Force is not a
datum of consciousness ; or if it can be shown that the several
laws of Force above specified are not corollaries from it ; or if176 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
it can be shown that, given these laws, the redistribution of
Matter and Motion does not necessarily proceed as described ;
then, indeed, it will be shown that the theory of Evolution has
not the high warrant here claimed for it. But nothing short
of this can shake the general conclusions arrived at.&quot;
To this challenge we have previously replied by anticipation.
We deny that the proposition predicating Persistence as an
attribute of Force Force itself being unknowable has any
corollaries, and we do not hold that the quantitative Persistence
of Force is a datum of consciousness.
Section 193 is a re-statement of the unification effected
throughout all knowledge by the theory of the Persistence of
Force.
&quot; Given the Persistence of Force, and given the various
derivative laws of Force, and there has to be shown not only
how the actual existences of the inorganic world necessarily
exhibit the traits they do, but how there necessarily result
the more numerous and involved traits exhibited by organic
and super-organic existences how an organism is evolved?
what is the genesis of human intelligence ? whence social
progress arises 1
&quot;
This places the unification of knowledge and the attainment
of the goal of Philosophy on the basis of the definition on
p. 541 rather than on the attainment of congruity of know
ledge.
Section 194 is a repudiation of Materialism as ordinarily under
stood. With the statement and argument in this section we find
we entirely agree. We believe there is as much mystery in the
nature of the relations of Matter and Motion as there is in the
nature of sentiency, in the relations of body with body, or in
the relations of body with consciousness. Our contention is
that in the face of so much mystery no unification of knowledge
such as that described in 193 and 186 is possible, i.e., an
unification which shall show the necessary sequence of the traits
of all existences, both inorganic, organic, and super-organic, from
some primordial homogeneity. If we say there is the Persistence
of Force, and then that there is Matter and Motion, logic stands
impotently staring at propositions made up of symbols utterlyDIGRESSION. 177
incomprehensible, and cannot set to work till the ghosts depart
and comprehensible realities only are left. Even supposing that
we agree with Mr. Spencer that the controversy as between
Spiritualism and Materialism is merely a war of words, still it
does not follow that we can formulate all phenomena in terms
of Matter, Motion, and Force. And if we do, then one of two
things happens. Either, first, we attach no definite meaning to
the words, and they are mere symbols without much content
the playthings of inquiring philosophers ; or, secondly, we must
insist that all the facts of the universe should be explained
in terms of Matter, and Motion, and Force, according to the
accepted meanings of these terms, and this is obviously a mate
rialistic interpretation. In the former case explanation is clearly
acknowledged to be impossible ; in the latter it is insufficient.
Therefore we see no injustice in pressing upon Mr. Spencer,
notwithstanding all his disclaimers, the charge of Materialism
as ordinarily understood
; and he can only escape it by having
recourse to Mysticism a confession of the inefficiency of any
formula to explain all that he requires a Philosophy to explain,
and a resort to a Power that cannot be understood.
It must be remembered that we entered upon this examina
tion of the





for the purpose of ascertaining if the method of the




really identical with the method of unification propounded at
p. 541 of the
&quot; First Principles.&quot; We found that an attempt
was made to identify, or rather to comprehend, the two methods
by inclusion in a larger proposition than either of them, viz., in
the proposition that
&quot; There exists an Unknowable Power, ever
changing its manifestations
;
&quot; and our conclusion respecting
that method of unifying knowledge was that it was ineffective,
because it had no meaning and no corollaries. Indeed, one
might just as well say that the alphabet is an unification of
knowledge, since all knowledge is contained in its ever-varying
changes and combinations. One would obtain just as much in
formation out of the one proposition as out of the other. And
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We therefore find that the only unification between the
two methods for unifying knowledge is a mystical and in
comprehensible one, and that if either of them is separately
able to accomplish it, they must be considered separately. The
one we fully considered in our former criticism, and found it
utterly impotent. The other we think we have now also shown
to be inefficient ; but we must proceed further with our conside
ration of it in the part of the
&quot;
Psychology
&quot; we have selected
for our present study.
(c.) Resumption of the Study of Part VII. of the
&quot;
Psychology.&quot;
It must be remembered that we proceeded with our exami
nation of
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; part vii., up to p. 310. To return to
that page, we are reminded (line 18) that the organised con
ceptions forming the Data of Philosophy were only accepted
provisionally ; it is also explained that throughout the pre
vious works composing the system of Synthetic Philosophy
these organised conceptions have been assumed
; and that all
the detailed phenomena have been found to be congruous with
such assumptions. We are then informed that
&quot; we are now
called upon to reconsider these provisional assumptions
. . .
the question here to be met is, whether they admit of being
unified * with the coherent body of conclusions to which accep
tance of them has led us.&quot; ...&quot; In other words, we have to
take up the vexed question of Subject and Object. The rela
tion between these, as antithetically-opposed divisions of the
entire assemblage of manifestations of the Unknowable, was
our datum.&quot;
We would have the reader carefully consider what he is about
here. A transformation of the argument seems to be going on,
and it is necessary to be watchful. The transformation seems
to be this :
Our object, as stated in the first half of p. 310, is the &quot;uni
fication of knowledge.&quot; Having abandoned the unification of
*
Query, does &quot;unified&quot; mean merely &quot;shown to be non-contradictory,&quot;
or does &quot;unification&quot; mean that they are both the necessary result of
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knowledge as an unification of sequences by means of the
Formula of Evolution, we seek it now in the establishment of
congruities between organised primordial experiences and all
the other dicta of consciousness. After a reference to the
&quot; Data
of Philosophy,&quot; where these primordial assumptions are fully set
out, Mr. Spencer states, in the second half of p. 310, that
&quot; Since then we have been occupied in carrying on the unifica
tion indicated, ... we are now called upon to reconsider these
provisional assumptions.&quot;
&quot; The process of unification . . . has
brought us at length to these assumptions themselves ; and the
question here to be met is, whether they admit of being unified
with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance of
them has led us ... it becomes needful to look closely at these
postulates, and to test the arguments of those who deny their
validity.&quot;
So far we understand our author. There were certain postu
lates assumed provisionally, and indeed necessarily, for they
were such that the mind could not move without them any more
than the body could move without the aid of its limbs
; and
we are now called upon to re-examine these postulates which
were thus only assumed provisionally, our object being to test
their validity. This is to be done by seeing if they are con
gruous with the coherent body of conclusions to which acceptance
of them has led us.
Waiving the question as to the necessity and propriety of
judging the validity of postulates by the congruity of their
logical results with themselves, we take Mr. Spencer s statement
as it stands. To do what he wishes evidently requires that
the postulates to be thus tested should be carefully enumerated
in definite language, and then, on the other hand, that the
coherent body of conclusions by which they are to be tested
should be summarised in some clear and formal statement.
When that is done, we shall have to compare the two, and find
ing that the logical results of the postulates are congruous with
them, we shall know that the postulates themselves are valid
and trustworthy.
But if the reader expects this course to be pursued by Mr.
Spencer, he will be disappointed. On p. 311 all the postulatesi8o SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
are arbitrarily
&quot; unified
&quot; into one datum, and this is not the
old favourite
&quot; Power or Force continually changing its mani
festations,&quot; but it is the relation between subject and object as
antithetically opposed divisions of the entire assemblage of
manifestations of the Unknowable, which was our datum. The
plural is changed into the singular ; the whole is unified into
one of its parts ; and the congruity sought must be between this
one datum and the coherent body of conclusions before referred
to. In the next sentence, indeed, it seems to be inferred that
all this coherent body of conclusions has been derived from this
single datum, and not from all or any of the others Ave have
had to consider
; for Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; The fabric of conclu
sions built upon it must be unstable if this datum can be proved
untrue or doubtful.&quot;
Now the consideration in question may be essential to Philo
sophy, but surely this is not the unification of Philosophy, nor
is it the mode of unification of knowledge which Mr. Spencer
has previously set out on page 310, and which we have just
examined. While one side of the comparison is ignored alto
gether i.e.,
&quot; the coherent body of conclusions,&quot; to which the
acceptance of the primordial data led us on the other side these
primordial postulates or primary conceptions are all most unwar
rantably and unjustifiably amalgamated into the narrow limits
of a single datum, and the whole question is transformed into
one respecting the validity of the distinction between Subject
and Object, and the reality of the existence of these two.
If this were logical and allowable, it would follow that the
accomplishment of this task would prove the congruity of all
the primary assumptions or postulates with the coherent body
of their logical results, and the accomplishment of this task we
are to take for granted. It is one of Mr. Spencer s principal
characteristics that he states very clearly what has to be done
and then fails to do it. But what can we expect of any one
who would grasp the universe in his arms perpetually ? Some
times the world of feeling eludes his hold; sometimes the
physical universe still goes astray.
It is clear that our logical continuity has come to a stop. We
abandon the comparison and verification we had intended, andTHE FINAL QUESTION. 181
which was to have been the final unification of knowledge, and
now set out to follow Mr. Spencer in new and disconnected
lines of thought.
(d.) The Final Question.
Collecting ourselves for a fresh start, we find the above head
ing to the chapter, and are refreshed. We have come across so
many apparent finalities, and found they were not final, that
we are glad to see it stated in a formal way that we have
reached the final question at last. And we take it to be ex
pressed in 387, p. 311, viz.,
&quot; The vexed question of Subject
and Object.&quot; The question allowing of an affirmative or nega
tive reply would seem to be this :
&quot; Are Subject and Object antithetically opposed divisions of
the entire assemblage of manifestations of the Unknowable 1
&quot;
Our first inquiry must be, Is this a fair statement of the
&quot; vexed question,&quot; or is it a statement which, by including too
much, or tacitly asserting some theory, would not be accepted by
all philosophers as a proper statement of the controverted point ?
But Mr. Spencer asks us to be satisfied with this statement of
the question, and to accept it as one which the idealist, the
sceptic, the dualist, and the realist would all recognise.
If it is answered in the negative, Mr. Spencer states that, so
far as he is concerned,
&quot; The fabric of conclusions built upon it
must be unstable if this datum can be proved either untrue or
doubtful.&quot;




but we proceed with Mr. Spencer s course of thought. This
leads us through Chapters II., III., and IV., which deal respec
tively with the assumptions, words, and reasonings of metaphysi
cians, who are here taken as Idealists. Chapters V., VI., VII.,
and VIII. are justifications of Realism ; Chapters IX. to XIII.
deal with the test of validity all these chapters being neces
sary to the elucidation of the argument, and leading up to
Chapter XIV., the Positive Justification of Eealism, a short
chapter, which is elaborated in Chapters XV., XVI, and XVII.,
which latter expounds
&quot; The Completed Differentiation of Sub
ject and Object.&quot; We have not thought it necessary to enteri8a SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
upon a minute examination of these chapters, because we do
not see much to disagree with, and because they do not seem
to present salient points for criticism so far as regards our main
object of examination, viz., the unification of knowledge to be
attained by the recognition of the two classes of manifestations,
or in any other way. The result of all these chapters appears to
be summarised and expressed in the concluding paragraph of
Chapter XVII.
, thus:
&quot; The general result is that the vivid aggregate, both as mani
festing passive resistance and as manifesting active energy,
inevitably comes to have associated with it in consciousness,
the idea of power, separate from, but in some way akin to, the
power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within
itself.&quot;
This general result, then, is, after all, very ambiguous, and
therefore not very efficient in the unification of knowledge,
except upon the principle that the Knowable can only be pro
perly understood by means of our ideas of the Unknowable. In
order to understand the passage just quoted, we have to under
stand the power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves
within itself, and then we have to form some idea of &quot;akin-
ness,&quot; and attribute the same kind of power thus manifested to
the vivid aggregate. The result of this attribution would be
widely various, according to the different conceptions of the
power which the faint aggregate perpetually evolves within
itself.
But we now proceed to the study of Chapter XVIII., which
seems to require a detailed examination. It is upon the
&quot; De
veloped Conception of Object.&quot;
It is here pointed out in 347, 348, that the impression
we call resistance &quot;is the primordial, the universal, the ever-
present constituent of consciousness.&quot; &quot;It is primordial in the
sense that it is an impression of which the lowest orders of
creatures show themselves susceptible.&quot; ...
&quot; It is universal,
both as being cognisable by every creature possessing any sen
sitiveness, and usually as being cognisable by all parts of the
body of each.&quot; ...
&quot; It is ever present, inasmuch as every
creature, or, at any rate, every terrestrial creature, is subject toTHE FINAL QUESTION. 183
it during the whole of its existence.&quot; And it was shown that
this, consequently,
&quot; becomes the mother-tongue of thought, in.
which all the first cognitions are registered, and into which all
symbols afterwards learned are interpre table.&quot;
This is evidently another first primordial datum, and is a very
useful passage, because it gives us some clue by which to work
out the use and value of the symbols which we have been con
stantly using in the course of our studies. It is a kind of key
to the interpretation of the symbols Matter, Motion, Force,
Evolution, Dissolution, Integration, &c. We find that they
have all to be interpreted into
&quot; the impression we call resist
ance,&quot; and we find that all the
&quot;
first cognitions,&quot; which we pre
sume to be the fundamental data of philosophy, the primary





impression of resistance.&quot; To this interpretation and registra
tion we shall recur at a more convenient point. We must not
allow too many digressions to mar the consecutiveness of our
criticism. Mr. Spencer next says
:
&quot; Hence along with the segregation of our states of conscious
ness into vivid and faint, the consciousness of something which
resists comes to be the general symbol for that independent
existence implied by the vivid aggregate.&quot;
Here we notice that &quot;the consciousness of something
which resists
&quot; comes to be




&quot; We have just seen that mutual exploration of our
limbs, excited by ideas and emotions,! establishes an indissoluble
cohesion in thought between active energy as it wells upfrom the
depths of our consciousness, and the equivalent resistance opposed
to it ; as well as between this resistance opposed to it and an
equivalent pressure in the part of the body which resists. Hence
the root-conception of existence beyond consciousness, becomes
that of resistance plus some force which the resistance measures.&quot;
* &quot; In brief, our postulates are : An Unknowable Power ; the existence
of knowable likenesses and differences among the manifestations of that
Power ; and a resulting segregation of the manifestations into those of Sub
ject and Object.&quot; First Principles, p. 157.
t Elsewhere Mr. Spencer repudiates reeling as a factor in Biology.1 84 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
The statement seems to be this, we have the active conscious
energy + the physical forces of the exploring limb = the resist
ance of the explored limb, i.e.,
&quot; a force which the resistance
measures.&quot; This, firstly, implies a correlation of conscious force
with physical forces a theory not recognised by scientists.
Secondly, it exhibits a confusion between the modes of the
physical forces. Thirdly, it fails to show the correlation be
tween the forces of mutual resistance of limbs and the impres
sion of resistance. Fourthly, it fails to explain the differentia
tion of feelings in terms of the differentiations of resistances.
Mr. Spencer endeavours to reduce all knowledge to the rela
tions of two factors, Object and Subject. Philosophy requires
their unification as a corollary from one fundamental proposi
tion. If this can be done, then the final proposition must be
formed from the Persistence of Force, from which object and
subject must as corollaries be derived. This Persistence of Force
has many corollaries ; but we submit that subject and object
are not logically deducible from it.
Mr. Spencer proceeds to say
&quot; This essential element in our consciousness of the vivid
aggregate, is also the essential element in our consciousness of
each part distinguished as an individual object. The unknown
correlative of the resistance opposed by it, ever nascent in
thought under the form of muscular strain the unknown
correlative which we think of as defying our efforts to crush
or rend the body, and therefore as that which holds the body
together, is necessarily thought of as constituting body. On
remembering, &c. . . . we shall see clearly that this unknown
correlative of the vivid state we call pressure, symbolised in the
known terms of our own efforts, constitutes what we call mate
rial substance.&quot;
This we can only interpret as meaning those mutual attrac
tions according to known or ascertainable laws of chemical
elements, causing combinations of such coherency that chemical
elements otherwise combined, and forming an individual coher
ent body under the direction of the Will, are unable to dispart
them. The nature of the coherency of the external body and
of the body seeking to dispart it is the same, viz., chemical andTHE FINAL QUESTION. 185
cohesive forces of the elements which produce the formation of
diversely coherent hodies ; but the nature of the &quot;Will being
unexplained does not imply an equivalence either of Will or
Force, or anything else in the external existence. 1STor does the
aggregation of the elementary substances in any case imply con
sciousness.
Section 467 gives us a definition of Existence as the permanent
in the midst of that which has no permanence. Not that the
definition is very clear, nor that it is of any practical utility.
Section 468 requires careful study.
&quot; On changing from passivity to activity on evolving* the
feeling which excites muscular motion, and using the limbs
for mutual exploration, this partial differentiation is completed.
For such exploration shows that muscular tension, resistance,
and pressure, are correlatives and equivalents ; that the vivid
aggregate can initiate two out of these three correlatives the
pressure and the resistance
; and that these imply a something
equivalent to the third.&quot;
The reasoning is this : Firstly, we have muscular tension,
resistance, and pressure, as three correlatives. Secondly, of
these the vivid aggregate (i.e., external existence) can initiate
(i.e., render us conscious of) two, namely, pressure and resist
ance. Thirdly, these two correlatives imply a something equi
valent to the third, namely, to the muscular tension.
&quot;We find a great difficulty in understanding this. Is muscular
tension subjective or objective? Is it part of the vivid or the
faint aggregate ? The nearest approach we can make to a repre
sentation of the state of the case is that muscle being composed
of nitrogen, &c., organised in a particular way, is caused by some
incomprehensible power to press against some external object,
or some other part of the body of which itself forms a part,
and is then met by a resistance. ISTow these are external
existences to each other. The active energy which evolved the
feeling which caused the muscular tension is incomprehensible.
But it is not said that this active energy, nor the evolved
feeling, requires any correlative
; but it is said that the mus
cular tension implies a something. It is indeed said that
* Used in the popular sense, and not as defined in
&quot; First Principles.&quot;1 86 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
pressure and resistance imply a something equivalent to the
third, i.e., muscular tension, but it is difficult to see the necessity
for such an implication. Perhaps it is thus : the muscular ten
sion causes the pressure ; this implies a something which causes
the resistance. The argument takes it for granted that there must
be an equivalence between the cause of the pressure and the cause
of the resistance. If we take, firstly, the cause of the resistance,
we should say that it was due to the mutual attractions of
ultimate units constituted into separate and diversified bodies,
according to shapes, sizes, modes, and rates of motion, which
diversities are traceable to the original physical laws of attrac
tion and repulsion of these ultimate units
; and if we ask for
the equivalent as the cause of the pressure, we should give the
same reply. And this reply would be true, save and except
the evolution of the feeling which caused the pressure a plus
is here revealed. But if, on the other hand, we demand an equi
valent for the pressure and its cause, we have to say it is met
with in resistance and its cause ; but for the cause of the resist
ance we need go no further back than the laws of attraction and
resistance of ultimate units; and if equivalence is absolutely
demanded, our only course is to limit the cause of the pressure
to the cause of the resistance, or otherwise to expand the cause
of the resistance to the cause of the pressure, namely, Will
a plus over and beyond merely physical explanations.
Mr. Spencer may suppose not only something equivalent in the
external world to conscious force, but something analogous to it.
This is a subject which is beyond the scope of our inquiry, for
it is clear that if Feeling is not a factor in Biology, our studies
are limited to the known relations of physical factors, and the
unification of knowledge is to be confined to terms thereof. If
consciousness and something analogous to it in the external
world are necessary to that unification, it is obvious that we
require to know more of this analogous force before we can
unify our knowledge.
But to proceed with our examination. &quot;Hence the vivid
aggregate necessarily comes to be thought of as not simply
independent of the faint, but as being, like it, a fountain of
power. And this conception of it as a fountain of power, isTHE FINAL QUESTION. 187
made distinct by experiences of changes directly caused in us
by it, like those directly caused in us by our own energies.&quot;
The principal thought to master here is &quot;a fountain of
power.&quot; This evidently means from the context
&quot; a cause of
changes.&quot; The faint aggregate is a
&quot; fountain of power,&quot; -i.e., a
cause of changes. The vivid aggregate is also a
&quot; fountain of
power,&quot; i.e., a cause of changes. An aggregate to be a cause
of changes means that the items of the aggregate are so inter
related as not to be in a state of equilibrium or mutual adjust
ment, such as proximately exists in the case of the solar system,
and so precludes change.* The supposition of a faint aggregate
as a cause of change means nothing ; taken in itself as apart
from connection with the vivid aggregate, it is unknown ; and
in the latter connection it is a fountain of power i.e., an ante
cedent of changes in the vivid aggregate only if it is indepen
dent and not merely a concomitant ; and then, even if the laws




is mystery. If a man wills to pull
down an opposing scale, he can only do so according to the
relative weight of his body and the weight in the opposite scale.
It is a matter settled for him by the laws of attraction of bodies ;
and whether he stands in the scale and throws the tension of
his weight into the supporting chains, or hangs on to the beam
with his hands, and experiences the muscular tension caused by
the attraction of his body to the centre of the earth, the result
is the same
; his will, or his evolved feeling and his conscious
ness of muscular tension, weigh nothing ; they find and imply
no equivalent in the weight on the opposite scale.
Hence it follows that the fountain of power in the vivid
aggregate and the fountain of power in the faint aggregate
mean no more than this, that each exhibits changes and implies
merely a cause or causes of changes, but towards an intelligible
unification of these changes there is no approach.
* If it means anything more than this if it is taken to mean that the
items of the aggregate are caused, then it means that there is some other
fountain of power which caused them, i.e., laws of attraction and repulsion
of ultimate units ; or again, if we go further back still, we arrive at an
ultimate fountain of power, or ultimate cause, and
&quot; fountain of power
&quot;
means &quot;ultimate cause.&quot;1 88 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
If herein the argument is in favour of a duality of the causes
of changes, it seems to be effective.
&quot;The general conception thus formed of an independent
source of activity beyond consciousness, develops into a more
special conception when we examine the particular clusters of
vivid states aroused in us. For we find that each cluster, dis
tinguished by us as an object, is a separate seat of the power
with which the objective world as a whole impresses us. &quot;We
find that while it is this power which gives unity to the cluster,
it is also this power which opposes our energies. And we also
find that this power, holding together the elements of the
cluster notwithstanding the endlessly- varied changes they
undergo in consciousness, is therefore thought of by us as per
sisting, or continuing to exist, in the midst of all these mani
festations which do not continue to exist.&quot;
Here we start with the idea of &quot;an independent source of
activity beyond conscioiisness.&quot; We not only recognise activi
ties beyond consciousness, and independent of consciousness
i.e., the changes of the external world but we recognise an
independent source of them. It does not seem to us that we
do recognise a source of them. But it also
&quot;
develops into a
more special conception.&quot; Let us watch the development
of a general conception into a more special conception.
&quot;
&quot;We
find that each cluster, distinguished by us as an object, is a
separate seat of the power with which the objective world as a
whole impresses us. We find that while it is this power which
gives unity to the cluster, it is also this power which opposes
our energies.&quot; If we start with the power which opposes our
energies, we find it to be a specialised mode of the attraction of
ultimate units. The temporary unity of any object is due to the
accidents of the law of attraction and repulsion of ultimate
units
; and so long as no other body interferes with its stability,
it is a separate seat of the same power i.e., the attraction of
matter and has special relations according to the shapes,
sizes, modes, and rates of motion of the particles of which it
consists, with other separate states of the same power, viz., the
attractions and repulsions of ultimate units differently arranged
and combined. The single power is thus seen to be the alternateTHE FINAL QUESTION. 189
law of the mutual attractions and repulsions of ultimate units.
Any other
&quot; Power




independent source of activity
&quot; we can recognise
&quot;
beyond consciousness.&quot;
&quot; And we also find that this power holding together the
elements of the cluster ... is therefore thought of by us
as persisting ...&quot;
To proceed with the next paragraph.
&quot; So that these several
sets of experiences unite to form a conception of something
beyond consciousness which is absolutely independent of con
sciousness ; which possesses power, if not like that in conscious
ness yet equivalent to it; and which remains fixed in the
midst of changing appearances. And this conception, uniting
independence, permanence, and force, is the conception we have
of Matter.&quot;
We have shown that the previous considerations unite to form
a conception of something beyond and independent of conscious
ness, namely, Matter that is to say, if we call the laws of
attraction and repulsion of ultimate units Matter, or if we call
ultimate units acting under laws of attraction and repulsion
Matter, we have a conception at once of Matter and of that
external world and power beyond consciousness. So far this
is quite intelligible ; whether we call the ultimate units units
of matter or units of force or the chemical elements is quite
immaterial ; all we know of them is that they are separate
units, and attract and repel each other, and nothing more. The
forms in which we, then, know their combinations as differen
tiated aggregates are merely the result of those primal laws,
and are the separate seats of the primal powers or forces called
attraction and repulsion ; and it is these which possess power
&quot; which remains fixed in the midst of changing appearances.&quot;
Mr. Spencer says that this power, if not like that in conscious
ness, is yet equivalent to it. Now, we do not see how any one
can possibly understand this assertion. What is the power he
refers to as in consciousness 1 The power that is in conscious
ness we take to be &quot;our own energies,&quot; or
&quot;
evolving the feeling




&quot; he speaks of in the external world and inde-1 90 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
pendent of consciousness is like it ; but it is, nevertheless,
equivalent to it. Equivalency is applied to numbers, spaces,
values, matter in motion mechanically, sometimes figuratively
to the meanings of words, &c. Power, as we have just ascer
tained it to mean, as an external fact means the mutual attrac
tion and repulsion of ultimate units, atoms, molecules, and
masses. Does Mr. Spencer mean that the power we are per
sonally conscious of in the exercise of our own feelings and
energies has a mechanical value, and that the sum-total of all
conscious beings is equivalent to the sum-total of the power
exhibited over the attractions and repulsions of the material
world 1 Evidently there is no common measure by which to
judge of their equivalence ; and, again, before the existence of
consciousness there was nothing for the material world to be
equivalent with. The proposition that the external world pos
sesses a power equivalent to that in consciousness is an impos
sible conception. It may be practically correct in the experi
ence of the weight of a book in our hand, where there is an
equivalence of exertion and weight, but it is only a temporary
equivalence, for our hand tires, and the book falls to the
ground. Or we put half a dozen upon our hands, and they obey
the law of gravitation immediately, and fall to the ground. In
this sense the power manifested in the external world is more
than an equivalent for that in consciousness, and therefore is
not equivalent.





in a loose way for
&quot;
analogous.&quot; There must be some
thing in the resistance of inanimate matter analogous to what
we feel in the resistance we make to pressure. But this involves
an analysis of the
&quot;
Ego.&quot; Is it more than the physical forces of
the organised mechanism 1 If not, then the analogy between
the forces of the Ego and the forces of the external inorganic
world holds good. And if consciousness is merely a concomi
tant, the analogy is not interfered with, for it is not a force, but
merely an unexplainable accompaniment. But if it is a force,
then the analogy does not hold good; and if an analogy is neces
sary, then there is a something behind the external forces ana
logous to the conscious force of the organism. But what is theTHE FINAL QUESTION. 191
use of the supposition if all its manifestations of this force are
known as manifested ?
In 469 Object is described as the &quot;unknown permanent
nexus which is never itself a phenomenon but is that which
holds phenomena together.&quot;
Subject, in like manner, is the unknown permanent nexus,
which is never itself a state of consciousness, but which holds
states of consciousness together.
Now, when Object is spoken of as a permanent nexus, it
means that the nexus of the properties of the chemical elements
is permanent, or at the furthest that the properties of the ulti
mate units are permanent. Surely Mr. Spencer cannot mean
that every individual aggregate has an individual nexus or bond
constituting it an object, otherwise than as the result of the
varied forces which produced the combination ?
What is the meaning of the permanency of the Subject 1
Apparently the permanent nexus of the Subject comes to an end
when the physical organisation with which it is connected
comes to an end. We do not know that we can recognise
anywhere
&quot; an unknown permanent nexus
&quot; which ever forms
the Subject. In fact, Mr. Spencer says it is unknown, and if
it is unknown, how can there be any meaning in our discourse
of it?
What Mr. Spencer means, however, is seen in the next para
graph, and it only amounts to this, that as long as the organised
body lasts the Subject is permanent, and the nexus of the Sub
ject is permanent notwithstanding all the changeful conscious
ness of which it is the scene. But this is a different thing
altogether from the permanence of the power, force, &c., of the
independent, external, objective world, and is rather a considera
tion affecting the nature of that unity of conscious life which
we call the Ego.
The further course of the argument shows the difference in
the treatment of the permanency of the Subject nexus and the
permanency of the Object nexus, for the discussion of the former
naturally leads us to the discussion of the Ego in 470.
At the conclusion of this section, which is the end of the
chapter, there is a claim for &quot;akin
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manifested in the Ego and the force manifested in the Non-ego,*
but it is badly and obscurely expressed, and does not make clear
the question how far the persistence of force is affected by the
variability of the quantity of conscious energy, nor how these
two modes can be derived as corollaries from the Persistence of
Force.
Here we refer to
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; vol. i. p. 98, and find, with
respect to the Subject
:
&quot; Now, however, we turn to a totally distinct aspect of our
subject. There lies before us a class of facts absolutely without
any perceptible or conceivable community of nature with the
facts that have occupied us. The truths here to be set down
are truths of which the very elements are unknown to physical
science. Objective observation and analysis fail us, and sub
jective observation and analysis must supplement them.
&quot; In other words, we have to treat of nervous phenomena, as
phenomena of consciousness. The changes which, regarded as
modes of the Noti-ego, have been expressed in terms of motion,
have now, regarded as modes of the Ego, to be expressed in
terms of feeling. Having contemplated these changes on their
outsides, we have to contemplate them from their insides.&quot;
And again, &quot;Psychology,&quot; vol. i. p. 140
:
&quot; Under its subjective aspect, Psychology is a totally unique
science, independent of, and antithetically opposed to, all other
sciences whatever.&quot; . . . &quot;Mind still continues to us a some
thing without any kinship to other things ; and from the
science which discovers by introspection the laws of this some
thing, there is no passage by transitional steps to the sciences
which discover the laws of these other things.&quot;
Wbat, then, are the results of our examination of this chapter ?
It is to be regarded in two aspects, according to the point of
view from which it is criticised. If it is studied with a view
* In Chap. XIX., p. 494, we find a reference to a previous chapter in the
Psychology,&quot; thus :
&quot; In the next chapter, on the Relativity of Relations
between Feelings, it was similarly shown that no relation in conscious
ness can resemble, or be in any way akin to, its source beyond conscious
ness.
&quot; We do not know that this statement involves a contradiction, but
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to ascertain
&quot; how can there be found within consciousness
this notion of an existence that is not within consciousness ?
&quot;
it may be regarded as a satisfactory and conclusive argument.
But on the other hand, if it be studied with a view to unifica
tion of knowledge, an unification which shall enable us to
understand the connection and relations of all sequences, or
even only an unification which consists simply in the abolition
of incongruities of knowledge, it does not seem to be of any
value whatever, and it must be remembered that it was in
pursuance of this latter object that we entered upon the present
study.
In the following chapter on Transfigured Kealism, in which,
being the last of Part VII., one would naturally expect to find
a connection of the results with the object of the inquiry, we
find only a summary of the process of reasoning leading up to
the conclusions of Realism, and without the requisite argumen
tative connection with p. 310.
The general summary is worth quoting on its own merits.
&quot;The conclusion to which our General Analysis has brought
us, is in perfect harmony with these conclusions, yielded by
inductive inquiry at the outset. &quot;While some objective exist
ence, manifested under some conditions, remains as the final
necessity of thought, there does not remain the implication
that this existence and these conditions are more to us than
the unknown correlatives of our feelings and the relations
among our feelings. The Realism we are committed to is one
which simply asserts objective existence as separate from, and
independent of subjective existence. But it affirms neither
that any one mode of this objective existence is in reality that
which it seems, nor that the connections among its modes are
objectively what they seem. Thus it stands widely distin
guished from. Crude Realism, and to mark the distinction it
may properly be called Transfigured Realism.&quot;
Mr. Spencer says in the last paragraph of Part VII. p. 502
&quot; Thus ends our examination of the Ultimate Question.
We saw, when considering its nature, that Philosophy reaches its
goal when it establishes universal congruity (&quot; First
Principles,&quot;
Part II. Chap. I.) Before stirring a step towards this goal,194 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
however, Philosophy had to assume the validity of certain
primary dicta of consciousness ; since before there can be
thought there must be some data of thought. A general survey
brought us to the conclusion that the relation of Subject and
Object was a dictum of consciousness which must be thus
provisionally accepted. Accepting it, the process of establish
ing congruities was pursued, until at length it brought us round
to the original dictum ; and we had then to consider whether
this could be absolutely justified. The foregoing chapters have
led us not only to the result that it harmonises with all other
dicta of consciousness, but also to the result that every ad
verse proposition is absolutely and in every way incongruous
with them.&quot;
Here is to be noted some confusion of statements.
Philosophy had to assume certain dicta.
The relation of Subject and Object was a dictum.
Congruities were established with the original dictum.
The original dictum harmonises with all other dicta of con
sciousness, i.e., both the other primary dicta and all the
secondary consciousnesses.
Therefore the relation of Subject and Object, being found
congruous with all other consciousnesses, primary and secondary,
affords the unification of knowledge, which is the goal of
Philosophy.
It is to be presumed that any other of the primary dicta of
consciousness for there appear to be others treated in the same
way would also afford the unification of knowledge, which is
the goal of Philosophy. Philosophy is rich in methods, all
equally useless for any object of enlarging our definite and useful
knowledge, and all equally inefficient in informing us of our
place in the cosmical history.
After having thus settled &quot;The Ultimate Question&quot; we come
to
&quot; The Final Question.&quot;
&quot;
Finally, then, we resume this originally-provisional assump
tion but now verified truth. Once more we are brought round
to the conclusion repeatedly reached by other routes, that
behind all manifestations, inner and outer, there is a Power
manifested. Here, as before, it has become clear that while theSUMMARY OF SECTION. 195
nature of this Power cannot be known ... we learn that
the one thing permanent is the Unknowable Reality hidden
under all these changing shapes.&quot;
We confess we do not see anything in this leading to the uni
fication of knowledge according to any of the various modes
proposed by Mr. Spencer. Neither the finality of the relation
of Subject and Object, nor the finality of an Unknowable
Power, are of any use to organise knowledge, and give it that
structural unity which is the characteristic of completed science,
and for which we look in a science of the sciences.
(e.) Summary of this Section,
The general consideration involved in this section is, whether
the problem of the unification of knowledge is rightly pro
pounded by Mr. Spencer in the passage so often referred to by
us, in which it is placed in the explanation of all things and
events as resultants of original factors, requiring of us a system
of historical reconstruction, or whether it is to be rightly sought
in the correlation of the objective and the subjective, or by some
of the other methods of the class advanced in this section ? It
is true it might be held that they are all identical, but cer
tainly Mr. Spencer has not undertaken to explain that they are
so. Failing this unification, one class must be held to exclude
the other, and the student is in doubt which to pursue. But
of the two classes, the one we have just been considering does
not possess the greater value. The deductive or historical pro
blem is the one of all-absorbing interest to humanity.
With respect to the treatment of the subject by Mr. Spencer,
we have shown, we think, that he has not treated it with clear
ness and logical continuity. The argument passes through many
phases, and is characterised by changefulness and uncertainty
of thought and language. In its final result, as an explanation
of the relations of Kealism and Phenomenalism, we think it
exceedingly valuable, and if our object were other than the
examination of Mr. Spencer s system of the unification of know
ledge, we should have more to say than this mere acknowledg
ment of the substantial merits of his teachings on this subject.
We cannot help thinking that Mr. Spencer, in Part VIL of196 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
the Psychology, confounds a theory of knowledge -with a theory
of the unification of knowledge. What he there advances is the
former, not the latter, although it professes to be the latter.
Yet his own criterion of the unification of knowledge is placed
not in forming a theory of knowledge, but in forming a cos-
mical reconstruction. We therefore consider that all the claims
made in this part for effecting the unification of knowledge are
wrongly made, and rightfully appertain to a theory of know
ledge, placing them therefore as only subordinate considerations
in the more general inquiry.
2. The Problem of the &quot;Psychology&quot; being a Consideration
of the Science of Psychology with Regard to its Place in
Mr. Spencer s Constructive Scheme.
The problem sought to be elaborated in the &quot;Principles of
Psychology&quot; may be gathered from Part I., Chapter VI.,
&quot; ^Estho - Physiology ;&quot; Chapter VII, &quot;The Scope of Psy
chology;&quot; Part III., Chapters I. and XL, Life and Mind as
Correspondence;&quot; Part V, Chapters VI. to X., &quot;The Rela
tion of Psychical Laws to the Physical Synthesis.&quot;
The problem to be solved from our point of view is the
affiliation of the Evolution of Pyschology upon Evolution in
general. Thereupon arises the question, What is Psychology 1
and what is meant by Evolution ?
(a.) Wliat is Psychology ?
We will first consider what Psychology is not. In the first
place, it is not Biology. The whole process of biological
evolution is a purely physical process, wrought out by the
action of environment upon organic masses, and, down to the
very minutest detail of the arrangements of the completed
organism, the result of physical and chemical relationships under
the guiding law of that physical law of equilibration by
which a moving equilibrium adjusts its forces to counterbalance
external forces threatening its destruction.
When we come to study the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; we shall find that
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one of the circle of energies it is bound to be for it is
incapable of doing work by changing into other forms of
energy. We must therefore understand that the action of
the organism throughout, including every nervous current
and every cerebral change, is part of an unbroken physical
sequence. With these sequences, therefore, Psychology has
nothing to do as a factor, that is to say, as an active agency
being the cause of change.
These actions of the organism, however, are accompanied
in great measure by subjective feelings. These feelings vary
qualitatively and quantitatively. They are found to be speci
ally localised, and to vary in intensity with physiological con
ditions. The study of these localisations and variations with
physical conditions is not, however, the science of Psychology,
but is called &quot;^stho-Physiology.&quot;
&quot;
.^Estho-physiology has a position that is entirely unique.
It belongs neither to the objective world nor to the subjective
world
; but taking a term from each, occupies itself with the
correlation of the two.&quot;*
Mr. Spencer here very happily states the case, but he does
not tell us which are the two specific terms, nor does he attempt
to express the nature of their correlation. All that he has done
in the preceding chapter has had reference to the localisation
and the dependence of the variations of feelings. The generali
sation is not attempted which would express the general relation
of subject and object.
We rather think Mr. Spencer considers such a generalisation
impossible, for at the commencement of the chapter he says
&quot; Now, however, we turn to a totally-distinct aspect of our
subject. There lies before us a class of facts absolutely with
out any perceptible or conceivable community of nature with
the facts that have occupied us. The truths here to be set down
are truths of which the very elements are unknown to physical
science. Objective observation and analysis fail us
; and sub
jective observation and analysis must supplement them. In
other words, we have to treat of nervous phenomena as pheno
mena of consciousness. The changes which, regarded as modes
*
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of the Non Ego, have .been expressed in terms of motion, have
now, regarded as modes of the Ego, to be expressed in terms of
feeling.&quot;
*
Are we, then, to consider that the science of Psychology relates
to the subjective only, that is to say, to the distinguishment,
connections, order, and general relations of feelings, ideas, emo
tions, &c. 1 Is it merely the subjective mode of speaking of
the nervous and cerebral changes changes which we have
already seen are wholly biological, and determined by the
physical interaction of the organism with its environment ? If
so, it is but a subjective aspect of physical processes which
somehow have that aspect, and since the determining causes
are wholly physical, are more properly to be regarded as coming
within the science of Biology. To treat them separately would
in this case be merely a matter of convenience ; for although
the real agencies are actions of the brain and nervous systems,
they are beyond the reach of our observation, and are only
known to us subjectively.
However, this does not accord with Mr. Spencer s definition
of Psychology, and we now approach the inquiry as to what is
meant by the term. For this purpose we study the chapter
on
&quot; The Scope of Psychology.&quot; It commences by a negation of
Biology and JEstho-Physiology as included in the study. Biology
is regarded as a purely physical study ;
&quot; the direct meanings
of all the propositions set down have nowhere implied con
sciousness or feeling; and, ignoring consciousness or feeling,
they have left out that which is tacitly or avowedly contained
in every proposition of Psychology.&quot; f This is a first approach
to a recognition of the contents of that science. Nevertheless,
it is distinct from j^Estho-Physiology, because the latter is con
fined to propositions expressive of relations of phenomena occur
ring wholly within the organism.
Mr. Spencer proceeds to say that this is the case with regard
to Biology also. He endeavours to make out that the science
of Biology is a science complete within the limits of the
organism. He has to admit that
&quot; distinct or tacit reference
has, indeed, been made to some external force. . . . But such
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references, vague or distinct, have been made merely because it
was needful to suppose something by which an organic change
was set up ; not because this something had to be included
in the proposition set down, which in every case formulated an
internal relation only.&quot;*
&quot; Now so long as we state facts of which all the terms lie
within the organism, our facts are morphological or physio
logical, and in no degree psychological. Even though the
relation with which we are dealing is that between a nervous
change and a feeling, it is still not a psychological relation so
long as the feeling is regarded merely as connected with the
nervous change, and not as connected with some existence lying
outside the organism.&quot;
Mr. Spencer here seems to speak of Morphology and Physio
logy as if they could be sciences in themselves without reference
to the environment, and as if they could now be studied in
that old-fashioned isolated way ; whereas the great object of
his work on Biology is to show that all the facts of that science
have been produced by the action of the environment on cer
tain peculiarly constituted masses of matter, from which also
the subjective presumably results. Therefore we do not under
stand the distinction which he proceeds to make.
&quot; For that which distinguishes Psychology from the sciences
on which it rests, is, that each of its propositions takes account




&quot; and of the connected external phenomena to
which they refer. In a physiological proposition an inner
relation is the essential subject of thought ; but in a psycho
logical proposition an outer relation is joined with it as a
co-essential subject of thought. A relation in the environ
ment rises into co-ordinate importance with a relation in the
organism. The thing contemplated is now a totally different
thing. It is not the connection between the internal pheno
mena
&quot;
(query, objective or subjective ?),
&quot; nor is it the connection
between the external phenomena ; but it is the connection be
tween these two connections. A psychological proposition is
necessarily compounded of two propositions ; of which one
*
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concerns the subject and the other concerns the object; and
cannot be expressed without the four terms which these
two propositions imply. The distinction may be best ex
plained by symbols. Suppose that A and B are two related
manifestations in the environment say the colour and taste of
a fruit ; then so long as we contemplate their relation by itself,
or as associated with other external phenomena, we are occupied
with a portion of physical science. Now suppose that a and b
are the sensations produced in the organism by this peculiar
light which the fruit reflects, and by the chemical action of its
juice on the palate ; then, so long as we study the action of
the light on the retina and optic centres, and consider how
the juice sets up in other centres a nervous change known as
sweetness, we are occupied with facts belonging to the sciences
of Physiology and ^Estho-Physiology. But we pass into the
domain of Psychology the moment we inquire liow there comes
to exist within the organism a relation between a and b that
in some way or other corresponds to the relation between A and
B. Psychology is exclusively concerned with this connection
between (A B) and (a &) has to investigate its nature, its
origin, its meaning,
&c.&quot; *
Mr. Spencer then proceeds to combat the opinion that
Psychology is part of Biology, on the ground that all biolo
gical structures and functions are produced by the intimate
actions of the environment upon organic masses and organ
isms.
&quot; The life of every organism is a continuous adaptation
of its inner actions to outer actions ; and a complete interpre
tation of the inner actions involves recognition of the outer
actions.&quot; f But Mr. Spencer thinks that
&quot;
throughout Biology
proper, the environment and its correlated phenomena are either
but tacitly recognised, or, if overtly and definitely recognised,






attention. But in Psychology, the correlated phenomena of the
environment are at every step avowedly and distinctly recog
nised
; and are as essential to every psychological idea as are
the correlated phenomena of the organism.&quot; J
*
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This reply is based upon the statical aspect of Biology,
whereas by no one more than by Mr. Spencer has Biology been
taught as a continuous process. And it is surprising to find
him say
&quot;In brief, then, the propositions of Biology, when they imply
the environment at all, imply almost exclusively its few general
and constant phenomena, which, because of their generality and
constancy, may be left out of consideration ; whereas the pro
positions of Psychology refer to its multitudinous, special, and
ever-varying phenomena, which, because of their speciality and
changeability, cannot be left out of consideration.&quot; *
Now, any one who will refer to the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; and study the
detailed instances by which it is made clear that the whole of
the morphological and physiological history of every animal and
plant, down to the minutest detail, is the result of the action
of the environment upon the organism, and who is able to master
the general principle of biological equilibration as propounded
by Mr. Spencer, through which all this comes about, will be
astonished at such a passage as the foregoing from the pen of
the self-same writer.
However, this matter does not affect our present criticism.
Here our point of interest lies in studying the problem of
&quot; the
connection betiveen these two connections&quot; On the one side we
have the objective connection (A B), and on the other side we
have the clearly subjective connection (a b).
The problem of Psychology is to ascertain how there comes
to exist within the organism the subjective connection (a b).
We note in the first place that it is a historical problem,
&quot; how
it comes to exist,&quot; and in this view of it we consider the true
and only manner in which it is to be regarded is with the
object of assigning its place with regard to evolution in general.
Our studies, as Mr. Spencer indicates, should be directed to an
inquiry as to
&quot; its nature, its origin, its meaning,&quot; &c. To this
we will recur, but in the meantime would point out that the
subjective connection (a b) only exists as the subjective aspect
of some physical arrangement of the cerebrum, or nervous
system ; and if this cerebrum or nervous system, being part of
*
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the physical organism, has been produced by ordinary biological
evolution, its subjective aspect can only come within the
purview of the science of
&quot;
jEstho-Physiology,&quot; and therefore
the origin of the connection (a V) is to be accounted for on its
objective side as the particular nervous arrangement (sym
bolised by A B) produced by the object (A B), and the
only remaining question appertaining to the inquiry is as to the
nature, origin, and meaning of the subjective aspect of (A B)
which is symbolised by (a b). This mode of stating the inquiry
implies three sets of connections instead of two. The cause
(A B), the effect (A B), and the concomitant (a &). And it
results in the statement that every representation of the sub
jective in italics is but the unaccountable concomitant of all
arrangements of the small capitals representing the result of
their interaction with the environment, symbolised by large
capitals, or of their own interaction.
Mr. Spencer next proceeds to dispute the demarcation of
Psychology from Biology by a sharp line. Evolution is one
and continuous. This is shown by a study of the relative
connections of the different sciences.
&quot;
Theoretically, all the concrete sciences are adjoining tracts
of one science, which has for its subject-matter the continuous
transformation which the Universe undergoes. Practically, how
ever, they are distinguishable as successively more specialised
parts of the total science.&quot;*
&quot;And Psychology is a specialised part of Biology, limited in
its application to the higher division of these peculiar aggregates,
and occupying itself exclusively with those special actions and
reactions which they display, from instant to instant, in their
converse with the special objects, animate and inanimate, amid
which they move.&quot;
We must say this is not very clear. As long as the actions
and reactions are the interrelations of the physical environment
with the physical organism, they come within the scope of
Biology, and the whole thing is complete in itself without
Psychology at all, as witness the work on Biology and the
exclusion of Feeling as a factor in these interrelations. Mr.
*
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Spencer enters upon an argument in which he calls some of
the complex results of simple factors
&quot; additional factors,&quot;
adding to the results of the previous complexity. By this
means he makes a broad distinction between Molecular Physics
and Chemistry, and by analogy implies a similar connection yet
difference between Biology and Psychology.
&quot;In this way it is, then, that the conspicuous presence of
additional factors differentiates Psychology from Biology proper ;
although in Biology proper these factors make an occasional
appearance.&quot;*
There is evidently some confusion of statement in Mr. Spencer s
works as to what Psychology really is. Obviously it is a branch
of knowledge. Is it a knowledge of subjective impressions,
feelings, memories, &c., as a body of knowledge complete in
itself, and further added to by a knowledge of the physical
conditions under which they occur and with which they are
universally associated, and of which they are thereby one aspect,
although they have no place as factors in the interrelation or
changes of these physical concomitants ? If so, then clearly, in
the absence of the knowledge by which, in pursuance of these
physical interrelations, the subjective arose, and in the absence
of any influence of the subjective upon the physical organism,
Psychology is a separate science, cut off from the hierarchy of
the sciences by a sharp line.
Is it, on the other hand, but a study of the higher complexi
ties and organisation of the physically-constituted nervous
system by which the various incident motions are traced to
their effects upon multitudinous centres of nerve force and to
the regulative action of these centres, resulting eventually in
efferent currents of reaction upon the external world ? If so,
then it is merely a higher branch of Biology.
Is it, again, a study of the connection between these two sets
of connections ? Then, as pointed out before, all we can do at
the present time is to note the relation of definite feelings with
special parts of the organism and of concomitant variations.
Until the general relation of feeling and physical change is
formulated, this knowledge is merely a body of unorganised
*
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facts not yet arrived at the dignity of a science. This would be
the science of ^Estho-Physiology.
If to this has to be added a knowledge of the relation of
bodies external to the organism, this knowledge is of two kinds,
one in regard to the physical relationships, and again in regard
to the manner in which external objects affect the subjective
percipient. But the former seems clearly a branch of physical
science, and the latter to be only capable of study interme
diately through Biology and ^Estho-Physiology unless, indeed,
it is a branch of that unknown science, not yet formulated,
which will deal with the historic relationship of the objective
and the subjective. From all which we judge that Psychology
cannot yet be ranked in the deductive sequence of the sciences,
and that the unification of knowledge is not complete.
The fundamental problem is considered by Mr. Spencer,
when, in the chapter
&quot; On the Substance of Mind,&quot; he treats
of units of consciousness as in some way analogous to nervous
shocks (though more simple than them), and suggests a theory
of the differences of the sense-impressions as due to differences
in these nervous shocks. This is a reasonable and suggestive
hypothesis, but one which, until it is worked out in the formu
lation of relations, ought not to be made too much of; and
failing that formulation, still leaves the history of the organism
completely within the range of physical science, the subjective
being something merely added to and incident upon the opera
tion of the physical factors.
(b. ) What is Evolution ?
Having now considered what is meant by
&quot;
Psychology,&quot; we
must next inquire what is meant by Evolution.
If by Evolution is meant a gradual growth from a state of
&quot;indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite coherent hetero
geneity,&quot; then undoubtedly there may be proved to have taken
place such a development of correspondences, symbolised by
small capitals and by italics, as to attain a result more and
more representative of the ever-growing complexities of the
realities symbolised by the large capitals. The acceptance of
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of the Formula of Evolution, but then the part of it which
does imply some connection of sequences is only applied by Mr.
Spencer in simple physical evolutions, and is practically of little
account.
Except in the definition of Evolution given in
&quot; Eirst Prin
ciples,&quot; Mr. Spencer seldom uses the word in the sense there
defined as the concentration of matter and the concomitant
dissipation of motion, but he universally employs it (like every
body else) as meaning the advance from a state of homogeneity,
indefiniteness, and simplicity, to a state of definite, coherent
complexity.
The history of Mind accords with this idea. The ques
tion is, does this similarity of modes of development constitute
an unification of knowledge ? Mr. Spencer seems to think it
does, for in his
&quot; General Synthesis
&quot; he considers it sufficient
to show this gradual growth of mind in the manner specified.
Perhaps this is hardly correct. Considering mind as part
of Biology, he shows not an independent but a dependent and
concomitant development of mind pari passu with the evolu
tion of physical organisms, and then says, see how mental
evolution conforms to general evolution ! We submit that this
conformity of characteristics of development, however signifi
cant it may be, does not bring Psychology within the deductive
process from original factors which the unification of know
ledge requires. It is something, however, if the Evolution of
Psychology by natural growth is recognised. It is something
more if this development is found coincident with another order
of development. But still, the mere establishment of the fact
of Psychological Evolution is not an explanation of it, and until
it finds its place amongst the deductions from the properties of
original agencies, it cannot be held to rank in a system of
unified knowledge.
(c.) Digression on Verbal Modes of Identifying Processes.
Before proceeding with an investigation of the second or true
mode of presentment of Evolution, let us consider the manner
in which the development of Psychology is identified verbally
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identity of sequence wrought out. This is effected by the
employment of the same set of terms in the description of both
processes. It is for us to inquire if the likeness of process
giving warrant for the common methods of description is one
of similarity of process only, or one of identity of sequence.
For the study of this question we take Part III. of the
&quot;
Principles of Psychology,&quot; entitled
&quot; General Synthesis,&quot; com
mencing with the idea of &quot;Life and Mind as Correspondence,&quot;
and followed by chapters showing the development of this
correspondence from the direct and homogeneous, through
various accretions of heterogeneity of space, time, speciality,
generality, and complexity, eventuating in their co-ordination
and integration.
The primary relations between an organic mass and its
environment are direct that is to say, are merely chemical and
physical; but when this mass has become a &quot;moving equili
brium,&quot; these direct equilibrations are overborne by the power
which the mass now possesses of adapting or rearranging its
structure or motions, so as to resist the disintegrative effect of
the direct equilibrations, and thus counterbalance force by
force. This is the special characteristic of all biological change,
and the ruling cause of all biological development. Therefore,
whenever an adaptation, rearrangement, or adjustment of an
organism to its environment is spoken of, it is this kind of
change which is referred to, the terms just mentioned being
merely used for variety of expression, but are really representa
tive of the same thought.
The term
&quot;
correspondence,&quot; which is the one made use of
so largely in the
&quot; General Synthesis
&quot;
to cover the development
of Mind on the same method as the development of Life, is
but another term having the same reference. Vital changes,
instead of being spoken of as biological equilibrations, are spoken
of as &quot;correspondences.&quot; Thus, speaking of the locomotion of
organisms, Mr. Spencer says
&quot; Thus then, the addition of mechanical changes to the changes
displayed by motionless organisms, is the addition of new inter
nal relations in correspondence with new external relations.&quot; *
*
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Of course a correspondence is displayed, but the effect of
regarding the development in this indefinite manner is to
throw into obscurity the assigned cause of the change in the
special law of biological equilibration, and to bring forward a
general indefinite notion of correspondence which shall after
wards cover psychological as well as physiological develop
ments.
We could review each chapter, pointing out how this funda
mental fault of the argument vitiates its teachings ; but to do
so would produce too great a bulk of criticism, and after all
that has already been done, the student will be able to take up
these points for himself. We might instance passages on pages
3OI
&amp;gt; 34, 35&amp;gt; 3
X
9&amp;gt; 33&amp;gt; &c-
There is a most singular passage on page 331
:
&quot;Out of the primordial irritability which (excluding the
indeterminate types that underlie both divisions of the organic
world)
&quot;
(query, how then can it be primordial ?)
&quot; characterises
animal organisms in general, are gradually evolved those various
kinds of irritability which answer to the various attributes of
matter&quot; (What then are the various attributes of matter?)
&quot; The fundamental attribute of matter is resistance. The
fundamental sense is a faculty of responding to resistance.&quot;
(Query, what does &quot;responding&quot; mean ? What is sense, and how
does it originate, and in ivhat does it inhere ?)
&quot; And while in
the environment, associated with this attribute of resistance, are
other attributes
&quot;
(note that these attributes are of a different
hind, and not composed of the fundamental attribute) &quot;severally
distinctive of certain classes of bodies
&quot;
(ichat they are we
shall see just noio) ;
&quot;in the organism there arise&quot; (by Mr.
Spencer s law of biological equilibration ?)
&quot; faculties of respond
ing to these other attributes faculties which enable the
organism to adjust its internal relations to a greater variety of
external relations ; faculties, therefore, which increase the
speciality of the correspondence. We see this not only in the
rise of the senses that are affected by the sapid, odorous, visible,
and sound-producing properties of
things,&quot; &c.
We find, therefore, that Mr. Spencer considers bodies to
have the attributes or properties of producing odour, visibility,2o8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
and sound, which properties are associated with, but are not
composed of, the fundamental attribute, resistance. We under
stood that the latest teachings of science are to the effect that
sound, visibility, colour, &c., are merely the names of subjec
tive sensations, the result of vibrations aerial and ethereal.
Surely Mr. Spencer does not mean to say that they are attri
butes of matter, but only the relations of the series (a b), &c.,
to the series (A B), &c., which, again, are related to the series
(A B), &c.
If the fundamental sense is the response to fundamental
resistance, then the solution of the whole question is to be
found in some theory of the nature of the response. But to
say that the senses are an increase of the degree of subjective
correspondence (or response) is to throw no light upon the
explanation of the correspondence or the necessity for it, and,
as we have before said, the introduction of this term only tends
to confuse the consideration of the argument. Correspondence,
adaptation, and adjustment should all be abolished in favour
of the real ruling principle of biological equilibration as taught
by Mr. Spencer.
Eventually we come upon the term
&quot;
integration,&quot; and would
ask what this means in relation to biological equilibration.
Is it one of its results ? We could easily frame a theory of it
in relation to ordinary mechanical equilibration. But in Chap
ter X. we have an account of the integration of correspondences.
Does this mean an integration of the series (A B), &c., or of the





meant by Mr. Spencer to carry the mind back upon the For
mula of Evolution. But we must remember that the integra
tion taught there was the integration of matter, and we must
also remember that the essence of the formula was the con
comitance of the dissipation of something, viz., Motion. Now
in this case, if we have the series (a b), &c., in view, we have
not only no integration of Matter, but also no concomitant dissi
pation of anything. Therefore if the present use of the word is
intended to convey the idea that we are here effecting the uni
fication of knowledge, it is merely one of the simulations of
unification treated of in Chapter I. 13. It is still more diffi-MODES OF IDENTIFYING PROCESSES. 209
cult to say how psychological integration is related to Mr.
Spencer s law of biological equilibration ; and when we come
to consider the integration of psychological correspondences as
part of that process, we believe that we have arrived at a
problem of which we can form no conception, and which it is
impossible to solve.
Under cover of the term
&quot;
correspondence,&quot; Mr. Spencer
elaborates his argument in a series of chapters, through which
the greater part of its course is carried on by means of physical
development, until in the end he is able to say
:
&quot; Thus then we find illustrated in all ways the truth enun
ciated at the outset, that the connexions among vital actions
directly or indirectly correspond with the connexions among
actions in the environment. That method by which we sought
out the fundamental fact on which to base a Synthetic Psycho
logy, is justified by its results. On comparing the phenomena
of mental life with the most nearly allied phenomena those of
bodily life and inquiring what is common to both groups, a
generalisation was disclosed which proves on examination to
express the essential character of all mental actions. Regarded
under every variety of aspect, intelligence is found to consist in
the establishment of correspondences between relations in the
organism and relations in the environment, and the entire
development of intelligence may be formulated as the progress
of such correspondences in Space, in Time, in Speciality, in
Generality, in Complexity.&quot;
*
No doubt Psychology has made the development described,
no doubt Biology, including Morphology and Physiology, has
made the development described, but while for the latter there
is a hypothetical explanation in the special law of biological
equilibration, there is none whatever for the former, and it is
this which is looked for in a scheme of unified knowledge. To
call the psychological developments by a term which may be
applied as descriptive of the biological series, but which does
not disclose the law of their connection with the preceding and
continuous evolution, is not to find a place for Psychology in
Evolution in general.
*
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Nevertheless, Mr. Spencer considers this has been accom
plished, and says
&quot; The presentation of Intelligence as an adjustment of inner
to outer relations .... leaves us with a conception which
obviously requires further development. The various degrees
and modes of Intelligence known as Instinct, Memory, Reason,
Emotion, Will, and the rest, must be translated in terms of
this conception. If, as above alleged, the several grades of
Mind and its component faculties are phases of the corre
spondence and factors in the correspondence, they can be
interpreted as such, and to complete the argument it is needful
that they should be so interpreted.&quot;
*
To this task Mr. Spencer forthwith proceeds in Part IV. It
is sufficient, however, for our purpose if we confine our considera
tions to the essential preliminaries of such an explanation.
We do not quite understand Mr. Spencer s position when he
says that the psychological relations take part in the determin
ing of events
&quot; as factors in the correspondence.&quot; Probably he
does not wish to convey this meaning, as he has elsewhere ex
cluded all modes of feeling from the factors of Biology, and he
nowhere teaches that a Psychic Force finds its place in the
circle of the physical energies by which the work of the organ
ism is carried on, and we know already that no such mode is
included in Balfour Stewart s list of energies.
The whole onus of the affiliation of Psychology upon Evolu
tion in general is thrown upon the term
&quot;
correspondence,&quot; and
upon the translation of all biological developments into the
same terms. It is evident, however, that this is a verbal and
not a logical connection. To make it a logical connection it
would be necessary to show that all correspondences were
identical in their law of origin, and since all biological corre
spondences are occasioned from the law by which moving
equilibria generate arrangements for counterbalancing destruc
tive forces, it would have to be shown that not only the rela
tions (A B) were thus generated, but that the relations (a b) also
were thus originated, and that they reacted as counterbalancing
forces like the arrangement (A B).
*
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In the first place, amongst the constituents of the organism
we cannot recognise anything which could be transformed into
the relation (a &), and in the second, since it is out of the list of




&quot; These two progressions are in truth parts of the same pro
gression. Without dwelling upon the fact that the primordial
tissue displays the several forms of irritability in which the
senses originate, and that the organs of sense, like all other
organs, arise by differentiations of this primordial tissue with
out dwelling on the fact that the impressions received by these
senses form the raw materials of intelligence, which arises by
combination of them and must therefore conform to their law
of development without dwelling on the fact that intelligence
advances pari passu with the advance of the nervous system,
and has the same law of development as the other systems
without dwelling on these facts, it is sufficiently manifest that
as the progress of organisation and the progress of correspon
dence between the organism and its environment are but
different aspects of the evolution of Life in general, they cannot
fail to harmonise. In this organisation of experiences which
constitutes evolving Intelligence, there must be that same con
tinuity, that same sub-division of function, that same mutual
dependence, and that same ever-advancing consensus, which
characterise the physical organisation.&quot;*
If the argument commenced with the properties of primordial
tissue, and this tissue were known to have the two sets of pro
perties of balancing itself physically with the environment
according to Mr. Spencer s law of moving equilibria, and of
organising itself pari passu in a subjective manner, then the
whole of Mr. Spencer s argument would hold good. But since
he has set himself the task of explaining the order of the
cosmos from a simple state of unorganised matter consisting
of the chemical elements, we never get as far as the primor
dial tissue or its irritability, while the law of biological equili
bration a purely physical one is also never established.
*
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Many other objections could be raised, but contenting our
selves for the present with showing the merely verbal nature
of the unification developed in Part III., we proceed to a con
sideration of the affiliation of Psychology upon that view of
the unification of knowledge which presents it to us as the
reconstruction of the cosmos from original factors, or what is
the same thing, deducing it in a series of corollaries from
primordial truths.
(d.) Psychology Considered as a Direct Deduction from the
Persistence of Force.
Are we to deduce Psychology from the doctrine of the Per
sistence of Force? Manifestly, if Force is unknowable the
logical process is an impossibility. Are we, again, to deduce it
from Professor Balfour Stuart s list of Forces and Energies ?
It will become merely a physical problem shortly to be con
sidered.
It is a curious question, and one deserving of consideration,
whether the Subjective is a mode of Force. In the face of Mr.
Spencer s disavowal of Feeling as a factor in Biology, it is, in
regard to Mr. Spencer s Philosophy, a superfluous question ;
for in that Philosophy the whole series of changes are within
the constant quantity of the Forces and Energies of Nature,
not as the Unknowable, but as actually manifested in knowable
modes of Force quantitatively persistent and equal.
For those, however, who think that passion, emotion, will,
&c., are not mere concomitances of molecular changes within
the physical organism, it is an interesting, curious, and difficult
question about the action of these subjective feelings, considered
as beyond the absolute quantity of Force, and yet regarded as
having power with which to act upon the energies of the phy
sical organism. Whence and how do they derive this power,
and how come they to be specifically differentiated as tending
to act thus and thus ?
Is it possible, again, to suppose that the physical energies
are capable of transformation into subjective forces? Is Energy
capable of becoming under certain circumstances self-conscious?PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICAL HISTORIES. 213
Is there an element of Consciousness, or unorganised Feeling,
in all operations of Force or Energy ?
We shall see in the next sub-section that Mr. Spencer con
siders that mind cannot be explained by a series of deductions
from, the Persistence of Force.
(e.) Psychology Considered as an Indirect Deduction through
Physical Histories.
Let us now consider the problem of Psychology as associated
with a physical synthesis.




is devoted to an account of
the nervous system, and its functions. Chapters I. and II. lead
up to Chapter III. where these functions are more explicitly
generalised. The functions of the nervous system are (i.) the
reception of motion, (2.) the liberation of locked-up motion,
(3.) the direction of motion. The reception of motion is the
reception of motion from the external world by molar contact,
undulatory action, chemical action; in fact, of heat or light, the
mechanical action of other bodies, &c., the disturbances set up by
which motions run along certain definite lines of nerves accord
ing to circumstances. The liberation of motion is founded
upon the conception not properly explained anywhere by Mr.
Spencer of &quot;locked-up motion,&quot; but which we can indefinitely




capable, under given circum
stances, of effecting motion. The direction of motion is not to
be confounded with the directive power of any subjective will
or personality. The direction referred to is only an engineer
ing arrangement by. which, under given circumstances, certain
.small stores of energy are given off along specific channels.
Treating nerve actions on their physiological side we have to
ignore the subjective side, and in doing this we have no option
but to formulate them in terms of motion.* Hence the first
five chapters of the &quot;Psychology&quot; consist of &quot;propositions which
are exclusively morphological and physiological. In them the
structure of the nervous system, its functions, the conditions to
its action, &c., have been dealt with purely as physical pheno
mena phenomena as purely physical as the absorption of the
*
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nutriment or the circulation of the blood. Whatever impli
cations may have arisen from the use of words that carry with
them indirect meanings, the direct meanings of all the pro
positions set down have nowhere implied consciousness or
feeling ; and, ignoring consciousness or feeling, they have left
out that which is tacitly or avowedly contained in every pro
position of Psychology.&quot;
*
We have already sufficiently considered the parts treating of
Psychology proper, and proceed to Part V., which deals with
the Physical Synthesis. The problem here is,
&quot; How is mental
evolution to be affiliated on Evolution at large, regarded as a
process of physical transformation ?
&quot;
It is not enough that the
general syntheses of psychical life have been traced up along
with the phenomena of physical life, and have been observed
to progress in integration, in heterogeneity, and in definiteness,
while from first to last intelligence has found its growth due to
the repetition of experiences, the effects of which are accumu
lated, organised, and inherited. &quot;It may yet be asked By
what process is the organisation of experiences achieved?
Granting that a survey of the facts proves it to take place ;
still, no answers are given to the questions Why does it take
place 1 And how does the transformation which brings it about




To effect this affiliation it is necessary to bring Psychology
within the terms of the Formula of Evolution, which terms are
Matter and Motion and their interrelations ; and although the
Persistence of Force finds no place in the formula, yet as it is
the main idea of the work, Psychology must also be affiliated




Though the development of Mind itself cannot be explained
by a series of deductions from the Persistence of Force, yet it
remains possible that its obverse, the development of physical
changes in a physical organ, may be so explained ; and until it
is so explained, the conception of mental evolution as a part of
Evolution in general, remains incomplete.&quot;
&quot;Specifically stated, the problem is to interpret mental
*
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evolution in terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion.
Though under its subjective aspect, Mind is known only as an
aggregate of states of consciousness, which cannot be conceived
as forms of Matter and Motion, and do not therefore necessarily
conform to the same laAvs of redistribution; yet under its
objective aspect, Mind is known as an aggregate of activities
manifested by an organism is the correlative, therefore, of
certain material transformations, which must come within the
general process of material evolution, if that process is truly
universal.&quot;
We are at a loss to foresee how Mr. Spencer will regard our
criticism. For the sake of properly apprehending the problem,




as to the import of the terms Matter and Motion. Evidently
we have to interpret mental evolution in terms of the redistri
bution of Matter and Motion. The development of Mind
cannot be explained by a series of deductions from the Persis
tence of Force, but only mediately by means of the Formula of
Evolution. But if we go further, and ask what Mr. Spencer
means by Matter and Motion what conceptions we should
have of them when we wish to understand the development of
mind by means of their interrelations, he replies
:
&quot;
Though I have repeatedly made it clear that our ideas of
Matter, Motion, and Force are but the x, y, and z with which
we work our equations, and formulate the various relations
among phenomena in such a way as to express their order in
terms of x, y, and z though I have shown that the realities
for which x, y, and z stand cannot be conceived by us as actually
existing thus and thus without committing ourselves to alter
native absurdities ; yet,&quot; &c.*
In spite of this, we are asked to interpret physical evolution,
and mental development as involved therein, in terms of realities
which cannot be conceived by us as actually existing thus or
thus without committing ourselves to alternative absurdities.
We naturally ask what is the good of an explanation at all under
these conditions, and how is it possible to interpret the order
of nature by such instruments of thought.
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However, we take up the thread of our inquiry where we
left it, and we find that we are led to an investigation of the
genesis of nerves proposed as a physical problem.
&quot; If from a
corollary to the Persistence of Force, we can legitimately draw
the conclusion that, under certain conditions, lines of nervous
communication will arise, and having arisen, will become lines
of more and more easy communication, in proportion to the
numbers and strengths of the discharges propagated through
them
; we shall have found a physical interpretation which
completes the doctrine of psychical evolution, as set forth in the
last two parts. It will be made manifest how the experience
of an external relation produces a corresponding internal rela
tion how, as experiences of the external relation become more
numerous, the internal relation becomes more coherent how
perpetual repetitions of the one cause indissolubleness of the
other how outer persistences that are almost or quite absolute,
establish, in the course of generations, inner cohesions that are
automatic or organic ; and thus the interpretation of instincts
and forms of thought will be assimilated to that of the ordinary
phenomena of association.&quot; *
It is always well to consider whether the mode of stating a
problem is satisfactory or not, before considering the proposed
solution. We are not by any means certain that the finding
of sundry physical processes to be corollaries of the Persistence
of Force (considered as a symbol of the Unknowable) is the
same thing as the proposal to interpret mental evolution in
terms of the redistribution of Matter and Motion (taken as
sums total of the chemical elements and physical energies) so
as to bring our reasonings within the scope of the Formula of
Evolution.
In furtherance of the inquiry, the problem next proceeded
with is the Genesis of Nerves. This is an inquiry as to the
origin of the Biological connections (A B), &c., represented
by the small capitals as correspondences to the external rela
tions (A B), &c., and not as to the origin of the Psychological
relations (a &), &c. As such, it is an inquiry which we reserve
for criticism in our next chapter. But it is obvious that the
*
Psychology, vol. i. p. 509.PSYCHOLOGY AND PHYSICAL HISTORIES 217
mere ascertainment of concomitance of development between
some of the connections (A B), &c., and the connections (a &),
&c., is not an explanation of the origin of (a b), &c., in the
same manner as the origin of (A B), &c., is supposed to be
accounted for as logically deducible from the interrelations with
(A B), &c.
Nor is the logical difficulty avoided by merging the question
into one of Function studied in Part V. Chapter VI. In the
preceding chapters the origin and development of nervous
structure have been studied. The function of this structure is
evidently the reception of motion, the storage of energy, the
liberation of motion, altogether forming a highly complex
mechanism, with a vast number of little engines and channels
for the reception, redirection, and expenditure of energy. Not
withstanding its wonderful complexity and delicacy of construc
tion, it is a purely physical arrangement, and its actions are
altogether physical. To characterise its natural actions by the
term Function is correct enough so long as this term carries




intelligence, we have to protest against the slip
ping in of the subjective. We are engaged upon a truly deduc
tive study, and not upon an inductive one. So again the study
of
&quot; reflex action&quot; and
&quot; the gradually increasing excitement of
the new motor apparatus
&quot;
is followed by the statement
&quot;
Thus, then, results what we call perception; for we have here
a cluster of real feelings caused by the presented object, joined
with a cluster of ideal feelings, representing certain other real
feelings which the object has before produced and can again
produce.&quot;*
&quot; Between a perception physiologically considered and a per
ception psychologically considered, the relation now becomes
manifest,&quot; &c.f
A physiological perception is, for instance, the action of the
rays of reflected light coming from a body and falling upon
the eye, which motions are continued into the cerebrum and
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tion&quot; we hold to be a purely subjective term. We can under
stand the action (A B) as the result of the connection (A B), but
although experientially we know of the concomitant (a b), we
cannot discern it as a deduction from the relations of (A B) and
(AB).
By the same method of identifying the physical and the sub
jective concomitants in the terms of biological function, Mr.
Spencer affords supposed explanations of ideas and afterwards
of emotions. Since we know as a matter of fact that the
intimate concomitance he describes does exist, and judge that
the antecedent concomitant history he refers to did take place,
it seems ungracious to argue against him
; but as a matter of
logic, in the deductive study he proposes the subjective con
nections (a &), &c., are not explainable as to origin, history,
meaning, &c., by any of the methods he attempts.
(/) General Considerations ivitli Regard to the Unification
of Knowledge.
To all such criticisms Mr. Spencer undertakes a reply in
Chapter X. The general result of criticism, as Mr. Spencer
truly anticipates, is a charge of
&quot;
Materialism.&quot; But in his
reply to this charge Mr. Spencer singularly misses the point of
the criticism so far as it is of value from a logical point of view,
and it is with this aspect only that Mr. Spencer and his
scientific critics are concerned. He considers
&quot; Materialism
&quot; a
term of opprobrium, and by the mouths of two Materialists
makes reply. The first vindicates the delicacy and sensitive
ness of the mechanical motion of some material bodies, and then
proceeds to impress upon us the wonderful complexity of the
constitution of inorganic bodies. The second identifies Mind
with Motion that is to say, the connection (a b) with the action
of the connections (A B), or with the delicacy and vivacity of
ethereal motions. Both of these vindications are in the ser
monising strain, and deal with the charge of Materialism as a
term of opprobrium. In the oratorical reply, the coolness and
accuracy of pure logic are lost sight of. However, Mr. Spencer
remarks that neither of these are true replies to the criticism
advanced, and he proceeds to meet it in his own way.GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 219
The criticism, as we take it, is to the effect that from the
given factors of premises, oxygen, nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen,
&c., and a various environment of solids, liquids, and gases,
together with the action of light, heat, electricity, &c., we are
not able to deduce
Firstly, Biological histories. But if biological histories are
capable of being so deduced, then it forms a purely materialistic
history, using materialistic as a term expressive of the sum-
total of the above factors and as excluding all other agencies. O O
Secondly, Psychological histories. For even supposing biolo
gical histories are deducible as just specified, which is a logically
possible problem, still the psychological histories present results
which are not logically deducible from our conceptions of the
given factors.
In this view, the charge of Materialism simply means that
the explanations given of biological histories being merely mate
rialistic explanations, they do not account for the subjective
accompaniment, and most decidedly shut it out from taking any
part in the processes of the sequences. For whatever the con
sciousness of conflict, or doubt, or choice, or determination, they
are merely the concomitants of physical processes in the brain,
and this consciousness is not a factor influencing the result.
We have nothing to do in our present study with any ethical
or sentimental estimation of this mode of representing human
action. &quot;VVe have merely to view it in its logical aspect, and the
logical view of it is that the subjective result is not contained
in the given premises which are termed materialistic, but that
nevertheless if subjective sequences are wholly determined by
these materialistic factors (the subjective being merely concomi
tant), then most certainly the explanations are materialistic,
however much Matter may be advanced in our estimation by
oratorical efforts.
What is Mr. Spencer s reply ? He speaks about the unknow-
ability of the ultimate nature of Mind, and the unknowability
of the ultimate nature of Matter and of Motion. But it is at
once seen that our premises have nothing to do with
&quot; ultimate





the known properties of the elementary substances named and220 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
the laws of the physical environment. To place the question
upon more remote antecedents is to alter the problem com
pletely, and to make it not only impossible but altogether incon
ceivable. If, again, the non-knowability of the ultimate nature
of mind is an obstacle in our way, then truly we must be forced
to admit failure in the unification of knowledge.
Confessedly we end in a predicament, but a predicament is
not the unification of knowledge.





only in terms of Mind
&quot;
(consciousness).
&quot; We can think
of Mind only in terms of Matter&quot; (i.e., as the concomitant of
some physiological actions).
&quot; When we have pushed our ex
plorations of the first to the uttermost limit, we are referred to
the first for a final answer ; and when we have got the final
answer of the second, we are referred back to the first for an
interpretation of it. We find the value of x in terms of y ;
then we find the value of y in terms of x ; and so on we may
continue for ever without coming nearer to a solution. The
antithesis of subject and object, never to be transcended while
consciousness lasts, renders impossible all knowledge of that
Ultimate Reality in which subject and object are united.&quot;
What are we to understand by this ? The first impression
is that Mr. Spencer has adopted Talleyrand s use of language.
But what are we to understand by it ? Does it mean that the
two volumes on the evolution of Biology are adhered to or
abandoned? Does it mean that the factors upon which that
great deduction proceeded are inconceivable, and the whole of
our reasonings upon them worthless ? Or, again, does it mean
that not knowing the ultimate nature of Mind, our reasoning
powers are unreliable ? We can imagine no other practical
application of the above passage ; and if so, what becomes of
the unification of knowledge ? We would contrast it with Mr.
Spencer s criterion of the unification of knowledge quoted by
us at the outset of our task,* and ask the student to consider
whether this is a satisfactory outcome of the enterprise we have
undertaken. For our part, we think a more damnatory con
demnation than the above passage could not have been written
*
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by any opponent of Mr. Spencer. Yet he has written it in re
gard to his own undertaking.
Nevertheless, this predicament is said to bring us to the
true conclusion,
&quot; that it is one and the same Ultimate Reality
which is manifested to us subjectively and objectively. For
while the nature of that which is manifested under either form
proves to be inscrutable, the order of its manifestations through
out all mental phenomena proves to be the same as the order
of its manifestations throughout all material phenomena.&quot;
This may be so
; but if we can form no conception of this
Ultimate Eeality so as to be able to deduce the histories of the
cosmos from it, knowledge is not unified. We observe the
universality of its manner of operation, but we do not discern
the secret of the sequences, or rather, we discern it partly, and
would extend our scientific knowledge to the whole. The
deficiency of our knowledge is not made up by recognising
the universality of modes with its implication of community of
origin.
It would be well, however, to give a separate consideration
to the suggestion made in this reply as to the Ultimate Keality
manifesting itself by a
&quot; double aspect.&quot;
3. TJie Double-Aspect Theory.
As we have somewhat anticipated the subject of this section
in Chapter III. by showing the futility of the Double-Aspect
Theory in any attempt to find an explanation of the historical
series of events culminating in the subjective aspect itself, as
deductions from primordial factors, there is not much left to
say. It would be as well, however, to give a little more atten
tion to Mr. Spencer s treatment of the subject, and to the lan
guage employed in the statement of his views.
We first direct attention to 194, being the closing section
of
&quot; First Principles,&quot; of which the following is a summary:
The deepest truths we can reach are the widest uniformities
in our experiences of Matter, Motion, and Force.
These are but symbols of the Unknown Eeality.
An Unknowable Power works in us certain effects.222 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
These effects we class together under the names Matter,
Motion, and Force.
Between these effects there are likenesses of connection.
Analysis reduces these effects to one kind of effect.
Analysis reduces the kinds of uniformity to one kind of
uniformity.
&quot; And the highest achievement of Science is the interpretation
of all orders of phenomena, as differently conditioned mani
festations of this one kind of effect, under differently conditioned
modes of this one kind of uniformity.&quot;
Science, therefore, merely systematises our experience.
We do not know that these uniformities are absolutely neces
sary only that in our thoughts they are necessary.
&quot;We cannot conceive how the one is related to the other. The
connection between the phenomenal order and the ontological
order is for ever inscrutable.
(&quot;We remark here that the classification and systematisation
of our experiences is not the same kind of unification of
knowledge as that by which all sequences are to be deduced as
corollaries from one ultimate truth or from primordial factors.)
The connection between the conditioned forms of being and
the unconditioned form of being (query is there any ?) is also
inscrutable.
The interpretation (query wliat doe$ interpretation mean ?)
of all phenomena in terms of Matter, Motion, and Force is
nothing more than the reduction of our complex symbols of
thought to the simplest symbols.
&quot; Hence the reasonings contained in the foregoing pages
afford no support to either of the antagonistic hypotheses
respecting the ultimate nature of things. Their implications
are no more materialistic than they are spiritualistic ; and no
more spiritualistic than they are materialistic.&quot;
This all depends upon the meaning given to the terms. The
discussion after all does not relate to ultimate natures. Ulti
mate natures, being absolutely unknowable and inconceivable,
do not enter into the discussion at all. But taking the materials
and facts of chemistry and the laws of physics as imagined in a
nebula, can we from these primordial factors deduce the solarTHE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 223
system, and the forms of life with, which we are acquainted on
the earth at the present time ? This is what would generally
be called a materialistic explanation, and that it appears to us
Mr. Spencer attempts. To discuss the ultimate nature of these
bases of knowledge is going beyond science. Either their ulti
mate natures are all conditioned as we know them, and hence
the deduction is possible ; or they are not all conditioned and
known, which makes (as is the case) the deduction impossible,
and causes knowledge to remain ununified.
However, Mr. Spencer says
&quot; The Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from
the law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under
the form of feeling, is transformable into an equivalent of
mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all
the other forces which matter exhibits
; may consider it there
fore demonstrated that the phenomena of consciousness are
material phenomena.&quot; And the Spiritualist may argue the
converse.
&quot;
Manifestly, the establishment of correlation and equivalence
between the forces of the inner and the outer worlds, may be
used to assimilate either to the other ; according as we set out
with one or other term. But he who rightly interprets the
doctrine contained in this work, will see that neither of these
terms can be taken as ultimate. He will see that though the
relation of subject and object renders necessary to us these
antithetical conceptions of Spirit and Matter, the one is no less
than the other to be regarded as but a sign of the unknown
reality which underlies both.&quot;
We submit that the correlation and equivalence between the
inner forces and the outer, between the subjective and the
objective, has not been made out except in regard to the
dependence of the former upon the latter. Mr. Spencer
repudiates Feeling as a factor in Biology, and makes all his
interpretations as resultants of certain elementary substances
and certain physical conditions. And we have before shown,
Chapter I. p. 43, that subjective consciousness is excluded
from the list of energies which are acknowledged by scien
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of the order of sequences is couched in materialistic terms, and
to say that the unknowability of ultimate natures invalidates
the explanation is to say that Mr. Spencer s explanation fails,
and tolundo all the work that he claims to have performed.
Can Mr. Spencer complete his work, on the double-aspect
theory, by making a complementary explanation in subjective
or spiritualistic terms and processes
? Can he explain chemistry
and physics and the growth of organic molecules and organisms
in terms of the subjective, and derive all as deductions from
certain spiritualistic factors ? When this is done we may
acknowledge that the series of events is a process one and
continuous, having a double aspect, and capable of being de
ductively demonstrated and explained in two sets of terms,
materialistic and spiritualistic. At present it seems to us we
can only explain the course of cosmical events in materialistic
language down to a certain point at which the materialistic
language fails us, and then the spiritualistic or subjective
comes in as necessary for other explanations, though still
dependent upon the materialistic. We find that we have to
begin our explanations with one aspect, and end them with
two. How came the second to be evolved ?
It materialistic explanations now take the language of dynamics
rather than of geometry, they are still materialistic in the sense
of not being subjective. If we use the terms affinity, attrac
tion, repulsion, polarity, equilibration, &c., they are all objective
terms. So also are segregation, integration, dissipation, rhythm,
&c. These are the terms of Mr. Spencer s explanations. Can
we graft upon them other meanings, so as to render them
capable of expressing the order of sequences in a subjective
cosmical explanation
1
Is it to be done by means of the term Force, which may be
considered common to both aspects ? Our studies all point in
that direction ; but it is at present no more than a suggestion,
for even with his powerful and acute mind Mr. Spencer cannot
work it out into a logical, coherent, and systematic deductive
system.
Mr. Spencer refuses to allow Matter and Motion to bear
definite meanings. He maintains that Matter, Motion, andTHE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 225
Force are merely symbols ; not symbols standing for something
known, but indefinite symbols, standing for something not
known or only partly known. We are allowed to use them in
physical studies of their combinations and aggregations. We
are allowed to use generalisations about matter in the expla
nation of objective processes, but when we come to processes
in which occur phenomena not so explainable, we are asked
to give Matter another aspect. Now it is evident that up
to a certain point the view of Matter which takes it in its
known conditions as chemical elements is able to furnish expla
nations. Why then should we be called upon to view it up to
this point in some other aspect 1 Because we have to argue
backwards, and infer that since Matter becomes self-conscious,
there must have been something in the original factors which
was capable of becoming organised into consciousness. Ad
mitting this to be the case, it would appear that the ulti
mate units of Matter were units of attraction and resistance,
and something more
; or else Matter was not units of attrac
tion and resistance, nor yet a conscious subjectivity, but some
thing between the two ; not either of them, but a something
of which neither subjectivity nor objectivity could be predi
cated something of which neither attraction nor resistance
could be predicated, nor yet consciousness. Thus we are lost
in the Unknowable Force ; we are thrust beyond the limits of
Philosophy ; we are in the presence of an Unknowable Power.
As long as we contemplate it, Philosophy has nothing to do but
to sit waiting patiently till it manifests itself in some definite
form. If it does so manifest itself, and eventually resolves
itself into a quantitative Attraction and Repulsion, then Philo
sophy seizes upon it as her raw material, and builds up systems
of worlds until she comes to Consciousness. Then she says,
&quot;
Surely I have got more in my hands than I thought ; there is
something that feels.&quot; This does not alter the definite know
ledge of the interrelations of Attraction and Kepulsion, nor the
conceptions of them. It does not alter the aspect of looking at
them, nor change their value, operation, or quantity in the least
degree. If it is said that they have a subjective aspect also,
it is saying something that cannot be understood, and which
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those who hold that view must explain. Let the subjective
aspect of units of Attraction and Eesistance be described. Let
the subjective aspect of the formation of the sixty or seventy
so-called elements be described also. What is the subjective
aspect, for instance, of the union of oxygen and hydrogen into
the compound called water?
The dilemma at which we arrive in the course of evolution
is this : By a formula of Attraction and Kepulsion we may be
able to generalise all physical processes, and explain the exist
ence and history of every aggregate, but by and by we reach
events which the physical formula will not explain, namely,
subjective phenomena. The difficulty is to account for and
explain these in a general formula. We find the old one will
not do. What must be done 1 Will it do to say that Matter
and Motion, Attraction and Resistance, are not really objective
they have another aspect also 1 If so, we thereby destroy the
definite meaning of our formula, as already so much insisted
upon.
If every event has a double aspect, and to treat of the his
tory of events under one aspect is insufficient, we must amend
our formula, so that by exhibiting the double aspect we shall
be able thereby to deduce the double-aspected evolution. The
formula to account for a double-aspected evolution must itself
be double-aspected.
Thus we should have to say
Evolution is ( integration 1 of feeling and
and a concomitant \ integration of matter and dissipation of
motion, wherein, &c.,
filling in all the blanks in terms of the other aspect.
It is asserted, however, that the process of evolution is not
two concomitant evolutions, but one evolution. Notwithstand





a factor, yet in the passage quoted above he says
&quot; The
Materialist, seeing it to be a necessary deduction from the
law of correlation, that what exists in consciousness under
the form of feeling is transformable into an equivalent ofTHE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 227
mechanical motion, and by consequence into equivalents of all
the other forces which matter exhibits.&quot; We, however, noted
at the time that Professor Stewart did not include Feeling in
his list of energies which were mutually equivalent or trans
formable. Mr. Spencer has in various places maintained that
in conscious beings the subjective never interferes in any phy
sical action. It is said to be inconceivable that any muscular
reaction from an external stimulant has been at all interfered
with or influenced by any subjective feeling. There is a course
of molecular motion along a nerve, there is some change caused
thereby in the substance of the nerve or brain, and there is a
molecular reaction due to the previous action ; but to suppose
that this reaction is at all influenced by feeling is out of the
question ; we are merely conscious of it. All molecular move
ments in an organism are not two events, but only one. A
muscular motion may be described mechanically or subjec
tively, but it is one and the same event. The amount of
energy has not been augmented nor diminished by the action
of any feeling, nor could feeling augment or diminish it
without being itself a mode of motion, which it is not. It
is inconceivable that feeling should have a mechanical function.
Muscular and all other actions of an organism are all chains
of mechanical action uninterfered with by feeling. Yet they are
one and the same ; the subjective and the objective within the
organism are one and the same thing viewed differently. The
question arises, are all external changes to be regarded in the
same way as objective and subjective at the same time?
As a proposition limited to the actions and consciousnesses
of organisms, the &quot;double-aspect&quot; theory is one which is capable
of being understood, if not accepted ; but as a general truth
applicable to the historic explanation of the inorganic universe,
we cannot understand it. And if, impelled by a desire to so
represent it, we endeavour to frame a formula explanatory of
the universe in this double-aspected way, as attempted above,
we find it is impossible to formulate any proposition of an
intelligible character.
The double-aspect theory may serve a very useful purpose
after the stage of biological evolution has been attained, as228 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
affording diversified modes of description of the complex occur
rences affecting organisms, in which one or other set of terms
may be used, according as the incidents of a series of events
may have their chief import objectively or subjectively ; but as
a key to the order of events, and as a means of cosmical expla
nation, it is useless.




for all the operations of the physical organism. There are
some changes which have the double aspect and some which
have it not. What are called the organs of sense have the
concomitance of subjective feeling ; so have muscular motions
and other events of the organism ; but the processes of accre
tion and secretion have not this accompaniment. We must





is confined within the limits of
organisms. When we speak of the double aspect, it is the
double aspect of changes of a conscious organism. Therefore
if knowledge is some arrangement or state of the molecules and
fibres of the brain and nervous system, then all knowledge has
a double aspect, of which the physical arrangement is one side,
and the concomitant subjective is the other. This is indeed a
method of representing the theory of the Relativity of Know
ledge, since all knowledge is subjective, and the subjective is
but the consciousness of certain physical organisations, which
organisation is produced by physical interrelations. But when
certain portions of this physical arrangement (with which goes
the subjective) have effected that mechanical arrangement, with
which is concomitant the consciousness of there having been an
antecedent condition of the cosmos in which there was no con
sciousness, no subjective aspect, then the physical arrangement
of the brain which is the objective process of reasoning is
unable to bring about that other physical state of the brain
which is the physical state of an explanation of the origi
nation of the subjective concomitant ; and also that general
arrangement of the molecules and fibres of the cerebrum and
cerebellum which would produce the consciousness of the
unification of knowledge has not been effected. We assert,THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 229
in short, that the physical arrangement of the brain which is
equivalent to the argument of the Double-Aspect Theory does
not produce the cerebral organisation which is the analogue
of the unification of knowledge. It is true we are unable to
examine the physical changes in a direct manner, for they are
beyond our reach. We can only judge by our consciousness of
them.
The real solution of the difficulty would have to be placed
in the statement of an ultimate truth or factor, from the
double nature of which as a series of corollaries the conscious
double aspect of organised living beings could be deduced.
This problem is attacked by Professor Clifford with his usual
intrepidity of thought in the bold hypothesis of &quot;Mind-Stuff.&quot;
He says,*
&quot; The reality external to our minds which is repre
sented in our minds as matter, is in itself mind-stuff.&quot;
&quot; The
universe consists entirely of mind-stuff. Some of this is woven
into the complex form of human minds, containing imperfect
representations of the mind-stuff outside them, and of themselves
also, as a mirror reflects its own image in another mirror ad
infinitum. Such an imperfect representation is called a
material universe. It is a picture in a man s mind of the real
universe of mind-stuff.&quot;
&quot; Matter is a mental picture in which
mind-stuff is the thing represented.&quot;
&quot;
Reason, intelligence, and
volition are properties of a complex, which is made up of ele
ments themselves not rational, not intelligent, not conscious.&quot;





mind-matter,&quot; a double-aspect word supposed to be repre
sentative of the factor of the universe. This theory is examined
by us very fully in the Appendix to our former work. We
only note here the kind of factor which the Double-Aspect
Theory forces us to look for, the impossibility of forming any
conception of it, and finally, the impossibility of deducing the
sequences and evolution of the cosmos from it by way of
corollaries.
In the first section of this chapter we referred to Mr.
Spencer s account of the faint and vivid manifestations which
presumably forms another account of the Double - Aspect
*
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Theory. But we do not see that it assists us at all in escaping
from our difficulties. There are two different orders of mani
festations of Force. They segregate, and apparently segregate
in parallel groupings, the one corresponding to the other, but
whence the parallelism and correspondence does not appear.
Again, we found that all knowledge would have to be expressed
in terms of the impression we call Eesistance, implying both
the impression and the mutual action of pressing and resist
ing bodies ; again implying the double aspect. But then, as a
matter of fact, when events have to be considered as corol
laries, or such of them as can be so considered, the terms used
are all of the objective or physical side, and valid explanations
can be given on this aspect only.
Mr. Spencer s term
&quot; Force
&quot;
itself appears to be a
&quot; double
aspect
&quot; term in that it manifests itself objectively as opposed
to our consciousness and subjectively in our consciousness.
But Mr. Spencer himself acknowledges that we can form no
conception of it, although he apparently proposes to get
corollaries from it only that his corollaries are from, not the
factor itself, but only its adjective of &quot;Persistence.&quot; Here, again,
we only obtain any meaning when we consider the objective
aspect in the scientific doctrine of the
&quot; Conservation of Energy,&quot;
and that of a definite and limited character.
If the evolution of the subjective is to be unified with
evolution in general, as part of one universal process on the
ground of the conformity of its modes with the modes of the
general evolution of Force ; if because its characteristics are
such that they can be deemed corollaries from the theory of
the Persistence of Force in the same way in which the evolution
of physical bodies can be deemed deductions from that theory,
then subjectivity must itself be a mode of Force, and take its
place in the circle of the interchanges of correlative forces,
and is not a mere aspect of modes of physical forces. It must
be one of them. Otherwise it is a merely dependent something
unrelated as a corollary with any general primordial factor.
For the further study of the theory in its practical application
we append an examination of Clifford s
&quot;
Seeing and Thinking,&quot;
and of Dr. Bain s &quot;Mind and Body.&quot;CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 231
APPENDIX TO THIS SECTION.
(a.) Professor Clifford on the Double-Aspect Theory.
In the third chapter of
&quot;
Seeing and Thinking,&quot; the late
Professor Clifford makes an ingenious attempt to represent the
double-aspect theory. The first object is to show how all
external events come upon the human organism as motions, and
as such are transmitted to ganglions and other still larger ner
vous centres, where other groups of motions are set up which
either immediately or after an interval react upon the environ
ment in certain definite manners. This is, in fact, a chain of
physical events, and the supposition is that man and all his
actions can be so represented, and would have come into
being and worked as a thoroughly complete and perfect
machine, even had there been no feeling or consciousness at
all ; that this latter has been no factor in his evolution, but
that his existence and all his doings are incidents in the chain
of physical development the mechanical explanation being com
plete in itself.
What is required, therefore, is a full and complete represen
tation of human actions in physical terms. Now, since it is
ascertained that all the facts of sensation and action are con
nected with the nervous system, the problem resolves itself
into a description of the nervous system as a complicated
mechanical arrangement, and of all events as a series of motions
of this mechanism.
The first stages of this description are comparatively simple
and easy, and tend to bear out the theory. The further stages
are more and more surmise, and rely for acceptance on presumed
analogies, and on the probable continuance of processes, ren
dered more plausible by the consideration of the structure of
the brain
; while the final stages slip out of the reckoning alto
gether, even surmise finding no vague mode of expression in the
language of physics. Here Professor Clifford is forced into the
exclusive use of subjective terms, seeing his facts utterly escape
a physical representation.
Let the reader carefully examine this chapter, with the232 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
steady resolve to keep to language of physics, and see how he
fails. He will find, in the first place, a very liberal use of the
terms
&quot;message&quot; and &quot;messages.&quot; All of these he will cross
out, substituting in the margin the term &quot;motions.&quot; He will
see that motions of the nerves are the result of incident
motions of light, heat, contact, &c., of the environment
; and
will remember that the function of the nerves was hereto
fore stated to be the transmission., of these motions. Therefore




and keep rigidly to the term &quot;motion.&quot; The substitution of
terms is just as illegitimate in philosophical studies as is the
substitution of chemical substances by chemists in their experi
ments.
This substitution will have to be made eleven times up to
page 77, where the problem is re-stated :
&quot; How out of that simple process we can build up that
exceedingly complicated thing which we call human life.&quot;
So that in a microscopical examination of the brain of a
living man, if it were possible
&quot; You would see nothing more than the merely mechanical
actions that we have described hitherto.&quot;
How then does Professor Clifford describe the interrelation
of mind and brain, and formulate mental processes in terms of
mechanical actions ? He simply states the co-existence of
the sensation of sight with certain motions of a special part
of the nervous system, and speaks of the sensation as being
&quot; in the mind.&quot; And from this point he begins to confuse his
subject. He does not keep to his stated problem, how out of
simply mechanical processes to build up human life. Instead
of this, he introduces sensation as a factor in the chain of events ;
not merely as an accompaniment, but as a link in the course of
the motions, which by the supposition is excluded, and by
some is said to be inconceivable ; for it would be equivalent
to saying that that which is not Energy (which is quanti
tatively invariable) affects Motion, and would thus vary the
quantity of Energy. If he does not indeed do this directly, he
does so by implication; as thus (p. 81)
A sensation comes into the eye or the ear.CLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 233
A disturbance, i.e., a set of motions, comes into the eye or
the ear.
A sensation comes into the mind.
It gives rise to a train of thought.
It goes on to manifest itself in an action ; as thus
It causes a feeling of wanting to do something.
It causes exertion to satisfy that feeling.
From this point the sequence proceeds objectively, the imme
diately following description being given in physical language,
p. 82 (bottom) to p. 85. In reading these pages the terms
&quot; mes
sages&quot; and &quot;disturbances&quot; must be translated into the mechanical
term &quot;motions.&quot;
&quot;A motion is produced in the
eye.&quot;
&quot;A motion is produced in the optic nerve.&quot;
&quot;A set of motions is produced in the mechanical arrangement
called the brain.&quot;
&quot; The brain was in a state of complicated motions.&quot;
&quot; The new motion alters the motions of the mechanism of
the brain.&quot;
The motion is rearranged
&quot;
according to the ordinary laws
of action in the brain,&quot; i.e., mechanical these laws being
explained as &quot;dependent upon the shape of it, upon the way
in which these white threads in the interior are arranged, that
connect the different parts together,&quot; making the procedure
&quot; an
orderly sequence of purely material events in the brain.&quot;
This is followed (p. 85) by a message, i.e., a motion, going




&quot; which has come into the brain
&quot;
(i.e., a mechanism)
&quot; from without, and which has re-arranged
itself
&quot;
(i.e., produced certain mechanical effects upon the
mechanism according to the laws of motion)
&quot; in the brain
&quot;
(mechanism), &quot;going out again along certain muscles&quot; (or con
nections of other parts of the mechanism),
&quot; and passing away
from the brain
&quot;






goes to those muscles
&quot;
(mechanism)
&quot; and moves them, and that is all the brain
&quot;
(part of the mechanism)
&quot; has had to do with it.&quot;
How do we stand now ? We have examined the subjec-234 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
tive chain of events, and have seen its dependence upon the
physical chain, and its apparent interference with the subse
quent chain of physical events. We have also traced the
mechanical sequences of an incoming motion till we have lost
them in the complicated motions of the mechanism of the brain,
and we have failed to discern how the motions constituting, say,
the perception of a purse on the ground, can mechanically explain
the sequence of picking it up.
&quot;We trace motions from the eye
to the brain ; we discern consequent motions in the brain.
But we cannot see the mechanical connection necessitating those
further motions of the mechanism which, issuing to the muscles,
result in picking up the purse.
If we ask what was the cause of the
&quot;
picking up,&quot; are we
to be told that it is a purely mechanical action, the begin
ning of which we can explain in detail, and the latter part of
which we can explain mechanically in an intelligible manner,
but the middle part of which we are, as yet, from want of suffi
cient knowledge of the mechanism of the brain, unable to set
out in detail, though we judge from the first part and from the
latter part of the explanation that it must be of the same




as a sequence from the perception is a purely mechanical event
from first to last, and would have happened quite independently
of any sensation, feeling of want, or feeling of exertion.
If we say, however, that this sensation, feeling of want, and




&quot; would not have taken place, then
we manifest the insufficiency of the mechanical explanation, and
also affirm the existence of a force or power which is capable
of interference in a mechanical manner so as to the direct the
motions of material particles, which, indeed, is no less a miracle
than the removal of a mountain by word of mouth, and a plain
contradiction of the constant quantity of Energy or of Motion,
or of that more abstract proposition, the Persistence of Force.
How is this difficulty to be got over? Professor Clifford
says by the theory of parallelism or of a double aspect to the
phenomena. This parallelism is well described on p. 85
:
&quot; A
sensation apparently comes into my mind from without
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turned over in my mind ; conclusions are drawn from it, and
an action follows. A disturbance comes into my brain from
without, a purely mechanical disturbance ; it is turned over and
reverberated in my brain, and then it is sent out from my brain
again to a muscle to move it.&quot;






aspect,&quot; to see that it does not confuse our scien
tific intentions. The object of Science is to understand the
sequences of the cosmos the object of Philosophy is to express
in one formula the whole series of sequences. &quot;What we wish
to know is whether the whole series here illustrated is a
series of mechanical sequences derivable from the actions of
light and colour upon the eye, the optic nerve, and the mechani
cal construction of the brain, and ultimately from the laws
of the interrelation of aggregates of the chemical elements
; or
whether, on the other hand, no such result would have taken
place if it had not been for certain subjective facts which
affected the mechanical motions of the brain. In the latter
case, a mechanical explanation is evidently insufficient. Yet, if
we say that we are only speaking of the same event, and use dif
ferent language merely to denote the aspect from which we view
it, we do not escape from the responsibilities of a mechanical
explanation we are not speaking of a subjective event which
has a mechanical side, but of a mechanical event which has a sub
jective side. The whole weight of the explanation rests with the
mechanical theory, unless we are prepared to grant subjectivity as
a separate factor interfering with the mechanical. We are obliged
to say, then, that when we speak of a mental event as having
a double-aspect, we mean a physical event with a subjective
aspect. We must also say that there are, correctly speaking, no
mental events nor mental sequences, but only mechanical events
and mechanical sequences, which have also a subjective aspect.
The real factors are the chemical elements, or aggregates of
attractions and resistances ; but certain combinations and inter
relations of them (why is admittedly a mystery) are accompanied
by subjectivity, which subjectivity does not in the least interfere
with the course of the mechanical sequences. If this is so, then
it must be admitted that mental science exists merely by courtesy236 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
or by way of convenience, and that every fact, event, law, and
correspondence finds an independent representation and expla
nation objectively in the structure and actions of the brain and
nervous system regarded as mechanisms these mechanisms
not being in the least dependent upon the sensations, the feel
ings, or the exertions of the subjective in their construction or
actions.
We do not think there is any reason here for charging us
with a misunderstanding of the double-aspect theory. It may
be urged that we do not look at the matter exactly as our
teachers would have us look at it. They will say,
&quot; You keep
the aspects too much separated ; you will divide them when you
ought to unify them.&quot; &quot;We reply that when we look at the action
of a man, as it were,
&quot;
statically,&quot; we can, we think, place our
selves fully at the point of view of those who hold the double-
aspect theory ; and even when we take a man as he is con
structed, and view him under the influence of some external
motions, as before described, we are almost able to regard the
series of events as equally subjective and mechanical, though at
the same time we fail to see how the external incident motion,
either directly or indirectly, through the consequent motion of
the nerve substance, can originate or influence or change the
subjective. But when we come to study the structure and
actions of man as part of the history of the cosmos when we
have, that is to say, to study the subject historically, tracing
all existences and actions as consequents of previous existences
and actions ; when we come to a time when those chemical
aggregations with which the subjective is indissolubly connected
did not exist, we find ourselves quite unable to account for
the origination of the double aspect of certain existences and
events. The origin, structure, and functions of these aggre
gates hypothetically rely upon that mechanical explanation
which seems to be sufficient for the explanation of all preced
ing events and existences. Certain compounds in certain aggre
gations, however, seem to possess the property of a double
aspect, and it is not correct, considering their physical origin,
to say of them that they are the same series of events having
two aspects, one subjective and the other objective, but thatCLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 237
they are a special and limited class of objective events occurring
in due order of physical sequences, which have, we know not




&quot; almost confutes the theory of the
&quot; double aspect.&quot; It would partly imply that a double yet
independent series of events went on at the same time. It is,
indeed, a figure of speech, and is therefore a very unsafe term
to use. Parallel lines run on for ever, and never affect each
other, and never meet. They are separately independent, and
are only in relation in our minds ; and if we regard them as
the motions of bodies, still they do not affect each other; one
does not diverge because the other does, for that would be a
dependence or sequence to the action of the other ; one does not
move faster or slower in accordance with the movement of the
other, for that, again, would mean dependence. Parallelism may,
it is true, mean that the initiative is taken by one line and is
followed by the other
; and this, indeed, would seem to be the
meaning intended when people speak of the parallelism of the
mental with the physical operations of the brain and nervous
system ; but then the onus of all the explanations rests with
the mechanical processes to which the mental run parallel.
But if, on the other hand, it is held that the mechanical
runs parallel with the subjective, then the difficulty of the
explanation of the dependence of the physical upon the
mental process seems insuperable. If, again, we adopt a
mixed explanation, then sometimes the mechanical will run
parallel with the mental, and sometimes the mental will run
parallel with the mechanical ; and we have a contradiction
of parallelism altogether.
&quot;We have then to resort to the suppo
sition of two perfectly independent courses running parallel
without any intermediate line of connection, the course of each
independent movement being explainable in itself and on its
own grounds, though each has a uniform correspondence with
the other, the cause of this correspondence being explainable
otherwise than as one of mutual interaction. The theory of
parallelism is explained from pages 85 to 89. Parallelism is,
indeed, a weaker mode of representing the theory than that of
the double aspect. The latter, indeed, is one that could be238 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
adopted if the mechanical explanation were shown to be capable
of accounting fully for all the facts of the origin and evo
lution of life, and if the relation of the subjective to the objec
tive in the original simple factors could be formulated.
This brings us back to Professor Clifford, who now proceeds
to some such explanation. He first takes the case of hunger and
feeding (p. 90).
&quot; Let us first take a very simple connection between sensation
and action that is to say, suppose that at a time when we are
hungry a piece of food is put into our mouth, and we instinc
tively begin to go through the very complicated motion of chew
ing and swallowing it. This involves, in the first place, a pre
vious state of the brain implied in saying that we are hungry.&quot;
We stop the quotation here in order to ask what is the state of
the brain viewed as a mechanism 1 There is not the slightest
attempt to describe this state mechanically, nor even a hint at
the kind of mechanical condition of the brain that would be
produced by hunger. Professor Clifford continues :
&quot; And it




&quot; to be sent up from the tongue and from the muscles
of the mouth, and then an exceedingly complicated message
&quot;
(i.e., motions) &quot;comes back to direct the motion of the tongue
and the teeth in chewing and swallowing the food.&quot;
&quot; Here the important things to notice are two : first of all, what
are the messages which go in 1 and secondly, what are the mes
sages which go out
1
? . . . That instinctive movement of the
mouth does not follow in cases where we have already had
enough to eat. It is necessary that there should be beforehand
that state of the mind, and that concomitant state of the brain
which we express by saying that we are hungry.




&quot; to our brain, not only from those organs
which we call the five senses,








&quot;of hunger is a message&quot; (i.e.. motion),
&quot; which is sent to me from my stomach and from the rest of
my body, to say
&quot;
( this does not seem to be either a mechanical
or a subjective term, but a figure of speech)
&quot; that there is a wantCLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 239




differs from the other sensations in this. It suggests
&quot;
(a





get&quot; (subjective, endeavour to get)
&quot;
something to eat.&quot; Here,
then, we see that the mechanical explanation attempted as being
a process complete in itself utterly fails in an instance which
Professor Clifford has selected as a simple illustration. We do
not say that
4 such a mechanical explanation may not some day
be possible.
&quot;We do not say that it is, in fact, not a purely
mechanical process, part of a larger course of mechanical causa
tion, of which the subjective aspect is merely one side
; but we
do mean to say that a mechanical explanation is not now pos
sible, and therefore no one has any right to claim it ; and we
do mean to say that as long as those who desire to explain
the process drag in subjective terms, so long are we obliged to
infer that subjective feelings are factors in the result, however
impossible it may be for us to conceive of that which is not
Energy affecting a series of mechanical processes.
Professor Clifford, then, in a very careless manner, by way
of
&quot;
&c., &c.,&quot; refers to





promptings,&quot; as if to imply that the illustration
selected having been so plainly rendered, all these other things
&quot;
go without saying.&quot;
The outgoing nerves move the muscles or pinch the blood
vessels. The blood-vessels feed and reconstitute the wasted
parts, more particularly the nerves which have become worn out,
&c. All this is saying nothing. We require the mechanical
nature and connection of the whole process explained.
We do not know that it is worth while to take up the
explanation as resumed on p. 95, and examine it in detail. If
Professor Clifford wishes merely to show the concomitance of
feeling with mechanical changes of the organism, he succeeds.
If he means to prove that all the actions of organisms are parts
of a course of mechanical sequence in which the formation of the
organism is itself an incident, and in which feeling has no part
and is no factor, he does not succeed, because his explanations
are full of subjective terms.
It is tedious to writer and reader, and, moreover, expensive to240 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
have printed in a book these long-detailed examinations of
verbal intricacies ; and yet we consider it important both that
writers should be required to be precise, and that readers should
be taught to be critical, so as not to be misled by the reputation
of the author. Therefore, let us resume our study.


























&quot; of hunger, and the incoming message
&quot;
(motion)




move something or other. But if you have no food at the
time it is unable to go out and move your muscles, so as to




thing for it to do ; it must, therefore, do something, and








&quot; to the fact that you are hungry
&quot;
(ambiguous).
&quot; That is what we call having an appetite, that is to say, the
concomitant states of the mind and body in which we are more
particularly ready to reply to certain suggestions from without.
These are really states which again are produced in these grey




&quot; which are to come in, and the motions
which are to follow, so that, in fact, the state of having an
appetite means the state of being attentive to those connections
whereby, when a piece of food is put into your mouth, you will
naturally proceed to masticate and to swallow it.&quot;
Here again it seems to us that there is a want of logical




is to denote a mechanical state and a subjective state, and
that these states are always concomitant. It is admitted
that this state is produced, and it is admitted that certain
actions result from this state. We will ask, firstly, what pro
duces the state. The physical state is produced by the giving
off of Matter and Motion from the body, so that there is a lack
of material in the mechanical organism to continue its action.
This implies a certain physical or mechanical change in the
organism. Since this results in hunger and thirst, the actingCLIFFORD ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 241
cause of the mechanical state of hunger and thirst is a mecha
nical one, and the sensations of hunger and thirst are merely
concomitants. This mechanical state of hunger and thirst pro
duces actions. It is argued that the lack of incident forces on
the coats of the stomach or elsewhere, or perhaps a change or
falling off in the motions from the stomach or elsewhere, pro
duces a change in the actions of some of the mechanically con
stituted molecules and structural arrangements of the mechanism
called the brain, and results in the process of going to the cupboard
to get a cake and some wine. The question is, has the feeling
of hunger and thirst anything to do with this result ? or would
it have taken place had there been no such feeling ? &quot;We under
stand it to be argued that the feeling is not a factor in the
series of events, but is only a concomitant. The whole expla
nation is supposed to rest with the mechanical process. It is
right that we should clearly understand the position, but it is
right also that we should ask for the whole series of changes to
be given to us in mechanical terms
; and when physiological
science is sufficiently advanced, we shall even demand that the
series of changes shall be represented by means of diagrams
and models.
Next Professor Clifford deals with the emotional state, and
shows the transformation of sensation into action, which we take
to be the transformation of the subjective into the objective.
(See pages 97 and 98 down to the second sentence of the second
paragraph.)
Kesuming at p. 102, we come upon the question of proposi
tions and their physical counterparts. What is the mechanical
nature of a proposition ? Is it a molecule of the brain, or two
molecules connected together 1 or is it a motion of two mole
cules, or what is it ? and how are two propositions compared by
means of a mechanical process? Are some sets of molecules
brought from different parts of the brain to a common centre,
to be there adjusted in relation to each other? Professor
Clifford thinks there is every reason to suppose that propo
sitions are packed somewhere in the cerebral hemispheres. He
thinks that the formation of a proposition is effected by a
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physical connection between different parts of the sheet of grey
matter which lies just inside the skull.
In this theory we have a duplex difficulty a difficulty which
presents itself both from the subjective side and from the
mechanical side. We ask how propositions are packed away 1
How a memory of any fact is mechanically effected? What is
the mechanical description of a logical process of classification,
of generalisation, of deduction ?
And again, on the other side, what is the nature of the brain
of the infant with its mass of grey matter, and its emptiness
of propositions ? Are the molecules of the brain like empty
boxes ready to be filled, and what is the nature of the
mechanical change as the propositions are formed and as they
become more general ? Professor Clifford calls it packing, and
packing, and still closer packing, a term we very well under
stand in its usual sense, but of which we do not see the appli
cation in the present instance. We pack a number of simple
propositions into general ones, and we pack general propositions
into words, and so on. Does Professor Clifford mean that mole
cules of grey matter are packed into bundles, or that pairs of
them get so packed, and are then compressed into a smaller
size like trusses of hay under a hydraulic press, or what does
he mean ?
Evidently Professor Clifford thinks he has succeeded. He
says
&quot; We have so far then successfully built up out of one
elementary process
&quot;
(ice suppose this means the concomitancy of
a nerve motion wiih a nerve shock or unit offeeling)
&quot; the corre
spondence of action to sensation
; we have got as far as what
takes place in the mind
&quot;
(subjective)








rearranges them and produces new ones out of them. We first
of all combined
&quot;
(subjective or mechanical ?)
&quot; a number of very
simple messages&quot; (motions) &quot;coming along&quot; (mechanical)
&quot;the
nerves&quot; (mechanical) &quot;by means of a lump of grey matter&quot;
(mechanical),
&quot; we then combined a number of outgoing messages




&quot; then we combined these
together by means of propositions
&quot;
(subjective),
&quot; so that any
number of complicated sensations
&quot;





appropriate&quot; (ambiguous) &quot;propositions&quot; (subjective),
&quot;and by
being coupled with them
&quot;
(mechanical)




we have combined together a great number of propositions
&quot;
(subjective) &quot;into a general conception
&quot;
(subjective) &quot;which is








it, and that is what makes for us a picture
&quot;
(a very curious
term, evidently highly figurative)
&quot; of the universe, which is the
one&quot; (i.e., the picture!)
&quot;we have in our minds&quot; (subjective)
&quot; from day to day
&quot;
( i.e., continuously query, fixed or change
able ?) &quot;although it is not the one
&quot;
(i.e., the picture) &quot;which
we immediately
see&quot; (i.e., in our minds) &quot;when we get parti
cular perceptions
&quot;
(subjective or motions ?)
There is one last achievement of the mechanical explana
tion, viz., choice.
Eead the paragraph beginning &quot;But there is one
class,&quot; &c.,
and pass on to the next.
&quot; Now let us see what it is that determines the strength of





(i.e., to the brain and the mind),
&quot; and there is time to deliberate
&quot;
(ambiguous)








&quot; of the brain
&quot;
(mechanical)




&quot; and go out to all parts of the cerebral
hemisphere&quot; (a mechanical arrangement),
&quot;and there they are
compared together.&quot; (How are motions compared together?
We never heard of a machine comparing the motions that arise
in it from the introduction of different substances or from
applied forces.)
&quot;
So, then, if two sensations&quot; (motions or sub
jective?}
&quot;come in&quot; (to the brain) &quot;together, these messages&quot;
(motions)




parts of the cerebral hemisphere, and they will also be compared
together.&quot; (Here we have &quot;compared&quot; again.) _ &quot;But that244 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
one
&quot;
(i.e., that motion or subjective sensation)
&quot; which has the
strongest connection
&quot;
(mechanically read, this must mean either
the greatest harmony of motion, or the toughest or thickest thread
or fibre connecting molecules or aggregates of molecules)
&quot;with
the memories&quot; (evidently we were wrong when we took the
mechanical interpretation, unless we can render memories into
mechanical terms)
&quot; of past sensations
&quot;
(here evidently the
physical result of some motions)
&quot;




if that is all that takes place, if only the
cerebral hemispheres themselves are consulted
&quot;
(a strange neio
term, partaking of intelligence)
&quot; will have the strongest effect
&quot;
(notice not in directing, but miscellaneously)
&quot;
upon the muscles,




&quot; of outgoing messages
&quot;
(motions, but whence the con
nection of the choice thus mechanically explained in the cerebral
hemispheres, and the direction of the muscular motions ?)
There is an undoubted and intimate connection between cere
bral action and mental action, and the above explanations of the
order of sequences is so intermixed by the indiscriminate use of
objective and subjective terms that we may feel ourselves forced
to adopt a theory of concomitance or double aspect ; but as a
branch of the study of the unification of knowledge, where
each fact and event is viewed as the result of a previous set
of circumstances, forming altogether one dependent chain of
sequences, it is necessary to know whether the facts and events
of Biology, including mental action, are continuous with that
chain of physical sequences which lead us up to its threshold :
whether organic processes, although accompanied by subjec
tivity, are themselves capable of mechanical explanation from
first to last, the subjective being merely their obverse aspect,
and never interfering from beginning to end in the chain of
biological events. We need to know, supposing this important
aspect of things be left out of the reckoning altogether, if the
course of the history of a physical organism or of a species
would have been just the same without it as it actually has
been with it. If so, we shall be satisfied that we understand the
proposed unification, although we shall find in the next chapter
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when, in addition, we take into account the historical fact
of the appearance of the subjective amongst the results of this
physical process, we feel that the limitations of our factors are
transcended. We are obliged to recognise amongst our pre
ceding factors more than we supposed, or else to recognise an
interfering cause. But if the burthen of explanation is thrown
upon the phj
rsical factors only, then the double-aspect theory is
seen to be really beside the question ; it does not fall within
the scope of our deductive interpretation at all. We trace the
sequence of events, and if they are all capable of mechanical
explanation, it is not to the point that a certain range of the
events under our consideration has another aspect. The inter
dependence and continuity of our chain of sequence is wholly
complete and independent of this concomitant, and perfect
without it. The subjective aspect comes in, we know not how,
we know not why, at a certain stage, and at a certain stage it
disappears ; but whatever the intensity of the experienced
pleasure and pain, whatever the desires, the sorrows, the joys
included in the immense varieties of the subjective aspect, they
do not interfere with the exact mechanical course of the machines
we call animals and plants.
(&.) Dr. Bain on the Double-Aspect Theory*
Dr. Bain s book may be read as a work complete in itself, or
in connection with some theory of the cosmos. Katurally we
read it in connection with Spencer s theory of the unification of
knowledge. It is valuable to us in relation to our present study
of the double-aspect theory, which is the one held by Dr. Bain.
Mind, according to him, forms the subjective aspect of certain
physical phenomena; the history of mind details the subjec
tive aspect of a certain series of physical events. Apparently
these physical events are part of the cosmical series, which, at a
certain stage, assume a subjective aspect, a fact which does not
in the least interfere with the onward course of the physical
events. The whole series of sequences might, through the
* &quot; Mind and Body. The Theories of their Relation.&quot; By Alexander
Bain, LL.D. London : C. Kegan Paul & Co. 1878.246 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
period of double-aspectedness, remain purely physical, and be
all quite explicable simply as physical processes.
It is a satisfaction to meet with a theory so plainly stated.
Dr. Bain does not say that these physical processes are due to
the laws of Matter and Motion, or ultimately of Force, and
then turn round and say that these are unknowable factors, yet
the explanation nevertheless stands good. He maintains the
physical explanation in a plain, straightforward way, and we
are able to deal intelligibly with it. Dr. Bain does not connect
the study with any cosmical scheme ; nor does he even connect
it with any theory of heredity and propagation. He does not
advance any hypothesis of Biology. We infer that he approves
some doctrine of development, although we nowhere detect that
he adopts Mr. Spencer s System of Evolution.
We cannot but believe that he establishes the concomitance
of nervous change and mental change. We also recognise the
fact that the actual study of this concomitance is, from the
nature of the case, very difficult and obscure, more particularly
as a study of individual events ; for the brain cannot be observed
in action, and he who observes the subjective cannot at the same
time observe the concomitant physical changes.
Yet there are individual facts and large general observations
which go to establish the theory of the concomitance of brain
and nerve action with mental events. But as to the question
whether the ruling cause of the double-aspected change be alto
gether physical, or whether (although in the present state of
our knowledge it is certainly inconceivable) feeling enters as an
interfering factor, observation does not show any result, con
sciousness does not reveal any sign ; it merely gives a prima
facie probability, and reasoning does not altogether make the
matter clear.
The two principal chapters claiming our study are Chapters
V. and VI. The former contains an account of the physical
organism and its changes, the subjective aspect of which is Mind;
and the latter contains an account of the double-aspect theory
in general.
Apparently&quot; Dr. Bain presents more modest claims for the
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within the limits of actual knowledge. He looks forward
hopefully to the extension of knowledge and of consequent light
in the future without aiming at the universalistic. The expla
nations he recognises are those which are justified by actual
experience (pp. 127-129). It is good that we can reduce the
elements of experience in a last result, if not to one, at least to
two. These two are the mental series and the physical series,
and
&quot; it remains to consider the expression most suited to this
union of the two distinct and mutually irresolvable natures.&quot;
Dr. Bain says that the old theory of the independence of the
mind, as taught by Aristotle and Aquinas, is now out of date,
and that the modified opinion of modern times can no longer
be held.
&quot; It is now often said that the mind and body act
upon each other ; that neither is allowed, so to speak, to pursue
its course alone; there is a constant interference, a mutual
influence, between the two.&quot;
Dr. Bain thinks &quot;we have every reason for believing that
there is, in company with all our mental processes, an unbroken
material succession&quot; (i.e., uninfluenced by any mental aspect or
feeling).




the outgoing responses in action, the mental succession is not




&quot; While we go the round of the mental
circle of sensation, emotion, and thought, there is an unbroken
circle of thought, there is an unbroken physical circle of effects
&quot;
(i.e., part of the general physical sequences of the cosmos).
&quot; It
would be incompatible with everything we know of the cerebral
action to suppose that the physical chain ends abruptly in a
physical void, occupied by an immaterial substance, which
immaterial substance, after entering alone, imparts its results
to the other edge of the physical break, and determines the
active response two shores of the material with an intervening
ocean of the immaterial. There is, in fact, no rupture of nervous
continuity. The only tenable supposition is that mental and
physical proceed together, as undivided twins.&quot; (Here we have
an ambiguity ; it is better to say that the chain of events is phy
sical, having a subjective aspect.)
&quot; When, therefore, we speak
of a mental cause, a mental agency, we have always a two-sided248 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
cause ; the effect produced is not the effect of mind alone, but
of mind in company with body.&quot;
Here we find that Dr. Bain endeavours to unify an already
accepted ultimate duality by means of word-compounds. After
insisting upon the unbroken chain of physical sequences, from
incident forces upon an organism to the outgoing actions, he
speaks of mental causes and mental agencies as a two-sided cause.
Now a cause, we take it, is that which produces change. A
mental cause, if there is such a thing, is that which produces
change or effect, according to its properties under given con
ditions, for we are only able to understand and speak of
causes and effects according as we understand these properties
and conditions. Therefore, when we speak of a mental cause
producing effects, we must ask what are its properties? The
properties are evidently not those of mind alone, but of mind
in company with body. Are we also to suppose that the effect
produced is not of body alone, but of mind in company with it?
If so, the purely physical theory is abandoned. Or are we to
suppose that what Dr. Bain means is that a certain physical
state has a mental aspect, and this physical state is the cause
of other physical states which also have their mental aspects ?
The produced mental aspect is not the effect of the precedent
mental aspect, but is the mental aspect produced by a physical




is one of those figures of speech
which are the crutches of metaphysics, and enable halting
theories to make progress. We find the same difficulty in real








is a mode of naming a particular set of known
agencies, which, acting together with another set of known
agencies, produces certain changes. The study of them gives
us knowledge of their uniform relations. Thus the term cause
is a general term or term of totality, connoting such sets of
circumstances. That which acts is nothing without that which




there are, in fact, no plural
&quot;
causes,&quot; except as indicating the
interactions just referred to. There is of course no abstractDR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY.
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&quot;
cause,&quot; and no objectivised abstraction which is to be recog
nised under that name. A
&quot; two-sided cause,&quot; taken figuratively,
can only mean that of certain sets of active properties producing
effects, some of the active properties are capable of separate
classification, but they are co-operative in producing the result.
Therefore we take it that when we speak of a mental cause or
mental agency, we speak of a set of active properties which
may partly be classified as mental and partly as physical. In
what respect the former differ from the latter we do not know,
nor whether they are subjective, but Dr. Bain says that the
effect produced is not the sole product of either class, but the
result is the effect of their co-operative action. This is some
thing more than the double aspect of a physical chain of events,
and is not in harmony with the preceding passage maintaining
the unbroken chain of physical sequence. But Dr. Bain does
say that mind is a cause ; the effect produced is not
&quot; the effect
of mind alone, but of mind in company with body.&quot; JSTow the
effect produced is a physical change, i.e., a change in the brain
substance, nerves, muscles, &c., of the organism. Dr. Bain
says that this is partly produced by the mind and partly pro
duced by the physical cause. But he cannot mean that, for he
holds that the physical series of events has been unbroken
and uninfluenced. Does he, then, mean that the changed
mental aspect has been produced by the incident mental
aspect ? But this cannot be true, because the changed mental
aspect is the mental aspect of a physical change, which change
has been produced by a precedent physical state ; therefore
this state is the cause of the changed mental state. Accord
ingly Dr. Bain cannot be right in speaking of a mental state as
a cause of an effect. The cause of any change in the brain and
nervous system is a preceding physical state, and the mental
change is the accompaniment or subjective aspect of that
physical change a change with which it has had nothing to
do. And, indeed, Dr. Bain immediately reverts to his position
:
It is, after all, body acting upon body.
&quot; But even after that
statement he considers that
&quot;
mind-body giving birth to mind-
body&quot; is &quot;a much more intelligible position.&quot; We think the
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word which resolves all mysteries by means of a hyphen, but in
a proposition which discloses the sequences of events with single
intelligible words for its terms. It would appear as if philo
sophers were incapable of stating their doctrines without resort
ing alternately to figures of speech, untranslatable abstractions,
capital letters, and hyphens. The difficulty arises in the histo
rical fact of the precedence in order of development of the
physical, unless, indeed, the subjective be reckoned amongst the
initial causes, and is admitted as a factor.
Returning to Dr. Bain s exposition, is it not sufficient to end
here, at this assertion of the continuity and independence of
physical changes, and of mind as the subjective aspect of the
changes in a physical organism
? Apparently not, for Dr. Bain
proceeds to discuss their relation. But in the succeeding por
tion of the chapter it seems to us that Dr. Bain is fighting
with extinct Satans ; he is attempting to deal with difficulties
that do not arise after we have rendered all mental changes
into a subjective aspect of certain independent physical changes.
He says a mental fact is the subjective aspect of those classes
of physical facts which have a subjective aspect (p. 133).
Then he goes on to speak of the union of mind and matter,
which can mean nothing else than the question why certain
classes of physical changes should have a subjective aspect con
joined with them
; yet he speaks of the mind as if it were
something, and says, p. 136
&quot;This, then, it appears to me, is the only real difficulty
of the physical and mental relationship. There is an alliance
with matter, with the object, or extended world
; but the thing
allied, the mind proper, has itself no extension, and cannot be
joined in local union.&quot;
Here Dr. Bain speaks of
&quot; the mind
&quot; when there is no
existence which can be called mind, except the subjective
aspect of the changes of the brain and organism. He speaks
of
&quot; the mind proper.&quot; He speaks of it as a thing or
entity, and of its being allied to matter, just like any ordi
nary thinker. Indeed, most philosophic works exhibit such
instances of what Mr. Darwin calls &quot;survivals.&quot; Dr. Bain con
cludes that
&quot; the only adequate expression is a CHANGE OFDR. BAIN ON THE DOUBLE-ASPECT THEORY. 251
STATE : a change from the state of the extended cognition to
a state of unextended cognition.&quot; What is the meaning of an
extended cognition ? Perhaps Dr. Bain means a change from
the cognition of the extended to a cognition of the unextended.
But the question arises, what is a cognition 1 and what is the
meaning of a cognition changing its state ? Does a cognition
remain the same cognition when a cognition of the subjective
aspect as of the objective aspect of any fact? The word &quot;un
extended
&quot;
is a negative word
; it has no positive meaning,
and declares that a certain substantive or noun is not amicable








to the word &quot;cognition.&quot; Again, if we are to speak of &quot;the
unextended,&quot; we have an objectivised abstraction apparently
referring to some entity which has no existence. Dr. Bain
seems to have adopted this method of expressing himself, not
from pursuing the paths of science, but from sitting at the feet
of theologians
:
&quot; By various theologians heaven has been spoken of as not a
place, but a state ; and this is the only phrase that I can find
suitable to describe the vast, though familiar and easy, transi
tion from the material or extended to the immaterial or un
extended side of our being.&quot;
We desire to know what it is which undergoes transition,
and what is meant by the process called transition. If we are
speaking of the brain and nervous system, it changes its state
constantly, but only to other states of the brain and nervous
system. It never changes its state by becoming immaterial
and unextended. There is never any transition from the one
condition to the other. The only transition is that relating to
the double-aspect theory, where the passage is from one point
of view to another, from one kind of language to another, from
a set of objective terms to a set of subjective terms or vice
versa. There is certainly no change of state implying the
transition of the material and extended into the immaterial and
unextended, or vice versa.
The question is certainly interesting
: How came the material
and extended under certain laws of its own to have a subjective-52 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
aspect ? This is a natural question to ask, but it meets with no
elucidation from Dr. Bain s treatment of the subject. He may
not indeed admit that the material was prior to the subjective,
or he may not consider that the problem is a historical one
at all.
The last paragraph of this chapter is also mystical
:
&quot;The only mode of union&quot;
(i.e., of Mind and Matter)
&quot;is
the union of close succession
&quot;
(is close succession union ?)
&quot; in
time.&quot; (Time is not anything but succession, yet it is often thus
used, as if it were an entity containing other entities.)
Or again
&quot; The only mode of union that is not contradictory is the
union of ... position in a continued thread of conscious life.&quot;
That is to say, the only mode of union between Mind and
Matter is not one that we can explain, but one of which we are
merely conscious. So that if this paragraph was really intended
to convey any definite explanation, it has failed.
&quot; We are entitled to say that the same being is, by alternate
fits, object and subject, under extended and unextended circum
stances.&quot;
This, again, is not explaining a mode of union nor a change
of state ; it is merely stating an inexplicable mystery.
&quot; And that, without the extended consciousness, the unex
tended would not arise.&quot;
We know nothing of &quot;extended&quot; or &quot;unextended&quot; con
sciousness. We have a consciousness of our limbs and body,
and we may say that we have so many cubic feet of consciousness
as we may each individually displace in a vessel of water
; but
we do not see that this method of measuring consciousness throws
any light upon the nature of the union between the physical
body so measured (which would measure just the same if the
body remained in it, and no consciousness was left) and the con
sciousness which formed the subjective side of it. Xor do we
see how the unextended consciousness can
&quot; arise
&quot; out of the
extended consciousness.
Let us next examine Chapter V. Our object will be to see
whether the operations of the intellect can be explained by
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intellect are composed of three powers or three facts (p. 83)
:
&quot;(i.) Discrimination, the sense, feeling, or consciousness of dif
ference ; (2.) Similarity, the sense, feeling, or consciousness of
agreement; and (3.) Retentiveness, or the power of memory or
acquisition. These three functions, however much they are
mingled, and inseparably mingled, in our mental operations, are
yet totally distinct properties, and each the groundwork of a
different superstructure. As an ultimate analysis of the mental
powers, their number cannot be increased nor diminished : fewer
would not explain the facts, more are unnecessary. They are
the intellect, the whole intellect, and nothing but the intellect.&quot;
Dr. Bain next goes on to show how Discrimination is the
foundation of all knowledge, and then considers the physical
embodiment of that fact. This is found to consist, firstly, in
the particular organ and nerves employed, and secondly in the
degree of energy of the motion. So far, all that Dr. Bain
establishes is the concomitance of consciousness with nervous
structure and nervous change, and we await the further deve
lopment of our study. He says,
&quot; These two circumstances
namely, the separate consciousness of separate nerves and the
changing intensity of the currents we may regard as the
primitive mode of diversifying the consciousness; but it is in the
countless combinations of these simple elements that AVB are to
seek for the physical concomitants of our ever-varying conscious
ness. The union of different stimulations in different fibres
and in different degrees would unavoidably give birth to a
complex and modified consciousness.&quot;
The second power is that of Eecognition, the sense of simi
larity or agreement, and implies
&quot;a great power of reproducing
our past experience and acquisitions, an extension of the
resources of memory.&quot; We first remark that this sense of simi
larity must be dependent upon memory. Dr. Bain has been
arguing upon the principle, &quot;No change, no cognition; no sense
of difference, no knowledge.&quot; He has been considering the
changes of nervous structure, and the changes of intensities of
motions therein, as causing or being changes of consciousness.
Now he is apparently arguing that continuity of state or simi
larity of the continuing current is also a knowledge ; which254 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
statement is not consistent with the first. But we find that this
sense of identity or agreement really means the identity or simi
larity of a motion in a nervous structure with an antecedent
motion. It is an identification with a remembered one, and in
this respect the background of memory is common both to the
sense of Discrimination and the sense of Agreement. What
is the nature of the process of the obliteration of impressions ?
How is it possible to forget ? Indeed, it is as important a
problem to solve how is forgetting possible as to solve how is
memory possible.
The next remark we have to make is to the effect that,
whereas Dr. Bain endeavours to assign a physical basis for the
sense of Discrimination, he omits altogether any attempt at
assigning a physical basis for the sense of Agreement. How
ever, it appears that he omits this designedly, finding, in fact,
that his study forces him to rest his ultimate explanation
on that of the
&quot;
remaining intellectual function, Eetentiveness,
or memory. This explanation would make all the rest easy
enough.&quot;
The exposition of Memory is commenced on p. 89, and we
find a difficulty at the outset in the statement that Eetention is
the power of continuing in the mind impressions, &c., and of
recalling them at after:times by purely mental forces. How
ever, we pass this difficulty by to get at the physical explana
tion, and we find that the renewed feeling occupies the very
same parts as the original feeling and in the same manner,
not any other parts, nor in any other manner that can be
conceived.
Dr. Bain illustrates this, not by any memory of figures or
abstract laws, but by recollections of sound, sight, taste, &c.
He supposes the case of a clapper striking a bell and producing
certain vibrations of the air, which impinge upon the ear, and
are transmitted by means of motions of the nerve substance to
some nervous centre in the structure of the brain. The motion
in this particular system of nerves with the connected brain
centre as well as its intensity has, of course, a mental counter
part in our consciousness. The first question is, what becomes
of the motion
1
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dies away till it ceases altogether. Dr. Bain seems to argue that
the motion does not so die away, but goes on for ever in the
mechanism of the brain and nervous system, and this consti
tutes memory
:
&quot; If we suppose the sound of a bell striking the ear and then
ceasing, there is a certain continuing impression of a feebler
kind, the idea or memory of the note of the bell, it would
take some very good reason to deter us from the obvious
inference that the continuing impression is the persisting (al
though reduced) nerve currents aroused by the original shock.&quot;
And again,
&quot; If that be so with ideas, with ideas surviving their
originals, the same is likely to be the case with ideas resuscitated
from the past the remembrance of a former sound of the bell.&quot;
The case so far stands thus : The sound of a bell has caused a
persistent motion of, say, a small fibre between two cells of the
grey matter of the brain, which either goes on for ever or comes
wholly to a state of rest. If it comes wholly to a state of rest,
the memory of that sound perishes ; but putting aside the diffi
culty of imagining a perpetual continuance of this motion, we will
suppose it persistent, constituting a standing memory ; then we
have to suppose the recurrence of a similar sound. What is the
physical explanation of the identification of the present sound
with the past one 1 Of course, the nervous and cerebral changes
are identical, and so are the physical changes of the bell itself ;
the whole process is identical from first to last, yet the bell has
no memory or sense of agreement or difference, while the conscious
organism has. Even if the bell were conscious, it would have
no memory. Consciousness would come and go in accordance
with the incidence and intensity of shocks, but there would be
no memory of them. Wherein lies thec ause of the retention of
the motion by some particular nervous matter, or wherein lies
the physical explanation of a resuscitation of memories ?
Dr. Bain also introduces the doctrine that the consciousness
produced by intense motions, i.e., energetic motions of a nervous
system, may be reproduced in a reduced form, or represented by
feebler motions in some nervous connections in the brain. We
should like to know what warrant he has for this doctrine from
the physical sciences.256 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
But again, Dr. Bain speaks of memory as
&quot; revived currents
of the brain,&quot; as if. the sound of the bell had produced, not a
continuing movement, but a change of structure capable of re
producing the memory when put in motion again. But whether
this structure is capable of destruction or reconstruction by some
other incident force or not, Dr. Bain does not say.
This, however, seems to be all preliminary.
&quot; And now, as to the mechanism of Ketention.
&quot; For every act of memory, every exercise of bodily aptitude,
every habit, recollection, train of ideas, there is a specific group
ing or co-ordination of sensations and movements, by virtue of
specific growths in the cell functions.&quot;
The proof of this proposition seems to be its general proba
bility
:
First, From the fact of the connection between the brain and
nervous system, on the one hand, and memory, bodily aptitude,
&c., on the other, as well as the concomitant complication of
the two.
Second, From the fact of reflex action in simple cases, im
plying reflex action of a complicated nature in more complicated
cases.
Third, From the known effects of diseased brain or nerve
upon the memory.
Fourth, From the limit of acquisition corresponding to the
limit of brain and nerve substance.
It is not quite certain whether pages 94 and 95 are addi
tional reasons, or come under the fourth heading. A great deal
of the matter contained in them seems to refer to subjective ex
periences, which do not imply any physical counterpart. What,
for instance, is the physical counterpart of the suffix
&quot;
ness,&quot; by
which thirteen hundred adjectives are connected with abstract
nouns ? Again, how is the
&quot;
great principle of the will
&quot;
represented mechanically, and shown to be by its nature self-
correcting 1
However, so far we have made no progress beyond the fact
of the intimate correlation of the mind with nervous and cerebral
structure and change. What we want to ascertain is the actual
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Dr. Bain next proceeds to a comparison of the number of
mental acquisitions with the number of nervous elements in
the brain. This is interesting and curious, but it does not touch
the main question. It is all very well for Dr. Bain to say
that
&quot;
every special acquirement is the re-compounding of the
elementary groupings above sketched. A science, for example,
such as arithmetic, is a vast aggregate of new, sensible group
ings ; the elements being our conceptions of number gained
from numbered things, the ten ciphers, and their union in the
decimal system,&quot; &c. If he could describe to us the specific
changes in the brain prodiiced by learning the multiplication
table, this little bit of solid information would be far more use
ful than so much conjecture. Moreover, like most philosophers
who deal with the subject, he fails in consistency of language.




? or is it made up of motions of nerves and cell
junctions ? and how do these new growths or structural changes
and increments rule all the processes treated of in continuance
by Dr. Bain ?
After this comparison between the number of acquisitions
and the number of nervous elements in the brain Dr. Bain
proceeds to the study of structure ; and this portion is evidently
of higher importance than the other. The essence of Dr. Bain s
theory is connection and modes of connection. The molecules
of grey matter and the ganglions and nerve junctions are after
all only centres of force, varying according to size and state of
exhaustion. They are merely centres of energy, furnaces and
boilers, springs, galvanic batteries, or what not; and the actions
to which they give rise are due simply to the channels by which
incident motions enter, and the channels by which liberated
motions pass out.
The explanation of the system of nervous connection is given
on pages no to 116, after which Dr. Bain says
&quot;
Having thus considered how to provide for every new
mental connection demanded for our progressive acquirements
a special nervous track for that connection, the remaining point
is to consider by what means the connections are permanently
fixed in the several tracks. That is, to assign the physical
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bond underlying memory, recollection, or the retentive power
of the mind.&quot;
Dr. Bain s explanation so far amounts to this : he accepts
the fact of a child being born, without inquiry as to the causes
of its production and constitution. Nevertheless, he seems
in some places to refer to the question as to the origin of
nerves and the causes of a nervous system, and as to the de
velopment of the nervous and cerebral mechanism simply as a
mechanism, and not only to give an explanation of it as it is,
but also to show why it must have been so. However, he does
not state what he aims at distinctly, and we are left in a state
of doubt. The general impression he produces is that he is
explaining not merely an actual existence, but also the origin of
that existence (i.e., the brain and nervous system) ; but since he
does not treat this question thoroughly, he does not do it well.
Moreover, seeing this is really necessary for the explanation of
the organism as it is, he only presents us with a crude, a very
crude mass of general considerations, lacking scientific order
and precision.
In the main, Dr. Bain represents the nervous system as a
system of wires for the conveyance of motion to centres of
energy, and the giving off of motions from these centres of
energy to other wires. And since all incoming motions, or
some of them, set up new connections or new wires, which
grow into every wire they cross, thus forming new cell junc
tions, and since also each new wire produced by incoming
motions is perhaps duplicated by an outgoing one, there arises
at last a very complicated system, which is continually receiving
motion from the external world, and imparting motion in
return to the external world. In accordance with the nature
of the incident energies will be their far-ramifying mechanical
results in the system of connections and forces; and as the
centres of energy may be fully charged or otherwise, so will be
the effect along the outgoing wires, and the result in muscular
action.
It is all a matter of nerve currents and their connections,
together with any extra impetus arising from the storage of
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structure of the nervous substance for different feelings or dif
ferent ideas ; it is merely a matter of how the centres branch
off in different directions.
There is just sufficient show of warrant in the facts to lend
some plausibility to this explanation, and Dr. Bain himself
merely advances the view as &quot;hypothetical;&quot; but how far off
from a real explanation is it after all ! So far as we recognise
it to be true, it only accounts for the simpler reflex actions ;
all beyond is surmise, and the hypothesis, while wholly fail
ing to account for feeling and consciousness, does little to
explain human action, and falls short of a physical explana
tion of memory, of reasoning, of the prudent regulation of
action.
Dr. Bain has been at some trouble to explain memory as an
alteration of the structure and redirection of the nervous cur
rents in the brain. This is connected with habit and explains
motive. It also explains perhaps the slow process of learning
a language. But how does he explain rapid and enormous
memory of incident, such as will enable a man in coming home
from a theatrical performance to give an account to a friend of
all the incidents of a party going to the play how they dined,
what they ate and drank, what they talked about, what they
did, how they got ready, the occurrences during the drive and
on the arrival at the theatre, the auditorium, the people, the
overture, and then the wonderful combinations and successions
of sights, sounds, language, expressions, costumes, gesture, music,
and the varied incidents that crowd up the next two or three
hours 1 Yet a person with a good memory can give a wonder
fully long and correct account of such an evening.
We cannot but remark that Dr. Bain s argument winds up
very imperfectly, for though he begins by saying that the phy
sical explanation of the processes of Discrimination and Iden
tification depends, after all, upon the physical explanation of
memory, still, when that explanation has (in a manner) been
made, he does not return to the processes of Discrimination and
Identification to show how comparisons of present and past
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subjective class, and the problem is to give it a physical ana
logue. Any way, there is a want of completeness in the argu
ment owing to this omission.
Given the proposition that the facts of Biology are all expli
cable as interrelations of aggregates of the chemical elements
with environment, and given the proposition that Feeling and
Consciousness are but the subjective aspect of the physical pro
cesses of Biology, without in any way entering into or expressing
these processes, which are entirely independent of subjectivity,
and constitute in themselves an unbroken chain of physical
causation, then two questions arise, or rather two lines of inves
tigation present themselves to the student :
The first refers to the concomitance of subjective mentality
with physical development, and gives rise to such questions as
the following
:
&quot;What is the weight and structure of an infant s brain, and
what mentality is represented by it 1
&quot;What structural or physical change is effected in the infant s
brain in learning to talk, and in learning the properties of the
objects in its environment 1
&quot;What structural or physical change is effected in the brain
in learning the alphabet and spelling, and in learning the
multiplication table? There are sixty-six propositions in the
latter; what sixty-six structural changes are effected in the brain
in connection with the oral and visual teaching of these propo
sitions ?
Again, How can we explain the physical analogue of the feel
ing of sympathy?
What is the physical explanation of Imagination? of Motive?
of Temptation ? of Indecision ? of Eemorse ? of Self-control,
Prudence, Reflection, Determination, Benevolence, or Intro
spection ?
Or again
: &quot;What is the cause and what is the result of the
lengthening of a nerve ? of the thickening of a nerve ? of two
nerves which cross each other uniting together ?
&quot;What is the cause and effect of a growth in or of the cell-
junction
?
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What is the physical description of that state of the nerves
which gives the sense of pain or of pleasure ?
What is the difference, described physically, between the
state of the nerves which give the sense of sight, the sense of
smell, and the sense of taste 1 Mere locality is not a sufficient
explanation ; it is not that we are conscious of a sensation in a
particular place; there must be some differentiation either in
the molecular construction of various sense organs or in the
motions taking place in them. The recipient structure must
be suitable for the incident energy.
We have already noted that Dr. Bain treats his subject in a
very imperfect manner, in that he deals with it too much by
itself, instead of treating it as part of a general science of
Biology. In his hands it is an isolated study. But it is
evident that the greater rules the less. He cannot treat of cere
bral structure and changes as complete in themselves. If he
has to consider nervous or cerebral change in connection with
memory, if he has to speak of growths in the cell-junctions or
ganglions of nerves, he has to consider the origin, causes, and
history of nerves and their changes in general. He has to
adopt a theory of Biology. Indeed, he may have to go further,
and find a theory of the cosmos before he is able to give an
explanation of even one of its details. And in this respect,
again, Dr. Bain s argument is deficient.
The second great consideration which presents itself to our
minds in relation to the theory under consideration refers to
Subjectivity as a cause of action. This the theory precludes.
It is held impossible to conceive of Feeling acting upon
matter and causing the motion of matter. We know that the
action of matter in motion upon other matter causes motion.
Physical science teaches us in the domain of Dynamics, Physics,
Chemistry, and the like, how aggregates of matter and motion
affect each other
; and the highest sciences teach us the conser
vation of energy and the indestructibility of matter, and tell
us that no energy comes into existence to effect a change but
has had an anterior physical existence. Science teaches, in
fact, the unvarying totality of the quantity of energy or motion,
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motion is caused only by some mode of energy, but since Feel
ing is not a mode of energy, it cannot be a cause of muscular
motion.
But is this so 1 It seems to contradict our experience.
&quot;VVe
are apt to think that we select our viands from anticipation of
pleasure, and reject those which are offensive to our feelings.
Perhaps this is not a matter of feeling, but of motion and
structure of nervous system ; but still it seems to us that it is
the pleasure or the feeling of disgust which rules our action.
It would seem also that all our voluntary actions are thus
caused by the desire to secure feelings of pleasure and to avoid
painful ones. We are apt indeed to claim for Feeling a mono
poly of rule as regards our voluntary acts. We take all pre
cautions to avoid pain ; and as we act ourselves so we act
upon others. In our relations with them, we deal with them
in respect of anticipated pleasures, or the prospect of avoiding
discomfort or pain. In all descriptions of occurrences it is
seldom that we give a mere narration of events, but either in
speech or in emotional expression there is a large admixture of
the varying feelings of pleasure or pain.
Indeed, the principle
&quot; The greatest happiness for the greatest
number
&quot;
is a subjective rule. Happiness is the end and aim of
all philosophies and most religions, thus recognising a subjective
motive as the main spring of human actions.
The question thereupon arises, is there any mechanical, i.e.,
physical means of recognising feeling? It is impossible to
conceive of it. Nor can we build up a physical system, a
structure of nerves and brain, which, as mere recipients of
motion, collectors and reservoirs of motion or force, shall
explain to us the methods of memory, the process of com
parison, emotional changes, or the influence of rules of conduct,
as purely mechanical independently of the feelings ; and yet
we cannot conceive of feelings influencing action. Still we
cannot but recognise that the desire for present, and still more
extraordinary, the anticipation of future pleasures, and the
avoidance of present and future pain, are the ruling causes of
the whole of our voluntary actions the principal part of our
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tion of a &quot;two-sided cause,&quot; i.e., of subjective and physical as
co-equal factors, still we find that he is obliged to make all his
explanations in terms of physical arrangements and sequences,
the subjective being merely the concomitant of the physical,
and in no way entering into the processes as an agency having
a determining effect.CHAPTER V.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE &quot;PRINCIPLES OP BIOLOGY&quot; WITH
REGARD TO ITS PLACE IN MR. SPENCER S SYSTEM.
i. General Considerations.
To study a work individually, and to study it as part of a
larger scheme, obviously require different methods of treatment,
which may end in very different estimates of its real value.
The present examination is undertaken not with the view of
estimating it on its own merits, but with the object of ascer
taining the place of the
&quot;
Biology
&quot; in Mr. Spencer s great scheme
of philosophy. If, as we suppose, the main idea of this scheme
is the unification of knowledge, then the natural question to




fall in with the system
proposed for that object ? If Mr. Spencer had propounded one
distinct and intelligible method, our inquiry would have been
of a very simple character ; but, as the reader has already seen
in Chapter I., the methods proposed or suggested by Mr.
Spencer in the course of his works are numerous and confus
ing, if not indeed mutually destructive. To which of them





Probably to several. Let us therefore first distinguish between
those which are likely to aid us in our endeavour, and those
which are wholly inadmissible.
(a.) The Mystical Method Excluded.
In the first place, we may exclude all those methods which
are of a mystical character. If any terms are used the import
of which is not precise and definite, it is evident that any
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It is impossible to explain the known by the unknown. If
in the explanations of Biology the factors, or relatively general
and simple antecedents, of all biological change are known,
then explanations founded upon them are valid ; but if they
are not wholly and completely known, but are in some respects
unknown, then these explanations cannot but fail. How much
more so if the original factors are represented in our minds by
symbols standing for unknowables of which we are unable to
form any mental representation, while the very attempt to do
so only lands us in ultimate contradictions of thought.
(b.) The Metaphysical Method Excluded.
&quot;We are also justified in excluding from our consideration all
methods of a metaphysical character. We have seen in 6
of Chapter I. that these delusive methods are worked out by
means of ideal entities entities invented by the mind itself,
but having nothing to correspond with them in the actual
universe. For the most part they are objectivised abstractions.
These non-entities have taken too large a part in the history of
human thought ; but any one who would clearly study the
science of Biology must steadfastly repudiate the use of terms,
or all those senses of the terms he is obliged to employ, which
connote any such ideal factors.
(c.) The Psychological Method Excluded.
We have already pointed out that Mr. Spencer s psychological
methods do not harmonise with his main idea of unifying
knowledge by means of explanations of the sequences of the
cosmos. They form a class of methods altogether apart from
the main course of his constructive system.





are theories rather of knowledge than of the
unification of knowledge, and do not relate to the explanation of
historical sequences at all. In the second place, the Double-
Aspect theory also has been shown to be a theory of know
ledge rather than a theory of the unification of knowledge.
The explanations of the order of sequences are all on the physi-266 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
cal side feeling and consciousness being merely concomitants,
whose presence is altogether unexplained. These do nothing
they perform no part they are not even directly related. As
far as any share in the unification of knowledge is concerned
they may be thrown out of consideration altogether, for the
knowledge we wish to unify is but the subjective aspect of
certain physical arrangements of the brain, and its unification,
therefore, is but the subjective aspect of a complicated and
co-ordinated cerebral arrangement.
(d.) Feeling and Consciousness Excluded.
Feeling and Consciousness are so universally associated with
living things, that it seems strange to have to commence our
study of biological changes and developments by a strict disso
ciation of all Feeling and Consciousness from every part of our
inquiry.
&quot;We have first of all, in what laborious and patient
manner we may, to unlearn our supposed knowledge of the
influence exerted by Feeling upon muscular motions, and to
believe that these are only accompaniments and not causes
of biological change. We have to learn that all that takes
place in the human frame and in all other animal and vegetable
organisms is the operation of bodies under mechanical and
chemical laws, and that feeling and consciousness have no place
whatever in the process.
That this view is held by Mr. Spencer is clear from his com
bating the theory of Feeling as a factor in the structure of
organisms, as taught by Dr. Darwin and Lamarck. The passage
to which we refer occurs in 145-147 of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; vol. i.
At p. 404 Mr. Spencer quotes Dr. Darwin thus :
&quot; From their
first rudiment or primordium, to the termination of their lives,
all animals undergo perpetual transformations ; which are in
part produced by their own exertions, in consequence of their
desires and aversions, of their pleasures and their pains, or of
irritations, or of associations
; and many of these acquired forms
or properties are transmitted to their posterity.&quot; Mr. Spencer
hereupon remarks :
&quot; True though it is, as Dr. Darwin and
Lamarck contend, that desires, by leading to increased actionsFEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS EXCLUDED. 267
of motor organs, may induce further developments of such
organs ; and true as it probably is, that the modifications hence
arising, are transmissible to offspring ; yet there remains the un
answered question, Whence do these desires originate ? The
transference of the exciting power from the exterior to the in
terior, as described by Lamarck, begs the question. How comes
there a wish to perform an action not before performed
? ... To
assume that in the course of evolution there from time to time
arose new kinds of actions dictated by new desires, is simply to
remove the difficulty a step back.&quot;
We have here to remark that although the general tenor of
Mr. Spencer s criticism is in full accordance with his own philo
sophy, yet he seems to us to be inconsistent with it when he
admits in the beginning the truth of the fact that
&quot; desires
&quot; lead
to increased action of the motor organs, and thereby to increase
of structure. Is not this an admission of the factor of Feeling
into the evolution of structure at some stage, and does it not
involve the admission that Feeling has in more and more obscure
forms had an influence on the actions of organic matter from
the very first?
By this admission, and the concomitant repudiation of Feeling
as a factor at the beginning, Mr. Spencer lands himself in the
conclusion that Feeling is developed in some way from the
mechanical arrangements of Matter and Motion in those complex
organisations of colloids which we find in plants and animals,
and thereafter it becomes a factor in the further development of
those structures. If so, this is a department of Evolution that Mr.
Spencer has altogether overlooked, and it would thereby indicate
the insufficiency of the formulas and explanations which he
gives us an insufficiency which we already feel, and which, in
his admissions of the unknowableness of the principal terms of
those formulas and explanations, he seems himself to acknow
ledge, notwithstanding the precise and all-inclusive claims he
sometimes makes for his explanations.
However, we have to take Mr. Spencer s words as we find
them, and since he deliberately controverts the position of
Lamarck and Darwin as to the influence of Feeling and Con
sciousness on biological development and the differentiation of268 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
species, \ve must hold that our inquiry is purely one of physical
science, free from any such influences. For in any case he
implies the origin of Feeling from the original relations of an
aggregate of chemical molecules with its environment. And as





to describe the genesis, structure, and functions of all organ
isms, both as individuals and as races, in the terms of Mechan
ics. Witness his declaration
(&quot;Biology,&quot; voL i. p. 444), where
lie says
:
&quot; This survival of the fittest, which I have here sought to
express in mechanical terms, is that which Mr. Darwin has
called natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races
in the struggle for life.
J &quot;
And in the same manner, in his account of morphological
and physiological development in Vol. II., Mr. Spencer en
deavours to give a mechanical interpretation to all the occur
rences in animal and vegetable life.
It is worthy of notice that in Mr. Spencer s actual dealing
with the origin and development of the changes included in
biological science, he treats them not as subjects beyond our
understanding, but as events occurring in the mutual relations
of the chemical elements as we know them under the influence
of physical environments and the conditions of heat and cold,
gravitation and light, and their recurrences. He explains all
biological development in the physical language of molar and
molecular motion, segregation, differentiations by incident forces,
equilibrations, and the like. Feeling and Consciousness do not
enter as factors into the process at all. Biologic changes are
treated of as events in a physical history, and the theory is that
all plants and all animals are merely organised aggregates pro
duced in the chain of physical events, and modified, propagated,
or destroyed according to the exigencies of physical conjunc
tures. It is held that Feeling and Consciousness have not been
factors in any structural organisation or development of function,
have not been the causes of any action, nor of any motion have
not, in fact, had the least influence upon any fact in biological
history. The whole series of events from the beginning to the
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whole history of a race is but the aggregate of a large number
of these individual series of physical events.
This view of the case is justified by some writers on the
ground of the Continuity of Motion, and it is in complete
accordance with
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
&quot; Can we suppose the
motions coming upon the body and received by the sensory
organs, and transmitted by them to the brain, to go off there,&quot;
it is asked,
&quot; into vacuity whatever you may call this vacuity,
whether &quot;Will, Consciousness, or Soul and to be thence trans
formed into return motions, which shall act upon the outer
world 1
&quot;
Upon the theory of the Conservation of Energy we
can suppose no such thing. If we believe in this doctrine, the
motions carried by the nerves to the ganglions or to the brain
must produce a physical result, which physical result must be
either change of structure in the nervous mechanism or a dis
charge of the motion in a return action through established
channels of nervous energy.
&quot;We can neither conceive of the
physical motion of the nerves ending in nothing nor of the
origination of motion in motor nerves out of nothing. Such
motion can only arise from an antecedent physical motion. If
there is any ending of motion without the production of other
motion, or if there is any commencement of motion without its
being produced by antecedent physical motion, there is an end
to the theory of the Conservation of Energy, or at any rate of
the Continuity of Motion. Therefore, since we cannot con
ceive of Feeling or Consciousness as Motion, neither Feeling
nor Consciousness can be factors in any chain of biological action.
They cannot be comprised in the circle of changes of motion.
They are not even part of the endless band included in the
Conservation of Energy, whose members are mutually conver
tible, viz., heat, molar motion, electricity, magnetism, gravita
tion, &c. Therefore they have to be left out of account in
considering the history of the origin and development of plants
and animals.
It may be asked what Mr. Spencer has to say about Feeling
and Consciousness as factors in biological development. The
reply is not easily found. Some passages of his works would seem
to imply that he regards them as mysteries, their place in Biology270 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
as unknowable, and their influence as incapable of appraisement.
In other places they are assigned a place as factors (see &quot;Psycho
logy,&quot; Part II., chap, ix.) At other times they are treated
as merely accompaniments of changes of physical states (see
&quot;Psychology,&quot; Part I., chap, vi.) In the first case, Philosophy
must be incomplete and incapable of completion. The second
case will be reserved for separate study. The third case is the
one actually countenanced by Mr. Spencer in his
&quot;
Principles
of Biology,&quot; and as it throws the burthen of explanation upon
the interrelations of physical factors, it is reserved for examina
tion in the succeeding sections of this chapter. In this view,
Feeling and Consciousness are regarded merely as the sub
jective aspects of physical events.
In the &quot;Psychology,&quot; when Mr. Spencer treats of the Sub
stance of Mind, he assigns something like a very simple form of
nervous shock as the ultimate unit of consciousness from the
integration of which in successively higher degrees of complexity
all the feelings, &c., arise and are accounted for. But upon
what does this integration and growing complexity and differen
tiation depend?
&quot; If each wave of molecular motion brought by a nerve-fibre
to a nerve-centre, has for its correlative a shock or pulse of
feeling, then we can comprehend how distinguishable differences
of feeling may arise from differences in the rates of recurrence
of the waves, and we can frame a general idea of the way in which,
by the arrival through other fibres, of waves recurring at other
rates, compound waves of molecular motion may be formed, and
give rise to units of compound feelings
: which process of com
pounding of waves and production of correspondingly-com
pounded feelings, we may imagine to be carried on without
limit, and to produce any amount of heterogeneity of feel
ings.&quot;
*
According to this reading, the burthen of explanation rests
with Physics. Upon this supposition, all biological changes
have to be explained in a physical manner, and if this can be
done, it is of no consequence to the unification of knowledge
that Consciousness somehow arose and became the accom-
*
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paniment or additional aspect of changes upon which it had no
influence whatever as a factor. For if it can indeed be shown
that without it organisms originated, continued, underwent
modification, propagated, separated into races, all as incidents in
an unbroken chain of physical sequences, the whole thing is com
plete, and it is but idle to inquire the place of the subjective
aspect, and to ask why certain of these motions are accompanied
by pleasures or by pains.
So we must clearly understand in the biological inquiry into
which we are about to enter, that Feeling and Consciousness
find no place, and as a matter of fact in Mr. Spencer s study
of the subject no place is assigned to them. We shall see that
the factors of Biology are certain of the so-called elements and
certain external physical conditions. The language used is that
of Physics namely, matter, motion, incident forces, aggregation,
equilibration, polarity, and so on. Our explanations of motives,
emotions, hunger, passion, memory, &c., will all have to be
effected by means of physical structure and function. One in
stance of the nature of this mode of treatment we have already
had when considering Dr. Bain s explanation of memory in
the preceding chapter. We shall find that we have not only
to consider the inquiry as relating to one long continuous indi
vidual, but to generation, reproduction, and the continuance of
species and races of individuals. We shall have boldly to grasp
the whole problem of Biology, including all the races of plants
and animals, and expound it as a physical history.
According to this explanation, a man does not eat because he
is hungry, nor drink because he is thirsty. He does not marry
and surround himself with a household for his pleasure and
comfort, for this would be introducing subjective causes for
physical events, which cannot be conceived, and contradicts the
theory of the Conservation of Energy. He does all these things
because of certain interrelations of the physical states and
structures of his nervous mechanism. The fear of pain, the
hope of pleasure as such, are excluded from the causes of human
actions. The subjective has no place in the chain of cosmical
events.
We wish to impress this upon the reader before entering272 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
upon the explanations of Biology. It may be regarded as an
incomplete or unfair statement of Mr. Spencer s views. But Mr.
Spencer s works contain many inconsistent theories. All the
critic can do is to consider each one of them in its turn, bring
it out into clear statement, and taking it as the real opinion
for the time being, subject it to a rigorous examination. We
have therefore to ask the student to free his mind from all
associations of Feeling or Consciousness in connection with
animals and plants, and to set out in his constructive task with




(e.) Simulations of Unification.
Before entering upon our studies of Mr. Spencer s actual ex
planations, it would be well to call the reader s attention to
the various
&quot; Simulations of Unification
&quot; in order to free the
scientific inquiry into the sequences of Biology from all mis
leading influences.
It will be remembered that Mr. Spencer s leading idea is the
deduction of all sequences as corollaries from some primordial
truth or truths. These primordial truths are variously given
as the Persistence of Force, or as the laws of the relations of
Matter and Motion ; or else are vaguely referred to as
&quot; Evolu
tion in general.&quot; Now, with regard to these it may be said,
that none of the so-called corollaries are drawn out in proper
logical form, and that none of them can be put into the shape of
syllogisms at all. And Mr. Spencer s presentment of concrete
developments in their relation to these so-called primordial truths
is not always an implication of such logical connection. Very
frequently he uses the phrase
&quot; will be found in harmony with
;
&quot;
but to find a certain process
&quot;in harmony with,&quot; or, what is
much the same thing, &quot;non-contradictory of,&quot; a given principle,
is not identical with the logical process of deducing a corollary
from some antecedent truth. The latter is a true explana
tion, a deductive warrant, and the mind is fully satisfied by it.
But to find that one truth is in harmony with another simply
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is built in harmony with the laws of gravitation, but that fact
does not explain the building of the house. So a plant or an
animal develops in harmony with a great number of physical
laws, but until we know the particular relations of the physi
cal factors which have caused the origination of that plant
or animal, we have not found an explanation of its exis-
ence. Accordingly when in the course of our studies we find
that certain developments, certain processes, certain facts are said
to be
&quot; in harmony with&quot; primordial truths, we shall understand
that the required explanations have not been effected by this
simple statement it is a mere simulation of unification.
We would further call attention to the misleading use of the
term Evolution, and to the very partial use of that Formula
of Evolution which was promulgated in the
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
as the means of unification of all processes. Mr. Spencer
appears at different times to mean many different things
by the term Evolution. In the preceding section we have
taken his meaning to be a deduction from the relations of
certain given original factors. But in the
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
it is defined for us as meaning merely the concentration of
Matter (whatever that may be) accompanied by the transference
of Motion. On page 133 of the &quot;Biology,&quot; vol. i., we are told
that it may mean growth or increase of bulk, and develop
ment or increase of structure, and that it is reserved for occa
sions when both are implied. Mr. Spencer very often em
ploys it in its ordinary reference to recognisable development
by the operation of natural laws, as opposed to special creation.
In this respect further light is thrown upon Mr. Spencer s real
opinion about Evolution by some of the chapters in Part III.
of the Biology.&quot; In Chapter I. it is expressly declared that
the truths of Biology are in harmony with
&quot; those primordial
truths set forth in First Principles.
&quot;
&quot;We are then told,
&quot; What interpretation we put on the facts of structure and
function in each living body, depends entirely upon our con
ception of the mode in which living bodies in general have
originated.&quot;
&quot; We have to choose between two hypotheses
the hypothesis of Special Creation and the hypothesis of Evolu
tion. Either the multitudinous kinds of organisms that now
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exist, and the still more multitudinous kinds that have existed
during past geologic eras, have been from time to time separately
made ; or they have arisen by insensible steps, through actions
such as we see habitually going
on.&quot; * Here arises the point of
our criticism. Mr. Spencer takes it for granted that the defini
tion of Evolution ought to be
&quot; an accumulation of insensible
differentiations,&quot; whereas his own well-known definition runs,
&quot;Evolution is an integration of matter and a concomitant dissipa
tion of motion,&quot; &c.f Now if Mr. Spencer is able to establish
the theory that an insensible increment of differentiations accounts
for the different species of living organisms, and if he calls this
theory by the name of Evolution, it is clear that he establishes






&quot; which may well pass in an immense work like this
for a logical connection
; but when we notice the different
meaning attached in the two places to the word Evolution, we
perceive that it is a verbal connection only, and that there is
a grand severance in thought between the formula going forth
in all-conquering might to enclose and reign over all know
ledge, and the sham king which here usurps the rule in its
stead. The authority of the nominal sovereign is never once
appealed to throughout the work, but in its room we find a
principle which is clothed in its raiment, and which is called
by its name, though when its mantle is cast aside it is dis
covered to be only a counterfeit. This is largely exemplified in
Chapter III.,
&quot; General Aspects of the Evolution Hypothesis.&quot;
Throughout this chapter, Evolution is taken to mean differen
tiation by means of natural laws, insensible differentiation,
gradually accumulating and resulting in wide divergences ; and
this meaning of the term Evolution is amplified till it not
only is held to include organic development, but the whole
operations of the cosmos.
&quot; The interpretation of phenomena as
resulting from Evolution, has been independently showing itself
in various fields of inquiry, quite remote from one another.
The supposition that the Solar System has been gradually
*
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evolved out of diffused matter, is a supposition wholly astro
nomical in its origin and application. Geologists, without being
led thereto by astronomical considerations, have been step by
step advancing towards the conviction, that the Earth has reached
its present varied structure through a process of evolution. The
inquiries of biologists have proved the falsity of the once
general belief, that the germ of each organism is a minute
repetition of the mature organism, differing from it only in
bulk ; and they have shown, contrariwise, that every organism,
arising out of apparently-uniform matter, advances to its ulti
mate multiformity through insensible changes. Among philo
sophical politicians, there has been spreading the perception that
the progress of society is an evolution : the truth that consti
tutions are not made but grow, is a part of the more general
truth that societies are not made but grow. It is now uni
versally admitted by philologists, that languages, instead of
being artificially or supernaturally formed, have been developed.
And the histories of religion, of philosophy, of science, of the
fine arts, and of the industrial arts, show that these have passed
through stages as unobtrusive as those through which the mind
of a child passes on its way to maturity. If, then, the recog
nition of Evolution&quot; (i.e., gradual differentiation, according to a
natural law, the working of which is not given, and which
cannot be the Formula of Evolution),
&quot; as the law of many
diverse orders of phenomena, has been spreading ; may we not
say that there thence arises the probability that Evolution will




Mr. Spencer then proceeds to vindicate organic evolution.
lie says, in 1 1 8, that although the hypotheses of special crea
tion and of Evolution are both symbolic conceptions, yet
&quot; the
one belongs to that order of symbolic conceptions which are
proved to be illusive by the impossibility of realising them in
thought ; the other is one of those symbolic conceptions which
are more or less completely realisable in thought.&quot; f Here we
are glad to notice that the hypothesis of Evolution is one that
*
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can be grasped. That is satisfactory. So much indeed would
seem to be necessary for a hypothesis which is to unify know
ledge. Yet, to say the truth, we were doubtful of it in con
sidering the Formula of Evolution, which contained two terms,
viz., Matter and Motion, which we were told could not be grasped
and were not realisable in thought. However, we find that this
is not the evolution now referred to, but that the symbolic
conception which is more or less completely realisable in thought
is a much simpler principle
:
&quot; The production of all organic
forms by the slow accumulation of modifications upon modifica
tions, and by the slow divergences resulting from the continual
addition of differences to differences, is mentally representable
in outline, if not in detail.&quot; The words we have italicised
form the working definition of Evolution as acted upon by Mr.
Spencer throughout his works. The original formula of Evolu
tion is abandoned. The new use of the term is a sufficient
covering for all phenomena, although it does not disclose its
rationale, or mode of universal applicability, nor afford corol
laries which coincide with the actual order of sequences. In
the separate departments of Physics and Biology it may give us
independent descriptive propositions, and it thereby affords us
a single descriptive proposition applicable to both, but it is not
of that explanatory character which would enable us to deduce
all developments as corollaries from one ultimate proposition.
How completely Mr. Spencer has identified the idea of graduality
with the essence and scope of Evolution is singularly evident
in his illustration, p. 348
:
&quot; There is no apparent similarity between a straight line and
a circle. The one is a curve ; the other is defined as without
curvature. The one encloses a space ; the other will not enclose
a space though produced for ever. The one is finite ; the other
may be infinite. Yet, opposite as the two are in all their pro
perties, they may be connected together by a series of lines no one
of which differs from the adjacent ones in an appreciable degree.
Thus, if a cone be cut by a plane at right angles to its axis, we
get a circle. If, instead of being perfectly at right angles, the
plane subtends with the axis an angle of 89 59 , we have an
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pair of compasses, can distinguish from a circle. Decreasing
the angle minute by minute, the ellipse becomes first perceptibly
eccentric, then manifestly so, and by and by acquires so im
mensely elongated a form, as to bear no recognisable resemblance
to a circle. By continuing this process, the ellipse changes insen
sibly into a parabola. On still further diminishing the angle,
the parabola becomes an hyperbola. And, finally, if the cone be
made gradually more obtuse, the hyperbola passes into a straight
line, as the angle of the cone approaches 180. Now, here we
have five different species of line, circle, ellipse, parabola,
hyperbola, and straight line each having its peculiar proper
ties and its separate equation, and the first and last of which
are quite opposite in nature, connected together as members of
one series, all producible by a single process of insensible modifi
cation&quot; i.e., Evolution
; of which the last italicised line is the
new definition.
But the process of general evolution is clearly illustrated by
the special evolutions in the life-history of each plant and animal.
&quot; Each organism exhibits, within a short space of time, a series
of changes which, when supposed to occupy a period indefinitely
great, and to go on in various ways instead of one way, give us
a tolerably clear conception of organic evolution in general.&quot;
*
&quot; What can be more widely contrasted than a newly-born
child and the small, semi-transparent, gelatinous spherule con
stituting the human ovum ? The infant is so complex in
structure that a cyclopsedia is needed to describe its consti
tuent parts. The germinal vesicle is so simple that it may
be defined in a line. Nevertheless, a few months suffice to
develop the one out of the other
; and that, too, by a series of
modifications so small, that were the embryo examined at suc
cessive minutes, even a microscope would with difficulty disclose
any sensible changes. Aided by such facts, the conception of
general evolution may be rendered as definite a conception as any
of our complex conceptions can be rendered. If, instead of the
successive minutes of a child s foetal life, we take successive
generations of creatures if we regard the successive generations
*
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as differing from each other no more than the foetus did in
successive minutes
; our imaginations must indeed be feeble if
we fail to realise in thought, the evolution of the most complex
organism out of the simplest. If a single cell, under appropriate
conditions, becomes a man in the space of a few years ; there can
surely be no difficulty in understanding how, under appropriate
conditions, a cell may, in the course of untold millions of years,
give origin to the human race.&quot;
&quot;We are not now engaged in the study of the correctness or
incorrectness of this theory of development. We are engaged
in the task of examining Mr. Spencer s theory of the unification
of knowledge, and we fail to see how his new definition of the
term Evolution affords the requisite explanation. It is, indeed,
a kind of all-inclusive generalisation, but it does not give any
organic unity to our knowledge, such as that aimed at but not
effected in the Formula of Evolution. It is only a vague
description of the external appearance of Evolution. It sup
plies us with no key to its processes.
The idea of gradualitij of change and of the increment of
differentiations, as containing the meaning of Evolution, is
carried on throughout the chapter, and indeed throughout the
whole work.
&quot; Evidence that all organic beings have gradually arisen
through the actions of natural causes. . . . May we not, from
the small known modifications produced in races of organisms
by natural agencies, similarly infer that from natural agencies
have slowly arisen all those structural complexities which we
see in them? The hypothesis of Evolution, then, has direct
support,&quot; &c.*
Thus we see that the problem of Biology as a part of Evo
lution is not to understand the process viewed as a deduction
from the interrelations of original factors, but merely to form
an opinion favourable to the theory of graduality of change and
development by natural laws, as opposed to the contrasting
theory of Special Creation. Nevertheless, frequent reference is
made to the truths of Evolution as taught in the
&quot; First Prin-
*
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ciples.&quot; Accordingly, when Evolution is referred to we do not
know which of the several meanings is intended. But the
unification of knowledge is scarcely effected by the inclusion of
the various modes of knowledge in the different meanings of
one word. Such an unification is merely verbal.
(/.) The Theory of
&quot; Additional Factors.&quot;
There is still another misleading idea against which it is
necessary to guard ourselves in our studies of the
&quot;Biology.&quot;
It is the theory of &quot;additional factors.&quot; Reference is made
to it in the discussion of the relations of Biology and Psychology
in a passage occurring in the latter work.
&quot;55. The admission that Psychology is not demarcated
from Biology by a sharp line, will perhaps be construed into
the admission that it cannot rightly be regarded as a distinct
science. But those who so construe the admission, misconceive
the natures of the relations among the sciences. They assume
that there exist objectively those clear separations which the needs
of classification lead us to make subjectively. Whereas the fact
is, that beyond the divisions between the three fundamental
orders of the Sciences, Abstract, Abstract-concrete, and Concrete,
there exist objectively no clear separations at all : there are only
different groups of phenomena broadly contrasted but shading
off one into another. To those who accept the doctrine of
Evolution,* this scarcely needs saying ; for Evolution, being a
universal process, one and continuous throughout all forms of
existence, there can be no break no change from one group of
concrete phenomena to another without a bridge of intermediate
phenomena.
. . . Astronomy and Geology are regarded as dis
tinct. But Geology is nothing more than a chapter, continuing
in detail one part of a history that was once wholly astronomic.
. . . The separation between Biology and Geology once seemed
* &quot; Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of
motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent
homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.&quot; First Principles,
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impassable, and to many seems so now. But every day brings
new reasons for believing that the one group of phenomena has
grown out of the other. Organisms are highly-differentiated
portions of the matter forming the earth s crust and its gaseous
envelope, and their differentiation from the rest has arisen, like
other differentiations, by degrees.* The chasm between the
inorganic and the organic is being filled up.
. . . Thus the
distinction between Biology and Psychology has the same justi
fication as the distinctions between the concrete sciences below
them. Theoretically, all the concrete sciences are adjoining
tracts of one science, which has for its subject-matter the con
tinuous transformation which the universe undergoes. Practi
cally, however, they are distinguishable as successively more
specialised parts of the total science parts further specialised
by the introduction of additional factors. The Astronomy of
the solar system is a specialised part of that general Astronomy
which includes our whole sidereal system ; and becomes spe
cialised by taking into account the revolutions and rotations of
planets and satellites. Geology ... is a specialised part of
this special Astronomy
. . . Biology is a specialised part of
Geogeny, dealing with peculiar aggregates of peculiar chemical
compounds formed of the earth s superficial elements aggre
gates which, while exposed to these same general forces molar
and molecular, also exert certain general actions and reactions
on one another. And Psychology is a specialised part of Bio-
logy,&quot; &c.f
From this it is quite clear that all the sciences are to be
worked through from the original laws of Physics and Che
mistry, and are explainable thereby; and the change of the
argument attempted by Mr. Spencer in the passage we have
quoted is utterly unjustifiable. Let us, however, proceed with
our present quotation, since it discloses a peculiar notion of
the process of Evolution which does not harmonise with the
authoritative Formula of Evolution, and since it also leads up
* Notice here that it is not said to be a continuation in detail of the
history of Geology, but is vaguely stated to be a differentiation
&quot;
by
degrees,&quot; which may mean a differentiation of kind.
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to a new and curious theory of Evolution expounded in the
&quot;
Principles of Biology
&quot; which we are about to consider. Mr.




&quot; But this introduction of additional factors, which differen
tiates each more special science from the more general science
including it, fails in every case to differentiate it absolutely,
because the introduction of the additional factors is gradual.&quot;
The only factors we know under the Formula of Evolution
are Matter and Motion ; therefore the only additional factors
whose introduction is allowable are specialised differentiations
of Matter and Motion, and these are new factors only in the
sense of being newly formed compounds, but as to the nature
of their relations to previously existing combinations of Matter
and Motion, they are included in the same general laws. Under
these circumstances, it seems a mistake to call their formation
under the evolutionary process an
&quot; introduction of new factors.&quot;
A real introduction of a new factor would be such as the intro
duction of the factor of feeling a totally distinct agent, which
takes its part in future changes and growths ; but to admit this
or any other really new factor would invalidate the formula
under which we are working and the process of reasoning with
which we are now occupied.
If we endeavour to ascertain from Mr. Spencer s subsequent
remarks what he means by
&quot; a new factor,&quot; we are unable to
gather anything more from them than the gradual increment of
differentiations due to the continuous process of evolution, and
if evolution is merely the mechanical operation described in the
Formula of Evohition, these gradual increments of differentia
tion must all be of the same order, and be due to the properties
of the original factors. He treats in the first place of
&quot; the new
properties of the order we call chemical, as is shown by their
changed affinities for the molecules of other substances.&quot; What
is the meaning of the word &quot;properties
&quot; under the Formula of Evo
lution, and what is the interpretation of &quot;chemical changes&quot;?
Mr. Spencer defines &quot;a truly chemical change&quot; as the &quot;union
or disunion of unlike molecules.&quot; Is this not to be explained me
chanically ? If not, then chemistry is not included in the Formula
of Evolution
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proposition fails. It would seem that Mr. Spencer recognises
an occult
&quot;
property,&quot; or rather an endless number of individual
properties, by virtue of which elementary bodies have special
affinities and degrees of affinity with other elementary bodies,
which property or agent or factor, called
&quot; chemical affinity,&quot; is
unexplainable and ultimate, and is not derivable from any
wider and more general law ; is not a corollary from any propo
sition, nor capable of being included in the merely mechanical
process of evolution denned in the formula.
Mr. Spencer says, &quot;The new factor which differentiates
chemistry from molecular physics, is the heterogeneity of the
molecules with whose redistributions it deals. And the contrast
hence resulting is too strongly marked to be obliterated by
transitional cases.&quot;
Here it would seem that heterogeneity is the new factor. Of
course this heterogeneity has been produced out of homogeneity
by the Formula of Evolution. It was produced by the integra
tion of some of the homogeneous units and the dissipations
which would in this case be differentiations of their motions.
Upon the production of this heterogeneity of molecules there
result fresh relations and further integrations, being a fresh
stage in evolution, which can be separately marked off in the
classification of the sciences. But the new stage is conducted
upon essentially the same principles as was the primary stage.
The properties of the first-stage molecules are solely those of
different attractions and repulsions, and are the resultants of
the properties of the contained ultimate units. Amongst the
first-stage molecules thus formed there will be considerable
differences. Amongst these differences there will be some fitting
them to form further combinations with others, according to
their properties of attraction and repulsion, size, or motion (still
mechanical attributes), and thus the second stage of evolution
chemistry, or the union of unlike elements is attained. To
call this a new factor is misleading ; it is a further complication,
a new condition ; but there is no introduction of a new agency
or property or affinity into the history of sequences. If chemical
affinities can be explained on mechanical or physical principles,
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so explainable, then not one new factor, but sixty or seventy
new factors are introduced.
The introduction of a new factor, indeed, would destroy the
value of the Formula of Evolution and upset the theory of the
unification of knowledge ; and if either Biology or Psychology
introduce terms and properties that are not interpretable in the
language and formulas of the one inclusive science, clearly
knowledge is not unified, and Mr. Spencer s attempt is a failure.
It is therefore quite clear that the unification of knowledge
here sought is to be attained by a unification of processes and
sequences as deducible from certain original factors without
the assistance of
&quot; additional factors.&quot; We recognise originally
the Persistence of Force
; we have to deduce somehow from
that principle the two complementary forces of attraction and
repulsion ; we must then apparently deduce the formation of
the elementary bodies, followed, according to the Formula of
Evolution, by a concentration into solar systems. Geology
is governed by the same laws as astronomy; biology is only
a specialised form of geology ; psychology and sociology, again,
being specialised forms of biology. Therefore there is a depen
dence and coherency throughout the sciences which is interpre
table by means of the rules of the primary science. If this
science is placed in knowledge of the relations of the primary
attractive and repulsive forces, then into the terms of this
ultimate science, if the unification is complete, must all the
terms of the subordinate sciences be tamslatable.
Mr. Spencer, however, says
:
&quot;
23. But the truths which it is here our business especially
to note, are quite independent of hypotheses or interpretations.
It is sufficient for the ends we have in view, to observe that
organic matter does exhibit these several conspicuous reactions,
when acted on by incident forces : it is not requisite that we
should know hoiv these reactions originate.&quot;*
This passage we entirely dispute. It is a very common and
correct thing to teach that man can never understand the
ultimate why and how; but here the teaching is misapplied
*
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to the evasion of a logical requirement. We do not know the
how of gravitation, but we know its law, and we are able to pre
dict its operation on any body under any given circumstances.
In the case before us namely, a unification of all knowledge
similar to the unification of the special knowledge of the motions
of bodies given us by the law of gravitation although we can
never know the how of primary active principles, yet if we
know their law we are bound to find its application to all the
included sequences, and to be able to predict, and thus to account
for, all the changes included in the items of our knowledge.
If we fail of this, it shows that our pretended unification is not
complete. It does not do to turn round and say,
&quot; We cannot
see the application of our law in this instance
; we cannot
account for it ; all the same we are certain that it is unified by
the general
law.&quot; If we do not see the application of the
unificatory law, if the unificatory proposition does not grasp
this particular case, the law or the proposition is not to us
unificatory. To fall back upon a primordial mystery to fulfil
our unificatory proposition is clearly a logical evasion, and an
admission of the insufficiency of that unification.
We would further ask the reader to compare the above
quotation with
&quot; First Principles,&quot; p. 541, giving the criterion
of a Philosophy, as quoted by us at the commencement of the
present work.
It appears, therefore, that Mr. Spencer introduces us to
the study of Biology quite unprepared with scientific con
ceptions as to its place in any definite history of. the cosmos.
Our principal requirement at the commencement of our deduc
tive study is to know the factors with which we have to deal,
so that we can thereafter recognise in all their sequences and
combinations the interrelations of these original factors, and of
these alone. If we could do this, then Biology would be com
plete in itself. If in addition we could see that these original
factors themselves were no more than relations of certain know-
able ultimate units, then we should recognise that all biology,
as immediately the resultant of its special factors, and mediately
the resultant of the primordial factors, would fall into its place
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not thoroughly expounded. Nor do its difficulties of explana
tion as between mechanical properties and those of affinity
seem to he clearly appreciated. But notwithstanding this
default of clear initial definitions, Mr. Spencer enters upon the
study of Biology as a part of the cosmic process, involving the
argument from the outset in such obscurities of thought that
he and his readers are ready prepared to fall into any sort of
delusion as to the unification of knowledge being effected, even
to the extent of accepting
&quot; additional factors.&quot;
(g.) An Intelligible Explanation only to be Attempted ly the
Physical or Concrete Method.
Let us now approach the only method by which Biology,
freed from the confusing intermixture of Feeling and ad
ditional Factors, is to be affiliated upon the Unification of
Knowledge. This is to be done by regarding knowledge as
the knowledge of one universal history; and this universal
history is to be regarded as the history of a process. This pro
cess, again, is to be conceived of as commencing in the com
paratively simple conditions of a primordial nebula in a state
of fervent heat, composed of the chemical elements in certain
proportions and distributions. We call it primordial, because
it is the furthest point to which scientific imagination can carry
us and to which scientific investigation points, a state of
things actually precedent to the solar system. It is a theory
apparently accepted by Mr. Spencer. If he has theories of states
precedent to this, they are only effective as explanatory of this ;
and since they have to pass through it on their way to the pre
sent, they are in every way bound by it. Or if they do take
part in present histories, then let it be stated, and we shall know
that our deductions from the postulated nebula are manifestly
insufficient to explain post-nebular things. The affiliation of
Biology upon Evolution in general must consist in showing how
out of the primordial material organisms arose, and how they
developed into all the different forms with which we are ac
quainted. It is not enough to be conversant with the facts ofc86 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Biology and the details of its processes ; it is not enough to
know something of genesis, growth, assimilation, reproduction,
heredity, decay, death ; it is necessary also to know their
rationale. It is not sufficient even to be convinced of Mr. Dar
win s great scientific generalisations ; we have to give them such
an explanation as will show them to be natural results arising
out of precedent physical conditions. The biological develop
ments must be shown to be physical developments ; and if the
task is to be done well and thoroughly, it must be wrought
out in terms of physics and mechanics alone.
Our work, then, as limited to an examination of the
&quot; Bio
logy,&quot; consists in the inquiry if it is complete in itself, and
how far it harmonises with the &quot;First Principles.&quot; It will
be seen from this point of view that it is a task which need
not necessarily require a special acquaintance with the science
of Biology. Many literary people hesitate to controvert Mr.
Spencer on account of their scientific deficiencies, while scien
tific men, immersed in the details of their vast studies, are not
apt at encountering his philosophical and psychological positions.
The examination now proposed, however, is the work not of
the scientist but of the logician. The task is one requiring
assiduity of comparison between general principles and details,
a patient following of lines of reasoning to see that there
is no breach of continuity a cold marking off of deficiencies
of comprehension within a proposition, a rigid appraisement
of postulates of reasoning and factors of processes, a stern
exposure of any mixing up or changefulness in the meanings
of terms and the purport of propositions a strict supervision of
the use of words, for we must remember that :
&quot; There are also idols formed by the reciprocal intercourse
and society of man with man, which we call idols of the market,
from the commerce and association of men with each other.
For men converse by means of language, but words are formed
at the will of the generality
: and there arises from a bad and
unapt formation of words a wonderful obstruction to the mind.
Nor can the definitions and explanations with which learned
men are wont to guard and protect themselves in some instances
afford a complete remedy, words still manifestly force theEXPLANATION BY CONCRETE METHOD. 287
understanding, throw everything in confusion, and lead man
kind into innumerable controversies and fallacies
&quot;
(&quot; Novum
Organum,&quot; Book i., Aph. xliii.)
It will not be necessary for us to criticise throughout Mr.
Spencer s detailed treatment of the science of Biology
: his work
on that subject is a very valuable treatise, apart from its logical
dependence upon the
&quot; First Principles,&quot; and apart from the
theory of the unification of knowledge expounded both there and
in the
&quot;
Principles of Psychology.&quot; We shall examine it merely
on the ground of its logical connection with these two works and
with the unificatory theories Avhich form the gist and essence
of Mr. Spencer s Philosophy taken as a whole an interdepen
dence for which Mr. Spencer himself strenuously contends, and
which is supposed to form the crown and glory of all his labours.
But we shall see that if the unification of knowledge consists in
an unificatory explanation of processes by which all differentia
tions, including all organisms and the interrelations of the organic
and inorganic worlds, are accounted for from their origin in
the homogeneous, then the proposed explanation advanced in
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
namely, the Formula of Evolution is
wholly inadequate; for immediately Mr. Spencer sets seriously
to work with it, he has to abandon its terms, and .implicitly to
substitute for it a definition which is merely descriptive of its
external aspect, abandoning all real explanation as outside the
possibility of human thought. If, again, we take unification




say in the finding of a congruity between our primordial expe
riences and all other dicta of our consciousness, or in the fact
that all our experiences can be translated into experiences of the
feeling we call resistance, or in the resolution of all experiences
into those of subject and object ; then what have Biology,
Geology, Astronomy, and Physics to do with it ? Do any of
these supposed unificatory propositions form the one universal
science of which Astronomy, Geology, Biology, Psychology, and
Sociology are successively dependent parts
? If not, whence
the systematic organisation and interrelation of these sciences ?
In fact, unification is so bandied about from one ultimate
unificatory proposition to another, that when it is finally288 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
thrown upon The Unknowable, we feel it must stay there, at
least for a time.
Mr. Spencer thus states the problem of the affiliation of
Biology upon evolution in general
:
&quot; The point at issue is, how this inscrutable Cause has worked
in the production of living forms.&quot; *
&quot; The task before us is to deduce the leading facts of organic
evolution, from those same first principles which evolution at
large conforms to.&quot; f
And again
:
&quot; To say that functional adaptation to conditions, produces
either evolution in general, or the irregularities of evolution,
is to raise the further question Why is there a functional
adaptation to conditions? why do use and disuse generate
appropriate changes of structure ? Neither this nor any other
interpretation of biologic evolution which rests simply on the
basis of biologic induction, is an ultimate interpretation. The
biologic induction must itself be interpreted. Only when the
process of evolution of organisms is affiliated on the process of
evolution in general, can it be truly said to be explained. The
thing required is to show that its various results are corol
laries from first principles. We have to reconcile the facts
with the universal laws of the redistribution of matter and
motion.&quot;





will be to show that it is a constructive system carried
on mainly upon the lines of the physical relations of certain con
crete factors and their aggregates amongst each other and in
relation to their physical environments ; that this is aided in its
simulation of explanation, although not in its reality, by certain
metaphysical abstractions and false supraphysical laws
; that the




&quot; corollaries from truths,&quot; as well as by certain
verbal ingenuities such as
&quot; additional factors
;
&quot; and that even
teleology has to be called in at last to make up the still remain
ing deficiencies. And although, therefore, the main examination
*
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will be upon the lines of the physical inquiry, yet we shall have
perpetually to diverge according as we come upon one or other
of these misleading influences.
2. TJie Data of Biology.
The study is best commenced by a perusal of Chapter VII.
on
&quot; The Scope of Biology,&quot; with the preceding six chapters,
which are there summarised. The first three treat of the
factors of Biology ; the latter three are devoted to a discussion
of the definition of Life. &quot;We will begin by examining the
factors of Biology.
The first criticism we have here to make is with reference to
the difficulty the reader experiences in properly realising Mr.
Spencer s position and his inability to understand the terms
employed. This is due to Mr. Spencer s omission of a work
on the precedent inorganic evolution, an omission which he,
indeed, explains, though such a work, as being the foundation
of all the others, must be judged an indispensable prelimi
nary. The deficiency in question is partly supplied in the
Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;Biology,&quot; which contains an account
of the origin of &quot;organic matter.&quot; This account formed the
subject of a very close examination in our previous work, to
which we would now refer the reader. The result of our
studies was to show that the only change which took place in
the evolution described was a gradual increase of complexity,
and a consequent increase of mechanical sensitiveness and
instability of the most highly complex and comparatively large
molecules. Mr. Spencer characterised these molecules as
displaying motions approximating more and more to those of
organisms, so that in the end the only distinction between
inorganic and organic molecules was one of degree of com
plexity, and consequent changefulness under the influence of
the environment.
The four chief elements which so combine into these complex





starting-point in biological evolution. As Mr. Spencer argues,
&quot; It follows from the Persistence of Force that the properties
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of a compound are resultants of the properties of its components
resultants in which the properties of the components are
severally in full action, though greatly obscured by each other.&quot;
It is, therefore, necessary to enter upon a study of the proper
ties of these four chief factors. Mr. Spencer does not, however,
give a full account as a chemist would do of the properties of
oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, and carbon. He rather treats them
with regard to their physical characteristics. One of the leading
properties of each substance is its degree of molecular mobility.
We scarcely think Mr. Spencer makes out his case in proving
that the solid and liquid forms of compounds derived from
these gases, which possess molecular mobility in a high degree,
themselves possess this same molecular mobility, however much
their action is naturally obscured. As we remarked before, the
work requires a precedent study of inorganic evolution. In
such a preliminary treatise, the modifications of molecular
mobility would have been properly explained, together with
the meaning of the proposition that actions can proceed yet
can mutually obscure each other. It would also have been
explained how such a fact would harmonise with the Formula
of Evolution, which asserts that when substances integrate,
motion is transferred to other substances. In the next few










&quot; molecular activity,&quot; between
&quot; chemical energy
&quot;
and &quot;chemical inactivity,&quot; all implying a previous inorganic
evolution by which the various substances were differentiated
physically and chemically. Besides, no sufficient account is
given of the main distinction between chemistry and physics,
nor is the theory that the former is a branch of the latter at all
discussed.
Throughout the whole course of this examination we shall
find occasion to deplore this initial omission
; for not only in
the points just specified shall we feel the want of it, but also
when we have to consider the action of Mr. Spencer s great
constructive agencies, Polarity and Equilibration. To under
stand these operations properly would require a preliminary
elucidation, from Mr. Spencer s point of view, in abstractTHE DATA OF BIOLOGY. 291
mechanics, and it is to be hoped that he yet may be able to
write it. In it would have to be specified in a clearer manner
than appears in his works the place which the Formula of
Evolution maintains in all these operations. However, one
thing is clear, namely, that when Mr. Spencer speaks of matter
it is the chemical elements he refers to. Organic matter, from
which all living organisms are constructed, consists of oxygen,
nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, &c., and, as we shall see shortly,
the forces which, work amongst them are those classed by
physicists. This is to guard against Mr. Spencer s reply to
the effect that by Matter and Force he only means the symbols
x and y, symbols which stand for modes of the Unknowable,
and to which if we attach any definite conceptions we can only
be landed in ultimate contradictions of thought.
Amongst the ambiguities abounding in these first three




&quot;forces.&quot; Chapter II. treats of the actions of forces on
organic matter, the latter forming part of or being altogether
an organism, whether plant or animal. Chapter III. is con
cerned with the reactions of organic matter on forces, which
we find very difficult to translate into terms of Matter and
Motion : sect. 1 8 in particular we cannot understand in the
defined language of Evolution. For instance,
&quot; forces at work
among the molecules,&quot;
&quot; the force which ... is that which
causes the union of different substances with each other,&quot; &c.
Sect. 21 contains an allusion to &quot;nerve force
;&quot; this also requires
translation into the recognised language of Evolution. Sect. 22
gives an account of sensible motion as a
&quot; reaction called forth
from organisms by surrounding actions.&quot;
There is great ambiguity throughout all these chapters for





&quot; nerve force,&quot; and
&quot; sensible
motion.&quot; There are also curious uses of the word
&quot; force
;&quot;
such as, p. 39,
&quot; a sudden and great evolution of force ;
&quot;
p. 57,
&quot; these evolutions of force are rigorously dependent on these
changes of matter;&quot; p. 42, &quot;these units, reacting differently on
the different parts of the force,&quot; &c. It is an easy and common
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meaning of words for scientific purposes, to descend from the
high philosophic platform and employ the terms so set apart
in their ordinary colloquial usage. This carelessness and ob
scurity of language, though apparently of trifling effect, really
vitiates cumulatively all Mr. Spencer s reasonings. In so often
calling attention to these defects, we fear we may be thought
captious ; but we hold it to be an essential criticism of Mr.
Spencer s works, as these obscurities and this changefulness of
meaning are so all-pervading as to form a complete network of
error, from which the cautious reader is constantly endeavouring
to free himself, and in which the undiscerning student may
become hopelessly and completely entangled.
Amidst all this use of the term
&quot; forces
&quot; we are at a loss to
apply the scientific statement of the doctrine of the Conserva
tion of Energy as taught by Professor Balfour Stewart. Therein
we learned to distinguish between forces and energies, the
latter of which terms in particular was well defined, and its
interchanges of mode expounded in detail. How are they to
be applied to the interrelations of the constituents of organic
matter and their relations with modes of energy ?
At the same time we do not know whether Mr. Spencer con
fines himself to this account of the Conservation of Energy, for
in his footnote to the chapter on
&quot; The Persistence of Force
&quot;
he seems to object to the term
&quot; Conservation of Force,&quot;
because it does not imply the existence of the Force before
that particular manifestation of it with which we commence,
and he even regards this term Persistence itself as faulty because
it has not such an implication ; yet what is the use of this im
plication for scientific purposes, or even for the purposes of
philosophy, which is but the higher science 1
Section 5 is supposed to furnish us with the principles of
General Physics, both Molecular and Molar, which shall enable
us the better to understand the preceding sections, and supply
the want before expressed. Here we find that the molecular
mobility of a substance is not a constant property upon which
other sequences depend, as we would have supposed from the
first section, but a variable property, dependent upon other
properties of a substance, as follows : Firstly, upon
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inertia of its molecules
&quot;
(query, atoms
?). But what is inertia ?
motion, or rest, or continuance of either? Is, then, inertia
a constant property of any molecules or atoms? Secondly,
&quot;on the intensity of their mutual polarities.&quot; Is the sub
stance in question homogeneous or heterogeneous
? Say homo
geneous, since we are investigating the nature of the molecular
mobility of oxygen, for instance. The atoms of oxygen,
then, have mutual polarities, and differ from the atoms of
say gold in that these polarities have different degrees of
&quot;
intensity.&quot; This must mean that they attract each other less
and repel each other more, so that they remain at fixed but
varying distances, according to the intensity of the polarity.
But this is a matter of position or distance, and does not refer
to activity or mobility at all, except in the recovery of the
relative normal position after the removal of constraint. To
anticipate, on the next page (p. 15), we are told that polarity
itself is ascribable to contrasts of dimension, so that in tracking
molecular mobility to its ultimate source we find it due to
relations of dimension. Thirdly, the molecular mobility of a
substance depends upon the &quot;mutual pressure
&quot;
of its molecules,
&quot;as determined by the density of their aggregation.&quot; But we
have just been considering mutual pressure and density of
aggregation as due to degrees of intensity of polarity or mutual
attraction and repulsion. Fourthly,
&quot;on the molecular mobilities
of their component molecules.&quot; Here we find that, after all,
Mr. Spencer had in view a heterogeneous substance, whereas
we had in view an elucidation of the molecular mobility of
those constituent substances of which all organic compounds
are the resultants, so that, understanding our original factors,
we would be able to calculate the results. Does not this latter
sentence imply a fixed molecular mobility as a constant property
of the constituent molecules, or rather atoms ? and does not the
whole passage imply that these are modifiable amongst them
selves, or as the effect of chemical union with other substances,
so that the result is not the resultant of the original molecular
mobilities, but a confusion of terms out of which no progress can
be made, or out of which any progress can be made ? Can any
one understand the inference that, &quot;any three of these remain-294 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
ing constant, the molecular mobility will vary as the fourth
&quot;
?
However, it results in this
&quot; Other things equal, therefore, the
molecular mobility of atoms must decrease as their masses
increase,&quot; &c. ; from which it appears that the large-atomed
substances are not the resultants of their constituents, or else
that it is not a property of the original constituents to be pos
sessed of
&quot;great molecular activity&quot; as a fixed property. Page
15, treating of polarity, distinguishes between simple attraction
and polar attraction. The question is, &quot;What are the original
properties from which all others are resultants, and what are
dependent and variable properties 1 In turn we think each is the
fixed original factor, and afterwards we find it to be dependent.
However, it is not our design to criticise the biological pro
gress in every detail
; suffice it to point out the obscure treat
ment of the preliminaries. The general result of the first
chapter is to the effect that the materials employed in the
construction and processes of living organisms are in every
way fit for the purpose. At the same time we naturally ask
what of constructive efficacy appears in the account ?
The constructive or formative process would appear to consist
of simple attraction, chemical affinity, and polarity. Equilibra
tion does not yet make its appearance ; but no doubt, as it is
an universal process, although it fulfils a larger function later
on, it must have a place in the more minute rearrangements of
molecular physics. In view of the large part taken by Polarity
and Equilibration in the constructive processes of Biology, we
have given them separate study in later sections of this chapter,
and would recommend the reader to take them out of their proper
order at this point of the study, as they form the main operative
factors throughout the work, which we find it convenient to
treat on other lines of arrangement. However, in this first chap
ter the factor of Polarity is distinctly brought forward, and the
foundation laid for much constructive work in the establish
ment of colloidal molecules, which possess at the same time
two incompatible properties the property, that is to say, of
definite polarity, by means of which (like crystals) they have
the power of aggregating into definite forms, and the property
of plasticity, by which they adapt themselves with great readi-ORGANIC MATTER AND &quot;FORCES.&quot; 295
ness to their environment. This wonderful combination will
be found of enormous potency in biological construction, for
a substance which can sometimes determine structure, and on
the other hand can easily adapt itself to structure a substance
which can originate function and which can also adapt itself
to taking on any function, is capable of accomplishing almost
everything with the assistance of Equilibration. The difficulty
is to understand the coexistence of definite constructive polarity
and of plasticity in the same molecule.
3. The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter, and the Reactions
of Organic Matter on Forces.
Let us now take a broader view of the factors of Biology.
The first class, as already seen, consists of the so-called elements
oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, and a few others. The
second class consists of everything else that in any way becomes
related to molecules of the above, or to aggregates of them.
These are the external factors, and are treated of in Chapter II.,
entitled &quot;The Actions of Forces on Organic Matter.&quot; They
comprise: (i.) Incident mechanical force, (2.) Quasi-mechanical
force, i.e., (a.) Capillary affinity, (b.) Osmose, (c.) Heat, or a
raised state of molecular vibration, (d.) Light, (e.) Chemical
affinity, (/.) Induced changes, such as fermentation. The chief
criticism on this chapter is, that it does not seem correct to
speak of the actions of external forces such as chemical affinity,
without taking into account the fact that the organic matters
themselves possess affinities of this kind, and that the action is
therefore mutual. Thereupon Mr. Spencer has a chapter upon
&quot;The Reactions of Organic Matter on Forces.&quot; We can under
stand the reaction of the organic substances upon substances
external to them only in the sense of mutuality of action, in
which it is just as correct to speak of the operation of either as
action or reaction. The actions, being mutual action and reaction,
are contemporaneous and therefore identical. But we must say
that we cannot understand the reaction of organic matter on such
forces as heat, light, electricity, &c., and much less can we under
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motion, which are not external forces at all to be reacted upon.
]5ut as a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer has quitted the consideration
of the relations of unorganised organic matter, and is really
treating of the reactions of organisms on well, it is difficult to
say on what. The first illustration is with respect to heat.
Now heat, as applied to the end of a dry stick, causes it to
burn, and then the reaction on heat is said to be that the end
causes the middle to burn, and from the middle it spreads to
the remaining end ; therefore the organic matter of the wood
has reacted upon the force called heat which burned up one
half of it, by itself sacrificing the other half. One would think
that the whole event was a single process ; at any rate, the
reaction of the organic matter upon the force called heat is not
made apparent.
The second illustration is thus stated :
&quot;Among the forces called forth from organisms by reaction
against the actions to which they are subject is light i.e.,
phosphorescence.
&quot;
We presume that phosphorescence of vegetables and animals
is a consequence of antecedent factors, internal and external,
but we scarcely see that it is a reaction against anything. It
seems to us merely a joint product, like the results of the
chemical affinities before discussed.
Nerve force (21) and sensible motion
( 22) are classed as
reactions upon forces. In the first place, we are outrunning
our studies to speak of nerve force and sensible motion at all.
These are the very things we wish to have explained. They
are said to be
&quot; reactions called forth from organisms by sur
rounding actions,&quot; which is begging the question at issue. In
23 Mr. Spencer says that these are truths of induction quite
independent of hypotheses, and it is not necessary to know
liow these reactions originate. But it seems to us, if we are to
understand them as resultants of original factors, we must see
that what is produced is really an outcome commensurate with
those factors.
Mr. Spencer says of Chap. II. :
&quot; This chapter will have served
its purpose if it has given a conception of the extreme modifi-THE DEFINITION OF
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ability of organic matter by surrounding agencies.
* To this
estimate of its value no exception can be taken. It is otherwise
with Chap. III.
, in which amongst the reactions of organic matter
are classed the known reactions of organisms called nerve force
and sensible or muscular motion. These are evidently amongst
the results of biological evolution, but we are not in a position
to say that they are amongst the properties of that combination
of some of the elements which we have agreed to call organic
matter, nor can we assert that owing to this fact the same reac
tions are conspicuous in the completed organism. Indeed, the
reactions referred to are only possible in a completed organism,
and cannot be said to appertain in any way to the constituent
organic matter. Also it is clear that whatever reactions organic
matter may exert, they are not reactions upon things called
Forces ; but that all Mr. Spencer refers to are the changes in
the organism itself consequent upon the impingement of inci
dent forces.
4. The Definition of
&quot;
Life.&quot;
A state of equilibrium is one in which two or more forces
acting upon an intermediate body are so equal as to produce no
motion. Strictly speaking, it is a term of the science of me
chanics, but it can be and is frequently applied to conditions
coming within the other physical sciences, and even to circum
stances comprised in the domain of chemistry. In these wider
applications it refers to the state of quiescence due to the equal
balance of any forces or energies.
Mr. Spencer very often teaches us that all physical changes
are to be understood as stages in a process towards a state of
equilibrium, and he looks forward to a time when all the
energies of nature will be so mutually balanced as to produce
universal quiescence or death. This process is called equilibra
tion, and it evidently rules all the physical changes of the cosmos.
In this view it is clearly co-extensive with the ordinary law
of universal causation in the production of physical changes.
Every chemical process and every physical action in all classes
*
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of sciences are simple equilibrations of various energies on their
way towards a state of balance or quiescence.
We have now, however, to consider another and altogether
distinct idea of Equilibration.
Physical processes are simple equilibrations having results
due to the direct and calculable relations of the properties of
the bodies or motions in interaction. Biological processes,
though coincident to a certain extent with the former, are yet
not wholly so, but exhibit a power on the part of certain aggre
gates of developing fresh rearrangements, which shall counter
balance these direct equilibrations and prevent them from
accomplishing their due and direct effect
; and this with the
definite object of self-preservation. Thus, a creature s rate of
food-assimilation is increased in consequence of a decrease of
temperature, or else it is changed in kind, or the energy expended
is lessened by a state of torpor, or by the thickening of its fur,
so that the altered relation in the surrounding medium may thus
be protectively counterbalanced. The aggressive forces, which
by simple equilibration would destroy the aggregate, are, by
means of the law of special biological equilibration, met by the
rearranged forces of the aggregate, and being thereby counter
balanced, the aggregate is preserved.
Contrast these instances with the phenomena exhibited by
a storm-glass.
&quot; Outside there is a constant change ; inside
there is a change of atomic arrangement. Outside there is
another certain change ; inside there is another change of atomic
arrangement. But, subtle as is the dependence of each internal
upon each external change, the connection between them does
not, in the abstract, differ from the connection between the
motion of a straw and the motion of the wind that disturbs it.
In either case a change produces a change, and there it ends.
The alteration wrought by some environing agency on an in
animate object, does not tend to induce in it a secondary altera
tion, that anticipates some secondary alteration in the environ
ment.&quot; *
But it is altogether different with living organisms possessing
the power of anticipatory counterbalance.
*
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&quot; It is manifest & priori, that since changes in the physical
state of the environment, as also those mechanical actions and
those variations of available food which occur in it, are liable
to stop the processes going on in the organism ; and since the
adaptive changes in the organism have the effects of directly or
indirectly counterbalancing these changes in the environment ;
it follows that the life of the organism will be short or
long, low or high, according to the extent to which changes
in the environment are met by corresponding changes in the
organism.&quot;
*
If we now recur to the account of the Origination of Organic
Matter given by Mr. Spencer in the Appendix, we must resume
our study of it on the understanding that matter is inorganic
so long as it acts according to simple equilibration, and becomes
organic when it acts according to the law of special biological
equilibration that is to say, when, acting in antagonism to
threatened destruction by processes of simple equilibration, it
sets up rearrangements to counterbalance the external forces,
and so ensures its own self-preservation. We shall therefore
find that Mr. Spencer s account of the origin of organic matter
fails in that it places the attainment of the organic stage in the
degree of complexity, mechanical sensitiveness, changefulness,
and plasticity to which some chemical compounds attain. Only
when certain molecules or several molecules banded together,
attain the power of rearranging their forces or processes, so as
to counterbalance external adverse influences, can they be pro
perly called organic.
The affiliation, therefore, of biological processes upon preceding
inorganic evolution depends upon our ability to affiliate this anti
cipatory biological equilibration upon general physical processes.
The problem is to account for this physical law as derived from
wider and more universal laws. We can scarcely say that the
biological action is for the purpose of self-preservation, for that
is teleological. It implies a foreseeing mind, and action towards
a given end, whereas all evolution is simply from a beginning.
Development is wholly dependent upon antecedents. We must
look at every existence as a resultant of preceding circumstances
*
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not of expected ones. Hence we have to look for the warrant
of the special biological law in antecedent modes of activity.
Can we say it is a law of nature that all actions produce
not simple physical reaction, but counter preventative action ?
Scarcely
! Mr. Spencer himself holds to the special differen
tiating character of the biological equilibration, and repudiates
it as universal. Still he regards it as a true physical law, and
explains it as the law by which moving equilibria sustain them
selves against destructive forces.
Having thus stated the problem of affiliating Biology upon
Evolution in general, we leave the discussion of it together with
the general treatment of its application to a separate section.
We shall also have to consider whether the subjective feelings
or consciousness arise by way of equilibration, and to see that
the term equilibration is truly applied in a developmental and
not in a teleological sense. With regard to Objective Psycho
logy or the science of the nervo-muscular apparatus, Mr. Spencer
states in Chapter VII. that it clearly falls within the range of
biological study. Subjective Psychology, dealing with its direct
or indirect subjective concomitants, is not included in it.
It now only remains to note that the three chapters devoted
to the differentiation of biological processes are not clearly
wrought out in terms of this central idea, but that the exposition
is obscured by the employment of such indefinite terms as
&quot;correspondence&quot; and
&quot;
correspondences.&quot; It is evident that
all biological counterbalances are correspondences ; but to end
a clear explanation by adopting indefinite language is apt to
widen its application beyond its legitimate capacity, and enable
it to explain things that are not included in it ; such, for instance,
as feelings, memories, and the subjective aspect generally, and
perhaps many purely physical arrangements as well.
5. The Inductions of Biology.
The next part of Mr. Spencer s work, after the statement of
the factors, gives a summary of the Inductions of Biology, that
is to say, the known general processes which are the things to
be explained, this statement being itself accompanied by partialTHE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY. 301
explanations. The full explanatory exposition is, however,







Development,&quot; in which Mr. Spencer undertakes to deduce all
the recognised effects of biological history from the original
factors to which we have just given our attention.
The part devoted to the Inductions of Biology is therefore
preparatory in character, and in a criticism like this, which is
of a general rather than of an exhaustive nature, we cannot
undertake to follow the various chapters with any closeness of
detail. We must not attempt to do more than indicate the
principal formative agencies. The most effective of these,
namely, &quot;Polarity&quot; and
&quot;Equilibration,&quot; being separately
treated, we shall do no more here than note their main
applications.
Growth. There is an essential community between organic
and inorganic growth ; they both result in the same way. There
is the same segregation or union of like units and the same
parting of unlike units. The deposit of a crystal from a solu
tion exhibits this segregation, and since a plant is surrounded
by elements that are like the elements of which it is composed,
they are attracted to and segregate with it. Nor does the
animal fundamentally differ in this respect from the plant and
the crystal. But there is, also, a distinction : the aggregation
of inanimate matter is produced by simple attraction, and the
process may continue without end, whereas the aggregation of
organic bodies is produced by polar attraction, and is of a defi
nite kind which appears to have fixed limits
; nevertheless, the
aggregation of inorganic crystalloids is also limited and definite.
The main thesis at this point becomes rather confused. The
proposition advanced at the commencement was to the effect
that inorganic growth and organic growth are similar. There
are various modes of inorganic growth. There is simple non-
selective physical accretion ; there is crystallisation ; there is
the union produced by chemical affinity. Inasmuch as organic
bodies are composed of chemical substances and possess all the
physical properties of inorganic bodies, they will exhibit all the
physical properties and modes of inorganic growth, and there-302 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
fore similarities will be found. The question rather is whether,
in addition to these modes, organisms possess special modes
of growth
? And the inquiry will resolve itself into this ques
tion whether the growth of inorganic aggregates is not the
result of the physical and chemical properties of their con
stituents, and whether, on the other hand, organic growth is
not the production and adaptation of physiological units out of
the raw material of the environment by the organism for its
own growth
1 It will be found that Mr. Spencer himself adopts
this latter view, and so overthrows the proposition of the iden
tity of the two modes of growth. He recognises an essential
distinction between them.
In this chapter it would have been well if Mr. Spencer had
devoted some space to the consideration of growth as variously
exhibited by crystalloids and colloids. It can easily be under
stood that the accretions of the former must assume definite
forms, and the growth will be a definite result due to the par
ticular shapes of the constituent molecules. But since organisms
are mainly composed of colloids of protean form, it would have
been very instructive to have considered their modes of accretion,
and to have inquired how far the results were determined by
their molecular structure. For it would seem CL priori that
protean colloids could not produce aggregates of definite
shapes.
Development. Development means increase of structure, not
increase of bulk, and the study of development means the study
of the variations from and additions to structure. The chapter is
devoted to a description of the great varieties of organic structure
and to a very interesting classification of the modes of develop
ment from rudimentary centres or axes. The point of interest
to us is the deductive warrant for development from either.
This consideration Mr. Spencer necessarily has to postpone till
he comes to the fourth and fifth divisions of his work.* At
the same time he says that
&quot; the general law of development as
displayed in organisms, is readily shown to be necessary, if the-
initial and terminal stages are such as we know them to be.
*
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We are at a loss to know what place the terminal stage holds in
a process of deduction. The real question is as to the deductive
warrant for the terminal stage regarded as purely the result of
the initial factors. Passing over the inconsistent proposition of
a
&quot;
homogeneous organism,&quot; Mr. Spencer betrays himself when
he says,
&quot; Grant that each organism is at the outset homo
geneous, and that when complete it is relatively heterogeneous ;
and of necessity it folloivs
&quot;
(from the two facts, not the initial one
only)
&quot; that development is a change from the homogeneous to
the heterogeneous a change during which there must be gone
through all the infinitesimal gradations of heterogeneity that lie




&quot; he refers to is the germ of an
embryo or some prehistoric mass of protoplasm. However, he
pursues the argument through the terms found in the Formula
of Evolution, and the conformity of the process with Evolution
in general is self-evident, whatever may become of the postponed
deductive interpretation.
Development is assisted, if not initiated, by growth or as
similation. Like units tend to segregate, and this universal
physical truth is held to demonstrate & priori the necessity
for selective assimilation. Therefore, taking for granted that
organs have already been developed, we can understand why
&quot; Each organ, at the expense of the organism as a whole, inte
grates with itself certain special kinds and proportions of the
matters circulating around it. ... So that the organs are
qualitatively differentiated from each other, in a way analogous
to that by which the entire organism is qualitatively differen
tiated from things around it.&quot; *
This argument is taken from the section meant to show the
deductive interpretation of development. The special result
arrived at is
&quot; that organs are qualitatively differentiated
;
&quot; the
reason given is that they, the organs, being already qualitatively
differentiated, segregate to themselves divers matters in the
environment. But this does not explain the origin of the
qualitative differentiation, it only explains the growth of organs.
*
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It does but illustrate the truth
&quot; that the pre-existence of a




produces, probably by polar
attraction, a tendency for diffused units of the same kind to
aggregate with this mass, rather than elsewhere.&quot;
Function. This chapter, taken as a portion of the Inductions
of Biology, must be regarded mainly as a description of some
general results of biological evolution requiring explanation
rather than as an argument to be examined from a deductive
point of view. Nevertheless, it is necessary to translate the
general facts of function into the language of the precedent
inorganic evolution, in order that at the proper time the
problem of the origin of function may be suitably dealt with,
and in order that clear conceptions of what is meant by the
term from the deductive point of view may be elaborated. For
such a purpose the first and last sections of the chapter call for
more special attention.
&quot;We must always and clearly remember that the distinction
between an organic and an inorganic action, although both are
purely physical, is a difference of mode. The latter takes place
by simple equilibration, the former takes place as an adaptation
or adjustment within an aggregate of its constituent material
particles or their motions, in order to preserve its own con
tinuity of existence against some external force
; it is an action
of counter-balance. It is supposed to be purely of a physical
character, and is specially considered by us elsewhere. The
question we have now to ask is this Is this counter-balance
or adaptation to be called a structural change or a function 1
Upon it depends the question as to the relation of structure and
function.
A molecule of organic matter differs from a molecule of
inorganic matter in being a moving equilibrium able to present
to its environment a counter-balance. Since it is composed
of smaller molecules or atoms, this counter-balance can only
be one of rearrangement of parts or rearrangements of their
motions. It is to be presumed that the former would be called
a structural change and the latter a functional adaptation ; but
since it is probable that both changes would be effected simul
taneously, it is to be judged that the adaptations of structureTHE INDUCTIONS OF BIOLOGY. ;o5
and function go together. Therefore the precedence of either
is not a point worth discussing. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer




occupies in inorganic science,
from which organic science is held to be deducible.
Questions more to the deductive purpose of our studies are
those regarding the origin of moving equilibria, their aggrega
tion, and the validity of the law of counter-balance on a purely
physical basis.
Waste and Repair. After considering the facts of waste
and repair as biological inductions, Mr. Spencer regards the de
ductive interpretation of repair as by no means easy. He does
not consider the tendency of an organism to return to a state of
integrity when it has undergone the waste due to activity as
manifestly deducible from first principles, although it appears
in harmony with them. If in the blood there existed ready-
formed units exactly like in kind to those of which each organ
consists, there would be no difficulty in accounting for it as
ordinary segregation. An explanation is, however, suggested
in the hypothesis that complex molecules possess the power
of manufacturing out of the fluid bathing their surface other
similar molecules, which are then fit to assimilate with the
mass. The consideration of this subject generally, as treated
of in 65 and 66, throws the onus of explanation upon
Polarity, and receives examination from us in the chapter bear
ing that title.
Adaptation. As an induction of Biology, the phenomena of
adaptation are of remarkable interest, and in the hands of Mr.
Darwin they have achieved a position of immense historical
importance. With the individual facts we are all more or
less acquainted, while the grand import of the accumulated
results and of the general principle is every day becoming more
and more recognised. Mr. Spencer s account of this matter is
a very fair and adequate representation. Nor, granted the
validity of the previous deductive explanations, and granted a
further satisfactory deductive warrant for genesis and heredity,
is the deductive interpretation of the various modes of adap
tation difficult. But until these precedent deductive explana-
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tions are properly settled, there is not much satisfaction in
pursuing the beautiful ramifications of reasoning by which
organisms can thereupon be ideally reconstructed.
Of the modes of adaptation, there are several for which Mr.
Spencer offers suggestions of explanation. There is the adapta
tion by which excess of function is compensated for by increase
of bulk. There is, however, a limit to this process both in the
changes of individuals and in the adaptations of a race, and
the consequent reconstruction is not maintained unless the
increase of function is permanent. But this chapter on Adapta
tion, treating rather of the changes in organisms after they have
established their existence, is of comparatively less importance
to us than the study of the origination of organisms ; and
although the same principles apply at the end as at the be
ginning, and in the beginning as at the end, we must, in a deduc
tive interpretation of the histories of biology, carefully define
our initial conceptions of adaptation as a physical counter-bal
ance by a moving equilibrium to destructive forces. This view
of adaptation will be considered in our studies of Equilibration.
6. General Causes of Physiological Development.
Reserving our main examination of Mr. Spencer s method for
affiliating physiological development upon Evolution in general,
we will now ask the student to form for himself a general idea
as to the problem before him and its mode of treatment by a
review of Part V. The problem is thus stated in Chapter I. :
&quot;The problems of Physiology, in the wide sense above de
scribed, are, like the problems of Morphology, to be considered
as problems to which answers must be given in terms of incident
forces. On the hypothesis of Evolution these specialisations of
tissues and accompanying concentrations of functions, must, like
the specialisations of shape in an organism and its component
divisions, be due to the actions and reactions which its inter
course with the environment involves ; and the task before us is
to explain how they are wrought how they are to be compre
hended as results of such actions and reactions.&quot;*
*
Biology, vol. ii. p. 223.CAUSES OF PHYSIOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT. 307
&quot;
Here, as before, we must take into account two classes of
factors. We have to bear in mind the inherited results of
actions to which antecedent organisms were exposed, and to
join with these the results of present actions. Each organism
is to be considered as presenting a moving equilibrium of func
tions, and a correlative arrangement of structures, produced by
the aggregate of actions and reactions that have taken place
between all ancestral organisms and their environments.&quot;*
The succeeding chapters of this part contain a detailed account
of a probable historical development from unorganised organic
matter to all the highly organised forms with which we are
acquainted, accompanied by a supposed deductive justification.
This history reveals a process analogous to all other cosmical
histories, and possesses characteristics which give it the outside
appearance of uniformity with all other kinds of evolution.
Physiological development ig shown to display an advance from
a state of incoherent, indefinite homogeneity to a state of cohe
rent, definite, and complex heterogeneity. It is shown to exhi
bit features throughout in harmony with the
&quot; First Principles,&quot;
and in the Instability of the Homogeneous, the Multiplication
of Effects, Segregation, Rhythm, and the redistribution of Matter
and Motion, it shows an agreement with Evolution in general.
One cannot but admire the great ability displayed in the expo
sition of the progress of physiological development, and in the
marshalling of the supporting facts ; but after all, the question
with which this criticism is more immediately concerned is not
the inductive justification but the deductive validity of the
argument.
The general summary of the deductive warrant for physio
logical development is given in a very excellent manner in
Chapter X., to which we now direct attention. We would desire
to quote this chapter in extenso were it not for the space re
quired ; but that consideration compels us to content ourselves
with a brief outline.
&quot; In summing up the special truths illustrative of this general
truth, it will be proper here to contemplate more especially
*
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their dependence on first principles. Dealing with biological
phenomena as phenomena of Evolution, we have to interpret
not only the increasing morphological heterogeneity of organ
isms, but also their increasing physiological heterogeneity, in
terms of the redistribution of matter and motion. While we
make our rapid re-survey of the facts, let us then more particularly
observe how they are subordinate to the universal course of this
redistribution.&quot; *
The first step is to show how the
&quot;
Instability of the Homo
geneous
&quot;
operates in initiating change in a homogeneous mass
of organic matter. The general fact to which Mr. Spencer
refers is no doubt a common principle of physical change ; but
his representation of it as the
&quot;
Instability of the Homogeneous
&quot;
is fruitful of confusion. In our present study he regards it as,
&quot;
strictly speaking, the inevitable lapse of the more homogeneous
into the less homogeneous.&quot; There are, however, no degrees
of comparison in the &quot;homogeneous;&quot; a thing is either abso
lutely homogeneous or it is not homogeneous at all. The only
degrees of comparison are as to heterogeneity. Probably there
is no such state of homogeneity ; but if there is, there is no
reason to suppose that it would
&quot;lapse&quot; into any other state.
It would not be unstable ; a self-generating cause of change is
contradictory to the Persistence of Force.
The absurdity of this cause of Evolution we have exhi
bited in our previous work, and when we find Mr. Spencer
himself characterising it on p. 385 as &quot;but another name
for the absence of balance between the incident forces and
the forces which the aggregate opposes to them,&quot; we can
only come to the conclusion that as the homogeneous means
a perfect balance between incident forces and the forces of an
aggregate, the condition of homogeneity never existed, and that
if it ever did exist, it would for ever remain homogeneous. If
the Instability of the Homogeneous was, as it is sometimes
stated to be, the cause of Evolution, considered either as con
centration of Matter and concomitant dissipation of Motion, or
as organic growth and accretions of differentiations, this means
*
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that &quot;the absence of balance&quot; was the cause of Evolution, and
thus &quot;Absence of Balance&quot; is elevated to the dignity of capital
letters, and becomes the original power which initiated all sub
sequent changes, and was the cause of all inorganic and organic
Evolution. Is
&quot; Absence of Balance,&quot; then, a corollary from the
Persistence of Force 1 If so, then the tendency to equilibrium
is not. Yet Mr. Spencer teaches elsewhere the tendency to
equilibration, and speaks of an ultimate equilibrium to which
all things tend. It would be interesting to know if equilibra
tion is a corollary from the Persistence of Eorce. But again, it
is not clear but that the law of Rhythm prevents equilibration,
and keeps up the &quot;Absence of Balance.&quot; In that case Rhythm
would seem to be a corollary of the Persistence of Force.
But as Mr. Spencer has not thoroughly worked out a priori
the order of the corollaries of the Persistence of Force, we are
all along left in a state of obscurity. At any rate, it is some
thing to know that the Instability of the Homogeneous means
nothing more than the &quot;Absence of Balance.&quot;
Taken in this meaning, it is a condition and not a law. The
action consequent upon such a state of things is the tendency
to a balance or state of equilibrium, and thus we find physiolo
gical development to be part of the more general process of
equilibration. Mr. Spencer expresses his conclusion thus :
&quot;
Physiological development, then, is initiated by that insta
bility of the homogeneous which we have seen to be everywhere
a cause of evolution.&quot; *
The next section shows how physiological development has
all along been aided by the multiplication of effects, how each
differentiation has ever tended to become the parent of new
differentiations. The ruling cause of changes under this head
ing is, however, found to lie in the operation of the process of
equilibration a tendency to a state of balance either by means
of simple equilibration or by the special equilibration of the
moving equilibrium.
Section 313 brings before us in a more direct manner the
ruling principle of all change as operative also in Biology.
*
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&quot; The general truth next to be resumed, is that these pro
cesses have for their limit a state of equilibrium proximately
a moving equilibrium and ultimately a complete equilibrium.
The changes we have contemplated are but the concomitants of
a progressing equilibration. In every aggregate which we call
living, as well as in all other aggregates, the instability of the
homogeneous is but another name for the absence of balance
between the incident forces and the forces which the aggregate
opposes to them ; and the passage into heterogeneity is the pas
sage towards a state of balance. And to say that in every aggre
gate, organic or other, there goes on a multiplication of effects,
is but to say that one part which has a fresh force impressed oil
it, must go on changing and communicating secondary changes,
until the whole of the impressed force has been used up in
generating equivalent reactive forces.
&quot; *
These considerations lead us in the following section to the
affiliation of all these changes upon the principle which governs
the universal process of equilibration. This is the Persistence
of Force.
&quot;314. In all which universal laws, we find ourselves again
brought down to the persistence of force, as the deepest know-
able cause of those modifications which constitute physiological
development ; as it is the deepest knowable cause of all other
evolution. Here, as elsewhere, the perpetual lapse from less
to greater heterogeneity, the perpetual begetting of secondary
modifications by each primary modification, and the perpetual
approach to a temporary balance on the way towards a final
balance, are necessary implications of the ultimate fact that force
cannot disappear, but can only change its form.&quot; *
The general remark upon this doctrine is to the effect that
all changes may be found in harmony with it
; but that, never
theless, this statement of the principles of change in general is
not sufficient to explain any particular change. We saw, for
instance, in our study of the
&quot; Conservation of Energy,&quot; under
Professor Stewart, that the change from one kind of energy
necessitates an equivalent increase in some other kind ; but by
*
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no effort of the deductive faculty could we deduce any special
change from this abstract law. So in all other physical change,
and so in all biological change, we can make no concrete deduc
tions from abstract statements, but only from concrete ante
cedents, by applying to these given facts the known general
properties or modes of relation thereof summarised in the
abstract law. This remark will hold good as well of simple
equilibrations as of the special biological equilibrations. They
may indeed be discerned as being in harmony with the Per
sistence of Force, but they can never be derived from it in
their special forms. This has to be done intermediately through
special concretes. Thus we are thrown back upon our concrete
study as carried on in the previous sections of this chapter.
But since we found that all the processes therein dealt with
depended upon certain views of equilibration, we shall best
continue our study by examining the chapters in vol. i. of the
&quot;
Biology&quot; dealing with the causes of Organic Evolution.
7. How is Organic Evolution Caused ?
This is the question proposed by Mr. Spencer in Part III.,
Chapter VIII.
, and it receives an answer in the following
chapters.
&quot; The task before us is to deduce the leading facts of organic
evolution, from those same first principles which evolution at
large conforms to.&quot; *
&quot; To say that functional adaptation to conditions, produces
either evolution in general, or the irregularities of evolution,
is to raise the further question Why is there a functional
adaptation to conditions ? why do use and disuse generate
appropriate changes of structure 1 Neither this nor any other
interpretation of biologic evolution, which rests simply on the
basis of biologic induction, is an ultimate interpretation. The
biologic interpretation must itself be interpreted. Only when
the process of evolution of organisms, is affiliated on the process
of evolution in general, can it be truly said to be explained.
*
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The thing required is to show that its various results are corol
laries from first principles. We have to reconcile the facts
with the universal laws of the redistribution of matter and
motion.&quot; *
How is this done ? How is the process of the evolution of
organisms to be affiliated upon evolution in general, by which
this functional adaptation is to be explained 1
It is done by taking for granted that organisms exist, and
then proceeding to show how the conditions of their environ
ment have been affected, first, by astronomical changes ( 148) ;
secondly, by geological actions
( 149) ; thirdly, by consequent
variations of the meteorological conditions
( 150); fourthly, by
changes in the incident forces which organisms exercise on one
another ( 151); and lastly, by the increasing complexity of the
organism thus modified, which brings it into contact with a
greater variety of environment, and so itself produces still fur
ther complexity in the future ( 152).
This is clearly not an answer to the question proposed, for it
presupposes throughout the existence of organisms, and thus
begs the question at issue. Therefore, in Chapter X., we are
brought to consider the
&quot; Internal Factors
&quot; thus acted upon,
involving a reference to the first chapters of the work, giving an
account of these factors, which we considered at the outset.
Mr. Spencer then proceeds
&quot;
154. Our postulate being that organic evolution in general
commenced with homogeneous organic matter, just as the evo
lution of individual organism commences, we have first to
remember that the state of homogeneity is an unstable state
&quot;
(&quot;First Principles,&quot; 109).$
&quot; Hence the gravitation from a state of homogeneity, to a
state of heterogeneity, will be conspicuously shown in propor
tion as the environment is complex.&quot; f
This is not saying much. &quot;Organic matter&quot; is nothing
more than combinations of some of the chemical elements i.e.,
those which we now know to be the constituents of organisms,
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Supposing a great quantity of this to be so formed and to be




because it is &quot;homogeneous&quot; it does not remain so, but forth





the homogeneous is unstable. If \ve ask why it is unstable, we
are told that after all it is not because it is homogeneous, but
because of external influences, and it becomes differentiated
because these external influences are of diverse characters. This
being so, we can understand that homogeneous organic matter
should become differentiated.
But surely it is saying too much to call such changes
&quot; differ
entiations of structure.&quot; There are many changes produced in
bodies by external forces
; whether they are structural changes
or not depends in great measure upon the properties of the con
stituents. We should judge from the modifiability of organic
matter that it never possessed sufficient stability of character
to be capable of assuming any definite structural arrangement.
Thereupon Mr. Spencer, boldly assuming genesis and heredity,
speaks of
&quot; This transition from a uniform to a multiform state, must
continue through successive individuals. Given a series of
organisms, each of which is developed from a portion of a pre
ceding organism, and the question is,&quot; &c.*
Thus we see that
&quot;
Omitting for the present those circumstances which check
and qualify its consequences, the instability of the homoge
neous must be recognised an ever-acting cause of organic evolu
tion, as of all other evolution.&quot; f
We find that the multiplication of effects aids continually to
increase that heterogeneity into which homogeneity inevitably
lapses. |
Again,
&quot; One of the universal principles to which we saw that
the redistribution of matter and motion conforms, is that in
any aggregate made up of mixed units, incident forces produce
segregation separate unlike units and unite like units; and
it was shown that the increasing integration and definiteness
*
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which characterises each part of an evolving organic aggregate,
as of every other aggregate, results from this.&quot; *
Having thus passed in review the external factors and the
internal factors, Mr. Spencer concludes
-
&quot; It is quite conceivable that aggregates should be rendered
more heterogeneous by changing incident forces, without having
given to them that peculiar form of heterogeneity required for
carrying on the functions of life. Hence it remains now to
inquire, how the production and maintenance of this peculiar
form of heterogeneity is insured.&quot; f
8. Equilibration.
(a.) Introductory.
We will now ask the reader to enter upon an inquiry as to
Equilibration ; and first let us glance at the terms in which this
inquiry should be conducted. It is evident that if we com
mence our studies with one set of terms and end them with
another, there may possibly be involved some change of thought.
Mr. Spencer commences the investigation in terms of Motion
and concludes in terms of Force. The completed doctrine and
its application in the explanation of Biology receives its fullest
exposition in the language of the Equilibration of Forces,
whereas we commence our studies with an inquiry as to the
Equilibration of Motions.
(6.) Equilibration of Motion.
From Mr. Spencer s treatment of the subject in
&quot; First Prin
ciples&quot; it would almost appear as if he taught that all motion
tended towards a state of quiescence or no-motion. J This, of
course, would be contradictory to his theory of the Continuity
of Motion. We have already given our reasons for supposing
this theory to be incorrect ; but we can scarcely expect Mr.
Spencer to involve himself in the inconsistency of repudiating
*
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that which is one of the two essentials of the Formula of Evo
lution. We decide, however, that he has in view the theory of
the Dissipation of Energy, which would be more correctly de
nominated the Degradation or Equalisation of Energy. This
is an accepted scientific doctrine, recognising the universal ten
dency of all the forms of energy specified in Professor Stewart s
list towards an eventual equal distribution in the form of uni
versally diffused heat, when all energy should have lost its
efficacy in doing work in consequence of having sunk to a dead
level of uniformity of kind in a state of equal distribution. But
even in this last resort the quantity of energy remains constant,
and Mr. Spencer s theory of the Continuity of Motion need not
suffer from it. Therefore if we confine our inquiry to the facts
of Motion, we shall see that the processes are all towards an
ultimate state of equal distribution.
(c.) Equilibration and the Conservation of Energy.
We have found, however,* that Motion is not continuous,
that its various forms are only modes of energy, all of which are
capable of being transformed into modes of Energy of Position,
in which no actual motion takes place, although the Energy of
Position is capable of reconversion into energy of motion. It is
the sum of both kinds which is constant
; and even should all
suffer degradation by conversion into an universally diffused and
equalised heat motion, still the total quantity would remain the
same.
The changes which take place in the cosmos may pos
sibly be spoken of as equilibrations of energy, so much of
one kind being converted into so much of another kind. In
this view equilibration becomes identical with the conception of
Universal Causation, unifying the idea of the latter at the ex
pense of the definiteness of the former. Whether it is advisable
to regard all changes of dynamical relations, all physical inci
dents, all chemical processes, all actions of light and heat, all
motions of liquids and gases, all electrical and other manifesta
tions, as processes of equilibration, is a question well worthy
*
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of study, as is also the question what is involved in such a
mode of regarding the cosmos. The essential idea undoubtedly
is the attribution of quantitative to qualitative relationship, and
involves progression towards a state of universal rest or quies
cence, or towards a state of universal uniformity of distribution
a state of homogeneity or equal balance from which no farther
changes ensue.
(d.) Equilibration and Force.
Perhaps the more general acceptation of the term Equilibrium
would be in the sense of an equipoise of force or forces. Pro
bably the most typical of all modes of equilibrium is that of
the scales or balance. The idea of opposing force by force, with
the involved idea of relative proportion, must have entered very
early into the range of human conceptions. But neither the
vulgar notion of the play of forces, nor Mr. Spencer s equally
vague symbol &quot;z,&quot; is available for any scientific purpose, nor
for our present special object, in ascertaining the meaning of
eqiulibration.
&quot;We are obliged always to resort to the concrete
when we desire our reasoning to be effective in understanding
the laws of concretes or in our practical dealing with them.
Take, for instance, a pair of scales. We may, if we please,
consider that each side is drawn to the earth by a force,
and for ordinary everyday thought there is no need to quarrel
with the supposition. But for actual use, and in reasoning
processes, we are obliged to consider the 1-lb. weight we place
in the scale as the embodiment and measure of so much force, as
in fact being itself
&quot; a force ;
&quot; and if we place two J-lb. weights
in the opposite scale, we have the conception of a force balanced
by another and equal force, by which an equilibrium is at
tained. As thus used,
&quot;a force&quot; would not be a vague abstrac
tion, but a concrete body. Taken generally, a force would be a
definite concrete, which, either from its motion or its position,






Thus, we are not at liberty to indulge in vague notions of
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are obliged to regard heat or molecular motion, light or ethereal
motion, chemical attractions, cohesive attractions, &c., as defi
nite and measurable concretes.
If we choose to regard any aggregate possessing energy, or any
part thereof, as
&quot; a force,&quot; we may do so. And if by reason of
general distribution we refer to some of the modes of energy as
&quot; forces
&quot; or
&quot; external forces,&quot; again we may do so, bearing in
mind, however, the necessity for detailed and definite state
ment of the relations of the energies referred to.
We shall therefore pursue our inquiry into the processes of
equilibration by means of the strictly scientific set of terms
afforded us in Professor Stewart s list of the modes of energy,
and afterwards examine Mr. Spencer s looser expositions with
the involved corollaries. As Mr. Spencer carries on the inquiry
on the supposition that all changes are modes of equilibration
of forces, and the object of our study is to examine the validity
of this theory, it will be necessary for us so to employ the term,
though we take exception to it.
(e.) Equilibration as a Universal Process.
Eegarded in this light, all actions which take place in the
universe, being incidents in the interrelation of modes of energy,
are equilibrations, or processes towards a state of equilibrium.
Some form of energy is being changed into some other form, on
the way towards a state of general diffusion. Equilibration be
comes thus a general name for the totality of the processes of the
universe, and it takes the place of the general term Causation, but
connotes rather their quantitative than their qualitative aspect.
Obviously this is quite a different case from the conception of
the mechanical equilibrium of the scales previously referred to,
and their rhythmical motion when disturbed, which ends in a
state of rest. But this latter process receives from Mr. Spen
cer a wider application as &quot;equilibration.&quot; We have in this
confusion of the mechanical and the general physical applica
tions of the term a play upon two meanings of the word which
pervades the whole of Mr. Spencer s reasonings with very con-3 i8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
fusing effect. We have now to consider it in its general physical
application.
As an instrument of reasoning, however, it is not of much
use. For if we are to postulate a state of equilibrium at the
beginning of things, it is clear that in the absence of something
to disturb that equilibrium there could have been no initiation
of change. In this respect a state of perfect equilibrium is
equivalent to a state of homogeneity ; and to commence changes
we should have to suppose the instability of equilibrium, or a
self-determination to change similar to the instability of the
homogeneous. Any reasoning from such a basis is ridiculous,
and may be made to lead anywhere according to the fancy of
the reasoner.
The commencement of our reasonings, therefore, must be in a
state of want of balance, with a tendency towards an equal dis
tribution of energy. Thereupon arises the suggestion of two
modes of procedure towards a state of equilibrium. Taking the
origiual state of which we can form any scientific conception as
one of an incandescent nebula composed of the seventy so-called
elements or their primitive constituents, we would conclude that
under the law of equilibration they would all resolve themselves
into their constituents and produce a uniform state of ultimate
units of matter equally distributed. But since this is not the
process which actually took place, we must suppose that these
constituents, being unresolvable, each being a bundle of proper
ties incapable of dissociation, the equilibration towards which
they worked was one which would secure to all of them a state
of rest or quiescence. This would take, in the first instance,
the form of segregation according to the specific gravity and
polarities of the various atoms, their position in the mass, and
the general motion of the nebula itself.
Our conception of this process of cosmic equilibration, there
fore, is limited to a conception of the equilibrations of the
chemical elements, and thus we find our study is not capable
of any treatment in terms of a general or abstract nature,
but we are continually forced to a consideration of it as a
complex concrete problem. The task before us is to deduce
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incandescent nebula composed of the chemical elements in cer
tain quantities and distributions. To call these interactions by
the general term equilibrations is not to effect any explanation.
It may be of interest to know that mechanical, chemical, and
other modes of energy are interchangeable, and we may think
it adds to our knowledge to term these changes equilibra
tions
; but the definite knowledge of any given change, evolu
tion, or development must be knowledge of the relations of
antecedent concretes, before it can take its place in any valid
system.
The problem from beginning to end must be conceived of as
a concrete inquiry and not as a problem of mere nomenclature
of processes. We, however, still proceed with our inquiry in
terms of equilibration, and would next study the various kinds
of equilibration referred to by Mr. Spencer.
(/.) Modes of Equilibration.
Equilibration, of course, in principle is only of one kind, but
for convenience sake it may be regarded as effectuating itself by
various modes. Simple equilibration (sometimes called direct)
is a term which may be applied to all interactions of energies,
but is generally limited to those which terminate immediately
and are not the beginning of a long series of changes. When a
change is initiated in a complex set of conditions, the results
are complex and set up long lines of change. Each little change
in the series is a simple or direct equilibration, but viewed as a
whole the process may be regarded as compound, complex, or
indirect equilibration. These, however, are merely names given
for our convenience, and do not indicate anything peculiar or
varied in the modes of the process.
If we limit the use of the word Equilibration to the mechanical
relations of masses, the term loses its general vagueness, and in
stead of being understood as co-extensive with causation in
general, it becomes a term in the science of Mechanics. This
science is usually divided into the three branches of Kinematics
(Motion), Dynamics (Force), and Statics (Eest), the latter involv
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universe, including the chemical, ethereal, electrical, and others,
will ultimately be resolved in terms of mechanics is an open
question ; but until we are able so to deal with them we must
hold the laws of mechanics as applicable only within the purview
of that science. If we extend the use of the terms employed
there into other sciences, we must understand that they do not
carry with them the same meaning.
(g.) Unstable Equilibrium.
In mechanics equilibrium may be of three kinds, (i.) The
body may be in such a position that if slightly displaced it tends
to return to its original position, in which case the equilibrium
is stable. (2.) Or it may tend to move farther away from its
position, in which case the equilibrium is unstable. (3.) Or it
may remain in its new position, in which case the equilibrium is
neutral. A body when displaced assumes a position of unstable
equilibrium in passing from one position of stable equilibrium
into another. The potential energy or Energy of Position which
a body in a given position possesses varies with its condition of
equilibrium. In neutral equilibrium the potential energy is
the same for all positions of the body. In stable equilibrium
the potential energy is a minimum, in other words, the body is
in the most unfavourable position for doing work; whilst in
unstable equilibrium the potential energy is a maximum, and
the application of the smallest force can at once convert this
Energy of Position into Energy of Motion. A body in unstable
equilibrium may be said, therefore, so far as its position is con
cerned, to be charged with the greatest amount of potential
energy it can possess.
*
The considerations herein involved are illustrated in books on
mechanics by the relations of bodies, but it may be considered
that they are applicable also to other cases of Energy of
Position included in Professor Stewart s list that is to say,
to chemical separation, electrical separation, molecular separation,
and so forth.
*
Magnus, Lessons in Mechanics, p. 253.MOVING EQUILIBRIA. 321
(h.) Moving Equilibria.
In the preceding section we found it stated that a body when
displaced assumes a position of unstable equilibrium in passing
from one position of stable equilibrium to another. This is
in truth an untenable proposition, for a state of unstable
equilibrium is one of actual equilibrium, but one which is
capable of being very easily disturbed. The body, in passing
from one position of equilibrium to another, is never in a state
of equilibrium, unless, indeed, a body in motion is to be
regarded as at every moment of time successively in a state of
equilibrium. In this case, everything at every instant is in
a state of equilibrium, whether it be in rest or in motion, and
all distinctiveness of meaning is lost. It is well to keep rigidly
to the distinction between Equilibration, the process, and Equi
librium, the statical result. An equilibrium implies a balance
of energy in place, exhibiting no motion. An equilibration is
the process resultant upon the unequal relations of energies
seeking an equality. The former implies rest, the latter
implies motion. A difficulty certainly arises if we contemplate
the final state of the cosmos as one of the universally diffused
degraded energy of equal heat motion
; but this is perhaps a
merely speculative difficulty, to be got over by regarding the
final state as one of uniform spatial relation, and need not prac
tically be taken into account. An equilibration, in the widest
sense, may be regarded as the passage from some state of
Energy of Position through the state of Energy of Motion to
another state of Energy of Position.
Our view of an equilibration is much affected by its relative
length and simplicity. The fall of a body to the ground, the
flow of a liquid, or an instantaneous chemical combination,
affects our senses as a direct and simple equilibration. On the
other hand, when we see a series of quick changes ending in a
state of quiescence, the mind travels along the line of events, and
regarding the beginning and the end, considers it as an indirect
equilibration.
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study. If rotary motion be imparted to bodies of various
configuration, with or without other relative motions, a com
plicated resulting process ensues. The body having this rotary
motion may be placed upon the ground like a top, or projected
through the air like a rifle-ball. Evidently we could produce
illustrations, varying by insensible gradations from cases where
the rotary motion terminated abruptly, up to cases where the
rotary motion, having considerable initial energy and small
amounts of resistance to overcome (like the Japanese spinning-
top), might continue for a very considerable time. We direct
attention to the latter case, and ask the question Is it to be
regarded as a process of equilibration, or are we to consider the
top as in a state of equilibrium 1 We think there can be no
doubt as to the reply
: it is a case of protracted equilibration ;
it is absurd to call it a state of equilibrium. Yet the top
is called, when in this condition,
&quot;a moving equilibrium.&quot;
Kow, these are terms of convenience which are quite justi
fiable when properly employed, but which, when extended
to logically reasoned investigations of the unknown, are very
dangerous ; and as a large application is made of this term in
Mr. Spencer s biological explanations, we would have it well
understood.
Let us now pass on to another kind of rotation to which
the same term is applied. It is that in which various bodies
have related motions, forming altogether a complete system
amongst themselves. The typical instance is that of the Solar
System. Here we have quite a number of planets and asteroids
circling round a central sun, with apparently inappreciable
diminution of velocity ; but the reasonings of astronomers lead
them to predict a time when the motion of these bodies will be
overcome by the resistance of the fine medium through which
they pass, and all will be precipitated into the central mass.
Evidently this also is a case of protracted equilibration,
although it may be convenient in certain aspects to regard the
solar system as a moving equilibrium. We do not know that
this system is at all of a complicated character. The main
movements of the members are so preponderatingly due to their
initial motion and their relation to the sun, that their influenceEQUILIBRATION AND STRUCTURE. 323
upon one another is quite a minimum, and the term system, if
it implies complicated interrelationship of part with part, is
almost inapplicable. The system, although to the eye possessing
great complexity, is mechanically one of great simplicity. Nor
does the fact of some of the members of the system having
satellites affect our statement of the case.





is applied. It comprises all kinds of tools,
machines, engines, or instruments designed and used by an
intelligence for the intentional change of some kinds of energy
into rearrangements of matter. The most conspicuous illustra
tion is that of the steam-engine. The energy of position in the
coal is transformed into energy of molecular separation of the
water, which again finds a channel in the molar motion of the
piston-rod, beam, wheels, &c., of the engine, and is finally
expended in the production of some work. Altogether, this is
a process of equilibration in the scientific sense of the term
but where is the equilibrium? To call an engine a &quot;dependent
moving equilibrium
&quot;
may look scientific, but will not stand a
moment s investigation. A &quot;self-feeding&quot; engine is in this
respect to be regarded as identical with an ordinary engine.





atoms,&quot; are systems of a construction
something like the solar system, and are therefore
&quot;
moving
equilibria.&quot; This is a mere hypothesis, and all such suppo
sitions are very difficult to work out to their extreme results.
To do so we should have to decide whether they were merely
protracted equilibrations or absolute moving equilibria. But
to interpret chemical affinities, to explain the attractions of
polarity, to understand the normal velocities of atoms, and to
reason out the resulting combinations on the hypothesis of
atoms as being either protracted equilibrations or absolute
moving equilibria, transcends our knowledge and capacity at the
present time.
(? .) Equilibration and Structure.
Yet Mr. Spencer undertakes to explain molecular structure by
means of polarities and equilibrations. Are they more than mere324 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
words roughly symbolising some of the leading characteristics
of the process, but very far from affording us a strictly scientific
knowledge of each special formation 1 To know the mode of
crystalloid aggregation, to be aware of polar attractions, to have
discovered the laws of chemical combination, are great accessions
to real knowledge from which we can reason ; but we can only
reason from the known factors and their known relationships.
&quot;We are not justified in reasoning from general characteristics.
We cannot satisfy the logical faculty by the lavish use of terms
derived from actual physical processes but of unspecialised
application.
There is no reason from analogy to suppose any similarity of
structure between a chemical element and the solar system, but
rather the reverse. The latter would undoubtedly lose its indi
viduality if brought into union with another similar system, and
could not be extracted thereafter from the intermixture; whereas
an atom of a chemical element never loses its individuality, but
can be separated and recovered from its various combinations.
Therefore if it is a moving equilibrium it remains intact, and
may practically be considered solely as operating according to
its known modes, quite independently of the hypothesis of its
being a moving equilibrium. Atoms as moving equilibria may
be left out of account. Can the same be said of molecules ?
With regard to crystalloid molecules, we have no reason to
suppose that they aggregate otherwise than by mere attraction,
the components being ranged by their polarities, and producing
a general shape and structure resulting from the shapes and sizes
of the constituents. With regard to colloidal molecules, the
inquiry becomes more interesting and more obscure.
A moving equilibrium may be defined as a body or set of
bodies having a maximum of motions in relation to itself or to
each other, and a minimum of motions in relation to the en
vironment, so that their initial mechanical energy is slowly
expended in overcoming the slight resistances of the medium
or the environment. We state it in purely mechanical terms,
because we cannot imagine any other mode of stating a moving
equilibrium which shall retain any special meaning. It accords
with Mr. Spencer s examples, although he extends the applica-EQUILIBRATION AND STRUCTURE. 325
tion of the term equilibration so as to make its meaning identical
with general causation.
If we begin with ammonia, NH3 , and replace one of the
atoms of hydrogen by an atom of methyl, and produce methyl-
amine, jST(CH3H2 ), what is the nature of the process ? How
are we to regard
]S&quot;H3 in the first place ? Is it simply an aggre
gate of atoms sticking together like small magnets, or is it a
moving equilibrium composed of atoms having relative motions
according to their bulk and velocities ? Let us accept the latter
supposition as more favourable to progress in the direction we
wish. What must we suppose happens when an atom of hydrogen
is extracted and its place is taken by an atom, or rather a mole
cule, of methyl ? Granting this to be the removal of one member
of a moving equilibrium and the introduction of others, we can
only imagine that the sj
rstem of motions has been readjusted
according to the bulk and velocities of the new factor. Are we
then to conceive of chemical combinations on the hypothesis of
absolute permanent velocities of gases, and are we to regard the
molecules formed from them as permanent moving equilibria
which suffer no diminution of motion ? There would in this
case exist such things as absolute moving equilibria and not
protracted equilibrations ending in a final equilibrium of disso
lution. The theory of the absolute velocity of atoms and conse
quent absolute moving equilibria of molecules, according to
which each kind of chemical element in a gaseous condition
has its characteristic velocity and perhaps mode of motion, which
it never loses under any condition, and in virtue of which it
enters into relation with other bodies, contradicts all the recog
nised principles of mechanics and those processes of equilibra
tion through which, according to the theory of the dissipation
or degradation of energy, all motion eventually finds a dead
level of equal distribution either in the form of energy of
motion or equality of distance.
It would appear that an absolute moving equilibrium can have
no relation to environment as such, for if it is thus, in relation
it must lose energy and gravitate towards final equilibrium.
Is there any reason to suppose that water is such a protracted
equilibration, tending ever, but slowly, towards dissolution ?326 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
We think it is not so regarded. Yet if it were an absolute
moving equilibrium it would not as such have any relation to
the environment. We must therefore suppose that when part
of it enters into combination with iron, this combination is
effected otherwise than as the rearrangement of a moving equi
librium, more especially when such a recombination is selective
in the throwing off, for instance, of the hydrogen and the pre
ference for the oxygen. The explanation of preferential chemical
affinities is to be sought rather in primary polarities than in
the mechanical relations of moving equilibria.
Is there such a thing as the equilibration of polarities ? That
supposition is, we think, beyond the reach of conception. It
escapes mental representation altogether. It would imply a
quantitative equalisation of all attractions and repulsions, the
despecialisation of all special affinities, and indeed of all the
characteristics of the chemical elements.
Let us now return to a consideration of complex molecules
as moving equilibria. Mr. Spencer speaks of their formation
as
&quot; a change of the molecule into equilibrium with its environ
ment.&quot; * In so using the term he cannot refer to the rearrange
ment of a moving equilibrium as above defined, but can only be
employing it as a term connoting the quantitative aspect of
qualitative causation. It is true he attempts to specialise it as
&quot;an adaptation, as it were, to new surrounding conditions ;
&quot; but
here he does not use the term &quot;adaptation&quot; in the biological
sense we shall have to consider in the next section, but only in
the sense by which every change whatsoever, chemical or
physical or otherwise, may be termed an adaptation.
We have come to this point, then, that molecules however
complex are not to be regarded as moving equilibria in the
mechanical sense previously defined. They are to be regarded
rather as specially arranged positions of atoms than as specially
arranged motions of atoms, and are neither absolute moving
equilibria nor protracted equilibrations subject to loss of energy
and final dissolution.
If we can suppose the dissolution of complex molecules, not
*
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from chemical attacks, but from their own expenditure of energy
and final incoherence, how are we to imagine their original forma
tion ? It could not have been from their own resources, for that
which formed them would hold them together. The hypothesis
of the natural decay of molecules necessitates the supposition
of a superior external agency in their formation, the influence
of which restrains them for a period, and then, its coercive
power being lost, allows the dissolution. But as there is no
theory of the natural dissolution of molecules through failure
of such internal energy, we must abandon the hypothesis of their
being protracted equilibrations like the solar system. We have
also found the theory of their being merely absolute moving
equilibria untenable. Thus the purely mechanical theory of
molecular relationship by which biological changes are effected
in detail is found not to be true. We have now to see how it
is sought to bring biological changes within the scope of me
chanical laws, by means of the phenomena presented by
&quot; mov
ing equilibria.&quot;
(7u ) TJie Motions of Moving Equilibria.
We have two, possibly three, types of moving equilibria to
consider, of which the spinning-top, the solar system, and the
steam-engine may be taken as representatives.
A spinning-top has no parts moving in relation to one another,
but is a single solid body, and even in its most eccentric motions
these are all relative to other bodies, not to itself. When leav
ing the hand, it has two motions besides the rotary motion
one by which it travels a short distance from the operator, and
a &quot;wobbling&quot; motion by which the plane of its axis inclines
to one side or the other. The first motion is soon exhausted.
The second motion is more slowly overcome until the rotary
motion only prevails, and the top acquires the state of &quot;sleep
ing.&quot; If the initial rotary motion is not great, while the
thrust is great with a considerable declination, the top never
acquires the steady rotary motion at all, and presently falls
to the ground ; whereas if care is taken to secure a minimum of
these motions, the top will very speedily acquire the
&quot;sleeping&quot;32S SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
state, and will remain in motion a considerable time. It is
an instance of protracted equilibration. The opposing forces
are slight, the losses of motion slow. The principal point of




overcome by the rotary motion and the language by which it is
to be described. We think there can be no difficulty in ascrib
ing the process to the class of cases in mechanics in which one
powerful energy by sheer momentum nullifies a weaker opposite
energy, and with slightly diminished or divergent force pursues
its way. We do not think that there is any occasion to speak of
counterbalance, of adaptation, or rearrangement. We find no
such terms made use of in treatises on mechanics with regard
to the case before us.
The next instance we shall take is that of the steam-engine.
This case is extremely complicated in appearance but very simple
in principle. A certain amount of Energy of Position is con
verted into an equivalent of Energy of Motion, which is either
given off freely to the air and solid bodies in the form of mole
cular motion, or is reconverted into some other mode of Energy
of Position or Energy of Motion. The engine itself has no
motion except as the means of transfer. If its motions lasted
a long time after receiving the energy, it would be a case of
protracted equilibration ; but that is not so. When the energy is
removed, rest speedily ensues. The attainment of a state of
rest is one of great simplicity. There is no complication in our
thoughts as to counterbalancing, adaptation, and rearrangement
of motion.
The case of the solar system requires greater consideration.
Here we have quite a number of separate bodies, each with its
own momentum and gravitative attraction towards each of the
other members of the system. This is not a simple moving
equilibrium like the spinning-top, but a complex one, and it
leaves room for speculation. What, for instance, would happen
were another planet to be introduced into the system ? Startling
as such a supposition might be, we make no doubt however that,
given the size, momentum, and point of incidence of such a
visitor, a mathematician would be able to calculate the amount
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system. The incoming mass might be as small as an asteroid,
making no appreciable difference in the motions of the planetary
system, or it might be of such magnitude as to destroy the
general balance. But suppose a planet of medium size to be
projected into the system there would no doubt be some re
arrangement of the motions of the various members till a normal
rhythm was again attained. We believe the problem would be
recognised as a purely mechanical one of the composition of
motions. Possibly it would be fair to speak of such rearrange
ments as adaptations or counterbalances, but the terms would
be understood in purely mechanical senses.
(I.) Moving Equilibria Waste and Repair.
In the case of the spinning-top there is a loss of motion, but
no loss of substance. In the case of the solar system there is
again loss of motion, but no loss of substance. We do not
know if this accords with the fundamental conception of waste.
Of course there is no decrease in the quantity of energy in the
cosmos, but each of these cases presents a local diminution of
energy without loss of substance. Thus we may speak of waste




loss of substance. Moving equilibria, so far as we are acquainted
with them, are not subject to loss of substance, but only to
diminution of motion. If a member of the solar system lost its
motion, it would not be left behind or thrown out as waste
; it
would fall into the central sun, with results which it is not
necessary to consider. Should, however, a member of the system
be abstracted therefrom, there would be a rearrangement of
mutual motions. Yet we cannot suppose for a moment that this
missing planet would leave a hiatus which the system would
endeavour to make good. The system would in its way be just
as perfect and harmonious as before. It would not need repair
nor seek completion of its former model. Thus a moving
equilibrium does not imply loss of substance on the one hand,
nor the replacement of lost substance on the other hand. The
only meaning of a moving equilibrium is a continuous relative
and rhythmic motion of bodies constituting a system of motions330 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
subject to constant, although perhaps inappreciable diminution,
and thus subject to an eventual dissolution.
(m.) The Evolution of Moving Equilibria.
In Sub-section (i.) we considered the conception of atoms and
the evolution of molecules as moving equilibria, resulting in an
opinion adverse to that hypothesis. We have now to ask the
student s attention to the evolution of systems of molecules as
moving equilibria.
The radical weakness of all these speculations is that we know
nothing whatever about the ultimate structure and motions of the
chemical elements. This, in our judgment, is an absolute bar
to all sound thinking from the a priori side. However far back
we penetrate, we never get back far enough to reach the funda
mental explanations ; and if we begin our work at a later point,
we find ourselves continually being thrown off at a tangent from
the great cosmic circlings. Until we can penetrate to the very
heart of the matter, no deductive reasonings will carry us far.
If we enter upon such speculations, it is merely to show the
futility of all such endeavours, including those of Mr. Spencer.
How, for instance, are we to set about the d, priori study of
the evolution of systems of molecules as moving equilibria ?
Are we to conceive of the completed result as a system similar
to the solar system 1 And again, how are we to conceive of the
molecules and of their aggregation
1 Are they brought together
by polarity, and so arranged into certain forms of structure 1
Are we to suppose that in this concentration they acquire veloci
ties which in the system they form result in relative rhythmic
motions ? and these motions, are they rotary, or those of
mutual approach and retrocession? In all such cases there
would be preliminary difficulties to settle as to the confinement
of the term equilibration to the mechanical conception of the
motions of bodies, or as to the enlargement of its application to
the polarities of atoms and molecules. To disentange the con
ceptions of equilibrations of polarities is, however, beyond our
powers of analysis. Another difficulty would lie in the conception
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of molecules any sensible time for its existence, so as to give it
sufficient warrant in continuance to entitle it to be regarded as
a protracted equilibration. It is supposed that the formation of
a moving equilibrium of molecules could only take place in water
of a certain temperature. But one would suppose that the friction
and resistance of the water would very speedily subtract so much
motion from the system as to lead to an almost immediate dis
solution.
If we are to consider systems of molecules as moving equili
bria from a purely mechanical point of view, there is no doubt
of the above result. Can we then regard them from any
other conceivable point of view ? We cannot conceive of equi
librations of polarity otherwise than as the statical arrange
ment of structure involving the conception of relative position
rather than the conception of relative rhythmic motion. Can
we then form the latter conception out of any of the other
energies of motion mentioned in Professor Stewart s list, such
as molecular motion, electrical motion, ethereal motion, &c. ?
We fear we can form no conception of motion free from the
mechanical limitations of body,momentum, velocity, and position.
If this difficulty attends the a priori synthesis of systems of
molecules as moving equilibria, how much more difficult must
be the synthesis of systems of systems of moving equilibria
forming still more complicated moving equilibria
1
Each fresh combination involves the double difficulty of con
sidering the cause and nature of the combination. Is it merely
segregation or simple polarity ? Then what is segregation ? Is it
chemical affinity? Then what is chemical affinity? Is it
polarity ? Then what is the result of polarity beyond relative
position ? Is it mechanical equilibration ? Then how are we to
conceive of atoms and molecules and their correlations as purely
mechanical relations ? And when these systems of systems of
moving equilibria are formed, how do they interact?
We ask all these questions, supposing them incapable of
reply ; but we do not forget that Mr. Spencer himself has
given a hypothetical account of the evolution of such systems.
Let us recur to it with the view of testing the deductive warrant
and examining the language he makes use of in his reasonings.332 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
We have to direct attention to the Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;Biology.&quot; The especial point to be kept in view in this
account of the evolution of moving equilibria is not, as Mr.
Spencer would imply, the growth of complexity and consequent
susceptibility to change from the slightest alteration of incident
forces. Nor is it the question how from the known chemical
and physical properties of certain of the chemical elements the
properties of their aggregations are to be deduced. In our
previous criticism we animadverted upon the purely verbal
process and verbal result. What we would now specially im
press upon the student is that from first to last this process of
reasoning should be carried on in terms of the conception of
a mechanical moving equilibrium. We hold that any other
special conception of equilibration is not possible, and the
general conception of it as identical with universal causation is
valueless as an instrument of definite thought.
The passage in question takes equilibration in this wide sense
and altogether overlooks the treatment of the subject in the
special mechanical sense. It is, therefore, ineffective in its ex
planations taken as preliminary to those subsequent higher com
binations and [events which are to be interpreted under the
special aspect of moving equilibria. The second part of this
Appendix deals with the evolution of physiological units, and
is also characterised by the absence of any treatment of the
subject in the terms of
&quot;
moving equilibria
&quot; and by the constant
introduction of
&quot;polarity.&quot; Here again the onus of the con
structive process is thrown upon the known properties of the
original chemical elements. The only special use made of the
term equilibration is in the influence of parts upon parts in
changes of the molecular condition of bodies. Otherwise it is
employed in its universalistic sense.
(n.) Moving Equilibria and Simple Equilibration.
All direct physical actions, such as the fall of a body to the
ground, the passage of a current of electricity, a chemical com





equilibrations. In what relation do theyMR. SPENCER S ACCOUNT OF EQUILIBRATION. 333
stand to &quot;moving equilibria&quot; if the latter exist in the shape
of molecules or systems of molecules ? How do simple equilibra
tions affect moving equilibria
? or how do moving equilibria
affect simple equilibrations? Do molecules or systems of mole
cules ever acquire such a characteristic corporate or co-ordinate
existence as moving equilibria that they can nullify or coerce
simple equilibrations ; that is to say, render nugatory mere
physical actions which are inimical to their own continuance 1
All these and many similar questions arise and require replies
before the doctrine of complex molecules or systems thereof can
be understood in the mechanical or any special sense as moving
equilibria.
9. Mr. Spencer s Account of Equilibration.
Mr. Spencer s account of equilibration is to be studied in
&quot; First Principles,&quot; Chapter XXII., and in vol. i. of
&quot;
Principles
of Biology,&quot; Part III., Chapters XI. and XII
(a.) TJie Equilibration of Motions.
Mr. Spencer presents equilibration under the two forms indis
criminately of equilibration of motions and equilibration of
forces. These are by no means identical, and the course pur
sued leads to confusion of thought and incoherence of argument.
The primary concrete instances are rendered in terms of the
former, whereas the reasoned extensions are all expressed in
terms of the latter
; besides which there is an implied reference
to a method of equilibration in terms of the scientific doctrine
of the equivalence of energies.
The simple mechanical equilibration of motion, by which an
equal distribution of motion and an equal distribution of mate
rial substances is eventually attained, is identical with the
doctrine of the dissipation of energy. According to this theory
all the various forms of energy which from their heterogeneity
of distribution are now capable of effecting work or change,
constantly suffer degradation to a condition from which no
work is to be obtained. There is a continued tendency to sink334 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
to a dead level of a uniform low state of molecular motion. The
final outcome of this tendency would be a state of universal
equal molecular motion from which no changes would ensue.
Yet Mr. Spencer sometimes indicates that the end would be a
state of universal quiescence, a state of the energy of position
known as molecular separation rather than a state of energy of
motion known as molecular motion.
&quot; And if the actions observed be electrical or chemical, we
still find that they work themselves out in producing sensible or
insensible movements, that are dissipated as before, until quies
cence is eventually reached.&quot; *
&quot;
Every motion being motion under resistance is continually
suffering deductions
; and these unceasing deductions finally
result in the cessation of the motion.&quot; f
The consideration of the nature of this final state of things
is, however, of no importance in our present inquiry.
The fundamental fault of Mr. Spencer s system of philosophy
is its formal limitation to the terms Matter and Motion (the
former having the mechanical meaning of resistance and exten
sion only), whereas the actual elaboration of his constructive
scheme is effected in terms of Forces. The formulas are all
purely mechanical
; the work done is very various. Thus if we
are given a nebula to commence with, and treat it mechanically
as having a tendency to equilibration of motion, we would
naturally expect it to proceed directly upon a course of dissolu
tion towards a state of homogeneity in equal distribution of
matter and motion, even to the dissolution of the chemical
constituents : instead of which we are met, firstly, by the
instability of the homogeneous, which turns out to be change
caused by external agencies, and, secondly, by segregation or
changes caused by internal heterogeneity, which internal hete
rogeneity or want of balance is not expressible in terms of
mechanics, but, setting the mechanical formula of equilibration
at defiance, spontaneously initiates equilibrations of its own.
These equilibrations are due to the specific gravity and affinities
* First Principles, p. 484.
t Ibid., pp. 484, 485. See also 176 of &quot;First Principles.&quot;MR. SPENCER S ACCOUNT OF EQUILIBRATION. 335
of the various constituents of the nebula, which quite over
power the merely mechanical redistributions of extension, resist
ance, and motion. How then shall we still say the ensuing
general process is one of equilibration? Simply by calling
the new classes of actions equilibrations also ; and thus by a
verbal ingenuity equilibration remains the ruling principle of the
universe. Still it is not one process but two processes which
are included under that name.
Mr. Spencer, in order to furnish us with an adequate concep
tion of the process of equilibration, gives an account of its four
different orders.* The first order includes the comparatively
simple motions which, being quickly divided and subdivided into
motions communicated to other portions of matter, are presently
dissipated. The second order comprehends various kinds of
vibration or oscillation exhibiting a visible rhythm which is
soon lost in invisible rhythms. The third order obtains in those
aggregates which continually expend as much motion as they
receive, such as the steam-engine. The fourth order comprises
all moving equilibria, such as the solar system, in which the
resistance to motion being inappreciable, the equilibration is
indefinitely protracted.
This account of equilibration, it will be seen, is purely mecha
nical. No reference whatever is made to those equilibrations
of chemical affinity or polarity which do so much biological
work, nor to the equilibrations of specific gravity, which with
the chemical energies effect segregation both of colloid masses
and crystalloid structures. All these, it is true, might be found
to act mechanically in some fundamental science, but in the
absence of such a science, or even with a correct conception of
such a system of fundamental mechanics, it is clear that they
do not act conformably to the idea of a mechanics of which the
ruling principle is the equal distribution of resistances and
motions.
(&.) The Equilibration of Forces.
The change of thought which is effected when, instead of
speaking of equilibrations of motions, we speak of equilibrations
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of forces, is very difficult to analyse. No doubt all the former
changes can be conceived of vaguely as equilibrations of forces,
since they are recognised as modes of energy in the scientific
list
; and modes of energy, in Mr. Spencer s phraseology, may
be regarded as modes of force, and therefore we arrive at the
notion of equilibrations of forces ; but then, again, what may
not be called forces ? Thus equilibration loses all special mean
ing and becomes commensurate with universal causation. Mr.
Spencer says
&quot;
Every change is of necessity towards a balance of forces ;
and of necessity can never cease until a balance of forces is
reached.&quot;*
&quot;In all cases then, there is a progress toward equilibration.
That universal co-existence of antagonist forces which, as we
before saw, necessitates the universality of rhythm, and which,
as we before saw, necessitates the decomposition of every force
into divergent forces, at the same time necessitates the ultimate
establishment of a balance.&quot; f
Taken in this sense, Equilibration is merely another name
for the general interaction of factors resulting in a changed
state. In this sense it is employed by Mr. Spencer under the
term Simple Equilibration, and includes all the changes of one
kind of energy in Professor Stewart s list into any other kind.
It may be held to comprise all mechanical changes, all chemical
or electrical processes, and to embrace all actions of heat and
light. Nor can we exclude from it the processes of molecular
construction and the action of what Mr. Spencer calls polarity,
to whatever complexity and degree of mechanical sensitiveness
we may in our studies arrive.
(c.) Mr. Spencer s Interpretation of Moving Equilibria.
The change of thought we have indicated is of peculiar
interest when we come to consider the translation of mechanical
moving equilibria into moving equilibria of forces. Of course
mechanical motions among the members of a moving equilibrium
may be regarded as forces ; and the general constitution of this
*
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moving equilibrium may be described in terms of forces.
Thereupon other things called forces may be substituted in the
abstract statement, and new moving equilibria may be worked
on the lines of the old ones.
The first thing is to render the mechanical moving equili
brium into abstract terms. The three concrete instances adduced
by Mr. Spencer are the spinning-top, the solar system, and the
steam-engine. We have already shown that the first is a very
simple case of the mechanical relations of motions, and that the
last is not a case of moving equilibrium at all. The case of
the solar system is the purest case of all ; and since it is an
instance of a system of bodies having continuous relative motion,
it affords the best concrete example for the object now in.
view. Mr. Spencer says of it :
&quot; For any system of bodies exhibiting, like those of the Solar
System, a combination of balanced rhythms, has this peculiarity ;
that though the constituents of the system have relative
movements, the system, as a whole has no movement. The
centre of gravity of the entire group remains fixed. Whatever
quantity of motion any member of it has in any direction, is
from moment to moment counterbalanced by an equivalent
motion in some other part of the group in an opposite direction ;
and so the aggregate matter of the group is in a state of rest.
Whence it follows that the arrival at a state of moving equili
brium, is the disappearance of some movement which the aggre
gate had in relation to external things, and a continuance of
those movements only which the different parts of the aggregate
have in relation to each other.&quot; *
&quot; This penultimate state of motion is the moving equilibrium ;
which, as we have seen, tends to arise in an aggregate having
compound motions, as a transitional state on the way towards
complete equilibrium. Throughout Evolution of all kinds, there
is a continual approximation to, and more or less complete main
tenance of, this moving equilibrium. As in the Solar System
there has been established an independent moving equilibrium
an equilibrium such that the relative motions of the consti-
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tuent parts are continually so counterbalanced by opposite
motions, that the mean state of the whole aggregate never varies ;
so is it, though in a less distinct manner, with each form of
dependent moving equilibrium.
&quot; *
We do not here examine the various analogies suggested in
continuation, as we wish to understand the working of the
solar system first. Mr. Spencer proceeds to say
:
&quot; And the fact which we have here particularly to observe,
is, that as a corollary from the general law of equilibration
above set forth, the evolution of every aggregate must go on
until this equilibrium mobile is established
; since, as we have
seen, an excess of force which the aggregate possesses in any
direction, must eventually be expended in overcoming resis
tances to change in that direction : leaving behind only those
movements which compensate each other, and so form a moving
equilibrium. Respecting the structural state simultaneously
reached, it must obviously be one presenting an arrangement of
forces that counterbalance all the forces to which the aggregate
is subject. So long as there remains a residual force in any
direction be it excess of a force exerted by the aggregate on its
environment, or of a force exercised by its environment on the
aggregate equilibrium does not exist ; and therefore the redis
tribution of matter must continue. Whence it follows that the
limit of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses,
is the formation of as many specialisations and combinations of
parts, as there are specialised and combined forces to be met.&quot;
The question to be considered is whether this abstract state
ment is a correct representation of the history of the solar
system, the only known instance of a mechanical moving equi
librium.
The first point concerns the evolution of the moving equili
brium. Mr. Spencer says that &quot;the evolution of every aggre
gate must go on until this equilibrium mobile is established.&quot;
Is it because
&quot;
every equilibrium commonly regarded as absolute,
is in one sense a moving equilibrium ; because along with a
motionless state of the whole there is always some relative
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movement of its insensible parts
&quot;
? Apparently Mr. Spencer
means more than this, for this is the ultimate state, and he
wishes to show that every aggregate must pass throxigh the
universal penultimate state of which the solar system is typical.
This he endeavours to establish not a posteriori, but deductively.
The reason he gives is :
&quot;
Since, as we have seen, an excess of
force which the aggregate possesses in any direction, must even
tually be expended in overcoming resistances to change in that
direction : leaving behind only those movements which com
pensate each other, and so form a moving equilibrium.&quot; We
really cannot say that we understand the above passage. Is
Mr. Spencer speaking of the solar system or of every aggregate ?
We are asked to conceive of
&quot; an excess of force.&quot; This
excess of force cannot be that of molecular motion, nor light,
nor chemical action, for the force spoken of is referred to as
having a spatial direction, and it is expended in overcoming
resistances to change again specified
&quot;in that direction&quot; giving
the reasoning apparently a mechanical limitation. Moreover it
is said to leave movements behind it, and these movements
are compensatory of one another thus establishing a moving
equilibrium. We should be inclined to characterise this
reasoning as a chaos of thought, without definite beginning,
process, or result. The structural state reached simultaneously
with this arrangement of motions must, Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; be
one presenting an arrangement of forces that counterbalance all
the forces to which the aggregate is subject.&quot; We will ask
what are the forces to which the solar system is subject ? The
only force adduced by Mr. Spencer is the inappreciable resistance
of the ethereal medium. We will, however, suppose it appre
ciable. What is the meaning of the solar system counter
balancing this force to which it would be thus subject ? We
presume the meaning of counterbalance is to render ineffective
;
the question therefore arises, Would the solar system alter its
structure in order to render ineffective the increased resistance
of the resisting medium ? We cannot suppose any such thing.
Leaving the problem of the origin of moving equilibria un
solved, let us now take the case discussed in the chapter on
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&quot; The case of the Solar System will best serve our purpose.
An assemblage of bodies, each of which has its simple and com
pound motions, that severally alternate between two extremes,
and the whole of which has its involved perturbations, that now
increase and now decrease, is here presented to us. Suppose
a new force were brought to bear on this moving equilibrium,
say by the arrival of some wandering mass, or by an additional
momentum given to one of the existing masses what would be
the result ? If the strange body or the extra force were very
large, it might so derange the entire system as to cause its
collapse
: by overthrow of its rhythmical movements, the moving
equilibrium might rapidly be changed into a complete equili
brium. But what if the incident force, falling on the system
from without, proved insufficient to overthrow it 1 There would
then arise a set of perturbations which would, in the course of
an enormous period, slowly work round into a modified moving
equilibrium.&quot;
This statement will be accepted without question. It is a
hypothesis in mechanics. The conception of the moving equili
brium is a mechanical one, and the conception of the incoming
force must take the form of a mechanical one ; and the result is
expressed in terms of the rearrangement of the positions and
motions of the members of the system. Can we make an
abstract statement of this case in terms of modes of energy so
as to comprise an account of a moving equilibrium of energy
other than mechanical motion ? It appears to us that failing a
fundamental mechanical explanation of these modes of energy,
such a task is impossible. The essentials of the statement are
relative movements of bodies which form a system and have
little if any relation with the environment. Again we fail to see
that these rearrangements of position and motion can be spoken
of as structural changes effected to counterbalance the incident
force ; they are only the direct result of that incident force.
Eeferring to the abstract statement that &quot;so long as there
remains a residual force in any direction, be it excess of a force
exerted by the aggregate on its environment, or of a force exerted
by its environment on the aggregate, equilibrium does not exist,&quot;
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environment ? Is it anything but interstellar ether 1 Is its
excess of force molecular motion not possessed by the ether,
and does the ether possess a force which it exerts on the
aggregate nebula ?
Mr. Spencer continues :
&quot;
&quot;Whence it follows that the limit
of heterogeneity towards which every aggregate progresses, is
the formation of as many specialisations and combinations of
parts as there are specialised and combined forces to be met.&quot;
In all these passages the thought sought to be evolved is that
of counterbalance, with rearrangements of motion and position
in order to effect it. In such a conception the idea of simple
equilibration is lost sight of. The resulting rearrangements of
the moving members of a system due in a most direct manner
to an incident force, are regarded as counterbalancing that
force
; whereas the new force has really become an integral part
of a new system. It has been amalgamated with it as a consti
tuent. It does not nullify any amount of energy previously
possessed by the system, but adds to it. There is no warrant
for introducing the notion of any counteracting process or
arrangement. The idea of oppositions, of attacks and defence,
of a balance even against an intruding force, does not find place
in the consideration of the case at all. But if the ensuing





ment,&quot; &quot;counterbalance,&quot; &c., it must be on the distinct un
derstanding that nothing more is meant than the calculable
mechanical result of new dynamical relationships.
Mr. Spencer s conception of a moving equilibrium, in itself,
and apart from the hypothesis of an external force impinging
upon it, is that of a system of counterbalance. He says,
&quot; Whatever quantity of motion any member of it has in any
direction, is from moment to moment counterbalanced by an
equivalent motion in some other part of the group in an opposite
direction.&quot; We do not know whether this description of the
solar system is correct, but even supposing it to be so, any new
incoming member would take its place in a similar manner to
the others. There would be no general movement of opposition
to it. It could not be treated as an object external to the
system and its entrance resisted.34? SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
In one of the foregoing passages Mr. Spencer speaks of
moving equilibrium as having a tendency to self-maintenance.
Having the solar system in view as the typical case, let us ex
amine the correctness of this theory. It is admitted that the
solar system is a protracted equilibration. Are we to suppose
that the solar system supplies itself with increasing energy to
make good that which is expended in overcoming the resistance
of the medium 1 Such a supposition cannot for a moment be
entertained. Does Mr. Spencer mean, however, that it main
tains itself, or could maintain itself, against any external attack ?
This cannot be, for he says
:
&quot; For the new motion given to the
parts of a moving equilibrium by a disturbing force, must either
be of such kind and amount that it cannot be dissipated before
the pre-existing motions, in which case it brings the moving
equilibrium to an end; or else it must be of such kind and
amount that it can be dissipated before the pre-existing motions,
in which case the moving equilibrium is re-established.&quot;*
Thus if an attacking body should be relatively very large, or
possess great momentum, the moving equilibrium would be
destroyed, whereas if it should be relatively small, it would find
its place as a member of a re-arranged system. To term the
latter process a tendency to self-maintenance is merely a refe
rence to the theory of the inertia of bodies.
Having now considered the nature of the only moving equili
brium of which we have any knowledge, let us next consider
what is not included in it. It does not, for instance, as we
have just seen, take any account of environment. In the first
place, it has no environment to speak of. It does not seem to
have any established &quot;correspondence&quot; with any other solar
system ; the only general relation it may have is that of move
ment round a common centre.
In the next place, beyond the faint mechanical connection
just mentioned, it is not a member of a mutually dependent
system. In this respect there is a distinct difference between a
mechanical system and an organic system. ISTor does it appear
possible that the solar system could be brought into relatively
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near contact with other similar systems so as to form an organic
whole, and yet that each should maintain its separate existence.
The only result that could be predicted would be a general
destruction. This is to illustrate the difference between a
mechanical moving equilibrium and the relations of atoms and
molecules which can form chemical combinations without loss
of individuality. Any attempt to treat chemical aggregations
and processes upon the same theories as the equilibrations of the
momenta motions and mechanical aspects of bodies must be
a failure.
Again, we find in the solar system no reception of energy and
no means for the storage of energy. Every individual change
that can be imagined is one of simple and direct mechanical
action.
Finally, we recur to the question how the conception of
counterbalance, readjustment, &c., in the motions and positions
of the bodies composing the solar system under a hypothetical
incursion of a foreign body, is to be made applicable to any of
the relations or changes of aggregates of the chemical elements
under the conditions of Professor Stewart s list of energies.
That these chemical substances act upon one another, and
that they are affected in their relationships by heat, light,
electricity, &c., is matter of ordinary knowledge; but their
relations are altogether different from those of mass and velo
city. Atoms and molecules are not related to each other as
members of one unrelated revolving system, nor are they related
to each other as one solar system would be to another in relative
contiguity. There is a wide distinction between the purely
mechanical relationships of the one and the &quot;polarities,&quot; if such
they are to be called, of the others. The theory and all the
conceptions connected with &quot;moving equilibria&quot; are purely
mechanical. The only common conception is that of quantita
tive relationship. If one mechanical force is relatively great, it
will overcome the movements of another. If relatively weak, it
will influence and finally balance with the movements of the
other.344 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
(d.) Suggested Identical Interpretation of Organic Evolution.
The foregoing considerations derive their importance from the
fact that Mr. Spencer affiliates biologic evolution upon physical
evolution by means of the laws of moving equilibria. We have
given a very inadequate study of the ramifications of the argu
ment as presented by Mr. Spencer, but we consider it wiser, on
the whole, to afford the student a conception of the general
position rather than to overwhelm him with a large bulk of
detailed criticism. We now proceed to examine Mr. Spencer s
interpretation of the origin and development of organisms. The
question as to origin we shall postpone, on account of its
obscurity, until we have fully considered the meaning of organ
isms as moving equilibria.
Organisms are regarded by Mr. Spencer as dependent moving
equilibria. In this respect they are classed with the steam-
engine which receives and expends energy. It cannot but be
reckoned a very rough analogy, and we should be inclined to
reject it altogether, for beyond the mere fact of receiving and
expending energy there is nothing in common. Nor does the
analogy play any important part in Mr. Spencer s argument.
The specialty of the treatment is in the analogy with the pro
tracted equilibration of the solar system.
&quot; Now though instead of being, like the Solar System, in a
state of independent moving equilibrium, an organism is in
a state of dependent moving equilibrium ( First Principles,
130), yet this does not prevent the manifestation of the same
law. Every animal daily obtains from without, a supply of
force to replace the force which it expends ; but this continual
giving to its parts a new momentum, to make up for the mo
mentum continually lost, does not interfere with the carrying
on of actions and reactions like those just described. Here, as
before, we have a definitely-arranged aggregate of parts, which
we call organs, having their definitely-established actions and
reactions, which we call functions. These rhythmical actions or
functions, and the various compound rhythms resulting from
their combinations, are in such adjustment as to balance theMOVING EQUILIBRIA AND ORGANIC EVOLUTION. 345
actions to which the organism is subject
: there is a constant or
periodic genesis of forces, which, in their kinds, amounts, and
directions, suffice to antagonise the forces which the organism
has constantly or periodically to bear.&quot;*
Here we have an attempt to establish an analogy between
an organism and the solar system. We leave the question of
the supply and expenditure of energy out of account, except in
regard to the ascription of momentum. We think this is a
proper term to apply to moving bodies, but an improper term
to apply to chemical processes ; and the use of it here is to be
condemned as unwarrantably affording help to a verbal ana
logy which ought to be considered on its own merits. It is
more to the point to consider whether the definite arrangement
of parts called organs bears any analogy to the relations of
members of the solar system, and whether their actions are
related to each other like the relative motions of the sun and
planets.
Evidently the organs of the body are not related to each
other as the members of the solar system, for they are not
separate, nor do they revolve round one another in free space.
Nor is the method of equilibration the same, for in one case it is
due to the slight resistance of the resisting ether, and in the other
case it is due to the giving off of molecular motion and other
forms of energy. It is difficult to say in general terms what the
relations of the actions of the organs may be to each other, but
they are certainly not the purely mechanical relations of the
movements of the solar system. Is the analogy furthered by




&quot; We fear not.
Ehythm means a recurrence of action or position in a definite
time. It is applied to vibrations, oscillations, revolutions, &c.,
all forms of the movements of bodies visible or insensible.
Organic actions may have times of recurrence, but the main
characteristic of an organ is the nature of the work done rather
than its periodicity. The special function of the liver is to
secrete bile rather than to act rhythmically. The latter term
may be truly applied to the revolution of a planet, and its differ-
*
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entiation from the movement of another planet may be explained
in terms of rhythm ; but the differentiation of the liver from
the kidneys could not be so explained. If we take the case of
an organism -which is an accumulator of energy only and not
an expender, if such should be the correct description of a plant,
we do not see that the analogy is at all facilitated, for in this
case we have the reverse of a protracted equilibration, such as
is exemplified in the expenditure of energy by the Solar System.
Nor do the parts of the plant hold similar relations to each
other as do the bodies composing the Solar System.
The most suggestive point, however, is the alleged analogy
between the mutual readjustments of motion in a solar system
on the hypothetical intrusion of an invading body and the
actions of an organism with regard to its environment. Where
the analogy lies we are at a loss to discern. We have already
seen that the solar system has practically no environment with
which it is in relation except the retarding ether; and if we
suppose a new body brought within the sphere of its influence,
we find that it becomes part of a readjusted system and no
longer remains an element of the environment. In fact, we do
not think that the solar system, as such, ever could have an
environment. It is not an organic whole capable of self-main
tenance, and therefore every environment must become part of
itself, its own individuality must be lost in the environment.
But in an organism we find an entirely different characteristic,
rendering analogies of action utterly impossible. An organism
presents
&quot; a constant or periodic genesis of forces, which in
their kinds, amounts, and directions suffice to antagonise the
forces which the organism has constantly or periodically to
bear.&quot; The solar system does nothing of the sort, nor under
any conceivable circumstances would it ever do so.
The analogy is here left as we have rendered it, and further
confirmation is sought in two ways only Firstly, in d, priori
reasonings from the persistence of force, conducted in such a
manner as to include in one and the same final statement the
actions of solar systems and organisms
: Secondly, in a render
ing of the histories and actions of organisms in terms of
mechanics, in order to give the semblance of an analogy withM077A
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the solar system, more especially by emphasising the supposed
resemblance between the interior counterbalance possessed by
the latter and the counterbalancing or antagonising of exterior
forces by the former.
And first as to the a priori reasoning. It really appears to
be a double process one d, priori, the other concrete. Thus,
reasoning from the Persistence of Force never proceeds alone,
but is always illustrated by some concrete matter or motion.
We have terms of both combined in propositions, and we never
know whether our thought is being pushed forward by the one
or the other. The a priori reasoning showing the necessary
origin of dependent and independent moving equilibria and the
necessary condition of their conservation in self-maintenance is
given from 176 of
&quot; First Principles.&quot;
The postulate is,
&quot; Phenomena are interpretable only as results
of universally co-existent forces of attraction and repulsion,&quot;
these being
&quot;
complementary aspects of that absolutely persis
tent force which is the ultimate datum of consciousness.&quot; The
reasoned conclusion is that equilibration must proceed until
equilibrium is reached. In this process of equilibration, moving
equilibria must arise, because the motions of an aggregate are
dissipated by the resistances they encounter, and these being
brought to a close, others will continue longer. But Mr. Spencer
does not show how moving equilibria necessarily arise ; he begs
the question, and continues by speaking of an unaccounted for
&quot;diversely moving aggregate,&quot; out of which arise dependent
and independent moving equilibria, the latter of which may
reasonably be held to apply to the solar system as evolved from
the nebula, leaving the former, stated in mechanical terms,
neither accounted for nor applicable to any concrete existence
whatsoever.
We now approach the study of the special law which consti
tutes biological change.
Several kinds of equilibration contribute to biological evolu
tion. We have already seen that all chemical, physical, and
mechanical changes may be termed equilibrations ; while all the
processes in the growth of so-called organic molecules studied in
the Appendix to &quot;Biology,&quot; vol. i., as well as all methods of343 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
aggregation, selective or otherwise, all manufacturing of mole
cules, and all direct chemical and physical relations of the
organism with its own constituents or with the environment are
to be reckoned simple equilibrations. But as such they are not
of any biological character or import. As the fundamental
material for the construction and processes of the organism it is
difficult to conceive of them as acting otherwise than according
to the special proclivities of each atom or molecule ; but the
hypothesis is that such is not the case, for if it were, the origin
and history of organisms would be one to be worked out from
the relations of the chemical elements aggregated and influenced
in a direct manner by the physical relations of the environment.
But this is not the theory. The theory is that these atoms
and molecules are governed in their arrangements and move
ments by a higher power, namely, the balance of the organism
as a whole. The nature of this governing principle we are
now about to examine. It must first, however, be distinctly
recognised that no change which is not thus influenced is a
biological change, and that the special characteristic of biological
action lies in this coercive influence together with the adapta
tion to the environment.
The question naturally suggests itself whether the develop
ment of organisms cannot be worked out completely by means of
simple equilibration alone; and whether Mr. Spencer in his own
detailed explanations of waste and repair, growth and conse
quent adaptation, does not in reality accomplish all that he does
accomplish in this manner, rather than in the manner to which
he more prominently calls our attention ? On this we remark,
that if biological explanations were left completely upon the
ground of the simple equilibrations above specified, we do not
think they would be effective; but a special work would have to
be written on the lines of the deductive method and under these
limitations, before we could be in a position to judge how far
that might be the case. In all probability the attempt would
prove ineffective, and we take it that Mr. Spencer so regards the
question, since he supplements this simple scheme by the special
theory of biological equilibration.
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regarded as a balance having an influence as such upon the
simple equilibrations which perform the detailed constructive
work, we proposed considering this theory independently of
the view which regards this same balance as a balance with
external forces. In this aspect the question for consideration
would be Is the organism, as a whole, a balance of forces of
such sort that if one of its parts falls out of balance there is set
up throughout the system on the one hand an endeavour to
restore that part to due symmetry, or on the other hand a reduc
tion of the whole system to the reduced proportions of the
failing member, bearing in mind that this readjustment would
itself have to be effected by means, after all, of simple equi
librations ]
We do not think that such a theoretical balance could even
be conceived. No doubt the interdependence of organs can be
shown and to a very considerable extent explained ; but from
any a priori conception of the mechanical relations of balance
we fear no biological deductions could be made. The funda
mental notion of balance is equal relation. The tendency of
a balance disturbed by any addition to or subtraction from its
factors is towards a readjustment in accordance with the new
proportionate distribution of forces, and is not towards a restora
tion of its former condition, to which it has no proclivity what
soever.
From these considerations we perceive that the fundamental
biological idea is not the restoration of a disturbed balance, but
a readjustment of balance in accordance with the introduction
of new factors. According to Mr. Spencer s illustration of the
solar system, this adjustment is purely receptive and assimila
tive of the whole incident force. On the other hand, his
account of the biological equilibration implies that the moving
equilibrium seeks to secure self-maintenance by warding off
the natural effects of the incident forces. It endeavours to
receive from the environment only such forms of force as it can
assimilate and expend in this contest for self-maintenance.
Here we find that the conception of counterbalance is not
that referred to in the account of the solar system, where per
turbations caused by the incoming of a new member would pro-350 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
duce counterbalances of interior rearrangement by which the
new member would find its place in the readjusted system ; but
it is the conception of a counterbalance by which the entry of
incident forces into a system is met or combated, antagon
ised in such a manner as to prevent their entry. And if such
a principle be admitted in biology, there is no end to the changes
which this counterbalance could effect.
We will first present the matter in its full aspect as given
by Mr. Spencer, and then consider the position in which the
argument stands.
Mr. Spencer says, in continuation of the quotation given on
P- 344:
&quot; If then there exists this state of moving equilibrium among
a definite set of internal actions exposed to a definite set of
external actions, what must result if any of the external
actions are changed ? Of course there is no longer an equili
brium. Some force which the organism habitually generates,
is too great or too small to balance some incident force ; and
there arises a residuary force exerted by the environment on
the organism, or by the organism on the environment. This
residuary force this unbalanced force of necessity expends it
self in producing some change of state in the organism. Acting
directly on some organ and modifying its function, it indirectly
modifies dependent functions, and remotely influences all the
functions. As we have already seen
( 68, 69), if this new force
is permanent, its effects must be gradually diffused throughout
the entire system, until it has come to be equilibrated in work
ing those structural rearrangements which produce an exactly
counterbalancing force.
&quot; *
The conception aimed at in this description is that of a mov
ing equilibrium which combines the properties of the solar
system and of the steam-engine. Are we to suppose that this
combination produces unique results, or are the changes limited
to the analogies of the solar system, the analogy of the steam-
engine merely relating to the supply and expenditure of energy,
while the actual changes are due to the properties of the former
*
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system only ? Or, on the other hand, do the steam-engine analo
gies assist the analogies of the solar system in effecting changes
which the mere renewal of their energies alone would not
accomplish ? In these considerations we find ourselves endea
vouring to form a mechanical conception perfectly unique and
of a most complicated character, a conception which finds no
concrete representative except the organism itself, for which
we are trying to put forth an abstract mechanical statement.
We fail, in the first place, to apprehend an organism as a mov
ing equilibrium either upon the model of the solar system or
upon the model of the steam-engine ; and we further fail to
amalgamate the two in thought.
It is suggested that an incident force will act, not on the
organism as a whole, but upon a particular part of it. Is there
any reason to suppose that the incoming force would apply
itself to the restoration of this part ? In thus talking, we find
our endeavour towards an abstract conception fail
; for we can
not think of a part which is not a part of some whole, in this
case, of a mechanical moving equilibrium having other parts.
Mr. Spencer says the moving equilibrium in question has &quot;a
definite set of internal actions,&quot; but he implies that it is an
equilibrium, not as regards the balance of the internal set, but
as regards its balance with &quot;a definite set of external actions.&quot;
We therefore have to consider what is meant by a moving equi
librium of forces, not only internally balanced, but also balanced
with the environment. We can only take the meaning to be
the negative one that such an equilibrium is not being interfered
with, and so continues in existence. But this cannot be the
meaning intended, because there is interaction. In this case the
meaning can only be that the actions of the environment upon
the moving equilibrium are not such as to destroy it. Are the
actions then such as to become amalgamated with it? No ; they
tend some of them at any rate to destroy it. Their destruc
tive action, however, is met or counterbalanced, so as to coun
teract their prejudicial influence. But whence comes this coun
teraction for the purpose of retaining continued existence on the
part of the moving equilibrium
? This property of organisms has
no analogue in abstract mechanics. Mr. Spencer asks,
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must result if any of the external actions are changed
1
? Of
course there is no longer an equilibrium.&quot; Nor was there before
in any true mechanical sense. There was a process of equili
bration in the sense of general causation ; there was an aggre
gate of connected equilibrations in progress. The connection
of the interdependent equilibrations is affected by a change ;
still, there is no special tendency in a consensus of equilibra
tions to restore one of them, but simply to accept the direct
results of the new action even to the extent of dissolution of
all the connections. The conception of setting up a counter
balance for mutual protection is foreign to all mechanical
theories and experiences. Mr. Spencer s explanation is given
in terms of forces








some incident force.&quot; This is not the equilibration of general
cause and effect, nor is it the equilibration of the reception and
amalgamation of force, such as would be exhibited by the recep
tion of a new member in the solar system, but it is an opposi
tion to the incident force in order to antagonise its effects. We
have the conception of a moving equilibrium composed of forces
which balance incident forces of the environment. The balance
is not merely an interior balance, but a balance with the exterior.
If there is a new incident force, then there is a want of
&quot; bal
ance,&quot; which the moving equilibrium forthwith proceeds to
supply by a counteracting force.
It is quite clear that this is merely an attempt to represent the
changes in an organism in mechanical language, under the belief
that the mere employment of such language enables us to frame
for ourselves a good mechanical conception, and thus renders
organic evolution capable of affiliation upon physical evolution.
We have to submit that there is no analogy whatever in any
purely mechanical process or conception for the organic processes
so described.
Can we further our object by endeavouring to form a concep
tion of an equilibrium of forces ? In these terms Mr. Spencer
seems disposed to speak of an organism. Each organ may be
regarded as a force, and the total as an equilibrium of forces.
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of mechanical relationship. Is it in the sense of the reception
and expenditure of energy ? But this is not the sense which
would effect change of mutual relationships of balance. Then,
again, the whole has to be regarded as in counterbalance to
external forces. We must confess ourselves unable to form
any conception in the description of which the abstract term
&quot; force
&quot;
finds a place. The mutual equilibrium of an aggregate
of forces, which itself is a counterbalance to an environment of
forces, and which generates new forces in counteraction to new
incident forces, is a formula incapable of conception, and inca
pable, too, of application to any concrete save that from which
it was derived. Thus the method fails to effect any such general
affiliation as would accomplish a genetic union with universal
evolution.
We have purposely avoided making an inquiry as to the
genesis of such an equilibrium of connected forces. If all mole
cules are to be regarded as forces, how do some of these become
united so as to effect an internal equilibrium, and that a moving
one ? From what does it happen that, when so constituted, if
the presumed circumstances in the environment which brought
them together change, they should change not in correspondence
but in antagonism? For the essence of biologic action is not
the change of simple equilibration, but a change in antagonism
to simple equilibration, in order to avert its destructive conse
quences.
But passing over this question of origin, Mr. Spencer proceeds
to show how there has been continually going on &quot;a rectification
of the equilibrium
&quot;
according to the alteration of surrounding
circumstances, thus producing, by modification upon modifica
tion, structural and functional changes of great heterogeneity.
&quot; Any fresh force brought to bear on an aggregate in a state
of moving equilibrium, must do one of two things
: it must
either overthrow the moving equilibrium altogether, or it must
alter without overthrowing it
; and the alteration must end in
the establishment of a new moving equilibrium.&quot;*
This is a good statement of abstract truth as applied to moving
*
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equilibria like the solar system ; but it is not applicable to a
moving equilibrium which antagonises or counteracts the new
force brought to bear upon it. It would appear that Mr. Spencer
does not distinguish between the two cases, and the question
arises, Does he mean any more by the phraseology indicating
the latter than the facts belonging to the former 1 Yet we think
he does clearly teach the theory of the self-protective balancings
of a moving equilibrium, as distinct from and very often in
resistance to the purely assimilative process of effecting equili
bration.
This antagonistic tendency may be regarded as the specially
characteristic feature of biologic change. Without it, the change
is not biologic ; with it, the change belongs to that class. It con
fers on an aggregate the coherence and continuity which consti
tute life. &quot;We have already seen that Mr. Spencer regards life as
continuance of correspondence ; but the correspondence intended
is not the general correspondence which characterises all the
direct relationships of an aggregate with its environment
; it
must be of the kind which is able to maintain such correspon
dences in spite of new incident forces tending to destroy it.
As we proceed with our studies this specially characteristic
law of Biology becomes more and more pronounced, as thus :
&quot;Whence we found it to follow that the final structural
arrangements must be such as will meet all the forces acting on
the aggregate, by equivalent antagonistic forces. What is the
implication in the case of organic aggregates, the equilibrium of
which is a moving one 1 We have seen that the maintenance
of such a moving equilibrium requires the habitual genesis of
internal forces corresponding in number, directions, and amounts
to the external incident forces as many inner functions, single
or combined, as there are single or combined outer actions to
be met.&quot;*
All this reasoning, it will be noted, is on the supposition that
the maintenance of the moving equilibrium
&quot;
requires,&quot; &c.
But what requires the maintenance of the moving equilibrium 1
We merely note this feature in the argument at present, reserv-
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ing for separate treatment the use which Mr. Spencer makes of
the necessity for the maintenance of organisms and of species.
(e.) Statement of the Argument.
Let us now review the position of the argument. Our object
is the unification of knowledge, and we seek to accomplish this
object by a process of reconstruction from the supposed contents
and conditions of the primordial nebula. This is a deductive
process, and it has to be carried on from our knowledge of the
properties of the constituent factors, and of the general laws of
their interrelation.
The evolution of organisms by gradual change in the manner
taught by Mr. Darwin we accept on & posteriori grounds. This
advance in heterogeneity, this growth of modification upon
modification by gradual and natural response to change of en
vironment, is acknowledged ; and since these organisms are
composed of some of the chemical elements, and are surrounded
by others, we cannot doubt that ordinary laws of physical and
chemical action prevail among them, and help so far to affiliate
them upon preceding inorganic evolution.
But there are many things that cannot be explained ; for if
the modes of development are &amp;lt;1 posteriori understood on the
supposition of original undifferentiated organic matter, still the
origination of such organic matter having the specially charac
teristic biologic function is unexplainable either a priori or ci
posteriori. How did it ever happen that a moving equilibrium
having the tendency to oppose new arrangements in order to
antagonise the destructive influence of external forces first came
into existence ? To this question no answer can be found. The
finding of moving equilibria which receive and assimilate inci
dent forces is not the slightest assistance to us in understanding
the origin of moving equilibria which resist the reception of
incident forces. A still greater difficulty arises when amongst
the interior forces thus generated in the organism is that of
feeling and consciousness.
It will thus be seen that our quarrel is not with Evolution as
set forth in Mr. Darwin s truly scientific teachings, as far as they356 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
go. We accept these on the understanding that they do not
pretend to explain the origin of life nor the affiliation of organic
upon inorganic existence. Our contention is that Mr. Spencer s
attempt to accomplish this latter object has not succeeded.
(/.) The Origin and Maintenance of Moving Equilibria.
Mr. Spencer nowhere gives us a satisfactory account of the
d, priori necessity for moving equilibria. Nor does he attempt
to explain their origin out of the chemical elements. It is true,
in the Appendix to vol. i. of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; he gives a hypothe
tical account of the genesis of organic molecules, but he only
deals with them as regards their attainment of a high degree of
complexity, great modifiability, and extreme sensitiveness to
change, which cause them to manifest more and more those
characteristics that we call vital; he never treats of them as
regards their attainment of the special characteristic of biologic
function just elaborated. Evidently it was his duty to consider
their constitution as moving equilibria before he could apply to
them the term
&quot;
organic,&quot; and to have shown how they or the
primitive body which several of them might form became a
moving equilibrium. He should have shown why the circum
stances which formed them did not enable them to retain the
individuality so reached; and why, on the contrary, this continu
ance of individuality entailed an expenditure of force requiring
constant renewal. All this should have been set forth in ex
planation of their origin as moving equilibria before he began
to treat of those counterbalances with the forces of the environ
ment which constitute biology proper.
It must be clearly understood, therefore, that in all our sub
sequent investigations we take the origin of moving equilibria
for granted, and continue our studies with the full conscious
ness of this great initial hiatus between inorganic and organic
evolution.
We must also take for granted the cb priori necessity for the
maintenance of moving equilibria, whether the conviction of
this necessity be derived from a consideration of their constitu
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the essential idea of a moving equilibrium involves the continual
expenditure of energy, and therefore its tendency is not towards
self-maintenance but the reverse. Nevertheless, if there were
no necessity for the continued individuality of a moving equili
brium there would be no necessity for antagonising those external
forces which are detrimental to its existence.
Properly speaking, we ought to enlarge our conception of the
biologic problem by admitting the complementary process of adap
tation for the assimilation of such forces in the environment as
would assist in the maintenance of the equilibrium, thus initiat
ing changes of structure to this end. We do not understand,
since this is one of the main features of biologic change, why
Mr. Spencer has not brought it forward in full prominence for
& priori interpretation. It may be that he regards the assimi
lation of forces tending to the continuance of the moving equi
librium as coming within the scope of simple equilibration;
but then it appears to us that organisms show adaptations for
the reception and assimilation of favourable forces quite as
much as they exhibit arrangements to guard them from the
effects of destructive forces. And since many of the external
forces may be regarded as either favourable or unfavourable to
the maintenance of moving equilibria according to their varying
amounts, the question of the balance to secure an adequate
quantity and to guard against a destructive excess becomes a
complex one. But regarding the problem in the abstract, can
we at all conceive of a moving equilibrium of bodies, or of
forces, of such a nature that it not only so arranges itself
as to counterbalance incident forces which imperil its con
tinuance, but accommodates itself in the manner of balance
or counterbalance to incident forces which favour its conti
nuance ? Such a suggestion is inconceivable. We cannot con
ceive of a solar system which adapts itself to receive motion,
nor of an equilibrium of forces expending force in rearrange
ments for securing a commensurate reception of force. The
thought is altogether foreign to the idea of the balance of forces.
We can find no concrete instance whatever which throws any
.
light upon such a conception. If we consider the steam-engine
as a case in point, the steam-engine is but an inert mass of358 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
metal, incapable of any adaptation either for the reception of
force or for warding off injurious attacks.
Therefore if we find in Biology structural arrangements as
well for securing forces favourable to the maintenance of the
moving equilibrium as for protective purposes, we must under
stand that the a priori explanation is to be sought in other ways
than by an abstract theory of balances and counterbalances.
(g.) General Survey of the Counterbalances.
In order to attain a general conception of Biology, considered
as a system of counterbalances to external forces, let us now
briefly review the list of forces presented to us by Mr. Spencer
in his works as effecting those antagonisms of structure and
function which we desire to have explained.
As indicated in the preceding sub-section, the study is not by
any means a simple one, for organisms have had to adjust them
selves to the presence or absence, the excess or defect of various
forces. Now, viewing the biologic function as a counterbalance
to an external incident force, it is not possible to conceive of a
counterbalance to a force which is not present and in action.
Yet Mr. Spencer proposes to overcome this difficulty by regard
ing the negations themselves as forces. The absence of a force
is a force which has to be counterbalanced. As in old times
cold was classed in the same category as heat, so Mr. Spencer
regards cold as a force which has to be counterbalanced by
changes of structure and habit. Doubtless Mr. Spencer veils
this representation under the form of
&quot;
changed conditions,&quot;
necessitating change of structure ; but on the special biologic
theory of counterbalance, the force in this instance is decreased
molecular motion. As a counterbalance to this
&quot; force
&quot; we find
a great variety of rearrangements of organisms. The thickening
of the fur of some animals on the approach of winter is a case
in point. Absence of food, again, is thus transformed from the
negative aspect into a positive force, which has to be counter
balanced in the organism by structural arrangements to secure
food. Hence the necessity for counterbalances of locomotion
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and assimilate, the forces necessary to maintain the moving
equilibrium. If the absence of water is a force, is there not the
counterbalancing cistern of the great desert tortoise ?
It may be that the changes in organisms produced by absence
of heat, absence of food, absence of enemies, &c., may all be
explainable in yarious ways ; but we think that, considered as
a method of logical explanation, it is not cb priori correct to say
that these changes are counterbalances to the presence or absence
of external forces in relation to a moving equilibrium.
Another curious exigency of the argument is the counter
balancing by an organism of a future force. This future force
itself may be either of a positive or of a negative kind. Thus
the thickening of the fur on the approach of winter is anticipa
tory to change of temperature rather than occurring in direct
response to such change ; and various animals counterbalance by
anticipation the force of absence of food by laying up stores of
provender to secure their existence during the inclemencies of
winter. Cases of precautionary counterbalance are also to be
found in the means taken for the protection of the embryo and
the young animal. The shell of an egg is a counterbalance to
future external mechanical forces. In all the apparatus for
self-defence we find the same principle to prevail. In those
floral defences by which plants protect their pollen from the
incursions of the wrong insects we also notice a counterbalance
to an anticipated external incident force. The wonderful
variety of methods by which seeds are protected exhibit the
same remarkable prevision of counterbalance.
It is not to be denied that all these are cases of equilibra
tion in the sense of equivalence of relation, and presumably
they are cases of that biological counterbalance which Mr.
Spencer is at such pains to explain ; but since it is evident that
the principle of a moving equilibrium adjusting itself to forces
not in actual relation, but only going to be, cannot be maintained,
we shall have to search for some other explanation of these
adaptations.
A third difficulty occurs in regard to the evolution of Feeling
and Consciousness. According to Mr. Spencer s biological
theory these must arise in the organism as counterbalances to360 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
the forces of the environment. Their raison d etre lies in the
preservation of the moving equilibrium, ostensibly by way of
a counterbalancing force acting against some force detrimental
to its continuance, but also, in a wider view, to assist in the
assimilation of forces which will aid this continuance.
Various corollaries result from this. In the first place, it
follows that feeling and consciousness are not merely concomi
tants of physical change, but that, as feelings and consciousness,
they take an active part in the counterbalances of Biology. If
the merely mechanical arrangements of nerves and their motions
were sufficient to provide this counterbalance, they alone,
according to the theory, would have been evolved without any
concomitance of a subjective aspect. But since the subjective
aspect has been evolved over and above the physical arrange
ments, all the feelings which animals possess must have been
essential in the consensus of antagonistic forces which did
battle for existence with the environment. They are not
merely lookers-on in the strife, but active agencies. For if
feelings as feelings were not essential in the activity of the
organism, then the biologic Avork, either of the protective char
acter or of the assimilative, would be done by physical
arrangements without the accompaniment of feeling. This we
judge to be the case, both from the fundamental conception of
the moving equilibrium derived from the solar system and steam-
engine, and from the actual facts of biology. In organisms we
find that feeling only accompanies those actions which are
directly related to changes of the environment, whereas much
work is done by organs in an unconscious manner. The
difference existing between the conscious and the unconscious
actions of organism is only explainable by the theory under
consideration, on the ground of the concomitant consciousness
of the former being an essential and actual factor in the coun
terbalances which the organism presents to the external world.
This, again, implies the possible conversion of physical ener
gies into modes of feeling, and the possible conversion of feeling
into modes of muscular action.
Thus we are forced to the conclusion that feeling and con
sciousness have been actual factors in biological evolution ; thatFEELING AND CONSCIOUSNESS AS EXTERNAL. 361
any account of this evolution which omits these as factors and
explains its developments by merely physical interrelations must
be conspicuously deficient.
(h.) Feeling and Consciousness as External Forces.
Keserving the full consideration of the theme broached in the
last subsection, let us next consider the recognition, in the
structure of plants and animals, of feeling and consciousness as
forces in their environment We wish to inquire whether in
their adaptations to the external world organisms exhibit not
merely counterbalances to physical forces, but also adaptations
which clearly imply a recognition of feeling as such in the envi
roning organisms.
Take the sense of smell to commence with. The skunk,
when pursued by an enemy, projects upon him a most offensive
fluid. This is evidently a means of defence. Is the action to
be interpreted by the mechanical or chemical operation of the
juice upon the nervous system of the enemy, through which
certain molecular changes are set up, eventuating in motions of
retreat? Or are we to suppose that the subjective sensation is
essential to the result? In accordance with the argument con
tained in the preceding sub-section, the subjective feeling is an
active factor in such a case, and is recognised in the structure
and functions of the skunk.
So, also, there are some plants and animals which derive
their protection from bitterness of taste.
On the other hand, many plants and insects display in their
structure and functions a recognition of external sentiency to
attractive tastes and odours. The flowers which provide feasts
of honey for the bee and moth and butterfly seem to imply an
acknowledgment of the subjective. The sweet scents which
pervade the summer air surely have more than a mechanical
effect, and indicate the relations of the floral world to the
olfactory sensations of the animal environment.
But by far the most important instance of the recognition
of external sentiency registered in the structure and functions
of organisms refers to the sense of sight. Whence all the362 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
bright hues of flowers but for the sentiency of the insect retina 1
The same relation seems to hold between the colours of fruits
and the eyes of birds. The glorious plumage displayed by the
latter bears reference often to the appreciative taste of the oppo
site sex. Sometimes, however, the colourings of the bird may
be of a protective character; and this introduces us to the won
derful and interesting study of mimicry.
The whole rationale of animal mimicry, both of form and
colour, is to be found in the recognition by organic structures
of the subjective sense of sight on the part of surrounding
animals, together with the recognition of the colour and forms
of the inanimate surroundings. In response or counterbalance
to these forces of the environment, and more especially to the
fact of the presence of enemies having the sense of sight, fishes
adjust their colourings to the adjacent masses, moths and other
animals make themselves indistinguishable from the rocks and
walls upon which they rest, and the stick and leaf insects, both
in form and colour, simulate the refuse of the forest.
&quot;We cannot, however, here do more than briefly indicate the
nature of an argument which might be amplified to almost any
extent.
If it can be made out that all these instances of natural
adaptation on the part of animals and plants are explicable
simply as the direct results of motions in ether, or air, or of
other physical properties of the environment acting upon a me
chanical nervous system, our suggestion fails ; but we think
these arrangements all imply not only a subjective counterbal
ancing force, but also a recognition of feeling as an external or
objective factor over and above the physical interrelation, more
particularly when taken in connection with the argument of the
preceding sub-section.
(i.) Feeling and Consciousness as Counterbalance.
In 174 of &quot;First Principles
&quot; Mr. Spencer undertakes to
explain the equilibrations of nervous actions. But it will be
found that the phenomena there explained are not the equili
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as a counterbalance to external destructive forces, but those
mechanical equilibrations by which motions are dissipated and
brought to a close. This idea receives a changed import in an
account of the daily rhythms by which the force expended
during the period of mental activity is compensated by forces
renewed during the state of rest. The argument proceeds by
pointing out how to all external associations there arise answer
ing internal associations, showing a progress towards equilibrium
between the relations of thought and the relations of things.
It is pursued further by showing the attainment of moral and
social equilibrium. But it is evident that these processes of
equilibration are not identical with the biological equilibration
which finds the genesis of structural and functional arrangements
in the fact that these are counterbalances to external destructive
forces. It is indeed merely the verbal process of representing
all correspondences and all social relations as equilibrations.
Mr. Spencer anticipates one objection to his exposition, but
in reality there are two. The first objection is that the physi
cal structure of the nervous system is not explained upon the
special biological principle. To this he does not reply. But,
considered strictly as a physical arrangement of material mole
cules, and as a moving equilibrium having a varied entourage
of forces, we hold that the nervous system is not shown to
be the outcome of that biological law by which structure origi
nates as a force in counterbalance to an external force, which it
proceeds to antagonise.
The second objection, and the one to which Mr. Spencer
replies, is that the explanation he affords is purely materialistic,
and does not account for the subjective concomitant. The




theory. What we know objectively as modes
of force we know subjectively as states of consciousness ;
&quot; so
much feeling is the correlate of so much motion ;
&quot;
&quot; the per
formance of any bodily action is the transformation of a cer
tain amount of feeling into its equivalent amount of motion.&quot;
The latter sentence, indeed, implies the mutual transformation
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&quot;And thus the ultimate state, forming the limit towards






rated and transformed into motions, are equivalent to, or in
equilibrium with, the various orders and degrees of surrounding
forces which antagonise such motions.&quot; *
This passage tends to confirm the supposition that in Mr.
Spencer s opinion modes of physical energy can be transformed
into feeling and retransformed into modes of physical energy,
having in these transformations quantitative relations. They
are thus able to take their places as active agencies in the biolo
gical counterbalance, by which preservative forces are assimi
lated, or by which destructive forces are antagonised. And if
so accepted, they must be recognised as active agencies in the
biological development.
On no other view can their existence be accounted for and
justified. On reviewing the organic arrangements, we find that
some of the work done by the organism is of such a character
as not to require the accompaniment of subjective sensation.
Accordingly, the necessary physiological processes are automatic.
The liver, the spleen, the kidneys perform their normal func
tions without the accompaniment of feeling, which, indeed, would
be detrimental to the general balance; but we find that these
organs and others manifest pain when the normal functions are
not properly performed, thus exhibiting an active agency of the
subjective kind when requisite for the safety of the organism.
Apparently the merely physical arrangements of the eye, ear,
nose, mouth, and fingers would not be able to do their work in
this automatic mechanical manner. They seem positively to
require differentiated modes of feeling over and above the
currents of the nerves, by which a consensus of physical
action is secured. Thus feelings and special modes of feeling
as feelings are proved to be factors in biological action. The
biological explanatory view implies their place as forces in
action, as counterbalances to incident external forces, which
would otherwise tend to destroy the moving equilibria of
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which they form a part. The theory which regards them
merely as a secondary aspect of physiological events which they
have no power to influence, is insufficient to satisfy the bio
logical law of the moving equilibrium, which necessitates the
supposition that each fact in the organism is a potent acting
force.





theory in regard to the argument we




&quot; but complementary. The answer to
this is that that aspect in which the relations of sequences
present themselves, and by means of which the order of
sequences is to be described and actually calculated as hypo-
thetically conceived, must be regarded as primary ; and a second
aspect, if any, which is merely concomitant, and which does not
disclose the order of sequences, must be secondary or dependent,
whether the nature of that dependence is known or not. A
complementary aspect can only be one which is necessary in
the order of the sequences, and without which that order would
be incomplete. But if it is shown that a development is com
pletely explainable by a physical process, the concomitant
subjective is not complementary. Thus, when biological develop
ment is held to be explainable in the same way that chemistry
or the solar system is explainable, it is a purely physical
explanation. And, again, when all the developments and
differentiations of organisms are held to be explainable as
counterbalances by which active factors of the organism are set
up in antagonism to external forces, those feelings which we find
to exist in organisms are bound to be considered as amongst
those factors, not merely as concomitants, but as essential factors
in the biological balance. This can only be done by co-relating
them quantitatively with physical transformations, as Mr.
Spencer thas done, yet without thinking it necessary to explain
the process.
But should Mr. Spencer go further, and say that the sub
jective aspect is primary is the one thing known the objective
being inferential, then the explanation he proposes in the
&quot; Biolosv
&quot;
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external physical factors acting under the laws of moving
equilibria in general is propounded in the wrong language,
and necessitates a theory of universal subjectivity co-extensive
with the objective, so as to show that subjectivity does not
appear by accident in a few organisms. But this Mr. Spencer
does not attempt, and in it Professor Clifford has failed. All
we are concerned with, however, at the present time, is to show
how, according to the principles of the biological theory under
review, all the facts of the organism are to be regarded as
&quot;forces&quot; wrought out in the organism in antagonism to forces
of the environment which they counterbalance, and that the
&quot;feelings&quot; of organisms and their functions must so be ranged.
They are thus brought into the circle of the modes of energy,
which are not aspects of each other, but separate and mutually





as active factors in biology, this being their only raiscm d etre.
In 1 68 of the &quot;Biology&quot; we find it stated of Indirect
Equilibrations
&quot;It is scarcely possible too much to emphasise the conclu
sion, that all these processes by which organisms are refitted to
their ever-changing environments, must be equilibrations of
one kind or other. As authority for this conclusion, we have
not simply the universal truth that change of every order is
towards equilibrium ; but we have also the truth which holds
throughout the organic world, that life itself is the main
tenance of a moving equilibrium between inner and outer
actions the continuous adjustment of internal relations
to external relations
; or the maintenance of a correspondence
between the forces to which an organism is subject and the
forces which it evolves. For, if the preservation of life is the
preservation of such a moving equilibrium, it becomes a corol
lary that those changes which enable a species to live under
altered conditions are changes towards equilibrium with the
altered conditions.&quot; *
&quot;What these Indirect Equilibrations are we shall hereafter
consider. At present we simply note the import of the above
*
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passage in regard to the origin and place of feelings in the
maintenance of the moving equilibria in which they occur,
which is a vindication of their nature as acting factors over and
above the physical organisation.
We now direct the attention of our readers to the chapter
on &quot;Pleasures and Pains&quot; in vol. i. of the &quot;Psychology,&quot; in
which what we may by analogy term the functions of pleasure
and pain are exhibited.
&quot;
124. Let us first glance at the fact, sufficiently obvious
and sufficiently significant, that the extreme states, positive and
negative, along with which pains occur, are states inconsistent
with that due balance of the functions constituting health
;
whereas that medium state along with which pleasure occurs, is
consistent with, or rather is demanded by, this due balance.
This we may see ct, priori. In a mutually dependent set of
organs having a consensus of functions, the very existence of
a special organ having its special function, implies that the
absence of its function must cause disturbance of the consensus ;
implies, too, that its function may be raised to an excess, which
must cause disturbance of the consensus ; implies, therefore, that
maintenance of the consensus goes along with a medium degree
of the function. The ct, priori inference involved, that these
medium actions productive of pleasure must be beneficial, and
the extreme actions productive of pain detrimental, is abun
dantly confirmed d, posteriori where the actions are of all-
essential kinds.&quot; *
Thus we find that pains are the correlatives of actions inju
rious to the organism, while pleasures are the correlatives of
actions conducive to its welfare.!
It is a corollary from this that the seeking of pleasures as
such, and the avoidance of pains as such, have jointly tended
to the maintenance of the moving equilibrium of organisms,
and that they have therefore, as feelings, performed a very active
part in the evolution of organisms, and in their structural and func
tional development. Spoken of in the abstract langiiage of force
*
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or forces, they may therefore be regarded as taking part in the
equilibrations of forces in the system of which they form a por
tion, and as affecting the actions of that whole, considered as an
unit in its immediate environment and as an unit in an organ
ised society. And thus they might be considered to fall into
the general equilibrations of evolution at large, as well as to
maintain their special characteristic as forces in a moving equi
librium antagonising destructive forces in the environment.
10. Mr. Spencer s scheme of biological reconstruction considered
as the outcome of the laws of the moving egiiilibrium.
&quot;We have now to witness the conversion of the abstract pro
cess into a concrete one. The abstract model was arrived at by
an induction from the concrete instances of the solar system
and the spinning-top, which are mechanical moving equilibria ;
and its formulation was effected by the substitution of forces
for the separate members or motions of these systems. It is
supposed that the conception of mutual mechanical movement
is retained in this substituted idea because the mutual relation
of forces implies mutual motion of some sort, and so implies
a moving equilibrium. To this has to be joined the notion
of the reception and expenditure of force, derived from the
case of the steam-engine. The analogy of the counterbalance
of opposite movements in the solar system is translated into a
conception of counterbalancing forces, or of the generation of
forces which shall antagonise external forces. Thus we reach
at last the fanciful conception of a self-sustaining moving
equilibrium, which adapts itself in a twofold way
: firstly,
by assimilating favourable forces, and, secondly, by generating
forces which counterbalance any destructive forces of its envi
ronment.
This conception is supposed to be one derived from a study
of the physical universe ; and if by its means biological develop
ment can be explained, it is supposed that the latter is shown
to be a mere continuation of the former, without any change of
methods or introduction of new factors. Into this abstract
mould the concrete processes of biology have now to be run.BIOLOGY AND THE MOVING EQUILIBRIUM. 369
The ideal outline has to be filled in with actual biological
developments.
Whether the preliminary methods by which this conception
is arrived at are justifiable or not we have just considered. We
must, however, ask the reader to consider it as established for
the sake of continuing the argument, and with the view of fur
ther considering its applicability a task upon which we are now
about to enter.
The course of our studies brings us to the account given by
Mr. Spencer in the second volume of the
&quot;Biology&quot; of mor
phological development and physiological development, with
the view of ascertaining what part is played in these processes,
not by that equilibration in general which is simply another
name for the direct and free action of bodies upon each other
in accordance with the natural relations of their properties, but
by that special kind of biological equilibration which we have
been considering, and without which no event can be classed
as included in the science of Biology.
&quot;The problems of Morphology fall into two distinct classes,
answering respectively to the two leading aspects of Evolution.
In things which evolve there go on two processes increase of
mass and increase of structure.
&quot; *
&quot;The task before us is to trace throughout these phenomena
the process of evolution ; and to show how, as displayed in
them, it conforms to those first principles which evolution in
general conforms to. Two sets of factors have to be taken into
account. Let us look at them.
&quot; The factors of the first class are those which tend directly to
change an organic aggregate, in common with every other aggre
gate, from that more simple form which is not in equilibrium
with incident forces, to that more complex form which is in
equilibrium with them. We have to mark how, in correspon
dence with the universal law that the uniform lapses into the
multiform, and the less multiform into the more multiform, the
parts of each organism are ever becoming further differentiated
;
and we have to trace the varying relations to incident forces,
*
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by which further differentiations are entailed. We have to
observe, too, how each primary modification of structure, induced
by an altered distribution of forces, becomes a parent of secondary
modifications ; how, through the necessary multiplication of
effects, change of form in one part brings about changes of form
in other parts. And then we have also to note the metamor
phoses constantly being induced by the process of segregation
by the gradual union of like parts exposed to like forces,
and the gradual separation of like parts exposed to unlike
forces.
&quot; The factors of the second class, which we have kept in view
throxighout our interpretations, are the formative tendencies of
organisms themselves the proclivities inherited by them from
antecedent organisms, and which past processes of evolution
have bequeathed. We have seen it to be a necessary inference
from various orders of facts
( 65, 84, 97) that organisms
are built up of certain highly complex molecules, which we
distinguished as physiological units each kind of organ
ism being built up of physiological units peculiar to itself. We
found ourselves obliged to recognise in these physiological
units powers of arranging themselves into the forms of the organ
isms to which they belong, analogous to the powers which the
molecules of inorganic substances have of aggregating into specific
crystalline forms. We have consequently to regard this pola
rity of the physiological units as producing, during the develop
ment of any organism, a combination of internal forces that
expend themselves in working out a structure in equilibrium
with the forces to which ancestral organisms were exposed ; but
not in equilibrium with the forces to which the existing organ
ism is exposed if the environment has been changed. Hence
the problem in all cases is to ascertain the resultant of internal
organising forces tending to reproduce the ancestral form, and
external modifying forces tending to cause deviations from that
form.
&quot;
Moreover, we have to take into account, not only the
characters of immediately preceding ancestors, but also those
of their ancestors, and ancestors of all degrees of remoteness.
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in each successive stage of evolution, the structures acquired
during previous stages have been obscured by further integra
tions and further differentiations
; or, conversely, how the linea
ments of primitive organisms have all along continued to mani
fest themselves under the superposed modifications.&quot;*
In the Summary of Morphological Development we find
&quot; And here, indeed, we may see clearly that these truths are
corollaries from that ultimate truth to which all phenomena of
evolution are referable. It is an inevitable deduction from the
persistence of force, that organic forms which have been pro
gressively evolved must present just these fundamental traits
of form which we find them present. It cannot but be that,
during the intercourse between an organism and its environment,
equal forces acting under equal conditions must produce equal
effects
; for, to say otherwise, is, by implication, to say that
more force can produce more or less than its equivalent effect,
Avhich is to deny the persistence of force. Hence, those parts
of an organism which are by its habits of life exposed to like
amounts and like combinations of actions and reactions, must
develop alike
; while unlikenesses of development must as un
avoidably follow unlikenesses among these agencies. And, this
being so, all the specialities of symmetry and unsymmetry and
asymmetry which we have traced are necessary consequences.&quot; t
If we turn now to the problems presented to^ us in the study
of Physiology we find
&quot; The problems of Physiology, in the wide sense above de
scribed, are, like the problems of Morphology, to be considered
as problems to which answers must be given in terms of inci
dent forces. On the hypothesis of Evolution, these speciali
sations of tissues and accompanying concentrations of functions,
must, like the specialisations of shape in an organism and its
component divisions, be due to the actions and reactions which
its intercourse with the environment involves; and the task
before us is to explain how they are wrought how they are
comprehended as results of such actions and reactions.
&quot;
Or, to define these problems still more specifically
: Those
*
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extremely unstable substances which compose the protoplasm
of which organisms are mainly built, have to be traced through
the various modifications in their properties and powers, that
are entailed on them by changes of relation to agencies of all
kinds.&quot;*
&quot;
Here, as before, we must take into account two classes of
factors. We have to bear in mind the inherited results of
actions to which antecedent organisms were exposed, and to
join with these the results of present actions. Each organism,
is to be considered as presenting a moving equilibrium of func
tions, and a correlative arrangement of structures, produced by
the aggregate of actions and reactions that have taken place
between all ancestral organisms and their environments. The
tendency in each organism to repeat this adjusted arrangement
of functions and structures, must be regarded as from time to
time interfered with by actions to which its inherited equili
brium is not adjusted actions to which, therefore, its equili
brium has to be readjusted. And in studying physiological
development we have in all cases to contemplate the progressing
compromise between the old and the new, ending in a restored
balance or adaptation.&quot; f
The plan of exposition favoured by Mr. Spencer is in both
classes of development thus described :
&quot; Two ways of carrying on the inquiry suggest themselves.
We may go through the several great groups of organisms, with
the view of reaching, by comparison of parts, certain general
truths respecting the homologies, the forms, and the relations
of their parts ; and then, having dealt with the phenomena in
ductively, may retrace our steps with the view of deductively
interpreting the general truths reached. Or, instead of thus
separating the two investigations, we may carry them on hand
in hand first establishing each general truth empirically, and
then proceeding to the rationale of it. This last method will,
I think, conduce to both brevity and clearness.&quot; J
The programme thus roughly sketched is very faithfully
*
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adhered to and very ably carried out by Mr. Spencer in this
second volume of the
&quot;
Biology.&quot; Each process of structure
and function is set forth in considerable detail, and is followed
by its suitable deductive warrant. These deductive warrants
consist sometimes merely in the fact that the results are found
harmonious with one or other of the corollaries from the Per
sistence of Force. At other times the reasoning is of a cor
rectly deductive character, although the student will probablv
find that the a priori argument is conspicuously inadequate to
account for the complicated concrete results sought to be ex
plained by its means. But it is a characteristic of most of the
explanations that they are drawn from the various corollaries
of the Persistence of Force known as the Instability of the
Homogeneous, Segregation, the Multiplication of Effects, &c.,
and that no single instance is ever adduced of the action of that
special law of equilibration drawn from the abstract moving
equilibrium to which we have given our attention, though that
process is the one promulgated as specially characteristic of bio
logical changes.





brought into use, but it only appears in two several ways,
neither of which implies any special power either of seeking
to effect the assimilation of forces conducive to continuance,
or of freshly arranging internal forces in antagonism to external
destructive forces. The first use of the term to which we refer
relates to the simple and direct action between forces according
to their natural relations, and in this sense equilibration is
merely another name for general causation, and is indistin
guishable from the equilibrations or mutual relations of forces
which are not of a biological character. The second use of the





to the result of all these primary equilibrations aggre
gated into a complex consensus of relationship. But it is
evident that the mere application of the term in this way is an
indication of result rather than an explanation of process. If
we find that the approach of winter is accompanied by the
thickening of the furry coat of an animal, it is easy to say that
this is the readjustment of a moving equilibrium, but it affords374 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
no explanation of the process. We are unable in thought,
taking into account the decrease of molecular motion, to follow
out the various steps from the conception of the moving
equilibrium to the concrete result mentioned. Nor does Mr.
Spencer ever seek to show how the necessity for balance and
counterbalance does actually produce any of the changes and
developments he has set himself to explain.
To effect these explanations he makes use of a variety of con
crete knowledge and of the well-known mechanical laws ; and
his explanations must be appraised on their own merits. All
we are concerned with at present is to divest the inquiry of all
those speculative influences which we have just been consider
ing. These, although exalted to the first place in constructive
efficacy, are found in reality to be the outcome and not the cause
of change. In their statement they present to our minds a
semblance of analogy with some physical aggregates, but in reality
they turn out of an entirely different constitution.
&quot;We have just remarked that the conception of organisms as
moving equilibria is the result rather than the original cause of
biological development. And it is singular that in Mr. Spencer s
exposition we have no attempt whatever at an explanation of
the origin of biological moving equilibria. The whole exposi
tion takes organisms for granted, and then seeks to account
for subsequent growth or development and for the modification
of function. The question as to the origin of any such systema-
tisation or co-ordination of parts accompanied by the habit of
motion, which constitutes even the simplest life, is not even
referred to. Mr. Spencer s scheme requires some simple or
ganism to commence with. This given, he claims from the laws
of equilibration to work out any and every process of develop
ment even to the highest complex forms. But the problem of
the origin of this simplest biological form he does not attempt
to solve. It is not to the purpose to say that it is a condition
gradually attained by insensible modifications from the inor
ganic state. Slight though the distinction may appear to be
between the highest inorganic molecule which acts towards its
environment strictly in accordance with chemical and physical
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overpowering the operation of the former and coercing them to
the furtherance of its own preservation and continuance, that
distinction nevertheless is a radical one. By no means can we
convert the former into the latter, or derive the latter from the
former as a mere continuance, a state into which it developed
out of its own properties.
This we regard as a fundamental defect of Mr. Spencer s
system, and one which entitles us, should we so decide, to
declare that we need proceed no further with the consideration
of his scheme.
We hold that Mr. Spencer s theory of an organism being a
moving equilibrium, and, as such, governing the adaptation of
its forces to meet those of the environment, and influencing the
mutual balancings of its own parts with their accompanying
functions, implies a theory of the coercive power of the moving
equilibrium over the ordinary chemical and physical laws of its
units. The moving equilibrium is, therefore, not the simple
result of its constituents, but the necessity for its protection
and sustenance produces coercion of the units. If this is
not the case, and the moving equilibrium is to be considered
as the result of its constituents, then the theory of the moving
equilibrium as a cause of development has to be abandoned.
With it would go all the arguments by which external forces
are said to generate counterbalancing internal forces of struc
ture and function, which are meet for antagonising particular
external inimical influences. Casting this on one side, the
special characteristic of biological change is obliterated, and
what we call biological change is then really but a continua
tion of previous inorganic development, and the problem would
be, from the known factors of chemistry and physical environ
ment, to deduce the developments of vegetable and animal life
free from the embarrassing associations of the laws of the moving
equilibrium. As a matter of fact this is the course actually
pursued by Mr. Spencer, thus practically abandoning and in
validating his elaborate arguments drawn from the presumed
analogy between organisms and inorganic moving equilibria.376 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
ii. General Review of Mr. Spencer s Scheme of Biological
Reconstruction.
Thoroughly to perform the task indicated by the title of this
section would require a separate book. Our intention, however,
is rather to review the lines upon which the problem, of biological
reconstruction is attempted by Mr. Spencer than to criticise his
actual performance in detail. At the same time, while we point
out the difference between the actual methods employed and
the method indicated in the preceding sections, we shall also
have to show their inadequacy viewed even in themselves.
It will be convenient to divide our subject into two parts
one concerning the formative action of external agencies, and
the other concerning the formative powers of the constituents
of the organism itself. It is true, these have to be regarded as
operating conjointly, but we do not think the inquiry will suffer
from our taking it in the manner proposed. There is indeed
a third agency, in the
&quot; need
&quot;
for the continued existence of
individuals and species ; but as this is an inquiry beyond the
reach of science, we reserve the consideration of it till a later
period.
We have now to study the part played in the evolution of
organisms by the well-known laws of motion, by the action of
heat, light, moisture, &c., by chemical environment, and by
other factors of an external kind.
It seems strange that our first endeavour should not be
directed to an inquiry respecting the origin of organisms ; but
so it is. This subject is passed over by Mr. Spencer in silence.
Organisms of some simple character being taken for granted, our
study is limited to the less difficult task of ascertaining the laws
of their modification, so that out of the nearest approach to
homogeneity and the inorganic, we shall be able to evolve the
most highly complex forms. It is true that in the Appendix
to the first volume of the
&quot;
Biology
&quot; Mr. Spencer gives a
hypothetical account of the origin of
&quot;
organic matter,&quot; verging
indeed upon the origin of organisms ; but in our previous work
we have had occasion already to show that the endeavour, ifMR. SPENCER S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 377
it really aimed at the problem of explaining the origin of
organisms, was not successful.
Mr. Spencer very properly from his point of view denies that
any distinct line of demarcation ever existed between the organic
and the inorganic. According to the doctrine of Evolution, the
former must have acquired its differentiation from the latter by
insensible degrees. Yet we cannot but think that there is one
essential distinction between the very lowest organism and the
highest complex inorganic molecule in the origin of its exist
ence. As a matter of scientific fact, it is not known that any
even of the simplest organisms ever come into existence other
wise than from the substance of preceding organisms of a similar
character. And as a matter of theory, there is an essential dis
tinction between the continuous existence of a highly complex
molecule which does not expend energy nor require sustenance,
and the temporary existence of an organism continually expend
ing energy which has to be restored, and carrying with it the
means of propagation in view of a certain termination to its
own existence.
However, taking the case as it is presented to us, let us see
how simple and homogeneous organisms can be developed into
highly complex ones. We find the inquiry divides itself into
two portions namely, that relating to Morphological and that
relating to Physiological Development. In pursuing these in
quiries separately, Mr. Spencer takes all needful precautions for
notifying their conjoint and contemporaneous action.
(a.) General Principles of Morphological Development.
We do not know how far Mr. Spencer may be justified in






units.&quot; If they are ex post facto terms, their use is limited to
the later stages of scientific inquiry. If they are some of the
things which have to be explained, we beg the question at issue
by making use of them in our initial inquiries. However, they
are so employed by Mr. Spencer ; and we are asked first to con
sider the aggregation of morphological units. Presumably these
morphological units are already differentiated and specialised in
action as physiological units. They have various modes of378 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
aggregation, which form the first problem in morphological studies.
The second problem of the science consists in the changes of
shape that accompany changes of aggregation. Two sets of fac
tors have to be taken into account.
&quot; The factors of the first class are those which tend directly
to change an organic aggregate, in common with every other
aggregate, from that more simple form which is not in equi
librium with incident forces, to that more complex form which
is in equilibrium with them. &quot;We have to mark how, in corre
spondence with the universal law that the uniform lapses into
the multiform, and the less multiform into the more multiform,
the parts of each organism are ever becoming further differen
tiated ; and we have to trace the varying relations to incident
forces, by which further differentiations are entailed. . . .
The factors of the second class which we have to keep in view
throughout our interpretations, are the formative tendencies
of organisms themselves the proclivities inherited by them
from antecedent organisms, and which past processes of evolution
have bequeathed.&quot;*
The class of changes referred to in the first portion of the
above quotation receives from Mr. Spencer a very masterly and
interesting treatment in the first portion of the part entitled
&quot;Morphological Development.&quot; Here are explained the diffe
rentiations of structure which must ensue from differences in
morphological units, and from different modes of their aggre
gation. Afterwards Mr. Spencer exhibits in great detail the
differentiations which must naturally ensue in organisms ac
cording as they are similarly or differently exposed in their
parts to the action of the environment. This is accompanied
by an account of the manner in which changes of shape and
arrangement are affected by pressures and strains of various
characters, whether caused by gravitation, action of wind or
water, or contiguity of growth. As the study becomes more
advanced, and the structure of the plants and animals attains
greater complexity, the surrounding conditions produce still
greater variety. Thus abundant or diminished food-supply
*
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may play a part in morphological change, and the different
exposures of different parts in competitive growth may produce
great variety of development.
In all this morphological evolution, however, the prime fact
to be borne in mind is the internal power of growth. It is this
which does the work ; and all that can be said of the agencies
just referred to is that they possess the power of modifying the
action of that interior force. It is not suggested that the in
terior forces are called into being by the external forces, but
only that their action is modified by them. The action of the
inner power is restrained for instance by gravitation, while, on
the other hand, its natural tendencies may be heightened by
the heat and light of the sun. It is therefore evident that the
main interest of the inquiry must be concentrated on these inner
formative powers, which, indeed, throws the inquiry back upon
the study of the origin of organisms. How comes it that such
an arrangement of inorganic molecules is attained as to form an
aggregate which expends energy for the purpose of securing and
assimilating energy, so as to prolong an existence which would
otherwise come to a speedy termination 1 And however much
we may be convinced of the fact of a gradual evolution, and
however much the stages of this evolution may be known or
reasoned out, the extent and beauty of the harmonies thus
brought under our notice should not cause us to overlook the
need for mastering this primary element of the problem.
(b.) The Morphological Development of Animals.
The study of the action of external agencies upon the morpho
logical development of plants is comparatively simple. That of
animals is more complex. In the latter case, a new factor makes
its appearance.
&quot; This new factor is Motion motion of the organism in rela
tion to surrounding objects, or of the parts of the organism in
relation to one another, or both. . . . What, among plants, is
an inappreciable cause of morphological differentiation, becomes,
among animals, the chief cause of differentiation.&quot;
*
*
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We have to remark here the introduction of a new factor
without any explanation of its appearance. We are elsewhere
told that the organs of locomotion are generated by the neces
sity for seeking food when that food is not in perpetual conti
guity, but is diffused in the neighbouring environment; and
hence they seem to have no explanation other than in the
hypothetical need for the continuance of existence. But granted
the capacity for motion on the part of animals, we can discern
the modifying effects which surrounding agencies would have
upon them.
&quot; Animals that are rooted or otherwise fixed, of course pre
sent traits of structure nearest akin to those we have been lately
studying.
. . . But animals which move from place to place are
subject to an additional class of actions and reactions. These
actions and reactions affect them in various ways according to their
various modes of movement. Let us glance at the several leading
relations between shape and motion which we may expect to find.
&quot;If an organism advances through a homogeneous medium
with one end always foremost, that end, being exposed to forces
unlike those to which the other end is exposed, may be expected
to become unlike it ; and supposing this to be the only constant
contrast of conditions, we may expect an equal distribution of
the parts round the axis of movement a radial symmetry.&quot;
This instance is expanded, and leads up to a conclusion rea
soned out d priori; after which Mr. Spencer passes on to a
consideration of the facts presented by science, in order to show
how this conclusion is confirmed d, posteriori.
heedless to say, this account is of the greatest interest, and
tends to confirm our belief in the gradual evolution of organised
beings. The main question, however, remains Do we know
all the factors and understand the processes fully, so as to be
able to say that an&quot; explanation of them has been effected ? It
is true, we discern some of the conditions and some of the
factors concerned in this great history ; but however vast the
proportion of our attention that we concentrate upon them, and
however much we elaborate them in printed books, there^ are
some things which remain unexplainable, and some factors un
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(c.) Mr. Spencer s Exposition of Physiological Development.
Let us take for granted the fact of the existence of organisms,
let us take for granted, too, the power of motion possessed by
animals, and let us leave out of consideration altogether the
factor of Feeling. Then the task of accounting for physio
logical development as presented to us by Mr. Spencer involves
the study of the manner in which previously existing organisms
must have been modified by alterations in their relation to the
environment.
This account is very able, and it cannot be denied that the
proof of gradual evolution and the impossibility of finding lines
of demarcation between various developments of a particular
class is so well set forth that the representation carries with it
the force of conviction. But it is a conviction wrought in our
minds by inductive evidences rather than by a priori reason
ing. For instance, the account given by Mr. Spencer of the
tegumentary appendages shows very clearly the unity of nature
between hair, feathers, scales, and the other clothing of animals,
together with the horny appendages ; from which can be recog
nised the fact of their development from a common origin.
But the account of their origin is quite hypothetical. Having
arrived at a stage of development when the organism is pos
sessed of a skin a skin subject to waste and possessing the
power of repair we have to suppose the growth and casting
off of horny cells all over the skin in general. Kext, we have
to imagine a small pit formed in that skin, or rather a number
of small pits. Then from the larger area of the surface of
the pits compared with the area of the apertures there is a
proportionately increased production of horny cells, which from
the limited area of the cavity are condensed or integrated into
rudimentary hairs.* Thus established, it is easy to work out
the process of their extrusion beyond the surface of the skin
and their subsequent modification into the great variety of
forms mentioned above.
*
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We have selected this case because it takes us back to the
initial physiological development presented by Mr. Spencer in
the differentiations between the outer and inner tissues. We
are reminded * that this is a differentiation common also to inor
ganic masses whose outer parts are differentiated from the inner
by oxidisation, by drying, and by the action of light, moisture,
or frost. In the same manner an originally homogeneous por
tion of protoplasm will acquire a skin. Evidently this skin is
formed of the substance of the protoplasm, and is hardened, not
for the purpose of protection, but as the direct and simple effect
of the action of the environment. Here ought to be introduced
the d, priori explanation of the fact of waste and repair. Inor
ganic surfaces are not subject to waste ; and should abrasion
take place, there will be renewed action of the environment upon
the exposed surface, with resulting similarity. If it is argued
that the case of an organism is identical in principle, there is
nothing more to be said. But if it is advanced that there is a
natural waste which is supplied from the organism itself, or that
the abraded surface is re-formed by the action of the organism,
then we are introduced to a process which finds no analogue in
the inorganic world, not even in the self-repair of a crystal. It
is evident, however, that in order to account for the various
clothing and appendages of animals we require to have a con
tinuous expenditure of energy and a continuous repair of waste.
It is not our intention to discuss this question at present ; we
only wish to show how the notion of the expenditure of energy
and the necessity for fresh assimilations of energy are the funda
mental fact and the fundamental difficulty of Biology.
It follows that, if this fundamental principle be taken for
granted, as in the above instance, vast progress can be made even
in a priori reconstruction ; while the principle materially assists
us in appreciating the facts of gradual change brought under
our notice in our inductive studies.
As indicated in our notice of
&quot;
Morphological Development,&quot;
the main process is one of inner growth modified by external
influences. The inner forces are not called forth in response to
*
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the action of the environment, but in their tumultuous growth
are cahined, cribbed, and confined by the restraints of the oppos
ing environment ; or on the other hand, should the environment
be favourable, then the inner forces make use of it for the con
tinuance of the organism s existence.
The development of the organs of sense is by means of diffe
rentiations of the outer tissues. This is a truth arrived at by
inductions from various sources.* The question is whether
it can be deduced d, priori from a consideration of the rela
tions between a moving equilibrium of organic matter and the
surrounding light, aerial vibrations, and floating particles of
matter ? Mr. Spencer thinks that possibly light may have aided
in setting up certain modifications by which the nervous parts
of the visual mechanism are formed, and that the complexities
of the sensory organs are thus explicable. These must have
arisen by the natural selection of favourable variations.
The development of the means of locomotion Mr. Spencer does
not mention. Locomotive organs are evidently produced by
the action of the inner forces in seeking food, aided by the sub
sequent necessity of escape from enemies ; and they are not
a priori deducible from the action of the environment. In the
chapter on the
&quot; General Shapes of Animals
&quot; in the preceding
part, Mr. Spencer has shown how
&quot; the one ultimate principle
that in any organism equal amounts of growth take place in
those directions in which the incident forces are equal, serves
as a key to the phenomena of morphological differentiation.
By it we are furnished with interpretations of those likenesses
and unlikenesses of parts, which are exhibited in the several
kinds of symmetry ; and ... we are enabled to comprehend,
in a general way, the actions by which animals have been
moulded into the shapes they possess.&quot; f
But this view is subordinate to the question concerning the
origination of that habitual motion which constitutes an or
ganism, of the consequent necessity for repair of waste, and of
the origin of locomotion.
In the chapter treating of the
&quot; Differentiations of the Inner
*
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Tissues of Animals,&quot; we find the same course pursued. The
study is mainly an inductive one, with hypothetical explanations
of differentiation and development from a common origin,
certain essential primary stages in the evolution of an organism
being taken for granted. The first class of developments com
prises those which take their origin from a simple intestinal
canal. Out of this, by varied causes, arise differentiations in the
successive parts of the canal. Firstly, the different conditions
of the food in its passage produce different states, and finally
different arrangements of its parts. Hence originated the sto
mach with its secreting juices. Hence also can be explained
the gizzard, the arrangements for the storage of food by rumi
nants, and the crop possessed by some birds. The liver, the
pancreas, and various smaller glands are not to be accounted
for in the same way, but by the segregation which takes place
amongst mixed colloids and crystalloids even in inorganic
mixtures, the tissues giving ready entrance to the substances
that decompose them and ready exit to the substances into
which they are decomposed. The question is one as to the
excretion of waste and the specialisation of organs for that
purpose. In some cases, this is determined by the mechanical
actions of organisms ; in others, by facilities for escape. In the
case of the liver, the waste products of which are utilised,
&quot; natural selection
&quot;
will determine the most beneficial spot.
The respiratory system is one of the means by which an
animal organism is supplied with some of the necessary con
stituents for prolonged action. Mr. Spencer traces its origin
inductively to a differentiation in the alimentary canal. How is
this differentiation deductively established 1 By the hypothesis
of fish swallowing air-bubbles, and the consequent change in
the forces acting upon the alimentary canal causing special
differentiations to suit that new circumstance. The habit of
taking in air-bubbles is likely to become established, and the
organs for utilising them developed. The relative effects of
direct and indirect equilibration in producing this further
heterogeneity must, as in many other cases, remain undecided.
Mr. Spencer next proceeds to consider the differentiations
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the external tegumentary system, exposed to the action of
external objects, and the internal tegumentary system, exposed
to the action of food. The first set of tissues to come under
notice is the vascular system. This is found to arise primarily
from the osmotic action which must go on between two dis
similar fluids separated by an intermediate diaphragm. The
osmotic action, however, is not a simple one terminating in a
state of equal distribution
; but since there is an abstraction
of nutritive liquid either for growth or function, more nutri
tive liquid will be forced towards the point of utilisation,
which is the direction of least resistance. This osmose is a
cause of redistribution which is at work even before any central
organ of circulation exists. Changes of internal pressure will
tend to increase the circulation. Other causes assist those
differentiations which eventuate in the complicated vascular
system as we now know it in the higher organisms.
The osseous structure is determined by the strains to which
the body is subject in the mutual actions of the environment
and the moving organism. These strains cause hardening in
some of the gelatinous constituents ; such constituents harden
into cartilage, which again in the parts most exposed to strains
or pressures harden into bone. The process is completed by
the deposit of some of the calcareous elements contained in
the food ; and thereafter the problem is merely one dependent
upon the action of waste and repair, and the modifications due
to increments of repair, wrought by excessive actions in certain
directions, on the one hand, and deficiencies of repair, occasioned
by the non-exercise of other parts, on the other hand. The
osseous structure is due mainly to direct equilibration of a
mechanical character, although some of its parts appear rather
to be due to indirect equilibration.
The question as to the probable origin of nerves and the




&quot; and in the
&quot;
Biology.&quot; In the former our attention
is primarily directed to the abstract laws of dynamics set forth
in
&quot; First Principles,&quot; which are supposed to rule the formation
of the nervous system.
&quot; In First Principles, Part II., chap. 9, we found that in
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all cases motion follows the line of greatest traction, or the
line of least resistance, or the resultant of the two.&quot; We also
saw
&quot; that motion once set up along any line becomes itself a
cause of subsequent motion along that line, equally when the
motion is that of matter through space, that of matter through
matter, and that of molecular undulations through an aggregate
of molecules.&quot;
As this is to be our instrument in reconstructing the Genesis
of Nerves, wherewith goes the concomitant of Mind, it is
essential that we should clearly understand the materials with
which we have to deal, and the laws of Motion which -affect
them.
&quot; Motion follows the line,&quot; &c. ; of course this means
that Matter in motion or the motion of Matter
&quot;
follows,&quot; &c. ;
for jwe cannot dissociate Motion from Matter. Either Matter
means, firstly, combinations of ultimate units of attraction and
repulsion, each aggregate and combination of aggregates having
properties deducible from the shapes, sizes, modes, and rates of
motion of its constituents, and their modes of combination. Or
else, secondly, Matter means the seventy so-called elements as
known by us. With these meanings, the first enunciated prin
ciple can be accepted.
We now come to the principle
&quot; that motion once set up
along any line becomes itself a cause of subsequent motion
along that line
&quot; a proposition which, to say the least, is
ambiguous. Let us refer to Mr. Spencer s own statement in
&quot;First Principles.&quot; It is all contained in one short paragraph
on p. 226.
&quot; Movement set up in any direction is itself a cause of
farther movement in that direction, since it is the embodiment
of a surplus force in that direction.&quot;
Here we have an assertion and the reason for that assertion.
The reason is founded on the conception or the fact of there being
such things as
&quot;
surplus forces.&quot; Mr. Spencer s system of Philo
sophy, founded as it is upon Force, is deficient in not having a
chapter
&quot; On Abstract Laws of Force and their Interrelations.&quot;
If we had this,we could tell what was meant by
&quot; a surplus force.&quot;
Failing it, we must guess. We suppose that the changes of the
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virtue of the imparting by some matter to other matter of motion
when the former has it in excess of the latter, so as to establish
an equality between the two, much as Avater finds its level.
In this case the excess of the motion in the former over the
average of the two would be called surplus motion or surplus
force. Is this what Mr. Spencer means ? When he speaks of
&quot;surplus force&quot; we presume he does not speak of force pure
and simple, which we do not know, but of some manifestation
of it which we do know. Yet we are not able to understand
what state of things other than this Mr. Spencer refers to






Let us take the case of steam out of the spout of a kettle, or
what is much the same thing, the steam waste-pipe from an
engine. The surplus force or motion is shot forth into the still
air is this to be called
&quot; the embodiment
&quot;
of a surplus force
&quot; in that direction?
&quot; If the force or motion of the steam and
air is in a given direction, is the continuance of the force or
motion in that direction, on account of the continuance of the
conditions, an embodiment of surplus force in that direction ?
We are unable to argue the question in the abstract and
without recourse to concrete instances. Here Mr. Spencer
advances as the reason why movement once set up in any
direction becomes itself the cause of further movement in
that direction,
&quot; because it is the embodiment of a surplus force
in that direction.&quot; The fact is, Mr. Spencer does mean some
thing accurate, but not coming into contact with actual dis
cussion, his statement is not clarified by criticism. Absorbed
in his own studies, and expressing himself by his own phrase
ology, he does not realise the difficulty which other people
have in understanding him, with the momentous consequence
that the greatest of all scientific questions, namely, that as
to the genesis of Mind, is left in doubt owing to the obscurities
of half a page of his book.
Mr. Spencer proceeds to say that this law holds good of the
transit of Matter through space. We suppose Mr. Spencer
refers to interstellar space. This implies that if a body was
projected in a certain direction, then a similar one, projected
in a like manner, would take the same direction. This, no388 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
doubt, would be the case from the parity of conditions; but
it is not to be supposed that the first would compel a second
mass to follow it in the same direction. For how would it be
if the second mass were projected at an angle from the course
of the first 1 &quot;Would the previous event exercise any influence
upon the succeeding one ? Certainly not. Mr. Spencer s illus
tration merely exhibits the law of inertia, and it amounts to
this : Motion in any direction is a cause of its own continuance.
The motion of the earth round the sun one day is a cause of
its continuing its journey the next, and its circuit one year is
the result of its previous circuit. Its revolution upon its axis
is caused by previous revolutions.
The next illustration is the transit of matter through matter.
Let us take the example given.
&quot; Any breach made by one
solid through another, or any channel formed by a fluid through
a solid, becomes a route along which, other things equal, sub
sequent movements of like nature take
place.&quot; Notice here
that Mr. Spencer says the subsequent movements
&quot; take
place,&quot;
and not that they are caused by the previous movements. In
fact, he says that other things must be equal, i.e., that the causes
of the first movement must be present to ensure the like result
in the second, and the conclusion is that the repetition of
movements in a given direction requires the same set of causes
as produced the movement in the first instance, and not that
motion once set up along any line becomes itself a cause of
subsequent motion along that line.&quot;
We have next the case of
&quot; molecular undulations through
an aggregate of molecules.&quot; We do not see that this case
differs in the least from the flow of water through accustomed
channels. We may find that certain vibrations are hindered
in their passage through a body by the irregular constitution
of that body, and they may be able by their own motions to
effect such a readjustment of the molecular condition of that
body as to facilitate the transmission of subsequent vibrations.
Thus the conditions under which future movements will take
place are changed, and the facilities for their transmission im
proved, if they should come, but the new arrangement certainly
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first determine the second. Indeed, we know very little about
the passage of undulatory motion.
The only illustration in the non-biological world which Mr.
Spencer can find to illustrate his meaning is drawn, not from
cases of molecular motion, but from the science of hydro
dynamics, and will be found illusory. The passage of water
down a hillside or through almost level country is accompanied
by a process of washing away the portions of the ground in
the lower levels along which the water pursues its way, in
obedience to the law that motion takes the line of greatest
traction and least resistance. In pursuance of the same law a
second sheet of water will follow the same course, and with
greater facility, because of the previous removal of obstructions.
But this is not a parallel case at all with the propagation of
undulatory motions through a mass of organisable protoplasm.
The action of the water is disintegrative ; the action of the
latter is supposed to be formative. The former removes ob
structions by means of its mechanical momentum
; the latter is
supposed to place molecules in lines a process in which no
doubt the polarities of the molecules play a part a process
which might perhaps more fitly be placed under the class
which Mr. Spencer calls
&quot;
Segregation.&quot;
Mr. Spencer would undoubtedly draw a parallel between the
formation of a river system and the formation of a nervous system
between a disintegrative system and a formative system. But
we cannot admit the analogy, more particularly when we take
into account the fact that nervous systems are double, having
both a system for the reception of motion and a system for the
expenditure of energy, the origin and development of which Mr.
Spencer does not sufficiently explain.
Let us now summarise the instances that have been adduced.
We have seen that the passage of a solid through a solid does
not cause or set up movement in a similar direction
; we have
seen that the movement of bodies through space does not cause
movement in the same direction
; we have seen that the move
ment of gases through gases does not cause movement in the
same direction. The only valid instance affording any pre
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down declivities to its level, by means of channels previously
formed, thus obeying the law of movement in the line of the
greatest traction and of least resistance. But we do not find
that movement set up.
Having thus discussed the preliminaries, let us now approach
the practical problem, as dealt with by Mr. Spencer.
We find the examination of Mr. Spencer s explanation of
the genesis of nervous systems more difficult than anything we
have yet undertaken, on account of the obscure and compli
cated lines of thought pursued. The first difficulty arises from
the circumstance that he does not define his starting-point. It
would appear from p. 512 of the
&quot;
Psychology
&quot; that we have
to start from an
&quot; undifferentiated organism.&quot; We do not under




for it is a contradiction in terms. And next we are
referred to





sesses different parts. This is begging the question.
We find, however, a better and clearer explanation in 302
of the
&quot;Biology,&quot; which is really very plausible. It is too
concise to summarise and too long to quote. We must ask the
student to refer to it himself. It amounts to this ; in a mass
composed of various kinds of protoplasmic molecules, an inci
dent force impinging upon it at any point will cause mole
cular change, which change will propagate itself continuously
in suitable molecules, and thus form a continuous line of similar
molecules, changed and placed by the motion in segregated order,
which constitute the rudiments of a nerve. The obscure part
of the statement is that the incident force is not named. We pre
sume it must not be a general force equally distributed over the
surface, such as heat or light, but a force incident upon some
particular point, such as a mechanical strain, or a ray of light
or heat falling upon a point, or a vibratory motion, or something
else of a local nature.
It is quite possible to imagine that a mechanical arrangement
of differentiated molecules in continuous lines is a conceivable
occurrence in a mass of protoplasm under the action of external
forces such as heat, light, and mechanical motion, simultaneously
with the segregation of other kinds of protoplasmic molecules.MR. SPENCER S BIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 391
It is possible to imagine such a result, although, we may
not be able to work it out ct, priori in all its complications.
But when it is complete it is but a mechanical arrangement.
Mr. Spencer, however, goes beyond this, and takes one step
which appears quite unwarranted by the terms of the problem,
namely
&quot;
Every repetition will help to increase, to integrate, to define
more completely, the course of the escaping molecular motion
extending its remoter part, while it makes its nearer part more
permeable will help, that is, to form a line of discharge, a
line for conducting impressions, a nerve.&quot; *
The unwarranted step is to call the incident force
&quot; a stimu
lus,&quot; and the line of molecules,
&quot;a line for conducting im
pressions,&quot; instead of a line for the conduction of motion. This
is followed up in the succeeding section by speaking of irrita
bility as a property of protoplasm, and by inference a property
of the mechanical molecules arranged in a line.
We must ask here if this stimulating property, this quality
of irritability, this power of transmitting
&quot;
impressions,&quot; is
objective language ; and if so, is it language which could up
to this point be applied to any of the combinations of Matter
and Motion, or to the ultimate units out of which all molecules
are built ? Or does this mark the transition of the objective
into the subjective ? If so, it would seem to imply that the
subjective is not only dependent but consequent upon a certain
combination of the objective when molecules are formed in
lines by incident motion, and in an aggregate are variously
changed according to the varieties of incident motions. Here
upon would arise irritability, impressions, feelings, and afterwards
an organised consciousness. Both &quot;irritability&quot; and &quot;sensi
tiveness
&quot; have definite objective meanings, but inasmuch as
they have subjective connotations also, it is necessary in the
study of a physical process to restrain their meaning to the
mechanical limits of the problem, lest inadvertently the verbal
guise should cover an undetected transition of thought answer
ing to an explanation of the origin of the subjective.
*
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&quot; From beginning to end, therefore, the development of nerve
results from the passage of motion along the line of least resist
ance, and the reduction of it to a line of less and less resistance
continually. The first opening of a route along which equili
brium is restored between a place where molecular motion is
in excess and a place where it is in defect, comes within this
formula.&quot;
We have no room to consider the evolution of ganglia,
the storage of nervous force, and the development of efferent
lines for its discharge, nor for the study of the development
of the directive machinery of the nervous system. We only
observe that the evolution is accomplished by a process with
which feelings and consciousness have nothing to do ; and if
it takes place at all as described, it is effected upon purely
mechanical and physical principles.
Our next inquiry concerns the development of muscular tissue.
Contractility as well as irritability is a property of protoplasm or
sarcode, and it is not improbably due to isomeric change in one
of its component colloids. But the question remains, &quot;What
causes the specialisation of contractile substance 1 What causes
the growth of colloid masses which monopolise this contractility,
and leave kindred colloids to monopolise other properties ? Has
natural selection gradually localised and increased the primordial
muscular substance ? or has the frequent recurrence of irritations
and consequent contractions at particular parts done it ? We
have, I think, reason to conclude that direct equilibration rather
than indirect equilibration has been chiefly operative. The
reasoning that was used in the case of nerve applies equally in
the case of muscle. A portion of undifferentiated tissue con
taining a predominance of the colloid that contracts in changing,
will, during each change, tend to form new molecules of its own
type from the other colloids diffused through it: the tendency
of these entangled colloids to fall into unity with those around
them, will be aided by every shock of isomeric transformation.
Hence, repeated contractions will further the growth of the con
tracting mass, and advance its differentiation and integration.&quot;
*
*
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To conclude, Mr. Spencer resumes the study of the problem
of the repair and growth of the differentiated tissues.
&quot; When treating inductively of that restoration which takes
place in worn organs, it was admitted that little in the way of
deductive interpretation is apparent nothing beyond the har
mony between the facts and the general principle of segregation.&quot;
However, Mr. Spencer is able to point out relations and
conditions of osmotic exchange, which render it clear that the
amount of exchange must be proportionate to the amount of
consumption and decomposition ; so that the materials for
consumption and reintegration of tissue must be supplied in
proportion to the demand. To this must be added the cir
cumstance of osmotic distension, by which the nutritive fluid
is thrust to the parts where there is the greatest escape for it
i.e., to the parts in which it is absorbed by local expenditure
of energy.
Although this hypothesis is a reasonable one so far as the
operations of existing organisms are concerned, we fail to see
the origin of such a self-maintaining process in any combination
of inorganic molecules
; and the theory therefore seems to lack
deductive warrant. The originally homogeneous portion of
protoplasm is merely due to segregation, and the causes which
originated it would also naturally lead it to retain its aggregation
intact. We are not to suppose that it immediately commences
to expend energy in order to retain its aggregation, and that the
energy so expended has to be replaced. If its outer surface has
become differentiated from its inner, we do not see any necessity
for the process of osmose : nor do we see the applicability of
the theory of repair when there is no expenditure of energy.
We have thus shortly summarised these important chapters
for the purpose of forming a judgment on the methods employed,
and have come to the conclusion that they contain a system of
hypotheses suggested by the scientific inductions which lead us
to the conviction that all organisms have arisen by insensible
modifications from some simpler forms. These hypotheses are
all of a concrete character, and they are applied to some hypo
thetical simple organism already possessing the essential charac
teristic of animal life. It has the property of motion, which394 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
means the expenditure of energy, and implies the power of
seeking, or at any rate of assimilating fresh energy from its
environment for the purpose of self-sustenance. It exhibits
the phenomena of waste and repair. All the developments are
effected by means of these original powers of the organism ; and
Mr. Spencer s system is essentially one relating not to the origin
but to the development of organisms. And seeing that it is
deficient through this immense initial hiatus, it is merely Mr.
Darwin s great work put into another form. It is not a system
going behind that work and giving to it an explanatory or de
ductive connection with the general order of physical sequences.
It is merely commensurate with Mr. Darwin s work, and fails
of the attempted extension into antecedent histories.
(d.) Now Organic Development is Affiliated upon Evolution
in General.
The affiliation of morphological and physiological develop
ment upon Evolution in general must be managed by proving
their conformity with &quot;First Principles.&quot; It is asserted* that this
can be done in terms of the redistribution of matter and motion.
This is evidently a reference to the Formula of Evolution. On
this we have to remark, that the terms matter and motion cannot
be regarded as mere symbols like the symbols x and y, as asserted
by Mr. Spencer in his reply to our former criticism. They must
be held to refer to the chemical substances adduced as factors
in the early chapters of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; namely, oxygen, nitro
gen, carbon, hydrogen, &c., in relation with various substances
and motions of their environment. It is worthy of remark that
no reference is made anywhere to the concomitance between
integrations of matter and dissipations of motion, thus showing
the inutility of the Formula of Evolution for any practical ex




exhibited in other ways.
The instability of the homogeneous is endlessly exemplified
in the changes wrought upon the homogeneous by incident
forces. The multiplication of effects has also been exhibited,
*
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and we have been given innumerable cases of equilibration.
These equilibrations have in many cases been due to the simple
and direct operation of natural chemical combinations and phy
sical relations. All the biological changes we have contemplated
are but incidents in a progressing equilibration.
With respect to this point, however, we have to raise the
inquiry previously suggested Does Mr. Spencer mean the
mechanical equilibration suggested by implication in the For
mula of Evolution or, again, a physical equilibration of energies
on the way to an universal state of dissipation or degradation of
energy? Or does he only mean by equilibration an equivalent
to general causation regarded quantitatively
? In this latter
aspect we are inclined to regard Mr. Spencer s use of the term.
If it has a more limited meaning, it is insufficient for an
explanation of Biology ; but if it is used in. this larger sense,
it is too vague for scientific purposes.
Mr. Spencer concludes the summary of biologic affiliation
by terming the completed organism
&quot; a moving equilibrium.&quot;
This, however, is evidently but a name descriptive of the re
sults of biologic evolution that is to say, of the direct and
indirect equilibrations of the chemical components with their
physical surroundings and not a name for the cause of such
evolution.
He then winds up with the usual reference to the Persistence
of Force.
&quot; In all which universal laws, we find ourselves again brought
down to the Persistence of Force, as the deepest knowable
cause of those modifications which constitute physiological
development ; as it is the deepest knowable cause of all other
evolution.
&quot; *
It is impossible to follow this process of reasoning, more
particularly if Force is merely a symbol. We can only argue
that if Force manifests itself in modes, then when one mode
changes it must be into another mode. But why the first
should change, and what are the conditions of its change, can
not be deduced a priori ; it can only be understood a posteriori
*
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from inductive studies. The warrant for the perpetual lapse of
the homogeneous (?) into the heterogeneous, for the multiplica
tion of effects, for segregation, for equilibration of both orders,
lies in experience, in the very experience of which they are
supposed to be the a priori explanations.
1 2. Indirect Equilibration.
It must be remembered that the line of thought we are now
following is in pursuance of an examination into the argument
set forth in the latter portion of Part III. in the first volume,
with regard to the question
&quot; How is organic evolution caused ?
&quot;
In answer to this question we first of all considered rather elabo
rately what was meant by equilibration, and more particularly
by the special laws of biological equilibration. In the preceding
section we have shortly reviewed the more detailed account of
morphological and physiological development presented to us in
voL ii. so far as the external factors are concerned. We now
propose returning to the principal course of the argument in
vol. i. by considering the chapter on &quot;Indirect Equilibration,&quot;
as preliminary to a study of the operation of the internal factors






planations as due to this process ; but it was there stated that
many biological developments were not so explicable ; and these
were relegated to consideration under the head of indirect equi
libration. Among them were defensive appliances, respecting
which Mr. Spencer says
&quot; These defensive appliances, though they aid in maintaining
the balance between inner and outer actions, cannot have been
directly called forth by the outer actions which they serve to
neutralise
; for these outer actions do not continuously affect
the functions of the plant even in a general way, still less
in the special way required
. . . since the individuals
devoured could not bequeath changes of structure, even were the
actions of a kind to produce them
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that perpetuated themselves, would be those on which the new
incident force had not fallen.&quot; *
Another class of organs similarly circumstanced are those of
reproduction.t A third class consists of the precautionary
arrangements for the protection of embryos and seed-vessels, an
instance of which is adduced by Mr. Spencer J in the case of
the secretion of an egg-shell round the substance of an egg
in the oviduct of a bird, a fact quite inexplicable as a con
sequence of some functionally wrought modification of structure,
immediately caused by external conditions.
There are other peculiarities which again cannot be accounted
for by direct equilibration, such as the lengthening of bones, as
in the elongation of the metatarsals in wading birds.
&quot;Hence there must be at work some other process, which
equilibrates the actions of organisms with the actions they are
exposed to. ... Besides direct equilibration, therefore, there
must be indirect equilibration.&quot; ||
The first of these causes, as given in the chapter now under
study, is &quot;the survival of the fittest.&quot; Even in a race con
sidered as a whole, since its various ancestors must have been
exposed to slightly differing conditions, some differences must
exist in relative proportions of different functions : and in the
struggle for life those individuals which have been most fitted
to the conditions of existence will survive and propagate
producing a continual tendency in the direction of greater
correspondence to the permanent conditions. This is the same
principle as that to which Mr. Darwin has given the name of
&quot; natural selection, or the preservation of favoured races in the
struggle for life.&quot; The point to which Mr. Spencer would call
attention is that by means of this principle, adaptations may
not only be maintained but even produced,^ and he quotes
this as one of Mr. Darwin s greatest discoveries.
The instances given by Mr. Spencer as illustrations of this
truth are, firstly,
&quot;A soil possessing some ingredient in unusual
quantity, may supply to a plant an excess of the matter required
*
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for a certain class of its tissues ; and may cause all the parts
formed of such tissues to be abnormally developed.&quot; This is
a case of direct equilibration
: but the consequences of such
development in the individuals of a species might be such as
to secure them some advantage of propagation or otherwise in
the struggle for life, whereby the new type of the race becomes
established and the old type is crushed out of existence alto
gether.
In a similar manner Mr. Spencer thinks that the thick
coverings of the mollusc or the tortoise might have been pro
duced and established.
&quot;
Thus, too, is it with the production
of colours in birds and in insects
; the formation of odoriferous
glands in mammals
; the growth of such excrescences as those
of the camel. Thus, in short, is it with all those organs of
animals which do not play active parts in the compound rhythms
of their functions.&quot; *
A second class of indirect equilibrations consists in the changes
brought about by the use and disuse of parts, f and the alterations
initiated by such changes of habit upon the rest of the organism.
Following upon this comes natural selection, which presupposes
that some of these changes may give the possessor an extra
chance of life. The acquired change will thus be transmitted
to posterity,! although it is not to be supposed that the indivi
dual peculiarity is likely to be further developed by this means.
It can scarcely be claimed that the classes of development
reserved from the preceding chapter have been satisfactorily
accounted for in this. The protective appliances have been
partially considered ; the organs of reproduction have scarcely
been noticed ; the precautionary arrangements for the protection
of the embryo and seed vessel have been very inadequately con
sidered; and the elongation of bones has not been noticed at all.
Nevertheless, sufficient has been advanced to show us what
is meant by Indirect Equilibration. Taking the term equilibra
tion as merely a general name indicative of the interrelations
of various substances and motions, we can well understand
that as regards the relations of those aggregates which we call
*
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organisms there will have been formed some of a very complicated
character; and under the influence of varying incident forces
the consequences of some of these incident forces upon the
organism will be very remote. These remote effects not being
the immediate and direct results, are if we may use such a
phrase to indicate the relations of changes indirect equilibra
tions, although the value of such exegesis must lie more in the
proper understanding of the relations between the sequences
than- in the mere nomenclature of the general process.
Mr. Spencer proceeds, however, in section 167, to consider
how this hypothesis may be expressed in terms of the general
doctrine of evolution.
&quot; It remains to be shown that this pro
cess conforms to the same general mechanical principles as do
all other equilibrations.&quot;*
We have to regard a species as
&quot; an aggregate in a state of
moving equilibrium.&quot;
&quot; Its powers of multiplication give it an
expansive force which is antagonised by other forces
; and that
through the rhythmical variations in these two sets of forces,
there is maintained an oscillating limit to its habitat, and an
oscillating limit to its numbers.&quot; Thus a species as a whole
has a kind of existence analogous to the existence of an
individual. It is, in fact, a. moving equilibrium.
&quot;We have
therefore to
&quot; call to mind in what way moving equilibria in
general are changed.&quot; f If, however, we recur to the only cases
of moving equilibria recognisable in the inorganic world, namely,
those of the solar system, the spinning-top, &c., we are afraid
that Mr. Spencer s attempted analogy will not apply. To
make it apply we must recall the ideal moving equilibrium of
Mr. Spencer s own imagining a moving equilibrium ostensibly
drawn by induction from inorganic instances, but in reality
drawn from organic life. In other words, we must place the
parallel as an analogy with itself ! In pursuance of this prin
ciple Mr. Spencer says
&quot; In the first place, the necessary effect wrought by a new
incident force falling on any part of an aggregate with balanced
motions, is to produce a new motion in the direction of least
*
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resistance. In the second place, the new incident force is
gradually used up in overcoming the opposing forces, and when
it is all expended the opposing forces produce a recoil a reverse
deviation that counter-balances the original deviation. Con
sequently, to consider whether the moving equilibrium of a species
is modified in the same way as moving equilibria in general,
is to consider whether, when exposed to a new force, a species
yields in the direction of least resistance ; and whether, by its
thus yielding, there is generated in the species a compensating
change in the opposite direction. We shall find that it does
both these things.&quot;
Let us take the case of the protective appliances mentioned
above. These are explained as due to increased supply and
assimilation of food procured in a new habitat, and consequent
survival of the fittest in competition with the old race. We
do not see that the abstract rendering just given at all tends to
make the explanation plainer or more reasonable. Nor do we
see how it can be applied to the origination of the organs of
reproduction, nor to the precautionary adaptations for the pro
tection of embryos and seed vessels, nor to the elongation of the
metatarsals in wading birds.
However, it appears that Mr. Spencer has quitted the con
sideration of these cases, and furnishes us with illustrative con
crete instances in the case of species exposed to the attack of
new classes of enemies.
&quot; The disappearance of those individuals
which meet the destroying forces by the smallest defensive
forces, is tantamount to the yielding of the species as a whole
at the places where the resistances are the least.&quot; * But then
our desire is to find an explanation for these defensive forces or
appliances, and not to ascertain their subsequent relations to the
offensive forces. To proceed, however. &quot;Or if by some general
influence, such as alteration of climate, the members of a species
are subject to any increase of certain external actions that are
ever tending to overthrow their equilibria, and which they are
ever counter-balancing by the absorption of nutriment, which
are the first to die ? Those that are the least able to generate
the internal actions which antagonise these external actions.&quot;
*
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This conclusion is fully comprehensible quite apart from any
theory of moving equilibria, which indeed does not assist us at
all, and fails to render the process analogous to inorganic pro
cesses, as is essential in any cosmical interpretation. The suc
ceeding section we reserve for consideration in our general




merely means the more distant
effects of any sets of causes, but is not the enunciation of any
definite formula or principle by which any special range of
sequences is to be explained. Placed as it is in the series of
biological explanations, it is assigned a rank to which it has
not the slightest logical pretension.
13. The Liner Formative Forces of Organism Polarity.
(a.) General Considerations.
Why did not Mr. Spencer write a chapter on Polarity ? We
find it playing such an important part in the construction of
inorganic and organic molecules, and in the further construction
of crystalloid masses and of organisms, that a special study of
the subject would seem imperative. Yet we are left to gather
Mr. Spencer s opinions about it in a very fragmentary manner.
Perhaps the best plan would be to collect them together in the
first instance, and then consider them. After that, we should be
able to look at the factor of Polarity in relation with the other
established propositions of Mr. Spencer s philosophy.
For this purpose we shall take the two volumes of the
&quot;
Biology,&quot; where the factor Polarity is most frequently brought
into play.
We meet with Polarity at the very outset. We have firstly
&quot; ultimate units,&quot; some of which have
&quot; extreme mobility.&quot;
Then comes the theory that
&quot; the properties of a compound are
resultants of the properties of its components.&quot; Hence in some
compounds molecular mobility follows from the extreme mobility
of the ultimate units. But what is mobility? Does it mean
that the ultimate molecules are in a state of rapid motion to and
from each other 1 Does it mean that they are in a state of
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rapid rotation around each other, or each on its own axis 1 Or
does it mean that their mutual relations of connection are so
slight that they are easily separated from each other, or that
their motions are easily altered in rate or direction by external
increments or decrements of motion ? The term mobility is a
very indefinite one ; it may mean
&quot;
easily moved by an external
force,&quot; as opposed to &quot;immobility,&quot; or it may mean &quot;possessed
of rapid motion.&quot;
This is said to be a mechanical view of the matter. Then
on page 14 we are asked to consider the organic elements
&quot;chemically instead of physically.&quot; What is the difference
between chemistry and physics ? The differentia would appear
to lie in the doctrine of affinities. Some of the so-called
elements are narrow in their range of affinities and low in
the intensity with which they maintain them. Hydrogen,
carbon, and nitrogen will combine with few other elements
;
and then the bonds are but weak. And if we consider further,
we shall find between one of them and oxygen an extreme




alike in the range and intensity of its affinities, a chemical
energy exceeding that of any other substance. . . . Nitrogen
displays the greatest chemical inactivity.&quot;
Physics, then, is the science of the molecular mobilities
(?) of
ultimate units, and the resultants of their combinations
; and
chemistry is the science, not of ultimate units at all apparently,
but of the affinities of the seventy or eighty so-called elements.
The latter is a purely concrete science. The former has an
abstract side in the theoretic study of those ultimate units from
which the atoms of the so-called elements are composed, and a





It would follow that concrete physics and concrete chemistry
relate to the actual properties of the seventy or eighty so-called
elements, the former relating to their molecular mobilities, the
latter to their affinities. Now of the former ^it may be said
that the study of the mobilities of the elements is rather a





indefinite term. Does this study reveal tc us that oxygen hasPOLARITY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 403
always a certain rate and mode of motion, and that nitrogen
has another, and that these rates are fixed, forming an essential
property of each? Again, does it reveal to us that this is a
property of the element in itself, i.e., in its own internal
organisation, or that it affects the relations of atoms amongst
each other ?
Apparently the latter, for Mr. Spencer proceeds to note the
relations of oxygen and nitrogen, the former having extreme
mobility (?) and an extensive range of affinities, and the latter
little of either. He asks us to suppose a mass of them. In
trying to do so, we naturally suppose oxygen and nitrogen
combining by mutual attraction. But how is union affected by
the extreme mobility of one and the immobility of the other ?
That will depend upon what mobility means.
But Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; Let a force fall upon this mass.&quot;
But this is too indefinite. What
&quot; force
&quot;
are we to suppose ?
Shall we say heat or light ? The result would be segregation ;
all the nitrogen would gather itself together, and all the oxygen
would separate itself from the nitrogen. We cannot say that
it is quite clear to us a priori why the incident force should
produce this effect.
But there is a graver difficulty than this, referring to the
distinction, if any, between chemistry and physics. Mr. Spencer
does not sufficiently explain this distinction, nor show how they
mutually affect each other, if there is any. How do the mobi
lities of the elements affect their combinations, and how far do
they interfere with the combinations due to the affinities 1 and,
conversely, how do the affinities affect the mobilities of the
elements ? Again, to which of them are due the phenomena of
allotropism, isomerism, polymerism, atomic weight, &c.
; or are
there other properties of substances besides those of molecular
mobility and chemical affinity ? Are there properties, for in
stance, of relative weight (attraction of gravitation), shape, size,
&c., which affect the combinations and dissociations of the
elements ?
In sect. 5 Mr. Spencer proposes the enquiry how
&quot; mechanical
principles&quot; may solve all these questions, and indicates the
result of such a study.404 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
Firstly, as to
&quot; molecular mobility,&quot; Mr. Spencer says that
&quot; the molecular mobility of a substance
&quot;
(say a cubic foot of
water or a cubic foot ofoxygen)
&quot; must depend partly on the
inertia of its molecules
&quot;
(inertia = continuance in the same
state either of motion or of rest),
&quot;






their mutual pressure&quot; (intensity of mutual polarity ?)
&quot;
partly
on the molecular mobilities of their component molecules
&quot;
(molecular mobility is not defined, nor is it stated whether it is a
constant or a changing property of the molecule). Mr. Spencer
says that any three of these four remaining constant of which
four molecular motion is one the
&quot; molecular mobility will
vary as the fourth.&quot; So that molecular mobility is really
regarded as being a variable, and only the first three remain
constant. Molecular mobility, then, is not an essential and fixed
property of any substance, and the contrast heretofore made
between oxygen and nitrogen in this respect does not hold good
as an essential property of either. We cannot say that oxygen has
extreme mobility, because its mobility depends upon inertia,
mutual polarity, and mutual pressure. It is a variable quality
dependent upon these. Molecular mobility of a substance
decreases towards the centre of a mass, and thus the molecular
mobility of oxygen is not a constant property ; but a mass of
oxygen would exhibit less molecular mobility towards its centre
than perhaps would be manifested by the outside atoms of a
mass of nitrogen. Therefore the contrast in this respect be
tween the two substances would seem not to be an essential one,
but dependent upon conditions.
The next conclusion to which Mr. Spencer would come, is
derived from the application of a mechanical law known to hold
good of masses to the case of molecules. This law is that
&quot; inertia and gravity increase as the cubes of the dimensions,
while cohesion increases as their squares,&quot; by which
&quot; the self-
sustaining power of a body becomes relatively smaller as its bulk
becomes greater.&quot; From this it would result that large mole
cules are not as stable as smaller ones. Mr. Spencer then pro
ceeds to say that this
&quot; must be accompanied by a decrease of
those contrasts of dimension to which Polarity is ascribable.&quot;POLARITY GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 405
Polarity, then, is to be considered under the heading of Mecha
nics. It is ascribable to contrasts of dimension. This is not
very clear
; does it mean that Polarity, in other places regarded
as the attraction of Polarity, depends upon size and shape ?
Simple mutual attraction results in a sphere, which is the
figure of equilibrium. When, in addition to simple mutual
attraction, there is polar attraction, then the result is different.
Polarity being due to contrasts (or harmonies) of dimension, the
spherical grouping will be overcome by the tendency towards
some more special form, determined by the mutual polarities
of the units. This will more especially be the case if the
number of units or atoms is small.
&quot; But it is manifest that
in proportion as an aggregate atom becomes larger, the effects
of simple mutual attraction must become relatively greater;
and so must tend to mask the effects of polar attraction.
There will consequently be ... a less distinct polarity than
in simpler atoms. If this inference be correct, it supplies us
with an explanation both of the chemical inertness of these
most complex organic substances, and of their inability to
crystallise.
&quot;
Here the argument becomes confused. &quot;We have had so far
three factors : Mechanics, or simple mutual attraction
; Polarity,
or special attractions apparently due to properties of dimension ;
and Chemistry, or the affinities of atoms. We found that
increase of bulk meant the predominance of mechanics over
Polarity, and consequent greater liability to rearrangements and
decompositions of molecules. Then we had bulk-mechanics,
overriding Polarity and resulting in chemical inertness and
inability to crystallise. The latter may be impossible from the
premises, but how can we possibly understand chemical inert
ness? Has chemistry anything to do with Polarity? Has
chemical affinity anything to do with bulk ? Are the affinities
of oxygen affected by increase or decrease of bulk ? Are they
in inverse ratio to the bulk ? What has chemistry to do with
either simple mutual attraction, or with polar attraction, or with
bulk?
Based upon these nebulous theories there follow some highly
ingenious reasonings in the succeeding pages, which from the4o5 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
vagueness of the commencement it is difficult to follow and
impossible to criticise. The conclusion is stated in sect. 9.
Here it is said that &quot;the mutual affinities of the chief
organic elements are not active within the limits of those tem
peratures at which organic actions take
place.&quot; This implies
a dependence of polarity upon mechanical motion. What are
affinities? Are they forces or motions? What are tempera
tures? Motions? Then, how does Motion affect affinities so
as to render them active 1 Again, complexity means instability.
&quot; And those most complex compounds into which all these four
elements enter . . . have an instability so great that decom
position ensues under ordinary atmospheric conditions.&quot; But
on the other hand we have already seen (p. 1 5) that we had an
explanation
&quot; of the chemical inertness of these most complex
organic substances
&quot;
as due to colloidal sphericity.
Next we have the &quot;tendency to unite in multiples.&quot; Then
molecular mobility again, which gives a plastic quality fitting
for organisation. And it is remarked of these compounds that
&quot;the absence of power to unite together in polar arrangement,
leaves their atoms with a certain freedom of relative movement
which makes them sensitive to small forces, and produces plas
ticity in the aggregates composed of them.&quot;
The distinction between a colloid and a crystalloid molecule
seems to be that the latter is more simple in construction,
smaller in bulk, and has a definite shape, while the former,
in consequence of its bulk and complexity, loses the special
polarities due to the shapes of its constituents, and its own
spherical form is due rather to general or simple polarity (the
attraction of gravitation), which holds the constituent atoms
together by a loose and elastic sort of bond, with a liability to
give way to pressure, to stretch out with tension, and to spring
back to its original sphericity when relieved of the external
force (p. 25). But notwithstanding this quality, which facili
tates temporary alterations of form, it is a quality which also
assists, strange to say, permanent alterations. Continued pres
sure destroys this inherent property of colloidal molecules,
gradually diminishing and finally annihilating its power of
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but the a priori reason for it is not given, and indeed it seems
contradictory of the constitution and powers of the colloidal
molecule as previously explained.
This chapter is a study having for its object an ex
planation of
&quot;
polarity,&quot; but we have to take up other con
siderations by the way, to see how they stand with regard
to it. On pages 25 and 26 various forces are mentioned which
affect molecules, viz., quasi-mechanical forces, capillary affinity,
evaporation of water, osmose, &c.
; then again (p. 27), heat, or
a raised state of molecular vibration ; and finally light, or
ethereal undulations (p. 28). On page 32 is set out a theory of
the action of these ethereal undulations in effecting changes of
molecular combination. The ethereal waves are treated as if
they were waves of solid substance. One atom is held to
another by a positive force (Polarity, presumably), and it is
detached from it by the superior force or peculiar harmony
of the rates of motion of the ethereal waves, and brought
within the reach of other atoms with which it has some
affinity, although a weaker one than that operating in the
original combination ; and thus, Polarity is overcome, and some
other Polarity supervenes. Thus we see the relations of atomic
polarities and ethereal undulations in changes of molecular com
bination.
We next come to chemical affinity, the agency of chief im
portance in the changes of organic matter. Organic matter is
extremely modifiable by chemical agencies. We must presume
that chemical agencies are the special polarities of atoms, and
a chemical change is effected when a set of molecules come into
contact with other molecules for which they have polar affinities,
and pair off with them accordingly. This again is a process which
propagates itself, and when a change of this sort is set up in a
mass by some external force, the change will be continued in
neighbouring similar matter, as in the case of fermentation. A
slight local disturbance inducing more intimate combinations of
contiguous atoms will communicate a motion of combination
throughout a mass.4o8 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
(b.) Polarity, Groicth and Development.
The next important teaching of the author bearing upon the
subject of our special study is in the chapter on &quot;Growth.&quot;
Here we find that the aggregation of matter produced by simple
attraction may go on without end, but there appears to be a
limit to that more definite kind of aggregation which results
from polar attraction. Thus we find that each element or com
pound has its usual size beyond which there is a tendency to
form new crystals rather than to increase the size of those
already formed. The organic world is then surveyed to illus
trate the same truth, leading to the inference that the limit
of growth is there due to the same cause as in the case of
crystals, which would imply polarity on the part of these
colloid molecules, though we have already decided that they
have no polarities. However, the tenor of the argument is
immediately changed, and we lose sight of the influence of
special polarities, and even of simple polarity in respect \ to
growth and its limits. Organisation comes in as affecting the
bulk of plants and animals, and other considerations supervene
which do not concern our present study.
Our interest recurs in the relation of Polarity to Develop
ment (p. 151). Polarity is at the bottom of segregation, and
segregation not only is the accretion of mass from suitable
materials in the environment, but it also explains the interior
differentiations of a mass of organic matter. So that polarity,
possibly under the influence of externally communicated motions,
such as light and heat, determines the gathering together
within the mass of like molecules in one part, and diverse like
molecules in another part. This implies a degree of unlikeness
amongst the constituent units which negatives the conception
of original homogeneity, and also contradicts the theory of the
loss of polarity of colloids due to their bulk and sphericity.
The process is called
&quot; selective assimilation, and illustrates
this general truth, that the pre-existence of a mass of certain
units produces, probably by polar attraction, a tendency for
diffused units of the same kind to aggregate with this mass,
rather than elsewhere Particular parts of the organismPOLARITY AND FUNCTION. 409
are composed of special units, or have the function of secreting
special units, which are ever present in them in large quantities.
The fluids circulating through the body contain special units
of this same order. And these diffused units are continually
being deposited along with the groups of like units that already
exist. How purely physical are the causes of- this selective
assimilation,&quot; &c. Again,
&quot; Where the component units of an
organ, or some of them, do not exist as such in the circulating
fluids, ... it is clear that the process of differential assimilation
is of a more complex kind. Still, however, it seems not impos
sible that it is carried on in an analogous way. If there be
an aggregate of compound atoms, each of which contains the
constituents A, B, C, and if round this aggregate the con
stituents A and B and C are diffused in uncombined states ; it
may be suspected that the coercive polar force of these aggre
gated compound atoms A, B, C, may not only bring into union
with themselves adjacent compound atoms A, B, C, but may
cause the adjacent constituents A and B and C to unite into
such compound atoms, and then aggregate with the mass.&quot;
However, this theory of the manufacture of its constituents
out of the raw material is set forth only as a theory, and the
hypothetical theory of a
&quot; coercive polar force
&quot; which does
this work must be held in abeyance.
(c.) Polarity and Function.
Polarity apparently has nothing to do with Function, for it
is not mentioned in the chapter on that subject. Yet they
must be indirectly related. Function preceded structure (p.
167). Function is equilibration or the opposing of an inner
force to meet, resist, or balance an external force. Equilibration
in the sense in which it is applied to a moving equilibrium is
the cause of structure. How then are equilibration and polarity
related, more particularly as regards their dealings with masses
of homogeneous organic matter? If we are to regard colloid
molecules as destitute of polarity, polarity is out of court. The
burthen of construction would consequently be thrown upon
equilibration. What then is the relation of equilibration to
the operations of simple and special polarities
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(d) Polarity and Waste and Repair.
Mr. Spencer acknowledges that it is not easy to find a de
ductive interpretation of the phenomena of Repair.
&quot; The tendency displayed by an animal organism, as well as
by each of its organs, to return to a state of integrity by the
assimilation of new matter, when it has undergone the waste
consequent on activity, is a tendency which is not manifestly
deducible from first principles, though it appears to be in
harmony with them.&quot;
Is the difficulty got over by the theory of a
&quot; coercive polar
force,&quot; as already partially discussed ( 54), by which
&quot;
groups
of compound units have a certain power of moulding adjacent
fit materials into units of their own form
&quot;
? Is there not reason
to think that such a power exists 1
Mr. Spencer then proceeds to establish inductively the belief
that there is such a power. It is shown that the blood has the
power of forming blood molecules in specialised forms, and the
same power is claimed for each organ.
&quot; Indeed the assertion of this power is little more than an
assertion of the fact, that organs composed of specialised units are
capable of resuming their structural integrity, after they have
been wasted by function. For if they do this, they must do it
by forming from the materials brought to them, certain special
ised units like in kind to those of which they are composed ;
and to say that they do this, is to say that their component
units have the power of moulding fit materials into other units
of the same order.
&quot; The repair of a wasted tissue may therefore be considered
as due to forces analogous to those by which a crystal reproduces
its lost apex, when placed in a solution like that from which it
was formed. In either case, a mass of units of a given kind,
shows a power of integrating with itself diffused units of the
same kind : the only difference being, that the organic mass of
units arranges the diffused units into special compound forms,
before integrating them with itself.&quot;
There are two ways of looking at this statement firstly, as
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a hypothesis arrived at inductively, and possibly a correct hypo
thesis, but it does not seem a deduction from any first principle ;
if so, what is that first principle, and how is the deduction
effected ? If anything, it is a deduction from polarity; but then
polarity in its rigidity, as due to dimensions and as exemplified
in crystallisation, is not applicable to the more bulky and spe
cial and unstable morphology of a colloid molecule. And again,
the coercive force or coercive polarity of a mass over adjacent
units, as exemplified in the force of a magnet over iron-filings, is
very indistinct in its analogous application to the coercive force
of an organ over the materials in the blood. Is the assimila
tion of material in the nervous system, the muscular tissue, the
osseous structures, the skin matter, &c., only an arrangement in
certain different shapes or orders of the materials assimilated ?
ISTo ; the assimilation is a process of selective assimilation, and
apparently a process of molecule-manufacturing before assimi
lation which cannot be deduced from the polarity of molecules
nor from the coercive polarity of organs, without more definite
comprehension of what is meant by polarity. Therefore the
deductive interpretation of a possibly correct statement of the
facts fails. This is the more certain when Mr. Spencer himself
makes the important confession that polarity is
&quot; a power of
whose nature we know nothing&quot; (p. 179).
Secondly, the question arises, Has equilibration anything to
do with repair? Function modifies structure under the law
applicable to moving equilibria, that opposing external forces
are met by resistive inner arrangements. Therefore the incre
ment of parts, which is the result of this law of equilibration,
is due to it, and not to polarity. The thickening of fur, for
instance, is due to equilibration. But the thickening of fur is
the deposit of suitable molecules of that portion of the organic
economy. Therefore the deposit of special molecules in this
case is not due to coercive polar force of the mass over the
adjacent molecules, but to the establishment of equilibrium
between the organism and its environment. What we need
to know is, how this general equilibration effects the increased
assimilation of materials in the fur ? Is it effected by means of
the coercive polar force of the existing fur? If so, how is this412 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
coercive force regulated by the law of equilibration ? &quot;What are
the relations between the general equilibration of an organism
and the coercive polar forces by which the details of fresh
arrangements are carried out ?
We may remark parenthetically that polarity seems to have
nothing to do with waste, but only with repair, and in the
latter no reference is made to chemical affinity, with which,
perhaps, it is regarded as identical. Yet in regard to waste,
are we not bound to suppose a waste or expenditure of polarity ?
If so, we are bound to range polarity within Professor Stewart s
list of energies.
The principal view in which Mr. Spencer regards it is as to
its power of restoration of parts to a damaged organism. The
process is comprehensible in a crystal where particles of similar
shape in a moving liquid condition fall into suitable arrange
ments with a mass with whose particles it has polar affinity,
but is not to be understood when applied to colloids of such
bulk as to imply a spherical shape in which the special polarities
of its constituents are lost.
Yet Mr. Spencer says,
&quot; We must in the case of the organism
assume an analogous
force.&quot; Hence the restoration of a lizard s
leg or tail, by the filling out of the original outline. This
implies not only a coercive polarity in the mass, but the
coercive polarity of the colloid molecules of the lizard s blood.
We already know, however, that colloid molecules are destitute
of polarity. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer suggests the hypothesis,
&quot; That the form of each species of organism is determined by a
peculiarity in the constitution of its units that these have a
special structure in which they tend to arrange themselves
;
just as have the simpler units of inorganic matter.&quot; This, it
seems to us, is in direct contradiction to the doctrine of the
morphologic instability and loss of polarity by the bulky and
complex and colloid molecules as taught in the Appendix. Mr.
Spencer says (p. 180)
&quot; We have therefore no alternative but to say, that the living
particles composing one of these fragments, have an innate ten
dency to arrange themselves into the shape of the organism to
which they belong. We must infer that a plant or animal ofPOLARITY IN GENERAL. 413
any species, is made up of special units, in all of which there
dwells the intrinsic aptitude to aggregate into the form of that
species
: just as in the atoms of a salt, there dwells the intrinsic
aptitude to crystallise in a particular way.&quot;
It would be well here to have gone a little more into detail.
&quot;We can understand how the polarity of a salt will cause the
completion of the outline in a mass due to the outline of its
constituent particles. It is thereby homogeneous throughout.
But even if we granted the same power to organic molecules to
aggregate into a mass of a definite form or shape in accordance
with their own peculiar specific shapes, yet the only result we
could arrive at would be a similar homogeneous mass, the
form or shape of which would be the result of the building up
of specific shapes. But animal and vegetable masses are not
homogeneous, nor aggregated in such a general form as to be
the calculable result of the forms of constituent particles. We
defy any one to draw the outline of a particle which by building
up should produce the resultant outline of a horse. And if we
examine the horse, we find a heterogeneous structure and com
position which would seem to upset the theory that its construc
tion is due to specific shapes of constituent molecules. In fact,
so contrary is this theory to the general facts of vegetable and
animal life, that one is tempted to characterise it as absurd.
But this gives Mr. Spencer an opportunity of treating of
(e.) Polarity in General.
He takes it as a name for the force by which inorganic units
are aggregated into a form peculiar to them.
Let us examine this statement before proceeding farther.
Inorganic units may be simple or complex. We may take it
that simple units are aggregated into complex units by polarity.
It is not clear whether this aggregation commences with similar
units or with diversified forms of units, but in any case aggrega
tions proceed under the force of polarity, and whether from
different modes of aggregation or from original diverse forms,
great diversities of form and aggregation are eventually produced.
By and by certain stable and completed forms of aggregate
units are produced, and then there goes on a construction into414 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
masses due to the forms of these completed molecules. This is
effected by means of polar force.
Now with respect to this polar force several questions arise.
Firstly, Is it an energy that is interchangeable with the other
energies, viz., those chemical separations, those variable rates
of molecular motion called heat, light, &c., which we formerly
considered? Secondly, Has it anything to do with chemical
energy and activity or chemical inertia or indifference 1 Thirdly,
Has it anything to do with equilibration, and if so, are its
equilibrations confined to the equilibrations of polar forces, or
do polar forces ever come into antagonism with other ener
gies, viz., heat, light, electricity, gravitation, &c. ? Fourthly,
Is it a corollary from anything, or are its manifestations
corollaries from anything, and what are the corollaries from
polarity ? Generally speaking, what is its scientific position in
physics ?




to the analogous force displayed by organic units.
Yet he says it is
&quot; but a name for something of which we are
ignorant a name for a hypothetical property which as much
needs explanation as that which it is used to explain. Never
theless, in default of another word, we must employ this :
taking care, however, to restrict its meaning. If we simply sub
stitute the Avord polarity for the circuitous expression the power
which certain units have of arranging themselves into a special
form, we may, without assuming anything more than is proved,
use the term organic polarity, or polarity of the organic units,
to signify the proximate cause of the ability which organisms
display of reproducing lost
parts.&quot;
With regard to this we have to say, in addition to what has
gone before, that we apprehend the main distinction of organic
aggregates from inorganic aggregates consists in the power of
the one to coerce its constituents, while in the other the con
stituents determine the form of the aggregate.
&quot; The power
which certain units have of arranging themselves into a special
form
&quot;
results in that special form, and is the special character
of inorganic crystalloids. The power of the aggregate in
specialising the forms of the constituent units is an oppositePOLARITY AND PHYSIOLOGICAL UNITS. 415
power, and is the characteristic of organic aggregates. The two
processes are not analogous, but diametrically opposed.
(/.) Polarity and Physiological Units.
Always bearing in mind the teachings of Mr. Spencer with
regard to the non-polarity and morphological instability of
colloid molecules, let us now consider those physiological units,
&quot; which possess the property of arranging themselves into the
special structures of the organisms to which they belong.&quot;
Mr. Spencer teaches us (p. 182) that this property does not
reside in the chemical units nor in the morphological units. By
this he does not mean, as one would suppose, that there are
chemical units and morphological units existing separately in
the blood, but only this, that structure is not due to chemical
combinations of oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, &c., nor to the
particular shapes of some combinations of these. Therefore, he
says, we must conceive of some intermediate units, which we
may call physiological. The term intermediate Avould indicate
an intermediate position of the same order ; that is to say, in
the order of constructive aggregation. But elsewhere Mr.
Spencer defines physiology as the function or habit of action
of the same unit which, otherwise viewed, is a morphological
one, having specific structure, shape, and size. We will not,
however, minutely reflect upon the loose language of this
explanation, but take the positive teaching as it stands, viz.,
that not to the chemical qualities of certain molecules, nor
to the shape of them, is due the polarity which produces that
peculiar aggregation of heterogeneous structure and composition
which we call an organism. It is due to certain aggregates of
these chemical units, exceedingly complex, which have a dis
tinctive character. Some slight differences in the composition of
these complex molecules and their consequent display of forces
produce these distinctions of character. These distinctions of
character again produce the differences of form which the aggre
gates exhibit.
Does this mean that the physiological unit of a horse, which
unit is something more than a chemical unit or a morphological4i 6 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
unit, produces the aggregate horse, and that the horse is a
consequent of its units, as the crystal is a consequent of its consti
tuents ? No ; for the crystalline structure is due to the chemical
affinities, the simple polarities and shapes of the constituent
molecules, whereas these are deemed insufficient in the case of
the organic constituents. Physiological units display forces over
and above these simple properties.




polarity finds no place ; but, as remarked under the heading of
&quot;
Function,&quot; it is not easy to see what is the relation of polarity
as subordinate to biological equilibration that is to say, in the
anticipatory opposition of inner forces to outer forces. Neither
are we enlightened on the subject of the disintegration of or
ganisms, which again seems opposed to, and in certain circum
stances overcomes, the polar forces which produce integration.
(g.) Polarity and Genesis.
Polarity makes its appearance again in the chapter on
&quot;Genesis.&quot; On page 220 we find that
&quot; Conclusive proof obliged us to admit, that the component
units of organisms, have inherent powers of arranging them
selves into the forms of the organisms to which they belong.&quot;
Hence sperm-cells and germ-cells have the same powers.
From page 221 it would appear that the physiological units
which have produced an organic aggregate have themselves
become variously modified in the process, these modifications
being effected not by means of incident forces but by means
of ancestral forces
; and the question arises, Is the organic
aggregate still to be regarded as the result of the distinctive
character of the physiological units ? It would seem not,
for in the process the physiological units have themselves
become modified. The sperm-cells and the germ-cells differ from
the other physiological cells of a completed organism in not
having become modified. But if an organism has specific phy
siological cells, and great masses of these physiological cells of
which it is composed have become modified into organs which
are the genuine physiological cells which have produced thePOLARITY AND GENESIS. 4I/
organism? It is said that the great bulk of them, without
being subject to external influences, as in the growth of the
embryo, have departed more or less from the original and general
type. Of germ-cells and sperm-cells it is said,
&quot; Not that they
are peculiarly specialised, but rather that they are unspecialised ;
such specialisations as some of them exhibit in the shape of
locomotive appliances, &c., being interpretable not as intrinsic,
but as extrinsic, modifications, that have reference to nothing
beyond certain mechanical requirements.&quot; Here Mr. Spencer
admits that structure is not due to polar forces of physiological
units, but that these physiological units become modified by ex
ternal forces. He does not surely mean that these modifications
of physiological units go to the extreme of furnishing them with
locomotive appliances, &c. But in all this it seems to us the
argument of construction as dependent upon the distinctive
characters of physiological units becomes very much attenuated.
After the union of sperm-cells and germ-cells what has polarity
to do ? Does coercive polarity set in ? Mr. Spencer does not
follow this up. Two equilibria unite (p. 223) and destroy each
other s equilibrium, and set up changes and cell-multiplication,
or the manufacture of physiological units fit for assimilation
;
and it is to be presumed that coercive polar force is the instru
ment by which this manufacture and assimilation is effected
;
also by means of the distinctive character of the physiological
unit and its polarity these aggregations are worked into a depen
dent and consequent structure. After this external mechanical
forces are supposed to modify these physiological units, and pre
vent the structure that would logically result from their distinc
tive character
; yet, none the less, the result is a copy of the
parent organism, with an exact repetition of all those peculiari
ties which are set down as the result of modifications of the
physiological units by mechanical forces those external forces,
namely, which are in actual relation with the physiological
units ; for how can those pre-existent ones which modified the
physiological units of ancestors act otherwise than through the
modified polarities of the sperm-cells and germ-cells 1 Surely
there is much yet to explain in the part played by the polarity
of physiological units in the development of the embryo as
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against modifying forces, which, neither as forces acting in the
past on ancestral organisms nor in the anticipated future, are
directly in relation with these actual developments consequent
upon the properties of the physiological units so as to modify




(h.) Polarity and Heredity.
Page 253. &quot;The power which organisms display of repro
ducing lost parts, we saw to be inexplicable except on the
assumption that the units of which any organism is built have
an innate tendency to arrange themselves into the shape of that
organism ( 65). We inferred that these units must be the
possessors of special polarities, resulting from their special
structures
; and that by the mutual play of their polarities they
are compelled to take the form of the species to which they
belong. And the instance of the Begonia pliyllomaniaca left us
no escape from the admission that the ability thus to arrange
themselves, is latent in the units contained in every undifferen-
tiated cell&quot;
The theory is much the same as that of the building up of
crystalloid aggregates. We are to suppose a number of phy
siological units, very complex, being made up of aggregates of
molecules, the result being a special shape, and special polarities
which are the laws of their mutual combination. The resulting
combination in this case will be a shape and construction due
to the shapes and polarities of the constituent units.
The result from the bare statement given would be the
formation of a homogeneous colloidal mass without any de
finite shape. There is no reason to suppose anything more
than an irregular lump of material. Besides which we have
to point out, that although we are using the term physiologi
cal unit, the result, together with that of the analogous crys
talloid process, is purely morphological. The whole course
of the reasoning would be precisely the same were the term
&quot;morphological
unit&quot; substituted for the term &quot;physiological
unit ;
&quot; the only utility of the latter is that it is apt to lead
better towards the affiliation of organic processes upon inorganic,POLARITY AND HEREDITY. 4
, 9
and in effecting one of those verbal transformations of a logical
process &quot;by which the theory of evolution is worked out.
Again
&quot; And here the assumption to which we seem driven by the
ensemble of the evidence, is, that sperm-cells and germ-cells are
essentially nothing more than vehicles, in which are contained
small groups of the physiological units in a fit state for obeying
their proclivity towards the structural arrangement of the spe
cies they belong to.
&quot; We must conclude that the likeness of any organism to
either parent is conveyed by the special tendencies of the phy
siological units derived from that parent. In the fertilised
germ we have two groups of physiological units, slightly differ
ent in their structures. These slightly different units severally
multiply at the expense of the nutriment supplied to the un
folding germ each kind moulding this nutriment into units
of its own type. Throughout the process of evolution, the two
kinds of units, mainly agreeing in their polarities and in the
form which they tend to build themselves into, but having
minor differences, work in unison to produce an organism of the
species from which they were derived, but work in antagonism to
produce copies of their respective parent-organisms. And hence
ultimately results, an organism in which traits of the one are
mixed with traits of the other.&quot;
Again, if the organism be changed in response to environment,
as when, for instance, in a chilling climate fur thickens, or from
the necessity of escaping capture fish attain the power of adapt
ing their colour to that of their environment, then the physiolo
gical units undergo some slight modification, of such a nature
that, when rebuilt into new organisms, the new shape or the
acquired power is exhibited and established. And thus
&quot;
Bringing the question to its simplest and ultimate form, we
may say that as, on the one hand, physiological units will,
because of their special polarities, build themselves into an
organism of a special structure ; so, on the other hand, if the
structure of this organ is modified by modified function, it will
impress some corresponding modification on the structures and
polarities of its units. The units and the aggregate must act42o SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
and re-act on each other. The forces exercised by each unit on
the aggregate, and by the aggregate on each unit, must ever tend
towards a balance. If nothing prevents, the units will mould
the aggregate into a form in equilibrium with their pre-existing
polarities. If, contrariwise, the aggregate is made by incident
actions to take a new form, its forces must tend to re-mould the
units into harmony with this new form. And to say that the
physiological units are in any degree so re-moulded as to bring
their polar forces towards equilibrium with the forces of the
modified aggregate, is to say that when separated in the shape
of reproductive centres, these units will tend to build them
selves up into an aggregate modified in the same direction.&quot;
Thus when, in obedience to the law of moving equilibria,
the animal preceding the moose-deer opposed to the incident
external forces the enormous and weighty horns and power
ful neck muscles and fore-quarters, the change so effected pro
duced in its physiological units some corresponding modification
of structure and polarities, so that when they came to be built
Tip again, they produced the hind-quarters as they were before,
and the fore-quarters and horns as newly modified. It seems
strange that the effect of building up the modified physiological
units of the sperm-cells and germ-cells should be confined to one
part of the animal, and should not extend to the whole of it.
In the next chapter, on
&quot;
Variation,&quot; and in the chapter on
&quot;
Heredity,&quot; certain instances are quoted of the hereditary trans
mission of pecvdiarities of parts, such as deafness, malformations
of limbs, fingers, &c. Are we to suppose that the transmission
of peculiarities of parts is due to alterations in the constitution
of physiological units from which the whole structure is built ?
If so, how and in what manner are the sperm-cells and the
germ-cells modified by the changed developments of the animal
so as to reproduce the peculiarities of parts, such as deafness or
malformations 1
(?.) Polarity and Variation.
This chapter deals with the equilibration of organisms in
response to incident external forces ; with the consequent modi
fication of the physiological units
; with the admixture of thePOLARITY AND VARIATION. 421
slightly different physiological units of two parents ; with the fact
that every organism is built up not of one class of physiological
units but of two or more ; with the fact that the germ-cell and
sperm- cell each contains not one class of physiological units but
two or more, by which, according to the predominance in quan
tity and particular distribution, will be the form of different parts
of the resultant organism.
This view of the subject effects a serious change in the char
acter of our studies. Hitherto it has been a simple matter to
suppose (what indeed we found to be quite insufficient practi
cally) that the construction and shape of an organism are conse
quent upon the construction and polarities of simple and like
physiological units. But we have now to suppose that the
structure and form of an organism are due to the structure and
polarities of four or eight classes of physiological units derived
from immediate or remote ancestors. These mixed up together
segregate, and thus, by their coercive force on incoming material,
form and add to themselves fresh physiological units. But
while preserving the original type they will reproduce special
ties of shape and function of various ancestors ; not, however,
that dissymmetry will be produced, in that one leg will be longer
than another, or one arm longer than another.
We are not, however, engaged in examining the correctness
of the theory, but in ascertaining what part is played by
polarity in biological history ; and here it would seem that the
alteration of shape or function of an organism has the effect of
altering the structure and polarities of the constituent units.
How this is effected is not set out. It is merely a general infer
ence that it must be so. An alteration of equilibrium in the
growth of horns in balance with some external force causes a
general readjustment of equilibria throughout the body, and
therefore the structure and polarities of the physiological units
must be so altered that in succeeding generations the building-
up of these units must result in a creature with horns. It is
difficult to conceive the nature of such an alteration, nor is its d,
priori justification at all apparent. We do not see how the
addition of horns can alter the constitution of the physiological
units in the sperm-cell and germ-cell.422 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
However, what we actually find is, that alteration of shape
or function in an animal affects the shapes and polarities of
physiological units
; and these altered shapes and polarities
reproduce the alterations in the new organisms. Polarity is
said to be the agency by which the change is carried forward.
What is the nature of this change of polarity ? Is the polarity
of a colloid molecule the result of the polarities of its consti
tuent atoms ?
It seems to us, however, that when we talk of physiological
units which are colloid molecules being so modified by the
changes of an organism as to reproduce these changed forms as
a consequence in their building-up, and are therefore to be re
garded rather as morphological units, we are talking quite out of
the reach of our knowledge, and are trespassing far beyond the
range of legitimate deduction. We have no warrant either
from induction or deduction for our attempt, and we are un
able to work out our problem. We are brought to a perfect
stand-still.
(7r.) Polarity as a Factor in Genesis, Heredity, and Variation.
Genesis, Heredity, and Variation are made to depend largely
upon Polarity for their operations. This has already been made
manifest. In a new chapter Mr. Spencer gives us an ensemble
of the operations. The comprehension of the general history
of biological change not being our present purpose, there is no
need for us to consider the necessity for the overthrowing of
an equilibrium, nor for the expenditure and reception of force,
nor for growth and its cessation. We are only concerned with
the part played by polarity, and as regards that point we only
find a repetition of what has gone before. Physiological units
have special structures and polarities. They are not exactly
alike. Several similar but not exactly identical molecules are
mixed together in a fertilised germ. Incoming materials are
variously appropriated by each. The constituent physiological
units exert a coercive force, apparently a polar force, over the
raw materials, in conformity with which the materials range
themselves.POLARITY IN GENESIS, HEREDITY, ETC. 423
We certainly do find ourselves in a state of confusion when
we read that there are in the organism (which is the result of the
special structures and polarities of its physiological units) certain
molecular forces antagonistic to the forces exercised over them
by the aggregate (p. 275). Is the result of a cause antagonistic
to its cause ? Whence have come the forces of the aggregate
but from the molecular properties ? HOAV then can the aggre
gate turn round with forces antagonistic to its constituent
molecules ? The whole of the very abstruse reasoning on this
page is rendered unintelligible from this enigma.
On p. 278 we find that polarities can be balanced or partially
balanced, and that they have a great deal to do with the first
stages of the developments incident upon the union of sperm-
cells and germ-cells.
And one of the most remarkable things in all this history of
integrations and disintegrations is the absence of any reference
to the law of co-operation between the three factors in the uni
verse Matter, Motion, and Force as set down in the Formula
of Evolution. We ourselves have only just recollected it, and
Mr. Spencer seems to have forgotten it altogether. The con
comitance of the dissipation of motion with these integrations
of matter is never mentioned at all, never asserted, never ex
plained. All these complicated processes go on, and that which
is supposed to be the key to them all is never advanced either
to receive illustration or to throw light upon the intricacies of
our study. Indeed, life while it integrates matter also inte
grates motion instead of dissipating it.
In 97 Mr. Spencer recapitulates for us the general bio
logical forces. We have, in the first place, units of organic
matter which are large, heterogeneous, and unstable in a high
degree. Of these are formed other units. What must be their
properties? &quot;Already the colloidal atoms are extremely un
stablecapable of being variously modified in their characters
by very slight incident forces ; and already the complexity of
their polarities prevents them from readily falling into those
positions of polar equilibrium which result in crystallisation.
Now the organic atoms composed of these colloidal atoms, must
be similarly characterised in far higher degrees.&quot;424 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
But, on the other hand, Mr. Spencer supposes that each organ
is built up of those highly plastic units peculiar to its species.
The question arises, Have these plastic units any defined specific
properties sufficiently settled to enable a building-up process to
take place ? However, he says that these units, when mixed,
work towards an equilibrium of their complex polarities. One
would think that if this was all they did, some half-dozen of
them or fifty of them would soon be able to do it in a very
direct manner. But no ; they do it by adding raw material to
themselves, and by producing an aggregate due to their specific
properties ; the difficulty of their mechanical modification into
bone, muscle, &c., not being explained, and the difficulty of their
eccentricities of form not being explained. Then a modified
aggregate modifies the constituent physiological units, and so on
over again.
Nor is the difficulty explained how in an organism where
nearly all the physiological units become specialised into different
organs, there are some few which do not become specialised by
the organs they occupy
: on the contrary, special organs exist,
and are apparently constructed, for the express purpose of secret
ing them, preserving them, and excreting them as unspecialised.
This explanation is partly attempted on p. 288, where we are
told it is due to an excess of manufacture of physiological units
which cannot be amalgamated with any special organ, and
which will arrange themselves into the structure peculiar to the
species if freed from controlling forces and placed in fit condi
tions of nutrition and temperature. We presume a plastic
molecule, which we would have supposed perfectly contented to
retain any form in which it found itself, would not so arrange
itself into a definite form. And again, how can we imagine
that the structure in which it is placed protects it, and supplies
it with nutriment ?
Mr. Spencer winds up the exposition with the usual moral,
namely, that all these biological changes are thus seen to be
corollaries from those universal principles implied in the Per
sistence of Force.THE DOUBLE POWER OF PHYSIOLOGICAL UNITS. 425
(/.) The Double Power of Physiological Units in Construction
and ModifiaMlity.
We have now described with sufficient amplitude Mr. Spen
cer s teachings respecting the part which Polarity plays in biolo
gical changes.
The main question respecting them is Are colloid molecules
so decided in their polarities and shapes that their interre
lations sufficiently resemble those of crystalloids to justify an
analogous reasoning with regard to their power of effecting
similar results in structure : or whether, on the contrary, they
are so weak in polarity, so unstable of form, and so suscep
tible to change, that their mutual interrelations cannot produce
structure and organisation? On this point we have two sets of
teachings. On the one hand, we are told that general structure
results from the structure and polarities of physiological units.
On the other hand, we are told that colloid molecules are un
stable in shape and indecisive in their polarities.
Thus we find in
&quot;
Biology,&quot; vol. ii. p. 1 1 :
&quot; We set out with molecules one degree higher in complexity
than those molecules of nitrogenous colloidal substance into
which organic matter is resolvable
; and we regard these some
what more complex molecules as having the implied greater
instability, greater sensitiveness to surrounding influences, and
consequently greater mobility of form.&quot; We find them forming
an aggregate,
&quot;
showing vitality only by a higher degree of that
readiness to change its form of aggregation, which colloidal
matter in general displays ; and by its ability to unite the nitro
genous molecules it meets with, into complex molecules like
those of which it is composed.&quot;
Again, vol. ii. p. 346
:
&quot; There is good reason for ascribing it to the extreme in
stability of the organic colloids of which protoplasm consists.
These, in common with colloids in general, assume different
isomeric forms with great facility, and they display not only
isomerism but polymerism. Further, this readiness to undergo
molecular rearrangement, habitually shows itself in colloids by
the rapid propagation of the rearrangement from part to part.426 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
As Professor Graham has shown, matter in this state pectizes
almost instantaneously.&quot;
&quot;
Biology,&quot; vol. i. p. 486
:
&quot;
Step by step as the aggregate molecules so resulting, grow
larger and increase in heterogeneity, they become more unstable,
more readily transformable by small forces, more capable of
assuming various characters. Those composing organic matter
transcend all others in size and intricacy of structure
; and in
them these resulting traits reach their extreme. As implied by
its name protein, the essential substance of which organisms are
built, is remarkable alike for the variety of its metamorphoses,
and the facility with which it undergoes them
; it changes from
one to another of them on the slightest change of conditions.&quot;
The question thereupon arises how such units, so devoid of
stable shape and form, so susceptible to the least change of
conditions, can form the definite units by which structures are
built up, and result in shapes due to the definite units of which
they are so built up
?
If we follow out the latter idea in a structure containing
millions of millions of units, it is not so certain that, even if
any did contain units of a particular shape, there would be
much difference, for the differences of shape are lost in an
immense mass. A large building, for instance, may be built
as well of solid hexagons as of cubes.
However, to return to the question. Is it possible to get these
unstable, and indefinite, and changeable forms so fixed as to
have some definite result in structure, yet not so fixed as to
be incapable of change 1 We do not see how it can be done.
We are unable logically to follow Mr. Spencer s & priori process
to this result. If it is of the essence of complex colloid mole
cules to be unstable, changeable in shape and polarities, we do
not see how they can ever reach definite properties. And even
though we grant that in a mass this changeableness to external
conditions would produce changes in different parts of the mass,
we do not see that any typical unit would be produced. The
undifferentiated and unspecialised unit in the interior would
remain unspecialised still, just as unstable and shapeless as ever.
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sation took place throughout the mass, then still less is there
any typical physiological unit which, separated, would aggre
gate to itself other molecules to form a similar heterogeneous
mass, by a process analogous to that seen in crystalloids.
We must, therefore, leave in the hands of the reader and
student the question how we can reconcile the unstable, sensi
tive, changing character of colloid molecules with the structure
and polarities of a physiological unit, aggregating in modes
analogous to crystals. We must also leave to his consideration
the question how an aggregate composed of bone, muscle, nerve,
&c., can have any specific physiological unit. We must further
leave him to decide how the physiological unit can be unspe-
cialised, when the germ-cell and sperm-cell are supposed to con
tain physiological units differentiated as coming from different
ancestral sources, and therefore presumably specialised and pro
ducing special results. To us it seems that the physiological
unit is a fast and loose object, which can be most effectively
used in the logic of biological reconstruction, but without being
capable either of definite application or definite criticism.
(m. ) A Concrete Case of Biological Reconstruction.
We will now study a concrete case of biological reconstruction
in the definite history of a fertilised germ. We will take, for
instance, the case of an egg hatched upon an artificial incubator.
Now we are to suppose that one particular spot on the sur
face of the yolk is a fertilised germ containing ten slightly
different physiological units, derived partly from the male and
partly from the female progenitor. The theory is that these
physiological units have the power of manufacturing by means
of their own structure and polarities the raw material of their
environment into units of the same constitution and polarities
as themselves ; and that the aggregation so formed will conse
quently be homogeneous with the original physiological units :
with this proviso, that if there were slight differences in the
original units, the mass will be made up of patches of different
sorts.
This, it seems to us, would be the end of the process. To423 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
proceed further we must refer to Mr. Spencer.
&quot;We will first
quote a passage from
&quot;
Biology,&quot; vol. ii. p. 8 :
&quot; We found ourselves obliged to recognise in these physio
logical units, powers of arranging themselves into the forms of
the organisms to which they belong, analogous to the powers
which the molecules of inorganic substances have of aggregating
into specific crystalline forms. We have consequently to regard
this polarity of the physiological units, as producing, during
the development of any organism, a combination of internal
forces that expend themselves in working out a structure in
equilibrium with the forces to which ancestral organisms were
exposed; but not in equilibrium with the forces to which the
existing organism is exposed, if the environment has been
changed. Hence the problem in all cases is, to ascertain the
resultant of internal organising forces, tending to reproduce the
ancestral form, and external modifying forces, tending to cause
deviations from that form.&quot;
The first remark to make is that we do not see how, during
this development (if such it can be called), the forces at work
inside the egg ever come into contact with
&quot; the forces to which
ancestral organisms were exposed.&quot; We might suppose, indeed,
that the fertilised germ containing the ten physiological units is
the result of those forces
; but when we have got these, they
become &quot;a combination of internal forces,&quot; and are not subject
to any contact with external forces, storms, &c., of a hundred
years ago. The problem has to be worked out from the factors
within the limits of the egg-shell, plus a certain amount of
communicated molecular motion the & priori result of which
would appear to be a jelly-like mass of patches manufactured
by the slightly different physiological units out of the substance
of the egg.
Elsewhere Mr. Spencer says that this internal development
proceeds as stated, subject to the modifying influences of
mechanical forces ; but in the case of an egg there are no such
interfering causes, except the simple and uniform force of the
communicated molecular motion called heat.
Let us now take the Appendix to vol. i. Mr. Spencer says
(p. 484)
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&quot; There is no kind of rearrangement among molecules (crys
tallisation being one) which the modern physicist does not
think of and correctly reason upon, in terms of forces and
motions like those of sensible masses. Polarity is regarded as
a resultant of such forces and motions ; and when, as happens
in many cases, light changes the molecular structure of a crystal,
and alters its polarity, it does this by impressing, in conformity
with mechanical laws, new motions on the constituent mole
cules.&quot;
From this it appears that polarity is not a fixed and constant
property of the so-called elements. Polarity is only the resultant
of the internal forces and motions of the atom, which internal
forces and motions may -be so altered by communicated motion
as to alter its polarity, and thereby its relations to other mole
cules of the same sort and to molecules of other sorts will be
changed. But if this is the case, and if we are therefore unable
to tell the manner of these atomic variations of polarity, it seems
to us that we have no foundation for chemical science or mole
cular physics. If polarity is a variable instead of being a fixed
and constant cause, and if it is liable to be affected in the
manner indicated, it surely loses its position as a ruler of struc
tural change, and the confidence we are asked to repose in it as
an explanation of crystallisation and of organic structure is
destroyed.
But Mr. Spencer is talking about the influence of communi
cated mechanical motion upon masses of molecules having
polarities as, for instance, the influence of light upon crystal
lisation. Now we apprehend that this kind of influence can
cause change of structural combination without supposing any
change of polarity in the molecules.
Then follows, on p. 486, a long account of the cumulative
a^ffre^ations of atoms into molecules, and of these into still
oo o
more complex molecules and systems of molecules, already par
tially quoted, in order to show the changefulness, sensitiveness,
and morphological instability of these aggregates in proportion
to their complexity to show a continually increasing diver
gence from the well-known formative properties of crystalloids,
implying a continually decreasing typical form, and a conse-430 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
quent continually decreasing power of construction into special
shapes. So much, indeed, are the polarities of these complex
molecules reduced, that they have little bond of union amongst
themselves they seem only capable of being held together by
the simpler molecules of sulphur and phosphorus.
The next step in the argument is in the paragraph at the foot
of p. 486, where the fact of the existence of
&quot;
physiological
units peculiar to each species of organism
&quot;
is asserted. But
the statement is immediately weakened by the admission that
as the organism is made multitudinous in kind, so are these units
made multitudinous in kind. Which, then, of these is the
&quot;
physiological unit peculiar to the species ?
&quot;
&quot;Which remains
undifferentiated and entitled to the name, and what becomes of
it ? How comes it that it remains undifferentiated when, like
the others, it is in contact with larger organic masses exercising
coercive force ; and, producing others, is able at the proper time
to continue its work of reproduction ? And again, how are the
necessary arrangements to be made for effecting that combination
with the physiological units of another slightly differing indi
vidual, in order to disturb its equilibrium, and set up a repetition
of changes in that portion of its constituents which is to undergo
a like series of differentiations ?
To return to our special study, the question arises how, in
the egg we have under consideration, these multitudinous
differentiations of the typical physiological unit are effected
differentiations, we presume, into bone, muscle, nerve, and other
substances 1
&quot;
Every physicist will endorse the proposition that in each
aggregate there tends to establish itself an equilibrium between
the forces exercised by all the units upon each and by each
upon
all.&quot;
This is a kind of proposition that can be accepted in its
absolute form, but is not capable of much practical illumination
nor of much a priori effect. If we apply it to our practical
problem, we do not get a chicken
; we are still in want of a
formula that will hatch the egg.
The next passage, on the one hand, is a reassertion of the
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of their polarities, while on the other hand it seems to take
away almost as much from it Ly a reassertion of their morpho
logical instability.
&quot;As certainly as molecules of alum have a form of equili
brium, the octahedron, into which they fall when the tempe
rature of their solvent allows them to aggregate, so certainly
must organic molecules of each kind, no matter how complex
have a form of equilibrium in which, when they aggregate, their
complex forces are balanced a form far less rigid and definite,
for the reason that they have far less definite polarities, are far
more unstable, and have their tendencies more easily modified
by environing conditions.
&quot;Equally certain is it that the special molecules having a
special organic structure as their form of equilibrium, must be
reacted upon by the total forces of this organic structure
; and
that if environing actions lead to any change of this organic
structure, these special molecules, or physiological units, subject
to a changed distribution of the total forces acting upon them,
will undergo modification modification which their extreme
plasticity will render easy. Ey this action and reaction I con
ceive the physiological units peculiar to each kind of organism,
to have been moulded along with the organism itself.&quot;
We will see how this applies to our egg. Firstly, the
physiological units manufacture similar units out of their en
vironment, and then they range the new units with themselves
according to the &quot;form of equilibrium in which . . . their
complex forces are balanced,&quot; resulting in a special organic
structure. We do not know why the term organic is introduced
here. If it implies an organism, we have not arrived at that
yet as the result of the process of ranging the new molecules
into the
&quot; form of equilibrium
&quot;
of the colloid molecules.
Suppose, however, that they may possibly range themselves
into such a regular form as to be called a structure. Then the
individual physiological units will be reacted upon by the total
forces of the structure. Still we do not see our way to any
definite structure. However, we find that the process is sup
plemented by the action of external forces, and thus we have
a perpetual readjustment of balance, not only between units432 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
and the aggregate, but intermediately between the units and
the environment. Mr. Spencer sets down the balance to
&quot;Actions and reactions of the two, in which the units ever
tended to establish the typical form produced by actions and re
actions in all antecedent generations, while the aggregate, if
changed in form by change of surrounding conditions, tended
ever to impress on the units a corresponding change of polarity,
causing them in the next generation to reproduce the changed
form their new form of equilibrium.&quot;
But what about our egg expectant of the farmyard and
green fields? We do not see how any very great structural
change is effected beyond the patches of similar physiological
units accreted around the several original physiological units
with which we commenced. The theory of the reaction of the
aggregate on the units does not assist us towards the desired
differentiation of parts forming altogether a co-ordinated struc
ture. The theory of the action of the environment is reduced
to the minimum of communicated warmth, for the contents of
the egg are not subjected to mechanical strains, or other exter
nal forces.
However, we must bear in mind
&quot; that the proclivity of
units of each order towards the specific arrangement seen in the
organism they form is not to be understood as resulting from
their own structures and actions only ; but as the product of
these, and the environing forces to which they are exposed.&quot;
They must be
&quot;
subject to heat of a given degree, that is, to the
unceasing impacts of undulations of a certain strength and
period ; and, within limits, the rapidity with which the physio
logical units pass from their indefinite arrangement to the





portionate to the strengths of the ethereal undulations falling
upon
them.&quot;
This means that the definite form into which physiological
units aggregate is due not only to their structures and polarities,
but also to molecular and ethereal undulations. Yet, after all,
these only assist, not by modifying the shape or construction
of the aggregate, but by allowing full and free play to the con
stituent molecules, and permitting the result the more fully andBIOLOGICAL RECONSTRUCTION. 433
distinctly to be that consequent upon the structures and polari
ties of these physiological units. So far our egg remains in the
state already described, and makes no progress towards a chicken.
The full statement is given thus : &quot;In its complete form,
then, the conception is that these specific molecules, having
the immense complexity above described, and having corre
spondingly complex polarities which cannot be mutually balanced
by any simple form of aggregation, have for the form of aggre
gation in which all their forces are equilibrated, the structure
of the adult organism to which they belong ; and that they are
compelled to fall into this structure by the co-operation of the
environing forces acting on them, and the forces they exercise
on one another the environing forces being the source of the
potcer which affects the rearrangement, and the polarities of the
molecules determining the direction in which that power is
turned.&quot;
Here the theory is that the physiological units have such a
complex structure, and such complex polarities, although these
latter, according to former statements, are in inverse ratio to the
former in degree of strength, that the diverse molecules cannot
balance themselves with each other otherwise than by forming a
structure, in part resembling the organism from which they were
disparted, and more clearly assuming a complete likeness to it
(subject to external influences) in the adult form. We can only
say that we cannot discern the necessity for such a result. As
a matter of fact, we know this to be the actual course of things ;
but Mr. Spencer s object is to make us understand how it
comes about ; and to tell us that physiological units can only
balance one another s polarities by forming a structure like that
of the parent organism, is telling us nothing. We have only a
cloud of words. We need to know how the polarities of these
physiological units work so as to produce bone, and muscle, and
nerve, arranging them into a workable skeleton, a series of
muscles, nerves, and brain, organs of sight, hearing, &c., appar
atus for breathing, food, assimilation, reproduction, &c., means
of locomotion, feathers, &c. To say that this is all explained
by the equilibration of the polarities of the original physiological
units, together with the assimilated units with ancestral forces,
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or with present or anticipated forces, does not throw any light
upon the process.
We fail then to find a formula which shall hatch an egg. We
cannot in any definite manner say why one egg should turn out
a black Spanish cock, why another should bring forth a Brahma
hen, nor how it is that a third should produce a gosling. The
theory of aggregation analogous to that of crystallisation, by
which form and structure is produced according to the structure
and polarities of units, does not carry us beyond a homogeneous
jelly-like mass. To say that they must equilibrate by pro
ducing the parental structure, without showing us the depen
dence of each step of the process, is leaving the matter in such
a state of indefiniteness, incompleteness, and obscurity that it
cannot be said to be real knowledge, nor to constitute even an
intelligible hypothesis.
As mentioned on a previous occasion, we hold that Mr.
Spencer s main fault as a philosophic writer is in the misuse
of terms. He takes a word of definite meaning and concrete
application. He evolutionises it after the manner in which
he himself describes evolution, and of which he gives an
illustrative instance (p. 348), in showing how by insensible
modifications a circle can be transformed into a straight line.
We commence with the base of a cone, which gives a circle.
An insensible slicing process up one side of the cone gradually
gives various undistinguishable conic sections, till we finally
arrive at the straight line of the side of the cone. &quot;Here we
have five different species of line circle, ellipse, parabola,
hyperbole, and straight line, each having its peculiar proper
ties and its separate equation, and the first and last of which
are quite opposite in nature, connected together as members of
one series, all productive by a single process of insensible
modification.&quot; By a similar method Mr. Spencer undertakes to
elude the logical faculty. In a similar manner by a series
of insensible modifications Mr. Spencer in the course, not of
processes, but of sentences, so changes the meaning of words as
to make them bear the most diverse applications. We have
already seen how the term Force has been universalised. We
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equivalent to Universal Causation ; and we have noAv a similar
instance in the remarkable growth and expansion which has been
given to the term Polarity, and to the term physiological unit.
All these are words of definite meaning and limited application
in the first instance
; but by a system of gradual stretching, and
by perpetually concentrating the attention upon them, they are
forced to wider and wider applications, till at last they are so
universalised as to lose all real meaning.
In the case before us, polarity, which we can thoroughly
understand as applied to the crystallisation of inorganic sub
stances, is so overloaded with properties and powers, and is so
expanded for the purpose of explaining all chemical and physio
logical arrangements, that it ends in meaning nothing at all.
Fresh requirements, fresh properties needed call them polari
ties and let them equilibrate. We want growth and accretion
we want modification of molecules we want fresh aggre
gates produced out of these modified molecules call them
polarities and let them equilibrate. Anything, everything, is
polarity anything, everything, is equilibration. Make these
terms vague and all-embracing, and you can deduce whatever
you will. Put into them all that you want to get out of
them, and the deduction, though obscure, will be sufficient.
(n. ) The Affiliation of Polarity upon Evolution in General,
and its Relation to Physical Science.
Our object now is to consider Polarity in its place in the
scheme for the unification of knowledge. Since this unification
is to be found in the process resulting from the interrelations of
primordial factors, it is necessary to inquire what part Polarity
plays in that process, and in what manner it is related to those
primordial factors.
In the first place we ask, Is it an original factor itself?
But in
&quot; First Principles,&quot; Mr. Spencer, in proposing to express
the correlations of the cosmic factors, does not even mention
Polarity. He says
:
&quot; The three factors are the Persistence of
Force, the Indestructibility of Matter, and the Continuity of
Motion.&quot; The law of their co-operation is expressed in terms436 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
of two of them in the Formula of Evolution. We will first
ask if Polarity is expressed or implied in the Formula of
Evolution. Is it implied, for instance, in Matter or in Motion,
in Integration or in Dissipation ? We suppose we could not say
of Polarity that it is that manifestation of Force called Matter,
nor can we say that it is that manifestation of Force called
Motion. Neither can we say that it is a process like inte
gration or dissipation. It seems to cause integration if not
dissipation, and therefore to be a cause of motion. If it is
to be called anything, it must be called a Force, or rather, since
there is not one polarity but many, Forces. But no other kinds
or manifestations of Force other than Matter and Motion are
included in the Formula of Evolution
; and since the Forces of
Polarity are amongst the most important factors in cosmical
changes, it is evident that that Formula is very deficient in
definite intelligibility.
What then are we to say of Polarity as a mode of Force ?
Mr. Spencer teaches the interchangeableness of modes of Force.
Heat, light, electricity, &c. 1 Is then Polarity interchangeable
with them? Can the Polarity of an atom or molecule be
changed into the motion of that molecule or atom whereby it
loses its Polarity ? We do not see that such an interchange
can take place, for we do not discern that Polarity can be
a rate or mode of motion as the others are. The question
arises, Can Motion retain its place at all as one of the
primal factors of the cosmos, or is it only a result of the inter
action of the primal factors ? Must we dethrone the Continuity
of Motion from the important position in the unitative formula
assigned to it by Mr. Spencer ?
Again, what are the relations of Polarity to Matter and the
indestructibility of Matter ? Matter may be regarded as x, of
which we know nothing ; and in this case we have nothing to
say of the relations of Polarity to it. Or Matter may be regarded
as the sum total of the bundles of properties known to us as the
chemical elements. In the latter case, what position does
Polarity hold 1 Is it something differential in each kind of atom,
something inherent in it and essential to it, which it never loses
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accordance with some laws of which we know nothing ? Is it
something which cannot be disparted from each atom, and which
governs its behaviour to other atoms and molecules. If so, then
we have to speak of the Indestructibility of Polarity as one of
the fundamental facts of the universe.
If such be the case, then what is the law of the distribution
of polarity amongst the chemical elements, and what is the law
of their interrelations, by which some have superior affinities for
each other, and some have small affinities for each other, in infi
nite varieties?
The pursuit of this theme would lead us to an investigation
of chemical affinities. It would also lead to the consideration
of the constitution of molecules, if not of atoms, as well as to a
study of the nature of the correlations of the motions of mole
cules and atoms with shapes and sizes and with special polari
ties, undertaken with the view of ascertaining how polarity
worked, how it was dependent upon shapes and sizes, and how
far it was interfered with by molecular motions, all whicli
might help us to understand chemical combinations and
changes. What is the cause, or rather what are the conditions,
of varieties of Polarity, and how far are they connected with
varieties of shape and modes and rates of motion ?
Then, again, we should have to consider the relation of special
polarities with simple polarity. How far does one affect the
actions of the other 1 How far do they coincide 1 how far do
they counteract each other 1 And indeed one might go so far as
to ask, Could the special polarities all be resolved into the one
simple polarity
? Further, one would ask of this simple polarity,
as of the special polarities, Is not all polarity double, involving
repulsion as well as attraction ?
We would also have to ask, Does polarity exhaust itself in
action ? is energy expended in the exercise of Polarity 1 Surely
yes ; and yet surely no, for what would atoms and molecules
be if they lost their polarity
?
In a more concrete investigation we should also have to
inquire into the action of that molecular motion called heat,
not only in disparting molecules associated together presumably
either by simple attraction or by special polarities, but also to438 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
some extent in facilitating recombinations of atoms and mole
cules. How does communicated motion affect the mutual
polarities of intermixed masses, and what is the manner of the
influence exerted?
This would lead to a consideration of polarity as regards
equilibrium. Is equilibrium an equilibration of motions, an
equipoise of weights, a balancing of attractions, a balancing of
attractions and repulsions, a generating of opposing forces, or
what is it? Mr. Spencer throughout the &quot;Biology&quot; largely
applies it to the balancing of polarities. It is not very clear
what this or its effects can be until we thoroughly understand
how far polarity varies, the laws of its variations, whether
dependent upon shape and size, whether differentiated in
strength, whether variable in mode or strength in the same
atom or molecule, modifiable by motion, different from and
affected by simple attraction or the attraction of gravitation,
how far polarities are negative and positive, &c. ; all of which
circumstances enter into the consideration of the balance of equi
libration of polarities, and must be understood before anything
can be deduced from the bare statement that structure results
from the equilibration of the structure and polarities of mole
cules.
The uncertainty as to the terms in which fundamental physical
science is to be discussed renders any unificatory endeavour par
ticularly difficult. Apparently there are two primary concep
tions as to the nature of the elementary factors. The first is
founded upon notions of pure mechanics, and carries out its
explanations in terms of the relations of shape and size, together
with the motions consequent upon simple attraction. A modi
fication of this theory is that which looks for fundamental
explanations in rates or modes of motions or relative velocities.
The second theory recognises as ultimate certain special polari
ties or affinities, although this theory may only hold a mediate
position, and may itself be explainable by the first. Between
these two theories, which may be termed respectively the
mechanical and the physical, Mr. Spencer wavers, basing his
explanations sometimes upon one and sometimes upon the other,
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cation to the latter of the terms used to describe the general
facts of the former. This transferred application of mechanical
language to physical processes is a cause of endless confusion.
Until scientific men are agreed as to the terms in which funda
mental physical science is to be discussed, no unificatory system
is possible. If, in addition, we have to find a place in this
fundamental science for Feeling as a factor amongst the sequences
of the cosmos, the study is still farther, and perhaps hopelessly,
complicated. Yet to this conclusion we are almost inevitably
forced, for we cannot suppose that Feeling and Consciousness
entered upon the history of life uncaused and unrelated to





theory favoured by Mr. Spen
cer, which can, however, furnish no explanations.
14. General Review of tlie Argument.
Our study, commencing with the Data of Biology and the
Definition of Life, resolved itself into the inquiry,
&quot; How is or
ganic evolution caused 1
&quot; The answer to this question furnished
us by Mr. Spencer is couched in terms of Equilibration. He
begins by recognising certain aggregates, the origin of which is
unexplained; and his omission of any explanation on this
point forms a fundamental defect in his historical account of
the sequences of the cosmos. These aggregates are moving
equilibria, possessed of inner formative forces which not only
equilibrate amongst themselves, but act under the restraints of
external forces. As moving equilibria they expend energy
which they endeavour to replace, and adapt themselves by a
process of counterbalance so as to antagonise such forces of the
environment as tend to their destruction. This theory of mov
ing equilibria we have already sufficiently discussed.
We have found that these aggregates or organisms are
changed through the action of the environment by simple ami
direct processes, according to the mechanical, chemical, or other
relations subsisting between them ; and also that such relations
involve indirect consequences. These are called Indirect Equili
brations, because although they consist of successive or continuous440 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
processes, the action of the original incident force is not immedi-
ateh
r
, but only mediately and in a deferred manner, manifested
in some established change of the organism.
In the detailed account of morphological and physiological
evolution, however, we do not find that the explanations are
given in terms of abstract laws of force, but in terms of the con
crete factors of which a list is furnished us in the three first
chapters of the first volume. These chapters recount on the
one hand a list of chemical elements forming the basis of organic
matter, and describe to us on the other hand the nature of those
forces which compose the external factors. In the detailed
accounts of development referred to, the term Equilibration is
employed simply as a general term alluding to the mutual action
of these factors, and not as a term of explanation ; nor is the
conception of a moving equilibrium of the least use in enabling
us to understand any process of organic evolution : it is merely
a general name applicable to the grand results which are sup
posed to be really explicable from the known relationships of
concrete factors.
We also noted the defect in the argument from which it
would appear that feelings and facts of consciousness, up to their
most complex modes of existence, must, under the analogy of
the moving equilibrium, be regarded as forces generated by the
organism in antagonism to adverse external agencies, and there
fore must be actual acting agencies as feelings in the physical
relations of the organism with its environment. This a priori
conclusion we justified by references to inductions from the
manifest physical arrangements of some organisms which recog
nised feelings, as feelings, on the part of other organisms. We
thus established the fact that the subjective plays a part in the
physical changes and developments of organisms quite indepen
dently of any theory as to the merely double aspect of such
subjectivity. Nevertheless, we found that in Mr. Spencer s
account of physiological development the subjective obtained
no place, but that the whole of that development, including even
the origin of nerves and the evolution of the nervous system
with its consequent actions, was all wrought out in terms of
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&quot;We found it necessary also to refer in a more marked manner
to a fundamental confusion of thought which pervades Mr.
Spencer s argument with regard to the factors of evolution, and
more particularly of organic evolution. The confusion of thought
is between the concrete factors themselves, and general pro
cesses regarded as factors a confusion of the concrete Avith the
abstract. Thus, as just indicated, the factors given to us at the
outset of our biological inquiry were the concrete chemical
substances oxygen, nitrogen, hydrogen, carbon, and a few others,
the properties and relations of which were very carefully con
sidered. We were also furnished with an account of the vari
ous external forces which played a part as factors in relation to
aggregates composed of the foregoing elements. Our inquiry,
therefore, was one as to the interaction of the formative tenden
cies of the elements (leaving unexplained the biologic tendencies
in the expenditure and replacement of energy) with the actions
of the external forces. The investigation was purely a concrete
one. The result was instability of the originally simple organic
aggregate ; segregation of like and unlike molecules ; the changes
due to the laws of mechanical agencies of various kinds
; the
multiplication of effects, rhythms, evolutions, dissolutions ; the
whole of which, again, can be summed up in the general term
Equilibration, or afterwards specialised as the equilibrations of
moving equilibria.
But singularly enough Mr. Spencer occasionally appears to
regard some of these terms themselves as factors. It is true
that in his resume of &quot;External Factors,&quot; given in Chapter IX.
of Part III., he recounts the concrete agencies of an astronomic,
geologic, and meteorologic character, and also refers to the general
organic environment of animals and plants
: but in the succeed
ing chapter on
&quot; Internal Factors
&quot; the reference made to the
concrete chemical factors is but slight* The stress of the
explanation is placed upon the abstract factors; and first let
us see what he says as to the instability of the homogeneous,
from which it would appear that Mr. Spencer considers the
homogeneous must inevitably lapse into something else.
&quot;Our postulate being that organic evolution in general
*
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commenced with homogeneous organic matter, ... we have
first to remember that the state of homogeneity is an unstable
state.&quot; How Mr. Spencer can say this, and then proceed to
say that it requires external agencies to produce a change in this
homogeneous state, we cannot imagine. This, however, not
being enough, we are further asked to suppose the case of
&quot; a
given whole,&quot; which,
&quot; instead of being absolutely uniform
throughout, consists of parts distinguishable from each other,&quot;
a distinction presupposed by Mr. Spencer in the differentiation
of the contractile molecules into muscular tissue, and of the irri
table molecules into nervous tissue. Nevertheless Mr. Spencer
speaks of the gravitation from a state of homogeneity to a state
of heterogeneity,* although it will be more conspicuously shown
in proportion as the environment is complex. Thus :
&quot;
Omitting
for the present those circumstances which check and qualify
its consequences, the instability of the homogeneous must be
recognised an ever-acting cause of organic evolution, as of all
other evolution.&quot; f
Next as to the Multiplication of Effects.
&quot; When consider
ing the causes of evolution in general, we further saw
( First
Principles, 116) that the multiplication of effects aids con
tinually to increase that heterogeneity into which homogeneity
inevitably lapses.
. . . How this multiplication of effects con
spires with the instability of the homogeneous to work an
increasing multiformity of structure in an organism, was shown
at the time
; and the foregoing pages contain further incidental
illustrations. Under the head Adaptation ( 69) it was shown
that a change in one function must act and react through ever-
complicating perturbations on the rest
; and that, eventually,
all parts of the organism must be modified in their states.&quot; J
The fact that a whole section of the chapter on &quot;Internal
Factors
&quot;
is devoted to its consideration would almost lead to
the presumption that the multiplication of effects is regarded
as a factor or cause instead of a result of evolution
; although
such a position is not actually claimed for it.
*
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The next section is devoted to
&quot;
Segregation.&quot;
&quot; One of the universal principles to which we saw that the
redistribution of matter and motion conforms, is that in any
aggregate made up of mixed units, incident forces produce
segregation,
. . . and it was shown that the increasing integ
ration and definiteness . . . results from this ( First Princi
ples, 126).&quot;
Here again the redistribution of matter and motion is said
to conform to a principle of which the proof is merely an in
duction from their own actions. Nevertheless it is stated that
increasing integration and definiteness result from this principle.
Segregation is said to be produced, and we are therefore at a
loss to assign its place. Is it the name of the results or of the
principle which produced the results 1
It is clear, however, that these are but names of some of the
general processes resulting from the relations of the actual
factors, and it is doing Mr. Spencer an injustice to suppose that
he means otherwise, although his language and occasional dis-
proportionateness of treatment warrant the notice we have
taken of it. Even Equilibration holds its position but as the name
of a process and not as the name of a factor ; and although
Mr. Spencer s chapter on
&quot; The Co-operation of the Factors
&quot;
is
mainly concerned with summarising the relations of the pro
cesses, yet it is only as processes resulting from the relations of
the true factors the chemical constituents of the aggregate
organism, and the physical forces and varying conditions of the
environment
The great argument drawn from the laws of the moving
equilibrium is more a statement of results than a key to expla
nations. In the summaries of biological development given in
Chapter I. it is very prominent. In the detailed explanations
of Chapter II. it is not given as an explanation of the means
for securing fresh energy in order to replace the expended
energies of the moving equilibrium; nor of the means for
effecting those adaptations by way of antagonism to external
destructive forces which it is supposed to necessitate; nor of
the means by which a species, considered as a moving equili
brium, effects its continuance by reproduction of individuals,444 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
which by analogy with the case of .an individual moving equili
brium should be considered an assimilation rather than a repro
duction. Altogether, Mr. Spencer s grand principle of biologic
description is not a means of explanation at all, but only a
nomenclature of results.
The general tendency of the whole argument is merely to
give an a priori justification for the doctrine of gradual and
natural development, in support of the similar inductions which
result from our concrete studies. Mr. Spencer endeavours to
show that such a view is not only reasonable but also necessary.
In this we hold that he has fully succeeded
; and if he had so
limited his claims, we should have had no occasion to subject
his works to so close a criticism. But there can be no doubt
that Mr. Spencer not only distinctly claims for that philosophy
at which he aims the full explanation of every existence, but
also endeavours to furnish us with a coherent system of sequences
from the primordial nebula to the present time. In this attempt
we consider he has failed, although in that bold endeavour he
has been successful in throwing light upon many great processes
of the cosmos, enlarging and giving definiteness to many of our
ill-formed conceptions, and pointing the way to further triumphs
of thought in the future.
An important consideration refers to the value and meaning of
those
&quot; mechanical interpretations
&quot; which Mr. Spencer claims
to have given
* to the evolution of organisms generally, and to
the causes of organic change taught by Mr. Darwin in
&quot; natural








&quot; within the limits of the
terms in their strict applications as we find them in a work on
mechanics. Undoubtedly Mr. Spencer must refer to those first
principles of abstract dynamics which he derives from the Per
sistence of Force. These abstract principles, however, being
derived by induction from a study of their sequences, the con
verse result is inevitable. One part of the reasoning is but
*
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complementary to the other. The inductive law becomes the
deductive principle. The process of deduction simply retraces
the steps of the inductive process. The Formula of Evolution
is as much the result of an induction as the means of a deduc
tion. Indeed these abstract laws are of little use in deductive
explanations, as we have seen in our previous studies. All solid
and useful deductions have to be made from original concretes.
The only use of abstract laws is to show the uniformity of pro
cess, which enlarges our view of the unity of nature, and facili
tates the reasonings from concretes to concretes by expressing
their truths in general terms. Abstract terms are of no use
but as generals, and derive all their value from what they con
tain of the concrete. A priori reasoning is only useful as a
means of applying a posteriori experience.
Therefore to find the unity of sequence which would unify
knowledge and attain the goal of philosophy as quoted from
Mr. Spencer at the outset of this work, we must be able to
deduce the origin of organisms and all their developments
from the concrete internal and external factors before referred
to. The identification of the general characteristics of these
processes with those of inorganic changes is not an explanation
of sequences at all. Notwithstanding Mr. Spencer s elaborate
work, we still find that the origin of organisms and of their
special characteristics cannot be deduced from their concrete
antecedents, whether we regard them as biologic moving equi
libria, or as manifesting feeling and consciousness, or as having
the power of reproduction, which last aspect we shall now pro
ceed to consider.
1 5. The a priori Explanation of Genesis and Reproduction.
Hitherto we have taken the fact of genesis and reproduction
as unquestioned, and have considered each species of organism
very much as though it were one continuous existence. If a
species could be studied in this way as being itself a con
tinuous moving equilibrium acting in the same manner as an
individual organism, adapting itself by readjustment of its
inner forces so as to antagonise detrimental external forces,446 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
and so as to secure assimilation of those external forces which
are favourable to the continuance of its existence the study
of biology would be very much simplified. But we hold that
the cases are not parallel. The suggested analogy between the
life of an individual and the continuance of a species does
not hold good. Although it is possible to find sufficient points
in common to enable us to formulate certain modes and pro
cesses applicable to both, yet a deeper investigation shows an
essential distinction between the methods of continuance. The
life of the individual is protracted by the assimilation of energies
from the environment in replacement of the energies expended.
The species is continued not in this manner, but by the actual
multiplication of individuals ; and no analogy can be made out
between these two processes. Again, it would be difficult to
show that any individual, or even any group constituting part
of a species, had the same relation to the whole which any
separate organ bears in relation to the whole of an organism.
In the latter case there is a distinct interdependence of struc
ture and function, in many instances of such a nature that
upon its sudden stoppage or severance the whole organism
perishes. The analogy between the constitution of an organism
and the constitution of a state was early recognised, as shown
in ^Esop s fables and St. Paul s Epistles ; but we do not think
that Mr. Spencer s analogy carries the matter one step in ad
vance. The writers referred to used the analogy for rhetorical
purposes. We have to regard its import scientifically and logi
cally, and we do not find that the conception of a species as a
moving equilibrium accords with the conception of an indivi
dual organism as a moving equilibrium, so that the existence and
modes of continuance of both can be explained and expressed in
common language as deductions from the ideal abstract con
ception of a moving equilibrium.
Before entering farther upon this inquiry, let us first consider
the question whether, upon the supposition of the continuous
existence of an individual organism, the same diversity of morpho
logical and physiological development could have taken place
as under the system of successions of individuals.
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state of the environment, as also those mechanical actions and
those variations of available food which occur in it, are liable
to stop the processes going on in the organism ; and since the
adaptive changes in the organism have the effects of directly
or indirectly counter-balancing these changes in the environ
ment ; it follows that the life of the organism will be short or
long, low or high, according to the extent to which changes in
the environment are met by corresponding changes in the
organism. Allowing a margin for perturbations, the life will
continue only while the correspondence continues; the com
pleteness of the life will be proportionate to the completeness
of the correspondence ; and the life will be perfect only when
the correspondence is perfect.&quot;
*
From this it would appear that there is no a priori necessity
for death
; and when we consider the characteristics of the
ideal abstract moving equilibrium from which the working
principles of the concrete organism are deduced, it is clear
that a moving equilibrium which possessed the power not only
of adapting its inner forces so as to counter-balance inimical
external forces, but also of doing this continuously from its
other faculty of replacing the energies thus expended by assi
milating external energy, might continue in existence for ever
in some modified form.
Although, however, there is no d priori necessity for death,
still we can see the great probability of its occurrence in the
accumulation of failures of adjustment on the part of the mov
ing equilibrium, and in the possibilities of the failures of supply
of the replacing energy. Failing the means of reproduction,
moving equilibria would therefore become extinct, or might be
originated de novo in the same manner as existent or preceding
organisms ; but the life history of each would be determined
absolutely by its own relations to its own environment. The
suggestion we here wish to make is, that such developments
could never attain to the complexity and variety AVC see
exhibited in the actual world. We find, accordingly, that re
production and heredity play a very important part in Mr.
*
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Spencer s scheme of biological reconstruction. Without their
assistance we believe Mr. Spencer could not theoretically have
accomplished any of his explanations. The inquiry, therefore,
as to the d, priori explanation of genesis, reproduction, and
heredity assumes great importance.
Such an inquiry must, according to the terms of our hypothe
sis, be worked out with reference to the requirements and consti
tution of our ideal abstract moving equilibrium. From the
conception of the nature of this moving equilibrium and its
relations to external forces, it is required that we should deduce
the reproduction of other moving equilibria which are copies of
itself.
We must attempt this problem either independently or by
the means furnished us by Mr. Spencer. We are afraid, how
ever, that, as an independent logical endeavour, we are unable to
make a single deductive step in the direction desired. The con
crete instances in the physical world from which we derived our
conception of a moving equilibrium were the solar system and
the spinning-top ; and to these were superadded the conception of
the supply and expenditure of energy derived from the steam-
engine, although the latter is a mental act which we are not
really able to achieve, and merely allow for the sake of the argu
ment which Mr. Spencer advances. We wish to pursue the sub
ject beyond the initial steps, but to thosestepswe nevertheless offer
the strongest objections. Given such a conception, we can, it is
true, deduce protracted if not eternal existence, so long as there
are external forces to be assimilated and used up in the mainten
ance of the moving equilibrium, and so long as the external inimi
cal forces which have to be antagonised are not of such a nature
as absolutely todestroy the movingequilibrium itself. Butwecan-
not see the least reason to suppose that, under any circumstances
whatever, this moving equilibrium would propagate itself would
ever out of the superabundance of supply receive more energy
than it expended; and even if it did, that it would do more than
augment in bulk. We cannot imagine that it would ever tend
to organise these supplies into separate and independent copies
of itself.
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subject. It is evident that the a priori explanation must be
found either in abstract considerations such as those just dis
cussed, or in the relations and properties of the concrete
chemical elements, and their complex combinations out of
which organisms have originated, and are supposed to have been
developed in conjunction with their environment. To carry
out our examination of Mr. Spencer s views, we shall have
to study principally Chapters VII. to X. in Part II. of the
&quot;
Biology.&quot;




leading up to the statement
&quot; The above induction is an approximate answer to the
question When does gamogenesis recur? but not to the ques
tion which was propounded Wliy does gamogenesis recur?
&quot;Why cannot multiplication be carried on in all cases, as it is
in many cases, by agamogenesis ? As already said, biologic
science is not yet advanced enough to reply. Meanwhile, the
evidence above brought together suggests a certain hypothetical
answer, which it may be well to set down.
&quot;
Seeing, as we do, on the one hand, that gamogenesis recurs
only in individuals that are approaching towards a state of
organic equilibrium ; and seeing, on the other hand, as we do,
that the sperm-cells and germ-cells, thrown off by such indi
viduals, are cells in which developmental changes have ended
in quiescence, but in which, after their union, there arises a
process of active cell-formation ; we may suspect that the
approach towards a state of general equilibrium in such gamo-
genetic individuals, is accompanied by an approach towards
molecular equilibrium in them. And the need for this union
of sperm-cell and germ-cell, is the need for overthrowing this
equilibrium, and re-establishing active molecular change in the
detached germ a result which is probably effected by mixing
the slightly different physiological units of slightly different
individuals.&quot; *
Mr. Spencer, however, professes to consider the question
more fully in Chapter X., after having considered the subjects
*
Biology, vol. i. p. 233.
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of heredity and variation. In the meantime, is it not singular
that the question as put by Mr. Spencer is not,
&quot; Why does
genesis take place ?
&quot; but
&quot; Why does gamogenesis recur 1
&quot;
Surely what we desire to have explained in the first place is
the necessity for genesis at all. Taking this for granted, as
Mr. Spencer does, it may be comparatively easy to find
answers to subordinate questions ; but the mind of the reader
will remain unsatisfied as long as no answer is found to the
great preliminary question. This question Mr. Spencer passes
over in absolute silence. And on examining the course of
thought pursued in suggesting an ansAver to the special question
proposed, we find the whole burden of the a priori explana




for the continuance of the species. This requires the re-estab
lishment of active molecular change in the detached germ, and
explains
&quot;the need for overthrowing this equilibrium,&quot; and
the
&quot; need for the union of the sperm-cell and the germ-cell,&quot;
which are supposed to be in a state of &quot;molecular equilibrium
&quot;
(whatever that may be), consequent upon the approach of the
organism to a state of general equilibrium. This, again, implies
the
&quot; need
&quot; for those organs which ensure the union of the




is a factor in the organism, called
forth by the action of the forces in the environment as a means
of defeating them, if not in individual survival, then in vicarious
survival, we perceive the
&quot; need
&quot;
for those feelings which bring
the organisms together in effectuating such an union of sperm-




for the continuance of species a
&quot;need&quot; which ought to be explicable from the constitution
of the ideal abstract moving equilibrium, but which we have
seen is not thus deducible. Obviously upon the hypothesis
genesis should be explicable as a rearrangement by an organism
of its own forces, for its own individual maintenance against
some destructive force of the environment.




of the species has actually played in the development of
organisms, if Mr. Darwin s theories are true, cannot but be
acknowledged as wonderful, both for its extent and the immenseTHE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 451
variety of its influences. It is as though Nature had said,
&quot;I have need of the continuance of species,&quot; and all the adjec
tives in the vocabulary rushed to offer their aid jointly and
severally ; softness that should contain the seed and protect
it uninjured, hardness that should defy the outrage of the
elements, solidity that should present a firm resistance to the
shocks of earth, lightness that should Avaft the seed onzephyrwings
through the air, profusion that should defy destruction, whatever
individuals might perish in the chances and changes of the great
life conflict. Then the flowers and their sexual loves afford a
wonderful contemplation in connection with their servants the
insects. How wonderful the structural developments in rela
tion to their winged messengers of love ! how beautiful, how
sweet their varied attractions ! how rich the banquet provided
for the welcome guests
! how sharp the defences against the
intrusion of the smooth-coated plunderer, who would despoil
without rendering the erotic service ! Then again the birds,
with their wings and their plumage and their antics, all to win
the love and admiration of their mates
; the soft nest, the hard
coating provided for the eggs, and the instinct of the parents
for the care of the young. But in the insect world is displayed
the most wonderful adaptation for the preservation of the
race. The ant tribe seems almost to exist for the continu
ance of its species alone. The whole life-interest of the com
munity seems concentrated on preservation. Bee communities
also partake of the same characteristic. By force or persuasion,
all animated nature is urged on involuntarily to the union of
the sperm and the germ. Even in the human race, where
the volitional is partially predominant, sexual feeling is one
of the strongest passions ; and in spite of all prudential
considerations, in spite of the responsibilities of a family, and
the risks or certainties of harassing and lifelong poverty and
care, youths and maidens are forced on to the propagation of
the race. It is true that in man there are often many high
and noble motives engaged in the fact of a marriage ; but
sexual love is the fundamental basis. For this master-pas
sion men and women will sacrifice much. It is the parent of
noble endeavour, of wonderful industrial energy, of beautiful452 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
self-sacrifice and self-rule, and alas ! also of sacrifices of all that
is good and noble the destruction, as by a fire-blast, of character
and position, of domestic happiness and of self-respect. Thus
even man is made the sport of this need for the preservation




Surely to say that the necessity
for the continuance of the species produced the means ami
the desire, and the adaptations for effecting it, is to confound
the end with the cause. It is to reverse the order of an
evolution which derives all its force and all the direction of
its developments from an initial activity. If the need for
the continuance of the species caused the means for its continu
ance, then structure and function have a teleological purpose ;
design is implied, and a designer. The means are provided for
an end ; the end is foreseen
; and according to the necessities of
each case the means are provided. This is enough to shake
our faith in non-teleological theories to the very foundation.
Evolution has no explanation to offer for genesis ; it can show no
need for it in the primal constitution of things ; it can deduce
it from none of its factors.
We do not indeed ask if there is any need for the propagation
of the elementary substances, for they remain a constant quan
tity. But we might ask, Is there not just as great a need for
the continuance of any of the chemical compounds as for the
continuance of an organism 1 We might ask, Is there not a
need for the propagation of the solar system, which is a moving
equilibrium
? We might ask, Is there not just as much a need,
and a need founded only upon precisely the same deductive
necessity, for the continuance of the compound called water, or
air, or salt compounds which are not quantitatively permanent,
but which are subject to dissolution. If we can deduce the
need of their continuance, we can deduce the need for their
propagation ; and if we cannot deduce from
&quot; First Principles
&quot;
the need for the continuance of chemical compounds or species
of organisms, we cannot deduce from it any of the structural and
functional arrangements of organisms for effecting that object.
We see, then, that, as a purely deductive reasoning process,
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which we are to deduce our explanations are nowhere given ;
and any that we guess at as probable premisses turn out to
be inadequate.
We have searched the chapter on the
&quot; Differentiation of the
Outer Tissues
&quot; and that on the
&quot; Differentiation of the Inner
Tissues&quot; for a deductive warrant for genesis and reproduction, but
all in vain. The chapter on &quot;Physiological Development&quot; also
fails to throw any light upon this subject. Only when we come
to the chapter on
&quot; Direct Equilibration
&quot;
is the matter referred
to at all. Direct equilibration is the balancing of a new incident
force by a new structural arrangement, which has already been
explained. Mr. Spencer says in this chapter that although
many functional adaptations are explicable in this way, there
are many that are not so explicable, as there is no external
incident force to be set over against them as their cause and
amongst these he mentions genesis or reproduction. There is
no incident force tending to produce a counter-force of function,
similar to the case of the production of nerves by incident
motions, of eyes by incident light, &c.
Therefore this, along with other cases, is left over for expla
nation in the succeeding chapter, which treats of &quot;Indirect
Equilibration.&quot; What, then, is indirect equilibration? It
turns out not to be equilibration at all. It is not equilibration
in the ordinary mechanical sense of working towards a state of
quiescence, nor is it equilibration in the arbitrary meaning
accorded to it by Mr. Spencer, of one force directly or indirectly
producing a counter-force or opposite motion in a moving equi
librium ; and the instances given show that it is not an equili
bration of any kind. A case adduced is this : Suppose the
seed of a tree (which seed has light hairs or down) is blown by
the wind upon a soil having in it material by which this down
in subsequently-produced seeds is made to grow longer; the
seeds will thereafter be scattered over a wider area, and the tree
will increase and multiply over a greater extent, than it would
have done before. This, we take it, is merely an interfering
cause producing a certain new effect; but what there is of
equilibration about it we fail to see, unless all effects are
equilibrations of all causes. However, be it what it may, the454 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
fact remains that none of the important cases specially reserved
to be dealt with under this heading are even referred to. All
we know is that Mr. Spencer says genesis cannot be accounted
for by direct equilibration, and that he does not attempt to
account for it even by indirect equilibration.
If we proceed now to examine the suggested
ct, priori ex
planation of heredity given on p. 253, we find, firstly, that
no such explanation is to be expected in the present state
of Biology. The suggested analogies between the process of
crystallisation and organic structure we considered in a pre
vious section. Variation, treated of in Chapter IX., depends
upon the explanation of genesis and heredity. Thus we are
brought round at last to resume the study of the a priori ex
planations of genesis postponed by Mr. Spencer from Chapter
VII. to Chapter X. The argument quoted by us from the
former is reproduced for consideration in the latter. How is it
dealt with?
We are surprised to find that the question considered is not
the d, priori explanation of genesis, but the question,
&quot; Why
does gamogenesis recur 1
&quot; The answer is an explanation of
the necessity for gamogenesis. This necessity is found in
the end, and not, strange to say, in the primary conditions.
Mr. Spencer s statement is to the effect that those moving
equilibria called organisms, in the course of their individual
growth and development, arrive at a time when they attain a
certain definite balance of parts and of external relations. The
attainment of this state causes the physiological units of which
they are composed also to exhibit an approach to equilibrium ;
although it is not clear whether Mr. Spencer refers to all the
physiological units of the organism, or only to those which are
freely floating in the interior fluids, or to those, again, which are
specially secreted in the organs of reproduction. It is on ap
proaching this state of general equilibrium that the organism gives
off those physiologicalunits which are to form the nucleus of fresh
organisms. These being almost in a state of equilibrium, a
state which is effected very shortly after parting from the parent
organism are not fitted of themselves, Mr. Spencer argues, to
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apparent. But since the union with a slightly different physio
logical unit from a slightly different organism would be calcu
lated a priori to initiate constructive changes, these combined
activities under favourable conditions would cause such growth
and development as to result in a new organism, combining in
varied forms the properties of both parent organisms. Mr.
Spencer shows indeed the reasonableness of this supposition ;
but he shows it too well; for he implies an adaptation of means to
the accomplishment of an end. The process is essentially teleo-
logical. The need for the continuance of species being taken for
granted, then, since the simple casting off of physiological units
is insufficient to accomplish it, means for the union of two
cells are requisite
: therefore they are produced. But this is
not ct priori reasoning. The deductive process requires that we
should be able to discern why those moving equilibria called
organisms should cast off certain portions of themselves made
out of the assimilated forces, not in the way of manufac
ture by each special organ of units suitable for its own repair,
nor yet in the way of floating units in the general circulation
of such nature as to produce results due to their own pro
perties and polarities, but in a special manner and by special
organs. This first act, however, is not explained. There is
no reason & priori in the nature of moving equilibria, nor in
their relations to the environment, to justify any such process.
Now granting such a process, is there any d, priori necessity
in the admitted incapacity of the physiological unit to repro
duce its parent (which by the analogy of crystallisation
it ought
t do) is there any logical necessity for supposing that organ
isms, having regard to this failure, should produce adaptive
arrangements for accomplishing an union of two such slightly
different iinits? It is not even deducible a priori that the
union of two slightly different physiological units of separate
organisms would result in another perfect organism. We
must conclude that Mr. Spencer s a priori explanation of
genesis and reproduction is a complete failure.
We do not know that it is requisite to examine Mr. Spencer s
reasoning in detail. He commences by endeavouring to establish
as an universal doctrine the theory that the aggregate exercises456 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
a coercive force over its units.* This is shown by references to
changes in the molecular arrangement of iron and unannealed
glass, and by the process of crystallisation. Organisms are
said to display the same characteristics. But this we dispute ;
for while the characteristic of the inorganic changes referred to
lies in the fact that the whole coerces the parts into uniformity
of arrangement, the characteristic of organisms is the incoer-
cibility of the parts, the retention of individuality by the separate
organs.
Mr. Spencer argues that in the early stages of the evolution




&quot; those antagonist forces which the aggregate
exercises on the molecules.&quot; We do not consider this intelli
gible, but
&quot; while this excess continues, it is expended in growth,
development, and function, expenditure for any of these pur




&quot; remains unbalanced. Eventually, however,
this excess diminishes.&quot; But can Mr. Spencer show that the
units of a moving equilibrium, the only characteristics of which
are due to their position as members of a mutually balanced
system of forces, possess any power when separated from that
system of reconstructing from the forces of the environment a
copy of the system of which they formed a part 1 And then can
he show that the molecular activities of this member, together
with those which it succeeds in coercing, will jointly possess such
a reconstructive power, until a complete system of balance is
attained, after which this system of balance coerces its origina
tors ? And can he further show that under these circumstances
the balance of forces requires that some should be expended in
reproduction 1 We do not think that he can establish this
theory by any process of abstract reasoning, not even if we
begin by granting the theory that a species is itself a moving
equilibrium. The Avhole of the reasoning on pages 274 and
275 is merely an attempt to translate the facts of Biology
relating to reproduction into terms of the relations of forces,
without any endeavour at all to show the deductive connection ;
and yet this is supposed to be an d, priori explanation
!
*
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But it is evident that the mere translation of all biological
processes into terms of force, the mere representation of them
in other language, albeit the language is of the most abstract
and universal applicability, does not amount to an explanation
of the order of sequences by which we would be able to under
stand how such and such a particular phenomenon occurred.
Section 96 exhibits in a very remarkable manner the faulty
conclusions to which a consistent ct, priori thinker is inevitably
led.
&quot; And so we reach the remarkable conclusion, that the life of
a species, like the life of an individual, is maintained by the
unequal and ever-varying actions of incident forces on its
different parts. An individual homogeneous throughout,
and having its substance everywhere continuously subject to
like actions,* could undergo none of those changes which life
consists of
; and similarly, an absolutely uniform species, having
all its members exposed to identical influences, would be
deprived of that initiator of change which maintains its exis
tence as a species, f Just as, in each organism, incident forces
constantly produce divergences from the mean state in various
directions, which are constantly balanced by opposite divergences
indirectly produced by other incident forces ; and just as the
combination of rhythmical functions thus maintained, constitutes
the life of the organism ; so, in a species,
. . . it is similarly
by the rhythmical production and compensation of these con
trary deviations, that the species continues to live.&quot; The point
to be here considered is this Does a species live except as by
the existence of the individuals composing it
1
? Mr. Spencer seems
to regard it as having an individual and corporate existence
capable of being spoken of in analogous terms. And since a
homogeneous organism under homogeneous circumstances would
not be an organism, he argues that an absolutely uniform species
under identical influences would not maintain its existence as a
* This is an impossible supposition according to Mr. Spencer s teaching
in thechapteron the &quot;Instability of the Homogeneous&quot; in &quot;FirstPrinciples.&quot;
f Surely this is a new theory, that the initiators of change maintain the
existence of species. Mr. Darwin s theory is that they cause the origin
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species because it would not manifest those adaptations which
constitute life. Does he mean that the species would die out
because it had become perfectly adapted to its homogeneous
circumstances ?
&quot; The moving equilibrium in a species, like
the moving equilibrium in an individual, would rapidly end in
complete equilibration or death, were not its continually dissipated
forces continually resupplied from without.&quot; What is the
&quot; without
&quot;
of a species considered as a whole, and how does it
as a species dissipate its forces, and get resupplied from without 1
The argument requires that changed incident forces should be
the forces supplied ; but surely changed conditions are not
necessary for the continuance of a species.
A priori reasoning. begins in words and ends in words; and
this Chapter X. exemplifies throughout in a remarkable manner
the futility of all such efforts for the investigation of truth.
In the chapter on the
&quot; Laws of Multiplication
&quot;
in vol. ii. we
find a half-suppressed, half-expressed recognition of the need
for the continuance of species.
P. 391.
&quot;If organisms have been evolved, their respective
powers of multiplication must have been determined by natural
causes.&quot;
P. 393, 317. &quot;The individuals of every species being thus
dependent on certain environing actions
; and severally having
their moving equilibria sooner or later overthrown by one or
other of these environing actions ; we have next to consider in
what ways the environing actions are so met as to prevent
extinction of the species.&quot;
Here is disclosed the whole tenor of Mr. Spencer s theory.
The necessity for multiplication of the species does not arise
from inherent necessities of the constituents of the cosmos, and
is not one of the inevitable sequences from their existence,
but it arises from the final aim and intention of preserving the
species from extinction. This is the great end for the accom
plishment of which adequate means have to be provided.
Having this necessity in view, Nature seeks the preservation
of all special modes of life in various ways (pp. 394 and 395).
Firstly, in the preservation of the individual.
Secondly, in the reproduction of the species.THE A PRIORI EXPLANATION OF GENESIS. 459
The favourable and adverse influences affecting both processes
are recounted, and Mr. Spencer continues :
&quot;318. Such are the factors with which we are here con
cerned. I have presented them in abstract shapes, for the
purpose of showing how they are expressible in general terms
of force how they stand related to the ultimate laws of re
distribution of Matter and Motion.&quot;
The unification sought, then, is to be found in ultimate
universal propositions.
&quot; For the purposes of the argument now to follow, we may,
however, conveniently deal with these factors under a more
familiar guise. Ignoring their other aspects, we may class the
actions which affect each race of organisms as forming two con
flicting sets. On the one hand, by what we call natural death,
by enemies, by lack of food, by atmospheric change, &c., the
race is constantly being destroyed. On the other hand, partly
by the endurance, the strength, the swiftness, and the sagacity
of its members, and partly by their fertility, it is constantly
being maintained. These conflicting sets of actions may be
generalised as the forces destructive of race and the forces pre
servative of race.&quot;
Surely this is a bad piece of generalisation which specifies
natural death, lack of food, &c., as forces, and classifies together
fertility, strength, sagacity, &c., as forces. The word
&quot; force
&quot;
seems to lend itself to any emergency, and appears able to cover
up in its mysterious folds all awkward transitions in Mr.
Spencer s arguments.
The argument so far stands thus : We have to see how the
laws of multiplication stand related to the ultimate laws which
affect the redistribution of Matter and Motion ; and the factors
with which we have to deal are the favourable forces and the
adverse forces affecting the continuance of the individual ex
istence and the continuance of the species. This leads us to
Chapter II., the &quot;1 Priori Principle.&quot;
Sections 319, 320, and 321 show how Forces always tend
through rhythmical movements towards an equilibrium a
moving equilibrium and thus species are continuous moving
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&quot;
While, therefore, on the one hand, we see that the con
tinued existence of a species necessarily implies some action by
which the destructive and preservative forces are self-adjusted ;
we see, on the other hand, that such an action is an inevitable
consequence of the universal process of equilibration.&quot;
So far it is not made out that there need be in the nature
of things any continuance of an individual or of a species.
Xor do we see why the individual, when once formed, should
not exist for as many thousand years as the external conditions
are favourable. But if there is an external force of cats acting
adversely to the internal force of mice, it is clear that the mouse
force will be limited
; and if it were not for the favourable
forces of nimble legs, scraps of food, reproduction, &c., mouse
force would come to an end. All these competitive organisms,
however, are subject to such mutual adjustment and rhyth
mical predominances of forces as prove preservative of all of
them in some kind of re-adjustment.
P. 394.
&quot; We have next to consider in what ways the envi
roning actions are so met as to prevent extinction of the spe
cies.&quot; This is evidently a teleological thought. Again,
&quot; There
are both active and passive adaptations by which organisms are
enabled to survive adverse influences.&quot; Once more,
&quot; The first
class consists of self-protective arrangements. The second pro
cess by which extinction is prevented the formation of new
individuals to replace the individuals destroyed is carried on
as described in the chapter on Genesis.
&quot;
A little farther on the matter is complicated by a change of
idea, when it is observed (p. 401), &quot;The forces preservative of
race are two ability in each member of the race to preserve
itself, and ability to produce other members
; power to maintain
individual life, and power to generate the species.&quot; Passing
over the strange application of the term forces, we are brought
back to the preservation of the race in the theory that, given
the need for such preservation, these must vary inversely. Mr.
Spencer certainly limits his rfemarks to races which continuously
survive ; but there is a suggestion in the background that
unless extinguished by utterly overthrowing forces, races ought
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For example, Mr. Spencer says on p. 410
&quot;
Thus, then, the condition which each race must fulfil if it
is to survive, is a condition which, in the nature of things, it
ever tends to fulfil. In the last chapter we saw that a species
cannot be maintained unless the power to preserve individual
life and the power to propagate other individuals vary inversely.
And here we have seen that, irrespective of an end to be sub
served, these powers cannot do other than vary inversely. On
the one hand ... it is requisite that they should have great
ability to form new individuals, and vice versa. On the other
hand that they should have great power of self-maintenance.&quot;
It is needless to say that there is nothing in a mechani
cal theory, or in the laws of force, or in the Formula of
Evolution, or even in the laws of equilibration however
Mr. Spencer would prefer his theory of the universe to be
named which has any regard for the survival of any of its
productions. Aggregates are formed in the working out of its
constituents : and if we could make out that organisms are
among the aggregates so formed, we can see no reason why these
should be preserved any more than a piece of salt rock or
crystal. Kature is indifferent to her productions, and has no
need for any organism to continue. If organisms do continue
and if organisms propagate, it is not for the purpose of continu
ing a race or species. These are merely incidents in the
cosmical history
: and if we cannot understand why organisms
should continue to exist and to reproduce themselves, then we
have not the key to the history of the cosmos. If Mr. Spencer
is unable to explain it, he cannot claim to have succeeded in
the unification of knowledge.
The abstract statement of Mr. Spencer s theory is briefly as
follows :
Moving equilibria continue to move and to preserve their
equilibrium.
If moving equilibria part with motion, they must receive
motion or come to a stop.
If moving equilibria are likely to stop from lack of motion
received, they will try to get a supply of it. (Adaptations for
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If moving equilibria are interfered with by an external
force likely to destroy tbem, they will generate an opposite
force, for the purpose of self-preservation. (Adaptations for
self-protection.)
If moving equilibria are likely to come to an end from the
expended motion being in excess or otherwise, they will throw
off a portion of themselves which shall unite with a portion of
a similar moving equilibrium in order that the same kind of
moving equilibrium shall continue to exist.
&quot;We cannot but consider it a matter of regret that Mr. Spencer
has not composed a separate book on ideal or a priori mechanics.
A work like his, the main principles of which are founded on
mechanics, would be far more easily understood and would
receive far readier acceptation from the general public if it
were accompanied by a special treatise showing the nature and
laws of all those mechanical conjunctures which occur in a
scattered form throughout his a priori expositions.
1 6. Natural Selection Its a priori Interpretation.
&quot;We have had occasion in various places to call attention to
some passages in Mr. Spencer s exposition of biological develop
ment where teleological implications appear. Teleology may
possibly find a place in Biology when organisms arrive at such
a stage of development as consciously to adapt means to ends,
in the intelligent appreciation of certain suitabilities, and
in what we may regard as semi-volitional activities, such as
some of the actions relating to the attainment of food or
the escape from enemies. But it is evident that in a system of
deductive interpretation, where all explanations are sought as
the resultants of the properties and relations of original factors,
teleology or anticipatory adaptation for the purpose of securing
definite objects, such as the continued existence of an organism
or of a race, are quite outside the range of the hypothesis. It
therefore appears singular that in so many passages Mr. Spencer
should admit by implication the adaptation of means to secure
these ends. &quot;We consider that even if Mr. Spencer repudiates
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convenience, it is a very faulty method of presenting his argu
ment when the real question at issue is this very one as
between teleology on the one hand, and deduction or unfore-
seeing development on the other hand. It is only right under
these circumstances to call attention to a passage in which Mr.
Spencer justifies his procedure in this respect, and in which he
claims for natural selection all that Paley claims for design.
&quot; While the explanation of the teleologist is untrue, it is often
an obverse to the truth ; for though on the hypothesis of Evo
lution, it is clear that things are not arranged thus or thus for
the securing of special ends, it is also clear, that arrangements
which do secure these special ends, tend continually to establish
themselves, are established by their fulfilment of these ends.
Besides ensuring a structural fitness between each kind of organ
ism and its circumstances, the working of natural selection
also ensures a fitness between the mode and rate of multiplication
of each kind of organism and its circumstances. We may,
therefore, without any teleological implication, consider the
fitness of homogenesis and heterogenesis to the needs of the
different classes of organisms which exhibit them.&quot;*
It is clear from this that when the student finds any passages
in Mr. Spencer s works which imply the adaptation of means to
ends in a teleological sense, he must render them into terms
of those deductive interpretations which are recognised as
&quot; natural selection.&quot; This theory, as an inductively established
truth, is now very generally and correctly understood from the
writings of Mr. Darwin and the more popular expounders of his
text. By it is meant the survival amongst species of those
individuals which are best fitted to the environing inorganic
and organic conditions. Thus if fleetness is an essential to
escape from enemies, those animals will survive which possess
in a superior degree the structure and powers enabling them
to surpass their fellows in speed ; and these, since they sur
vive, will propagate and reproduce their own superior quali
ties. On the other hand, those individuals of the attacking
species will survive who, by their wariness or comparative
*
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speed, relatively to their companions, are able to overtake or
otherwise secure the slowest or unwariest of their prey. These
again will propagate their superior qualities, while their clum
sier companions perish.
At the same time that the increased use of parts thus leads to
their further and still further development, changed conditions
of habitat and environment sometimes cause disuse and con
sequent reversal of the process. Thus, established structures
gradually dwindle away and finally disappear.
That which takes place amongst the individuals of a species
takes place also amongst species regarded as wholes
; so that
entire species may become extinct from the superior fitness of
other species to the environing conditions.
In these ever-fluctuating processes, with accompanying dis
appearances of intervening links, the distinctions between spe
cies have grown more and more marked, until at last schematic
classifications, although difficult, become justifiable.
This process of &quot;natural selection&quot; may be regarded as
a thoroughly established truth, and one which has received
the recognition not only of experts, but also of all thoughtful
men who have given their attention to the subject. It is now,
in fact, a commonly taught truth of popular science.
Our business concerns only the deductive interpretation of
the doctrine ; and our first question refers to the necessary
requirements of a deductive interpretation. Three methods of
procedure are open to us. Either we may justify &quot;natural
selection
&quot;
by abstract reasoning from the relations of ideal mov
ing equilibria, which may be regarded as a mechanical problem
on the one hand of the relations of bodies in motion, or on the
other hand of the relations of energies or &quot;forces&quot; in aggre
gation, related to other energies or
&quot; forces
;
&quot; each such aggregate
of energies expending and receiving energy, and counterbalanc
ing external inimical forces by means of antagonistic adaptations
of its own &quot;forces.&quot; Or, secondly, we may deduce &quot;natural
selection,&quot; through various intermediate stages of development,
from the properties of the chemical elements, as set forth by
Mr. Spencer in the first chapter of his work, in interrelation
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in the chapters immediately following. Or, thirdly, takino-
organisms and their reproduction for granted, and perhaps tak
ing the origin of variations for granted, we may deduce the
probability of
&quot; natural selection,&quot; or the continuous adaptation
of organisms to their environment, implied in the survival and
propagation of the fittest, with the consequent variations of
species.
We fear, with regard to the first of these problems, that we
shall find ourselves unable to take a single step beyond the
initial statement. Eegarding the moving equilibrium in its
purely mechanical aspect, as instanced by the solar system, there
is no reason whatever to suppose either adaptation of the biolo
gical sort, or assimilation, or reproduction, all of which are
requisite on the hypothesis under consideration. If, again, we
consider a moving equilibrium as composed of separate energies
or forces, that is to say, organs with their concomitant functions
which constitute a balance, jointly and severally antagonising
distinct forces of the environment, the energy expended
therein being ever replaced by the assimilation of favourable
forces from the environment, if, we say, it is possible to
suppose such an aggregate on purely physical grounds,, even
then reproduction and heredity, which are not deducible from
our premisses, have to be taken for granted; and the chain
of abstract reasoning is not continuous.
Should we once more endeavour to fill in this abstract model
with the known properties of the concrete elements which are
our physical factors, namely, oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, car
bon, &c., in relation to environment, the same difficulties
attend us as before. We shall not even then be able to
deduce genesis and reproduction. If we see our way to organ
isms at all, it is merely in the direct equilibrations by which
different parts of a mass of organic matter are differentiated.
AVe can take no deductive steps towards the accumulation and
expenditure of energy, much less towards any effort for self-
preservation. Here, again, we fail d, priori to account for
reproduction ; and failing this, our theory of natural selection
is not derivable in a ratiocinative way from our given factors.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Spencer in his d, priori interpretation
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of natural selection does not proceed so far back as these
abstract hypotheses. All he attempts to do is to show the
probability that organisms which have the power of adaptation
to circumstances, and which also have the power of reproducing
copies of themselves, will continually develop in directions favour
able to their continuance. The process is shown to be facili
tated and the results heightened by the aid of gamogenesis.
In this endeavour it cannot but be admitted that Mr. Spencer
has succeeded. It is not a difficult thing, after a theory has
been established inductively, to show that it is reasonable
a priori. Given the earlier stages of biology, it is easy to prove-
that the subsequent stages are reasonable probabilities
: and this
is all that Mr. Spencer has done.
The great defect of the explanation lies in the fact that it
still leaves unexplained the question of origins. Failing an
explanation of the expenditure of energy for self-preservation or
sustenance ; failing an explanation of reproduction, of gamo
genesis, of heredity, of the part played by feeling, of varia
tion ; all the subsequent developmental work accomplished by
&quot; natural selection,&quot; and it is vast indeed, remains still unex
plained. Granted these, we acknowledge the grandness of the
explanation ; but the fact that these fundamentals remain un
explained cuts off the latter explanation from the primordial
physical hypothesis ; and until this great hiatus is bridged over
we cannot admit that the deductive process is complete.
It would be desirable to have cleared up, before this question
is further discussed, what are the limits of the application of
&quot; natural selection.&quot; Is it a term, for instance, applicable to
molecules of every sort 1 Are we to say that all the molecules
and aggregates of molecules now existing in the world have
their present state and form by virtue of &quot;natural selection
&quot; or
the survival of the fittest ? Do we say of the granite mountains
which have survived their more friable companions that their
present existence is due to natural selection? Do we regard
the solar system as an instance of the survival of the fittest?
Do we imagine that any inorganic molecule exhibits the traits
which we characterise by those terms 1
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wholly inapplicable to inorganic aggregates and essentially
characteristic of organisms or organic matter ? If so, then
there is a breach of continuity between inorganic development
and organic. Another deductive failure exhibits itself. We
come again upon the gulf which approach the inorganic by
what terms and theories we may continually manifests itself
and severs the two classes of phenomena, though not widely yet
too deeply to fathom.
If it is to be fathomed, it must be by the careful and close
study of the behaviour of the most minute organisms, Actual
observation and experiment upon these, and upon highlycomplex
inorganic molecules, can alone inform us of the law by which
one is transformed into the other, should such indeed be the
case at all. No amount of ingenuity of thought can ever be
expected to solve the problem. If the evolutionary philosopher
takes refuge from his difficulties in the mere terms and phrases
applicable to the more developed branches of his science when
he meets with problems in those precedent inquiries which









&quot; needs more scien
tific precision. To what depth of investigation is it legitimate to
employ it, and what meaning will it carry with it in its applica
tion to inorganic processes ? Can it be used in connecting the
development of the inorganic with the evolution of the organic ?
To say that those forms which survived must have answered
to the conditions of survival (while those forms which perished
did not answer to the conditions), and to say that those forms
propagated which answered to the conditions of propagation
(while those which did not propagate did not answer to the
conditions), is not reasoning at all either by the deductive or
the inductive method, and does not carry the mind forward to
any new proposition. It is merely an identical proposition
with its complementary negative. It is merely looking at the
beginning and at the end of a process, and saying that somehow
or other even although the nature of the dependence is not
discernible every intermediate step in the whole range of468 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
sequences is the result of the interaction of preceding factors.
And even if some of the conditions of survivorship and propaga
tion are discernible, then to make any partial predication as to
the conditions is not tantamount to a complete deductive
interpretation. Thus the theory of natural selection or survival
of the fittest is valid and useful in the Darwinian account, but
of no value in the Spencerian attempt to affiliate biology upon
inorganic evolution.
It is claimed for natural selection that it not only accounts
for the variation of species but also for the origin of species ;
but it must be noted that the origin referred to is not the
origin of the simplest biologic forms, but the origin of one
species out of another
; and the claim thus made does not
differ in its significance from the power of accounting for varia
tion of species. When we are told that natural selection
accounts for the origin of species, all that is meant is such an
extension of its application as to give it a power of account
ing for all the most complex forms of life, granted some original
simple form. But it is certainly not able to explain the origin
of those simple forms, nor even the origin of many variations.
Granting these, however, and granting heredity, it is of immense
value in explaining the subsequent development.
It is noteworthy that natural selection can make no progress
without the accident of origins and the accidents of spontaneous
variation. Some accident of origin must have occurred amongst
inorganic molecules by which such an arrangement was effected
as to set up a habit of motion or function necessitating waste
and instituting repair. Some of these aggregates acquired
somehow the power of reproduction. Some by other happy
accidents acquired other accretions of function, more particu
larly relating to nutrition. The more fortunate acquired
motions to secure food supply. Others, still more lucky, ac
quired organs of locomotion. All these happy variations were
preserved by &quot;natural selection
;&quot; but not one of them is expli
cable thereby. Natural selection cannot account for a single
form, a single function, or a single feeling ; it can only
explain their growth and competitive preservation after they
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Thus, however much the mind may be filled, and whatever
satisfaction it may derive from the investigation of the vast
and interesting field of inquiry opened out by the theory of
&quot; natural selection,&quot; still this branch of explanation is not
equivalent to the continuity of explanation which we seek.
It is not the bulk of explanations which constitutes the unifi
cation of knowledge, but the linear continuity of sequences.
Each individual portion of these successive and dependent
explanations is of enormous importance, and is to be valued
accordingly; but until it is properly placed in due order of
succession, and the mode of its dependence fully ascertained,
the logical faculty which aims at the unification of all know
ledge by its power of deducing all phenomena from original
factors is not satisfied.
17. The Tlieory of Accidental Origins.
A review of the Evolution hypothesis would be incomplete




theory. This theory is inadequately treated both by
Mr. Spencer and by Mr. Darwin. Upon the latter it was not
incumbent to go further back than was necessary for the limited
scientific purpose he had in view, namely, the study of the
variation of species and of the so-called origination of species
by natural selection. Mr. Darwin need do no more than accept
the scientific fact of accidental variation, and upon the favour
able influence of such chance variation on the survival of
certain individuals he might build up his views of their develop
ment into a species by one or other of the various modes of
natural selection of which he gives an account. But it was
not requisite to explain these accidental variations, nor to con
sider biology as a series of deductions from preceding factors ;
he was at liberty to accept certain acknowledged facts of nature
and to reason therefrom. With Mr. Spencer it is otherwise.
It is incumbent upon him, seeking as he does to give an expla
nation of universal sequence, to explain fully the part played
in biologic evolution by accidental variations, lest, under cover
of such an indefinite notion, we should fancy we understand470 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
more than we really do of the connections of sequences. How
ever, before we proceed with our criticisms let us have the bear
ings of the question fully laid out before us.
This is best done by quitting our author, and taking for con
sideration two charming little books written by Mr. Grant Allen.
We refer to his




from Nature,&quot; works obviously intended and, well adapted to
popularise the theory of development by natural selection. In
a very interesting manner he familiarises the mind with the
changes effected by the use and disuse of parts ; with the deve
lopments effected in a species by the survival and consequent
propagation of those individuals best fitted to the conditions of
their environment ; with the divergent effects of different influ
ences acting upon a common stock ; with the developmental
influence of sexual preferences ; with the important results of
protective colourings, shapes, textures, tastes, and odours ; with
the part played by means of attractions offered to the senses of
various animals
; and with the other methods of biologic evolu
tion. All these are presented to us in a familiar manner as
lessons to be learned by any of us in the study of common
objects by the wayside.
Given in this form, it is scarcely to be expected that the
author should take into account philosophical difficulties. Nor,
like Mr. Darwin, is he committed to any universalistic deduc
tive theory, and therefore he is quite free to work out the
methods of natural selection without being obliged to account
for origins. Our criticism, therefore, does not apply to the
accomplishment of his task, but only to the general position of
Evolutionists, and we merely make use of his works as illus
trative of this position.
One of the principal characteristics of the works in question
is the amount of teleological language and the amount of teleo-
logical implication. This, however, has to be wholly ignored if
the work is to be regarded scientifically. The author would
justify himself no doubt in the same manner as Mr. Spencer in
the passage referred to in the preceding section. &quot;We constantly
read of the means adopted by plants
&quot; in order to
&quot;
accomplish





plan,&quot; either of function, of construction,
or of colouring, for ensuring their own existence or the fertili
sation or preservation of their seeds. The same anticipatory
or foreseeing prearrangements are constantly predicated of the
functions, structures, and colourings of animals. Although the
author indicates that this teleological language is only figura
tive, yet we hold that its very extensive employment is highly
detrimental to the scientific value of his work, and highly incon
sistent with the special object he has in view, which is natural
development as opposed to teleology. So marked is this char
acteristic, that in some passages the author would seem to imply
intelligent adaptation on the part of plants to the eventualities
of the future in their own race. But the abundant use of such
metaphors tends to obscure rather than to illustrate the author s
object.
This object is mainly to explain biologic evolution by natural
methods. To these methods we have already referred. All we
are concerned with at present is, firstly, to notice that they are
limited in their application to races of creatures which possess
the power of propagation, and therefore that an unexplained
power of genesis is antecedent to the operation of
&quot; natural
selection.&quot; In the next place, we have to observe that
&quot; natural
selection
&quot; does not originate variation, but only selects such
variations as are advantageous to the preservation of the race.
Natural selection thus requires a basis of accidental origins
upon which to work. Of these accidental origins or variations,
some, being useless to the race, perish in their inception by a
natural law, and others, being serviceable, are preserved by
natural selection, and are developed by use and continued by
heredity. Of these accidental origins our author says
&quot; The lucky accident, the casual combination of circum
stances, which produced the first elongation of the receptacle in
the strawberry has never happened to befall its more modest kins
folk. For on such occasional freaks of nature the whole evolu
tion of new varieties entirely depends. A gardener may raise a
thousand seedlings, and only one or none among them may
present a single new and important feature. So a species may
wait for a thousand years, or for ever, before its circumstances472 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.




&quot; An accidental variety of leaf or flower, like the mon
strosities which we cultivate in our gardens, means, as a rule,
very little indeed, because it is not correlated with any need or
habit of the plant. It affords no material upon which natural
selection can work.&quot;
And we find continued reference made throughout the work
to the
&quot;
original accidental possession&quot; of some property, to indi
viduals which by chance
&quot;
happen to show any tendency,&quot; which
&quot; take
&quot;




&quot; some function or rudimentary structure.
It is upon these bases that natural selection works. They
are pre-essential to it, and, therefore, in any deductive system
have to be accounted for before the process of natural selection
is introduced. Natural selection itself does not account for
them, but only for their consequences. Let us therefore con
sider the nature and extent of the happy accidents which gave
rise to and assisted in biologic evolution. Their extent must
have been coequal with every special arrangement of structure
and function by which the preservation of the individual has
been secured either in the procurement of food or in protec
tion from enemies, as well as with those by which the propaga
tion of the species has been effected.
What then is &quot;an accident ?
&quot; Of course, our study, being a
scientific one, does not admit of the use of the term in any occult
sense, but only within legitimate scientific meanings. For in
stance, the generalised relations of bodies known as the laws of
mechanics hold good of all bodies in their mechanical relations;
but any special mechanical relation of which we do not know
the preceding conditions is regarded as accidental. This mode
of statement does not place particular events beyond the laws
of mechanics, but only expresses our ignorance of the particular
line of sequences which led up to the particular concrete instance
of which we make the predication that it is accidental. The
same remarks apply to chemical combinations. &quot;NVe under
stand the general relations of the chemical elements, and we
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understand our own special chemical experiments ; but of many
chemical events we say they are accidental because of our igno
rance of some of the particular sequences which led up to their
occurrence. We would call the solar system an accident, or the
arrangement of the seas and continents of the planet on which
we reside if we are not too pessimistic a happy or lucky acci
dent. These arrangements are understood as due to certain
great laws of physics and chemistry ; and if we call them acci
dental, all we mean is that we cannot trace their special ante
cedents. Nevertheless, our general knowledge of physics and
chemistry is just as true and just as valid for all the concrete
cases within our cognisance as if the whole individual history
of all atoms was known to us.
Xow let us consider some cases to which the term &quot;accidental
&quot;
is applied, but which do not fall within the scope of the above
explanation, and in which the employment of the term tends to
false reasoning. Suppose Ave say of some inorganic molecules or
systems of molecules that they accidentally acquired the habit of
motion or of self-sustenance. If by that we meant no more than
that some particular atoms known to possess certain properties
in relation with other atoms accidentally got together and so
were enabled to display those properties in actual relation, then
the meaning is scientific
; but if it is meant that they displayed
properties not known to be included in our primary knowledge
of them, then the
&quot; accidental
&quot; outcome implies a something
wanting in our knowledge of those primary properties, or else it
implies that something new has accidentally come into existence.
The former conclusion does not militate against inductive science,
but it does militate against the validity of a deduction based
upon a hypothesis as to the properties of these primary factors
;
and the latter conclusion is subversive of any logical scheme
whatsoever.
Again, suppose we say that some of these systems of molecules
accidentally acquired the habit of multiplication by propagation,
and that the habit of heredity was accidentally introduced. It
is clear that if these circumstances occurred there could be no
new principle or property accidentally introduced into the
cosmos, but that only some event unexplaiuable from its inline-474 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
diate concrete antecedents had taken place. If such pheno




sense, it simply means the introduction of new factors, of
which we have no knowledge. Events have occurred which
are not explainable by our general deductive theory, implying
an ignorance of theory as well as of immediately preceding con
crete relations.




found not to be equivalent to the mode of applying it to parti
cular physical and chemical combinations whose general laws
we understand, but whose particular concrete conjunctions we are
unable to explain. Our ignorance in the latter case is merely of
immediate special antecedents and not of general law or theory ;
whereas in the cases referred to our ignorance is of general law
and theory as well as of immediate antecedents. It is some
general law or factor of which we are ignorant rather than
some particular series of sequences, the general law of which




in the other case the theory with
its deductive explanations is found to be altogether valueless.
In the one case the accidentals fall within the line of sequences ;
in the other case events occur which cannot be recognised as
falling within the deductive system.
If we say of some aggregate of molecules that it accidentally




&quot; new properties not deducible from the
known properties of any combination of the chemical elements.
The expression of our ignorance, again, is not merely that of the
particular order of sequence of known factors, but is indicative
of the impossibility of connecting in thought the new pheno
mena with any of the known properties of the preceding factors.
It indicates a deductive failure.
Lastly, should we say that some aggregate of molecules acci




masks the entrance of a very important and powerful factor
in organic development, and indicates our ignorance of its rela
tion to preceding factors.
Thus by means of the continuous accretion of accidental com-SUMMARY. 475
lunations and by means of the accidental entrance of new fac
tors, natural selection is afforded most extensive bases, both in
extent and diversity of nature, to work upon in biological deve
lopment. Evolutionists exhibit very clearly the interaction of
organisms with environment and of organisms with organisms,
showing how natural selection has worked amongst all these
accidentally produced combinations and accidentally produced
factors
; but it must not be supposed that by thus extensively
dwelling upon the wonderful history of natural selection we
have exhausted the explanation of biological history or even
found a basis of explanation.
&quot;We have only been afforded a
means for understanding an intermediate portion of it. What
is required in addition is to show that the accidental variations
are within the limits of the properties of the primary factors
from which it is proposed to reconstruct biology. If the
&quot; accidental
&quot;
is shown to be within the limits of the original
properties it is legitimate and logical, but as actually used it
appears to us to mask the introduction of factors not properly
included in the premisses.
1 8. Summary.
Thus we have seen that whether we set out to deduce bio
logical evolution from the relations of the concrete internal
and external factors as described at the outset of vol. i., or from
the nature of mechanical moving equilibria as given in reply
to the question,
&quot; How is organic evolution caused ?
&quot; we have
equally failed in that deductive endeavour. Therefore the
evolution of biology is not affiliated upon evolution in general.
With regard to Mr. Spencer s system of philosophy taken
as a whole, we come to the conclusion that, admirable as is
the boldness, magnificent as is the sweep, extraordinary as is
the connectiveness of his reasonings, he nevertheless fails in
his vast attempt. At the same time we must admire the
grandeur of the outline he has sketched, acknowledge the
greater breadth of view he has given to human speculation, and
appreciate the abounding wealth of suggestion displayed through
out the work, which not only enriches human knowledge, but476 SPENCER S UNIFICATION OF KNOWLEDGE.
is sure to give rise to further earnest, bold, and penetrating
research into the mysteries of nature.
At the same time, we feel that, although deduction may give
unity and consolidation to science, it must be mainly
t
perience and induction that we are to look for he
. solid
Increment of knowledge: and if ever we arrive at a f
unification, which is doubtful, it must be by the patient labc
of the human race through ages yet unborn.
THE END.
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